A LETTER TO Mr. *DODWELL*;

Wherein all the Arguments in his Epiſtolary Diſcourſe againſt the Immortality of the SOUL are particularly anſwered, and the Judgment of the Fathers concerning that Matter truly repreſented.

Together with

A Defence of an Argument made uſe of in the above-mentioned Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, to prove the Immateriality and *Natural Immortality* of the SOUL. In FOUR LETTERS to the Author of *Some Remarks*, &c.

To which is added,

Some Reflections on that Part of a Book called *Amyntor*, which relates to the Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Teſtament.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. late Rector of St. *James's Weſtminſter*.

The SIXTH EDITION.

In this Edition are inſerted The Remarks *on Dr.* Clarke's *Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, *and the ſeveral Replies to the Doctor's Defences thereof.*

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AND

The Judgment of the FATHERS concerning that Matter truly repreſented.

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BIBLIOTHEQUE DE L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS

A LETTER

TO

Mr. DODWELL;

WHEREIN

All the ARGUMENTS in his EPISTOLARY DISCOURSE against the Immortality of the SOUL are particularly answered,

AND

The Judgment of the FATHERS concerning that Matter truly represented.

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D. late Rector of St. James's Westminster.

LONDON:

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A LETTER TO Mr. DODWELL, &c.

SIR,

IT is a Thing of very ill Conſequence, when Men of great Reputation in the World for Learning, in their Diſcourſes upon the moſt important Doctrines of Religion, raſhly and upon very little Grounds, allow themſelves to advance new and crude Notions, and extravagant Hypotheſes; which the Profane *will* not, and the Weak are not *able* to ſeparate, from the principal and fundamental and moſt neceſſary Doctrines themſelves.

For, as in Natural Philoſophy and in the ſearch after Phyſical Truth, the Syſtems and Hypotheſes which ingenious Men invent for explaining the appearances of Nature, and which for ſome time are received with Applauſe, but

afterwards are confuted by Reaſon and Experience; are apt to make Men think the Natural Cauſes of things abſolutely impoſſible to be diſcovered at all; and have really ſuch an effect upon very Many, as to make them reject for their ſake, or at leaſt to call in queſtion, even the certaineſt Truths which have been diſcovered by plain Experiments, or clear Mathematical Demonſtration it ſelf: So in Matters of Religion likewiſe, the inconſiderate and groundleſs Notions, which Men of great Learning and much Reading, have with too little Judgement ſometimes joined and intermixed with their Explications of ſome of the greateſt and moſt important Doctrines of Religion; when upon due Examination, the abſurdity and inconſiſtency of ſuch Schemes plainly appears; have been apt to raiſe Doubts in many Mens Minds concerning the Truth even of the certaineſt Doctrines themſelves, which are either the moſt plainly diſcovered by right Reaſon, or are moſt clearly delivered in Scripture.

You teach that the *Soul of Man is naturally mortal*, and will of it ſelf periſh and come to nothing, if not upheld by the extraordinary Power of God, in a præternatural way. Many, who ſee the imprudent Title of your Diſcourſe, and will not take the pains to read the Book it ſelf, will conclude that you ſuppoſe the Soul to periſh at the diſſolution of the Body; And all Libertines, when they *have* read and conſidered all that you offer, will ſtill conclude, that if (as you grant to them) the Soul muſt of it ſelf naturally periſh ſometime or other, there is no time ſo probable when it ſhould periſh, as at the diſſolution of the Body; and they will eaſily perſuade themſelves to rely upon this,

this, that God will not work a perpetual Miracle to preſerve them præternaturally by his omnipotent Power, on purpoſe to inflict upon them an eternal Puniſhment, which by Nature they were not capable of undergoing.

Theſe Mens Concluſion indeed is by no means right; But it is ſuch a one, as is very natural for Men of looſe Principles and vicious Lives to draw from your Doctrine; and therefore you ought to have been very careful not to give them ſuch an Occaſion of deceiving themſelves, unleſs you had firſt been very ſure that your Notion was either very plainly contained in Scripture, or very clearly demonſtrable by right Reaſon: Which that it is not, I preſume will appear from the following Obſervations.

You begin with a Diſtinction (*Præmon. Sect.* 3.) that the Souls of ſome Men are made immortal by the *Spirit* of God, to Happineſs; and the Souls of ſome others, by the *Will* of God, to Puniſhment. Now what can be more precarious and groundleſs than this Diſtinction? For what real Difference is there in the thing it ſelf, between being immortalized by the *Spirit*, and by the *Will* of God? Eternal *Life and Happineſs* is indeed conſtantly attributed to the *Spirit of God*, that is, thoſe only who have the *Spirit of God*, and are *guided by it*, who obey the Will of God, and live in conformity to his holy Laws, ſhall be partakers of *Eternal Happineſs*: And thus the *Spirit of God* is indeed neceſſary to qualify Men for, and to make them capable of, the *Happineſs of Heaven*. But if, to make good Men capable of an *Eternal Duration* in order to that Happineſs, it be neceſſary that the *Spirit of God* give them a new *Principle of Subſiſtence*, or ſuperadd a *new Subſtance to*

their Souls; (as your obſcure Expreſſions concerning *the Acceſſion of an adſcititious Spirit*, &c. frequently ſeem to ſignify; and without which, there is no other difference than only in Words, between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God;) then nothing can be more contrary to reaſon, than to ſuppoſe any Men made immortal without the addition of that new Principle; nor can any repreſentation of God's Proceedings, be more harſh and incredible, than to ſuppoſe him by his Omnipotent *Will* and Power, eternally and miraculouſly preſerving ſuch Creatures unto endleſs Puniſhment, who never had in them, either *originally* or *additionally*, any *Principle of* Immortality at all. How *plainly* and how *very much* more agreeable to Reaſon and to our natural Notions of God is it, to ſay that all Creatures who ſhall ever undergo eternal Puniſhment, are ſuch as having been created *naturally* immortal, and by wilful continuance in Sin, having ſo far depraved themſelves as to become uncapable of eternal Happineſs, muſt conſequently by the juſt Judgement of God fall into ſuch Miſery, as their immortal Nature ſo corrupted neceſſarily makes them liable to. When we ſpeak of the Soul as created *naturally* immortal, we mean that it is by the *Divine Pleaſure* created ſuch a Subſtance, as not having in it ſelf any Compoſition, or any Principles of Corruption, will *naturally*, or *of it ſelf* continue for ever; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any Power of Nature, be diſſolved or deſtroyed; But yet nevertheleſs depends continually upon God, who has power to deſtroy or annihilate it, if he ſhould ſo think fit. When therefore you ſay that the *Original of the Immortality of*

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ſuch Souls as ſhall be eternally puniſhed, may be more agreeably derived from the Divine Pleaſure, than from the Nature of the Soul; if thereby you mean that the Soul was made immortal by the *mere pleaſure* of God, in oppoſition to its being immortal by the *neceſſity of its own Nature*, in the ſenſe that God is immortal; then indeed not *Plato* only, but all others alſo that ever held the Immortality of the Soul, have been and are of the ſame Opinion: But if by thoſe Words you mean, as through the whole of your Diſcourſe you expreſsly declare, that the Soul was created mortal, but by the Divine Omnipotence is upheld eternally; then it is, on the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to right Reaſon and to our Notions of God, to derive the Immortality of the Soul, and eſpecially of a miſerable one, from its *own Nature*, than from the *Divine Pleaſure*; that is, to ſuppoſe the Soul to have been at firſt created ſuch a Subſtance, as by the ordinary concourſe of Divine Providence would continue for ever; than that it was created of a mortal and periſhable Nature, but by the extraordinary and miraculous Power of God, is continually ſupported, only to endure Torment and Puniſhment, beyond the capacity of its own Nature, to all Eternity.

There cannot eaſily be made a worſe repreſentation of God's dealings with Mankind, than what you affirm (*Præmon. Sect.* 4.) that *if the Devils had not fallen, there had been no Hell at all*; and that *Mankind is no otherwiſe concerned in it, than as, by joining themſelves to the Devil's Party, they intitle themſelves* alſo *to his Puniſhment.* It is true, the Fire of Hell was *firſt and originally*

prepared for the Devils, becauſe they were the *firſt and original* Offenders. But to ſay that, without their Fall, there *never* would have been *any* Hell *at all*; and that the ſame or equal Puniſhment ſhould not then have been inflicted upon Wicked Men for the ſame Crimes, as there now ſhall; is repreſenting God like an Arbitrary Tyrant, who without caring to make an exact, equal, and particular diſtribution of Juſtice, deals with all Offenders of all ranks and degrees alike, becauſe they have all *interpretatively* joined in oppoſing his Authority.

You affirm expreſsly (*ibid.*) that the Soul does *not depend on our groſs Organical Body, nor periſhes upon its diſſolution from thoſe Bodies.* I beſeech you, if the Soul be ſuch a Subſtance as is incapable of being hurt by ſo great a change and diſſolution, as is cauſed in us by a violent Death, ſuppoſe by Fire; upon what Principle can it be imagined to be naturally mortal; or what Revolutions in Nature will it not be able to reſiſt and ſupervive? You explain this further, by ſaying, that Mens *Souls do not ſo depend on any other created Being, but that they may ſtill continue in their duration, whatſoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleaſed ſtill to continue that ordinary Providence, which is eſſentially neceſſary for their continuance.* And is not this the *very definition* of *Immortality?* or did ever any Man mean more than this, when he affirmed the Soul to be *naturally Immortal?* You diſtinguiſh it indeed from the Natural *Immortality of Angels*; but by ſuch a *diſtinction*, as includes not in it any the leaſt *difference.* For what difference is there between affirming concerning *Angels*, that *it is in the Power*

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and Pleaſure of God to annihilate them when he thinks fit; and concerning *Humane Souls, that they do not ſo depend on any other created Beings, but that they may ſtill continue in their Duration, whatſoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleaſed ſtill to continue that ordinary Providence, which is eſſentially neceſſary for their Preſervation?* And yet in the very next Words, you very inconſiſtently imagine the Soul, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a *more immediate Dependence on God than other Creatures*, than even the meaneſt Particles of lifeleſs Matter have; *which muſt make it ceaſe to be, whenever he is pleaſed to ceaſe to breath it; as being unable to continue its Duration, by the Powers given it at its firſt Production, and the continuance of thoſe general Influences which are requiſite for the ſupport of Created Beings in general.* According to theſe laſt Words, the Soul not being ſo much as a Subſtance of any kind at all, is likely to be more effectually deſtroyed by Death, than even the Body it ſelf. Whereas according to the Words juſt preceeding, your Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that the Soul is *by Nature Immortal*, and muſt be *mortalized* by the Omnipotence of God, if ever it periſh; and not, that it is by *Nature Mortal*, and muſt be *immortalized* by a new Act of Omnipotence, to enable it to ſubſiſt for ever. So that here, you ſeem to have framed no conſiſtent Notion even of your own Scheme.

What you advance (*Præmon. Sect.* 5.) concerning its not having been culpable to hold communication and join with the Devil, before the Publication of the Goſpel; and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his being declared ſo by the

Goſpel; is ſo extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy when he tempted our firſt Parent? And was he not publickly declared to be ſo, in the Curſe pronounced to him thereupon? Is not the Devil deſcribed as a publick Enemy to God and good Men, in the Hiſtory of *Job?* And as an Enemy to *Iſrael*, 1 *Chron* xxi. 1? Or was he known to be an Enemy in *Temporal* Affairs only, (*Præmon. pag.* 41,) and could not be known to be ſo in things relating to the Life to come? Or had the Patriarchs, no expectation at all of a *better City* to come, after the preſent *Tabernacle* was diſſolved? Is not *Idolatry* in the Old Teſtament conſtantly branded with as ſevere a character of *Rebellion* againſt God, as in the New? And in the Heathen World, before the Goſpel was begun to be preached, (though *the times of that Ignorance God* did indeed *wink at*, that is, would not be ſo ſevere in puniſhing them, as thoſe who ſhould afterwards ſin againſt greater Light;) yet was it no Crime, to *worſhip the Creature more than the Creator?* was it no Fault that the World did κεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ, lie under entire ſubjection to the *Evil One*, 1 Joh. v. 19? and in the *Power of Satan*, Acts xxvi. 18? Were not the abominable Rites of the Heathen, plainly a ſacrificing to Devils? And do not all the Ancient Fathers, for whoſe Judgement you expreſs ſo great an eſteem, ſuppoſe in all their Writings againſt the Pagans, that before the propoſing of the Goſpel to them, they ought to have known from the Light of Nature and Right Reaſon, that thoſe impure Spirits whoſe Worſhip was attended with all manner of beſtiality and wickedneſs, were profeſſed Enemies to God and Goodneſs? Nay,

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does not St. *Paul* himſelf expreſsly affirm, that *That which may be known of God*, was *manifeſt* enough to them, to have preſerved them from Idolatry? and that, becauſe *they did not like to retain God in their knowledge*, but *changed the Truth of God into a Lie*, for that Reaſon *God gave them up unto vile affections*, &c.

Nor is it leſs abſurd, to found (as you do in the ſame place) the Heinouſneſs of Sin, and the Reaſonableneſs of the Severity of its Puniſhment, principally upon its being *interpreted* as a joining with the Devil. Idolatry indeed, and Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all Religion, may juſtly enough come directly under this Charge; and all other Sins alſo may in effect and in event, not improperly be looked upon as promoting the Intereſt of the Devil, and an oppoſing the eſtabliſhment of the Kingdom of God. But to make the *formal Reaſon*, the heinouſneſs and demerit, not only of Idolatry, Witchcraft, and Profane open Oppoſition of Religion, but alſo of all other Sins whatſoever, to conſiſt not ſo much in the original depravity of the Actions themſelves, in their contrariety to Right Reaſon, and to the Light of Nature and Conſcience, in their oppoſition to the Nature, and Will, and Law, and Authority of God, as in their being *interpretatively* a joining and communication with the Devil; To ſuppoſe God inflicting upon Men ſuch a Puniſhment, not as their Sins deſerve in their own Nature, and ſuch as the Nature of their own Souls makes them capable of falling into by wilful and obſtinate corruption and depravation of themſelves, but ſuch as * is *diſproportionable to their Nature*, and † *exceeding the natural Powers of their degree of Being*;

* *Pramon.* p. 30.
† *Ibid.* p. 28.

and

and to account for this only by saying, that Christ *will* so *interpret* their not joyning with Him, as if they had joyned themselves to the Devil; Is not all this, to make God, in the hardest Sense, act * *arbitrarily?*

* *Præmon.* p. 27.

Your Interpretation of *Rom.* ii. 12. and of *Joh.* iii. 19. (*Præmon. Sect.* 6.) is so loose and Groundless, that *any Text* may in the same manner be brought to prove *any thing*, or rather no *Text* can really prove *any thing* at all. For if when St. *Paul* says, *Rom.* ii. 12. *that as many as have sinned without Law, shall also perish without Law; and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by the Law*; the Word *perish* be not evidently Synonymous to being *judged or condemned*, and signifies that every Sinner's Condemnation or Punishment shall be proportionable to the heinousness of his Sin with respect to the Light he sinned against; but on the contrary from the Word [ἀπολοῦνται] *shall perish*, it can be concluded that the Persons spoken of shall only barely cease to be, in opposition to the Word [κριθήσονται] *shall be judged or condemned*; It will follow equally from the use of the same Word in other places of Scripture, that neither Rejecters of the Gospel, nor wicked Christians, nor even the Devils themselves, shall be condemned to any other Punishment, than bare ceasing to be: For of all these it is said in several Places of Scripture, that [ἀπολοῦνται] *they shall perish*, or *be destroyed:* And thus you unwarily overthrow all the Threatnings of the Gospel. Again, if when our Saviour says, *John* iii. 19. that *This is the condemnation, that Light is come into the World, and Men love Darkness rather than Light*; his plain Meaning be not this, That the clear Revelation of the Will

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of God made to Mankind in the Goſpel, and the expreſs denunciation of his Wrath againſt Sin, is the great *Aggravation* of impenitence, and that which makes Men obſtinately continuing in their Sins utterly inexcuſable, and their condemnation evidently moſt juſt, becauſe they cannot now pretend ignorance of their Duty; but the Words [Αυτη ἡ κρίσις] *This is the Condemnation*, muſt ſignify a *particular kind* of Puniſhment to be inflicted upon Men for *Aſſociating with the Devil* as being the *Prince of Darkneſs*; I cannot ſee but by the ſame Liberty, any Aſſerter of any new Opinion may interpret any part of Scripture ſo as to countenance any the moſt groundleſs Fancy or Imagination whatſoever.

Is it not a very weak Hypotheſis, to imagine that the Souls of Men muſt needs be naturally Mortal, becauſe otherwiſe God would not know how to diſpoſe of the Souls of the Heathen; *ſince there cannot be any third Eternal State, ſuitable to the Nature of a Rational Soul; neither happy, nor miſerable; as there muſt be, if thoſe Souls be naturally Immortal?* (*Præmon.* p. 43.) Is not the Univerſe large enough, for God to diſpoſe of all his Creatures into States ſuitable to their Natures? Are there not in God's *Houſe many Manſions?* Or will Heaven and Hell be two ſuch Places, in which there will be no Differences of States, no Space for Order and Variety of degrees? Does not our Saviour himſelf expreſsly tell us, that they who *knew not their Maſter's will, and yet did things worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes?* And does not St. *Paul*, in the whole 2d Chapter to the *Romans*, plainly declare that Gentiles as well

well as *Jews* ſhall be judged according to their Works?

The reſt of your Præmonition, being upon a different Subject, I forbear to conſider at this time.

IN the Diſcourſe it ſelf (*Sect.* 2.) you propoſe a moſt dark and unintelligible Notion, concerning [ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα] *Soul* and *Spirit*; not only diſtinguiſhing the *rational Soul* from the *ſenſitive*; which was the Philoſophy of many of the Antients; but moreover making the *Spirit* different from both, and wholly præternatural to Man. The whole *natural* Soul (ψυχὴ) including both the *ſenſitive* and *Rational* part, (which you elſewhere call the two Souls, *pag.* 220,) you ſuppoſe to be of itſelf mortal, but to be made immortal in good Chriſtians by the addition of the *Spirit*, (by the *Acceſſion of an Adſcititious Spirit*, as you ſometimes expreſs it) and in the Rejecters of the Goſpel to be made immortal without it. If by the *Spirit* you mean only an *Operation* of the Spirit of God upon our Souls, then (as I obſerved before) there is no real difference between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God. But if by the *Spirit* you mean the addition of a new Subſtance or Principle of Subſiſtence to the Souls of good Chriſtians in order to immortalize them, which yet in them that reject the Goſpel are immortalized without that addition; is not this juſt ſuch another ſuppoſition, as if you ſhould ſupppoſe the *Underſtanding* to be one Subſtance in a Man, and the *Will* another, and the *Habit of Virtue* a third; notwithſtanding that at the ſame time it be confeſ-

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ſed that all theſe things may be Faculties or Powers of one and the ſame Subſtance? And your perverting the Words of St. *Paul* to ſerve your obſcure Hypotheſis is very groſs. Does St *Paul* when he diſtinguiſhes the *natural Body* [ψυχικὸν σῶμα] from the *Spiritual Body* [πνευματικὸν σῶμα] and calls the one *corruptible*, the other *incorruptible*; mean that the *natural Body* [ψυχικὸν σῶμα] is therefore *corruptible* or *mortal*, becauſe the *Soul* [ψυχὴ] or *Principle of Life* which is in it, is itſelf a * *mortal* Principle? or that the *Spiritual Body* [πνευματικὸν σῶμα,] is made *incorruptible* by the ſuperaddition of a *Spirit* to the Soul that animates it? The plain meaning of St *Paul* is only this, that the Body which in this preſent ſtate is diſſolvable and *corruptible*, ſhall after the Reſurrection, by the Power of God, be made *incorruptible*; without having any reſpect at all to the *Soul*, or the *Nature* of it, in his whole Diſcourſe. Again, when St *Paul* derives our Title to the *Reſurrection* of the *Body*, wholly from Chriſt; does he thereby mean to affirm, that, without the Reſurrection of Chriſt, the *Souls* of Men muſt alſo have ceaſed to exiſt? On the contrary, for that very reaſon, becauſe the Souls of Men would not have ceaſed to exiſt; therefore Chriſt thought them of value to redeem them from Miſery, by the Purchaſe of his Blood, by his Death and Reſurrection. And it is the worſt repreſentation of Chriſtianity, that can be; ſomething that might indeed † *be thought hard dealing*; to ſuppoſe (as you do) that the Goſpel of Chriſt, which is every where in Scripture repreſented as the greateſt Inſtance of God's tender Mercy and Compaſſion towards Men, ſhould upon the whole ſo *very diſproportionably* increaſe

* Pag. 3.

† Pag. 5.

increaſe the Miſery of ſinful Men, as that whoever diſbelieved or neglected that new Offer of Grace and Favour, ſhould from thenceforth be condemned to everlaſting Torments; notwithſtanding that otherwiſe Sin, in its own Nature, againſt the Light of Reaſon and Conſcience, and the natural Law of God, was ſo little heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they that had lived in the utmoſt contempt of God and of his natural and eternal Law written in their Hearts, and in the moſt unreſtrained practice of all poſſible wickedneſs, might have been ſafe from the fear of any other danger, than that of periſhing finally by a natural Mortality.

Your Concluſion from our Saviour's deſcription of the laſt Judgment, *Matt.* xxv. is very extraordinary; [*Sect.* 3;] that becauſe the *rewardableneſs* of the good Works of the Righteous, is there aſcribed to their having been done for *Chriſt*'s ſake; therefore no other *Perſons* ſhall be concerned in that Judgment but thoſe to whom the Goſpel had been made known. You might exactly as well have concluded, that becauſe *Charity* and *Uncharitableneſs* are the only particular Actions there mentioned, for which Men ſhall be adjudged to Reward or Puniſhment; therefore no regard ſhall be had to any other *Virtues* or *Crimes* in that final Judgment. It is evident by comparing other places of Scripture, that all kinds of *Actions* ſhall then be examined; and it is as evident, that all ſorts of *Perſons* ſhall be ſo too. Thoſe who never heard of the Goſpel, it is true, cannot be judged by the *ſame Rule or Form*, as

thoſe who did hear of it; But is it not very wonderful, to conclude from thence, that because * *ſuch perſons muſt be judged by another form* not fully and expreſsly (ſuppoſe) mentioned in Scripture, therefore that *form cannot at all be known*, what it is; and if that *form could not be known, yet that therefore it ought not to be believed* that there is any ſuch form at all? Does not the ſame Light of Reaſon, which makes Men a *Law to themſelves*, neceſſarily diſcover alſo to them at the ſame time what Rule they ſhall be judged by? Neither is it true therefore, that no ſuch Form can be proved from the Scriptures: For does not St *Paul*, in the whole 2d *Chapter* to the *Romans*, largely declare that there is ſuch a Form, and alſo what that Form is? And does not the Scripture every where plainly ſuppoſe, that the Judgment ſhall be univerſal? The Phraſe of *judging the World*, Acts xvii. 31, manifeſtly implies it; and the oppoſition between Death and Judgment, *Heb.* ix. 27, though the ſtreſs of the Apoſtle's Argument does not indeed lie upon it, and the univerſal particle [*All*] is not added, yet very evidently ſuppoſes the *Judgment* to extend to the very ſame Perſons as *Death* doth. And what difference is there, between ſaying that it is appointed for *Men* once to die, or that it is appointed for *All Men* once to die? It is not a juſt anſwer here, to ſay that Univerſal Aſſertions are frequently in Scripture to be underſtood in a limited Senſe. That can only be ſo, when either the common acceptation of the words, evidently limits their ſignification; as in that place you mention, *Joh.* xii. 19; or when ſome other parallel places of Scripture, expreſsly add a Limitation. Where this is not the caſe,

* Pag. 7.

as

as it is not in the phraſe of God's *judging the World*, Acts xvii. 31; the ſame Expreſſion being in all other places of Scripture likewiſe univerſal; if limitations may be added arbitrarily and at pleaſure, there will then be no way left to diſtinguiſh at all, when any declaration is to be looked upon as *univerſal*, and when as only *particular*. You your ſelf are forced to allow the *Jews*, who lived before our Saviour's Coming, to be concerned in the Judgment; and not them only, but alſo others who lived before the Law, in the Times of *Noah* and the Patriarchs; becauſe (*pag.* 11,) *as they were intitled to the Spirit, in Reverſion; ſo they might be intitled to the Conſequences of the Spirit, one of which is Immortality.* I ſuppoſe you will eaſily grant, that the Knowledge many of theſe Men had of Chriſt, was but implicit and very obſcure: And if that was ſufficient to intitle them to Immortality, why is it not as eaſy to ſuppoſe that the Promiſe God made to *Adam* might intitle all Mankind to have ſome benefit of the Redemption purchaſed by Chriſt, according to their different proportions and capacities, though they never heard of him explicitly?

It may here be obſerved alſo by the By, that, according to your obſcure and indeed confuſed manner of expreſſing your ſelf, you in this Section (*pag.* 8,) ſuppoſe *the Holy Spirit to immortalize Men to Puniſhment*; and again (*pag.* 31,) that Men are *qualified* for *the higher degree of Puniſhment, by the Acceſſion of the adſcititious Spirit, which makes them* ἰσάγγελοι: Not very conſiſtently with your firſt diſtinction, (*Præmon. Sect.* 3,) that the actually immortalizing Souls to Puniſhment, may better be aſcribed to the

Pleaſure of God, than to the *Divine Spirit*. Unleſs you will ſay, that bad Men within the Covenant, are immortalized to Puniſhment by one Principle; and bad Men without the Covenant, or Rejecters of it, immortalized to Puniſhment by another Principle. And ſo there is no end of vain and groundleſs Imaginations.

That there ſhall be, as you ſay, (*Sect.* 4,) *a very great difference in the Puniſhment of thoſe who reſiſt and reject the Goſpel, from what it would have been if they had never heard of the Goſpel*; is undoubtedly very true. But does it from thence follow, that God did not * *oblige* Men at all to *worſhip himſelf*, before any *revealed* Religion was inſtituted? Becauſe *the* † *Scripture does* indeed *every where ſuppoſe the Condition of thoſe who reſiſt the Goſpel diſpenſation worſe than that of the worſt ſort of Criminal who never heard of the Goſpel*; does it from thence follow, that they that never heard of the Goſpel, had therefore *no concern at all* in the final judgment? Becauſe our Saviour declares that it ſhall be *more tolerable* for *Sodom and Gomorrha* in the Day of Judgment, than for thoſe who rejected the Goſpel when offered them; does it from thence follow, that thoſe wicked People ſhall not be caſt into ‖ *outer darkneſs* at all? When our Saviour threatens that *Capernaum, which was exalted to Heaven, ſhould be brought down to Hell*; is it not a very extraordinary Interpretation of the meaning of thoſe Words, and as wonderful an Inference from them, to conclude that thoſe People, if our Saviour had not preached to them, would have * *had no reaſon to fear the Puniſhment of Hell* at all? An unprejudiced Perſon would rather conclude on the contrary, that for that very

* *pag.* 11. *and* 12.

† *pag.* 13.

‖ *pag.* 14.

* *Ibid.*

Reaſon, becauſe they *were in danger of it*, therefore our Saviour preached to them, and exhorted them to *repent* and *flee from the* wrath to come. Laſtly, if they that never heard of the Goſpel, ſhall not indeed for their Unbelief be
* *pag.* 18. ſentenced to * *that Hell*, which was prepared for the Devil and his Angels; that is, to the *ſame Degree of Puniſhment* with thoſe who reject or diſobey the Goſpel; yet does it at all from thence follow, that they ſhall have *no concern* in the general Judgment, upon account of their having obeyed or diſobeyed the Law of Nature?

The Caſe (*Sect.* 6.) of that Text in St *John*, *John* v. 28 and 29; *The Hour is coming, in the which all that are in the Graves ſhall hear his Voice, and ſhall come forth, they that have done good, unto the Reſurrection of Life, and they that have done evil, unto the Reſurrection of Damnation*, is exactly the ſame with that before-mentioned, *Acts* xvii. 31. The Words are *univerſal*; and the Inſtances you bring of other *univerſal* Affirmations, which muſt be underſtood in a *limited* Senſe, have not the leaſt ſimilitude with the Text you are conſidering. If the *Gibeonites univerſal* Declaration to *David*, that *for them he ſhould not kill any Man in Iſrael*, muſt needs indeed be underſtood in a *limited* Senſe, becauſe they themſelves expreſsly *limited* it by demanding ſeven of *Saul*'s Poſterity to be delivered to them to be put to death: If *Ahab*'s ſending to *all* Nations and Kingdoms to ſearch for *Elijah*, muſt indeed of neceſſity, in the Nature of the thing it ſelf, be underſtood *only of thoſe that bordered* upon him: If St *Paul*'s *univerſal* Declaration, that he baptized none of the *Corinthians*, muſt indeed be underſtood with *an exception*; becauſe he himſelf

himſelf in the very next Words adds an *exception* expreſsly: Is it juſt to infer from theſe Inſtances, that our Saviour's *univerſal* Affirmation in this place, concerning the Reſurrection, may likewiſe be underſtood in a *limited* Senſe, though neither in the Nature of the thing itſelf, nor from the Context, there be any the leaſt Ground for ſuch Limitation? Nay though on the contrary, all the parallel Texts, which are very many, be likewiſe *univerſal?* It is a wonderful thing, to ſee in what manner *Learned* Men can argue, when Prejudices prevail over their *Judgment.*

Your 7th Section, to ordinary Underſtandings, ſeems to be mere Confuſion. *You* ſuppoſe Man to conſiſt of three diſtinct parts, *Body*, *Soul*, and *Spirit*: *But* they who made this diſtinction, ſuppoſed theſe three parts to be in *all* Men by *Nature*; which will not ſerve *your* purpoſe. *You* bring in *Plato* diſtinguiſhing *Mind* [Νοῦς] from [ψυχὴ] *Soul*, and making the one mortal, the other immortal: *But* this likewiſe, being ſpoken concerning the natural Formation of all Men, is nothing to your purpoſe; For in *your* Hypotheſis, you make the *whole* Man by nature Mortal. *You* mention *Plato* here (*pag.* 22 and 24, and again *pag.* 59 and 96, and *Præmon. pag.* 21,) as avowing your own Notions: *And yet* in other places, (as *pag.* 33, 60, and 66,) you inconſiſtently ſpeak of him as juſtly blamed for holding the contrary Opinion, *for aſſerting* Our *Doctrine of the Souls natural Immortality*, *pag.* 33. *You* affirm (*pag.* 23,) that there is no real difference between the Platonical Notions and thoſe of the New Teſtament, only that That which the Platoniſts call Mind [Νοῦς]

and make it Immortal, the Sacred Writers call [πνεῦμα] *Spirit*, as being the *Divine Breathing*, Gen. ii. 7: *Here* you openly contradict your ſelf, making the immortal [πνεῦμα] *Spirit* common to all Men by their original Formation, and confounding it with what you elſewhere ſo * often, in alluſion to that very Text, diſtinguiſh by the Name [πνοὴ] *Breath*, and make it mortal. *You* bring in *Philo* diſtinguiſhing the Immortal Soul from the *ſenſible formed Man*, as you darkly expreſs it; *But* even this alſo is directly againſt you: For *Philo* oppoſing the *immortal Mind* of Man, that is, the rational Soul, both to the Body and to the ſenſitive Soul, ſtill ſpeaks of them all as *original* and *natural* Parts of the Man; and therefore when you apply to your Hypotheſis of an *adſcititious Spirit*, what he ſays concerning this [πνεῦμα θεῖον] *Divine Spirit or Soul* infuſed into Man by God's *breathing*, Gen. ii. 7; you again directly contradict your ſelf, by confounding the *Spirit* [πνεῦμα] which you ſuppoſe immortal, with the [πνοὴ] *Breath* or *Soul* which you make to be mortal. *You* cite (*pag* 26.) the Words of *Aratus*, Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν as approved by St *Paul*, Acts xvii. 28: *But* if thoſe Words prove any thing, they prove directly againſt you: For γένος θεοῦ, if it ſignifies any thing, ſignifies *Off-ſpring of God* in that Senſe which you oppoſe, (*pag* 66.) And though you are pleaſed to underſtand them (*pag.* 66,) only of thoſe that are immortalized by receiving or rejecting the Goſpel, yet St *Paul* on the contrary as plainly applies them to all that *dwell on the Face of the Earth*, as it could be expreſſed in Words.

* *Præmon. pag.* 21 and 25; *and in the Diſcourſe it ſelf*, pag 160 and 216.

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In the ſame Section, (*pag.* 22,) you call it a *precarious Fancy, to make every cauſe of Motion diſtinct from Matter, to be properly what we call a Spirit, Independent on Matter, and Immortal:* Here you ſeem to ſuppoſe the *Soul* of Man, to be ſomething *diſtinct from Matter*; yet not a *Spirit*, nor *Independent on Matter*, *leaſt* from thence it ſhould follow that it was naturally immortal. In your Præmonition, *p.* 25, you make the *Soul*, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a more precarious ſubſiſtence, even than *mere Matter it ſelf*, ſaying that *it is unable to continue its own Duration by the Powers given it at its firſt Production, and the continuance of thoſe* general Influences *which are requiſite for the ſupport of Created Beings in general*: Yet in the ſame page (as I obſerved before) you ſay that Souls *do not ſo depend on any other Created Being, but that they may ſtill continue in their Duration, whatſoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleaſed ſtill to continue that* ordinary Providence *which is eſſentially neceſſary for their continuance:* This is making them properly Immortal. In the *Diſcourſe* it ſelf, *pag.* 51, you ſuppoſe again that the Soul *may depend on Matter, as to* its *Being and Preſervation*, though it be not a *Modification of Matter*, but *diſtinct from it:* Here you expreſs your ſelf, as if you thought it a *Subſtantial Form*, a contradictory Chimæra, which aroſe merely from the miſconſtruction of a *Greek* Word in *Ariſtotle*, ſignifying indifferently either *Subſtantial* or *Eſſential:* And again, *pag.* 91, you ſuppoſe in like manner, that the Soul is *ſomething diſtinct* both *from Spirit*, and alſo *from Matter and Motion*; that is to ſay, a *Material Form*; an *active Subſtantial Principle, diſtinct from Matter, yet de-*

pending on Matter, in eſſe, in fieri, in operari, *and which muſt accordingly be diſſolved on the diſſolution of that Matter on which it depends.* In *pag.* 220, you ſuppoſe, on the other hand, the *Two Souls* (as you call them) to be not only *diſtinct*, but alſo *ſeparable*: And *pag.* 218, you ſeem to incline to the Notion of thoſe Philoſophers, who *owned the* πνεῦμα *to be material like the Steams of odoriferous Bodies*; *Which Conſideration alone*, you ſay, *is ſufficient to cut it off from any pretenſions to any proper natural Immortality.* Is not all this, the greateſt Extravagancy and Confuſion that can be? Did not the World know you to be a ſerious Perſon, theſe things would look much more like the Raillery of an Unbeliever, than the Reaſonings of one that in earneſt intended to eſtabliſh any conſiſtent Notion. In reality, That the Soul cannot poſſibly be *Material*, is evident not only from the conſideration of its noble Faculties, Capacities and Improvements, its large Comprehenſion and Memory; its Judgment, Power of Reaſoning, and Moral Faculties; which Arguments have been urged with unanſwerable Strength by the wiſeſt and moſt conſiderate Men in all Ages from the times of *Socrates* and *Plato* to this very Day; but the ſame thing is moreover demonſtrable from the ſingle conſideration, even of bare Senſe or Conſciouſneſs it ſelf. For *Matter* being a diviſible Subſtance, conſiſting always of ſeparable, nay of actually ſeparate and diſtinct parts, 'tis plain, that unleſs it were eſſentially Conſcious, in which caſe every particle of Matter muſt conſiſt of innumerable ſeparate and diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion, can be an individual Conſcious Being: For, ſuppoſe

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three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given diſtance one from another; is it poſſible that all thoſe ſeparate parts ſhould in that State be one individual Conſcious Being? Suppoſe then all theſe particles brought together into one Syſtem, ſo as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Compoſition whatſoever, become any whit leſs truly diſtinct Beings, than they were when at the greateſt diſtance? How then can their being diſpoſed in any poſſible Syſtem, make them one individual conſcious Being? If you will ſuppoſe God by his infinite Power ſuperadding Conſciouſneſs to the united Particles, yet ſtill thoſe Particles, being really and neceſſarily as diſtinct Beings as ever, cannot be themſelves the Subject in which that individual Conſciouſneſs inheres, but the Conſciouſneſs can only be ſuperadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles muſt ſtill itſelf be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whoſe Power of Thinking is undeniably one Individual Conſciouſneſs, cannot poſſibly be a *Material* Subſtance. And if it be neither *Matter* nor any *Modification of Matter*, then (though you are pleaſed to * affirm ſomewhat raſhly, and without offering any reaſon for your affirmation, that ſuch *Reaſoning is far from being Self-evident*, yet) it is really as notoriouſly Self-evident as any thing in Nature, that it *cannot poſſibly depend upon Matter, as to its Being and Preſervation.* For if even one particle of Matter *cannot poſſibly depend upon another, as to its Being and Preſervation*, (which I believe you will confeſs to be Self-evident,) becauſe they are each of them diſtinct Beings; muſt it not be even yet leſs poſſible, for a Being which is neither Matter

* *pag.* 52.

itſelf, nor a Modification of Matter, but intirely *diſtinct* from Matter, (*pag.* 51;) *to depend on Matter as to its Being and Preſervation?*

It is not indeed of any great Moment in the preſent diſpute; but it ſeems to ſhow in general ſomething of haſte and inconſiſtency in your Notions; what you affirm concerning the Giants, (*Sect.* 8.) who you ſay, deſcended from the *Sons of Seth* and the *Daughters of Cain*; and yet in the very ſame Paragraph you call them the *Offſpring of the fallen Angels*; and, upon their account, make two *defections* of Angels, one before the Fall of *Adam*, the other before the Flood.

You proceed (*Sect.* 9,) to the Authority of the Fathers. *Juſtin Martyr*, whom you begin with, ſays indeed expreſsly, that the Soul ought not properly to be called *Immortal*: But this he ſays, not as you repreſent him, in oppoſition to *our* Doctrine, nor yet in oppoſition to *Plato*, but in oppoſition to the extravagant Notions of ſome * *pretended Platoniſts*, who taught ſuch an *Immortality* as implied *neceſſity of exiſtence*. For the reaſon he gives why Souls ought not to be called *Immortal*, is becauſe † *they had a beginning*, and *depend continually upon God for the Preſervation of their Being*. In which Senſe, neither are *Angels* Immortal; but ‖ *God only*. All that he ſays therefore, does not in the leaſt imply, but that the Soul may be ſuch a ſubſtance, as is able to continue its own Duration for ever, by the Powers given it

* Εἰ ἀθάνατός ἐστι ψυχὴ, ἀγέννητος δηλαδή. Ἀγέννητος ὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι κατὰ τίνας λεγομένας πλατωνικάς. *Dialog. cum. Tryph.*

† Ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς γεγονέναι —— οὐκ ἄρα ἀθάνατοι. *ibid.*

‖ Μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητός ὴ ἄφθαρτος ὁ Θεὸς. *ibid.*

it at its firſt Production, and the continuance of thoſe general Influences which are requiſite for the ſupport of Created Beings in general: Which is all that we mean by *natural Immortality.* Nay, that he did actually think the Soul to be in this ſenſe *Immortal*, may juſtly be gathered from thoſe very words which you your ſelf cite from him: Ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ἡ φθαρτὸς, &c. *What* Plato *thought concerning the World, that it muſt needs indeed be in its Nature capable of being deſtroyed and brought to an End, becauſe it had a Beginning; yet that God would never actually deſtroy it: The ſame may be thought concerning the Soul, and concerning all things that are or can be, excepting only God himſelf* (διατε ἐξαφανισθῆναι) *that they are capable of being deſtroyed:* Which laſt words ſeem clearly to explain what he means by the word [φθαρτὸν] *corruptible*, which he applies not only to the Soul of Man, but alſo to all Created Beings whatſoever; namely, not to ſignify any Tendency to Corruption in the Nature of the thing it ſelf, but only a Dependence upon the Will of God, in oppoſition to Self-exiſtence. He does indeed ſay, that the Souls of the Damned ſhall continue to exiſt *as long as God thinks fit*; and implies as if he thought they ſhould finally be deſtroyed, after very long Puniſhment: But this, not by a natural Mortality, but by the Will of God, who is as able to deſtroy if he thinks fit, as to create: Which Opinion, if there was any ground for it, would yet ſignify nothing at all to your purpoſe.

Tatian's Opinion, if it was of any Authority, would prove too much for you. For he fancied that the Soul was diſſolved with the Body, and roſe again with it at the Reſurrection. This

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part you pleaſantly call his *Humane Reaſoning* (*Sect.* 10;) as if you thought all the reſt of what he ſays in the very ſame Sentence, was *immediately Divine*. Yet even *He* alſo is expreſsly againſt you. For as he makes *all* Souls to die with the Body, ſo he makes them *all* to riſe again with it alſo; leaving none of them in their natural Mortality; but raiſing them all either to eternal Happineſs, or [θάνατον μὲν τιμωρίας ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ λαμβάνοντα] to immortal Puniſhment.

Irenæus is ſo very full and expreſs againſt you, and your perverting of his words ſo very groſs, that with the ſame liberty any perſon might eaſily make any Author ſeem to countenance any Hereſy or abſurd Opinion whatſoever, even from the very Words themſelves, wherein he with all poſſible clearneſs expreſſes himſelf againſt it. The Paſſages which you your ſelf cite, are as clear and plain as can be deſired. He in expreſs words (as you your ſelf cite them,) declares the Soul *to* * *be immortal in its own Nature*, and affirms that it does † *not die*. To evade this, you ſuppoſe he means only, that the Soul does not *die in the ſame Manner* that the Body does, namely by *ceaſing to breathe*; A more ſurprizing Evaſion could not poſſibly have been invented; His Words, which the Reader would expect you ſhould have tranſcribed at length, are theſe; that ‡ *it is the Body only that dies, not the Soul: For, to die, is to loſe the Powers of Life*; Breath, *Senſe and Motion*; *and to be ſeparated into its*

* Quæ ſunt natura immortalia; quibus à ſua natura adeſt vivere. *lib.* 5. *c.* 4. *o*

† *Ibid. c.* 7.

‡ Hæc [*caro*] enim eſt, quæ moritur & ſolvitur; ſed non Anima, neq; Spiritus. Mori enim, eſt vitalem amittere habilitatem, & *ſine Spiramine* in

its firſt Principles of Compoſition; which the Soul, the Flatus vitæ, and the Spirit which is a ſimple and uncompounded and indiſſolvable ſubſtance, cannot be: is not the word [*Spiramen*] *Breath*, in this Sentence an excellent ground for your diſtinction; that *Irenæus* by denying that the Soul dies, does not mean to deny that it dies, but only to deny that it dies in the ſame Manner the Body does, *viz.* by ceaſing to breathe? Again, He expreſsly affirms that * *the Soul and Spirit is not mortal:* By this you ſay he means only, that the Soul does not *actually* die *when the Body dies*; but, being aſhamed of this Interpretation, you add immediately, that he means alſo further, that the Soul *in its own Nature, does not conſiſt of contrary Principles, tending to a Diſſolution by its own Nature, as the Body does:* This is expreſsly giving up the whole Queſtion; and directly contrary to what you add preſently after, that *Death is natural to the Soul on account of its natural Conſtitution.* It is here further to be obſerved alſo, that theſe laſt words which you your ſelf cite out of *Irenæus*, that *the Soul and Spirit is not Mortal*, [ἔτε ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτε τὸ πνεῦμα,] are directly contradictory to the Notion you advance, *pag.* 3, concerning [σῶμα ψυχικὸν] *the natural Body*'s being therefore oppoſed to [πνευματικὸν] 1 *Cor.* xv. 44, becauſe it has only a *Mortal* Principle [ψυχὴ] in it; and alſo directly contradictory to what you inſinuate, *pag.* 41, concerning *Irenæus*'s underſtanding [πνοὴ ζωῆς] *the Breath of Life*, Gen.

poſterum, & inanimalem & immobilem fieri, & deperire in illa, ex quibus & initium ſubſtantiæ habuit. Hoc autem neq; Animæ evenit; flatus eſt enim vitæ: neq; Spiritui; incompoſitus eſt enim & ſimplex Spiritus qui reſolvi non poteſt, *lib.* 5. *Sect.* 7.

* Οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ζωητὸν, οὔτε τὸ πνεῦμα, *lib.* 5. 13. as the Words are cited by you: & *lib.* 5. 7, *almoſt the ſame Words again.*

Gen. ii. 7, to be, what *You* all along diſtinguiſh it to be, a *Mortal* Principle: Which he is indeed ſo far from doing, that, on the contrary, he, in that very Chapter from whence you have taken moſt of your Citations, declares [ψυχὴ] *the Soul*, not to be mortal, for * that very reaſon becauſe it is [πνοὴ ζωῆς] *the Breath of Life*, Gen. ii. 7. Notwithſtanding that he does indeed, at the ſame time, contradiſtinguiſh it, as St *Paul* does, from πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖν; The πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν being plainly with him, as it is with St *Paul*, that divine Power which Spiritualizes and Immortalizes, not the Soul, but the *Body*, at the Reſurrection.

* Quæ ſunt ergo mortalia corpora? numquidnam Animæ? Sed incorruptibiles Animæ quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum. Inſufflavit enim in faciem hominis Deus *flatum vitæ* (Gen. ii. 7.) & factus eſt in animam viventem; *Flatus* autem *vitæ*, incorporalis eſt. Sed ne mortalem quidem poſſunt dicere hominem ipſum flatum vitæ exiſtentem. Et propter hoc David ait; & anima mea illi vivet; tanquam immortali ſubſtantia una ejus exiſtente. *lib.* 5. *c.* 7.

Irenæus does indeed, with other Antient Writers, allow, that whatever is γεννητὸν *or had a beginning*, muſt be φθαρτὸν, that is, as *Juſtin Martyr* expreſſes it, Οἱόν τε ἐξαφανισθῆναι, *capable of being deſtroyed*. But this is only meant (as the Antitheſis of the Words [γεννητὸν] and [φθαρτὸν] evidently ſhows) of the Nature of the Soul as oppoſed, together with that of Angels and of all other the higheſt Created Beings whatſoever, to That Immortality which ariſes from *Neceſſity of Exiſtence*, which muſt needs be peculiar to God alone; Which is nothing to your purpoſe.

I cannot ſee how you collect any thing at all from *Athenagoras*, (*Sect.* 12,) He does indeed diſtinguiſh Νοῦς from ψυχὴ according to the old Philoſophy; but he does not found any thing upon

upon that diſtinction, which is in the leaſt to your purpoſe. He neither affirms the *Soul* to be mortal, nor makes any doubt but the *Bodies* of all Men ſhall riſe again unto Judgment. All you pretend to gather from him, is, that the *Soul* is not it ſelf ſufficient to immortalize the *Body*: But to this you have your ſelf given a full anſwer, that *No Body* ever thought it was.

The Words you cite from *Theophilus Antiochenus*, (*Sect.* 13,) relate wholly to the Queſtion concerning the State of *Adam* in Paradiſe, whether he was created Mortal or Immortal in *that State*: Nothing therefore can be gathered from thence, concerning the Nature of a *ſeparate* Soul. *Theophilus* determines, that He was *neither Mortal nor Immortal* * originally by his Creation; that is (as you your ſelf explain it, *pag.* 46.) God neither deſigned for him *Corporal Death*, nor *Corporal Immortality*; but he was capable of being either, according as he ſhould behave himſelf: But whether *Adam* before his Fall was in that Senſe naturally *immortal*, or naturally *mortal*; what is this to the *Soul?* Which, ſuppoſing *Adam* never ſo *mortal*, you your ſelf acknowledge does not periſh by *that Mortality* which denominates a Man *Mortal*, that is, the Diſſolution of the Body.

His ſaying that from that Text, *Gen.* ii. 7, *moſt Men* [πλείονες] ſtiled the *Soul immortal*; does not imply (as you imagine) that *Theophilus* himſelf thought it *Mortal*; but it implies ſome doubt concerning the proper uſe of the Word

* Note; your Emendation, ἐγῶμαι for ἐγῶ μὲν, in this Paſſage of *Theophilus*, is without ground. For the Senſe is not, [οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐγῶμαι,] *not ſo, I ſuppoſe*; but [οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐγῶ μεν,] *I dare not aſſert That neither, for my part*; anſwering to [οὐδὲ τοῦτο φαμὲν] in the preceeding line; As any one that pleaſes to compare your Book, may obſerve.

Word ἀθάνατος, which (as has been before noted) ſeemed to many of the Antients to imply as much as ἀγέννητος *Neceſſarily exiſting*, (in the Senſe that St *Paul* ſays of God, 1 *Tim.* vi. 16, ὁ Μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν that *He only hath Immortality*;) or at leaſt to ſignify an *indefectible State* of Virtue and Happineſs: And therefore it is, that he ſays concerning *Adam*, Εἰ ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπεποιήκει, θεὸν ἂν ἐπεποιήκει: *If Adam had been made originally immortal, he had been made a God.*

It is alſo further to be obſerved from this paſſage of *Theophilus*, that the Text you ſo frequently allude to, *Gen.* ii. 7, was ὑπὸ τοῖς πλείοσι *by moſt of the Antients*, underſtood in a Senſe directly contrary to your Notion of the πνοὴ ſignifying in that place a *Mortal* Principle. And it is with very extraordinary difficulty, that you here labour to ſuppoſe, that [πλείονες] thoſe *moſt Men* whom *Theophilus* affirms to have collected the *Immortality of the Soul* from this *Text of Scripture*, were not *Chriſtians*, but either *Jewiſh Phariſees*, or *Heathen Philoſophers*: which Suppoſition of Heathen Philoſophers proving the Immortality of the Soul from a Text of Scripture; and that a Chriſtian Writer ſpeaking of moſt Mens Senſe concerning a Text of Scripture, ſhould thereby mean the Senſe of Heathen Philoſophers; This, I ſay, with all that follows in that Section, is ſo extremely abſurd, as to need no Confutation.

Tertullian does indeed ſuppoſe the Soul to be *Material*; from whence it muſt alſo neceſſarily be confeſſed to follow that it would be *naturally Mortal*; and no one can (as you ſay, *Sect.* 14,) believe ſuch a Soul as he ſuppoſes, to be independent on Matter in its own Nature. All this

is very true; and yet *even This* ſeems to be nothing to your purpoſe. For though the *natural Mortality* of the Soul is indeed a neceſſary *Conſequence* of *Tertullian*'s Doctrine; yet, ſince *Tertullian* did not ſee nor own that Conſequence; and, if he had ſeen the Conſequence, would have diſowned the Doctrine; his *Authority* (which is what you would make uſe of) is not for you, though the *Conſequence of his Doctrine* be; And therefore you are guilty of a very manifeſt Fallacy, when you ſay, (*pag.* 55,) that *the Church had not declared againſt this Doctrine of* Tertullian, *which ſuppoſed the Soul's natural Mortality*: For his Doctrine did not *then* ſuppoſe it, though *our* Philoſophy ſhows it to be indeed a Conſequence. He ſays expreſsly in many places of his Book *de Anima*, that the Soul *is immortal:* He reckons this among thoſe Opinions of the Philoſophers which gave occaſion to Hereſies that * *ſome of them denied the Immortality of the Soul:* He denied † *that the Soul grew or increaſed in ſubſtance*, notwithſtanding he thought it Material; *leaſt it ſhould follow from thence, that it was capable likewiſe of periſhing:* He ſtrongly ‡ *oppoſes* the Opinion of thoſe who thought the Soul *received Nouriſhment*; *leaſt from thence likewiſe it ſhould follow that it was liable to periſh:* He expreſsly affirms, ‖ that *all Mankind*, without exception, *ſhall riſe again to eternal Happineſs or Puniſhment:* And many other ſuch Paſſages

* Alii immortalem negant Animam, *cap.* 5.

† Cæterum animam ſubſtantia creſcere negandum eſt, ne etiam decreſcere ſubſtantia dicatur, atq; ita & defectura credatur, *cap.* 37.

‡ Auferenda eſt Argumentatoris occaſio, qui, quod anima deſiderare videatur alimenta, hinc quoq; mortalem eam intelligi cupit, quæ cibis ſuſtineatur, deniq; derogatis eis evigeſcat, poſtremo ſubtractis intercidat, *cap* 38.

‖ Reſtituetur *omne humanum genus* —— exinde in immenſam æternitatis perpetuitatem. *Id. in Apologetico.*

are

are to be found in his Works. You ſeem to be aware of this, when you ſay, that *Tertullian does indeed own the actual Immortality of the Soul:* But then, what you inſinuate in your next Words, [Eſpecially *of all who were, upon that account, obliged to come over as Proſelytes upon the Publication of the Goſpel,*] is extremely unfair; ſince *Tertullian*'s Words, being every where as univerſal as can be, are directly contrary to what *you* would inſinuate by the Word *Eſpecially.*

And here upon occaſion of the Paſſages you cite out of *Tertullian*, concerning *the Propagation of the Soul ex traduce*, and its having a *Humane Shape and Difference of Sex*; I cannot forbear propoſing it to your more calm and ſerious conſideration, whether your manner of citing the Fathers, by picking out chiefly ſuch Sentences, wherein for want of Philoſophy they were evidently miſtaken, and which can only be of diſſervice to Religion, and tend to confirm profane Men in their Mockery and Contempt; is not a very ill repreſentation of thoſe Writers, and a very ill manner of ſhowing your regard to them. I believe, ſhould any other Perſon do the like upon any other Philoſophical Subject, you would immediately look upon him as doing it with an ill deſign, and deſerving a very ſevere Cenſure.

What you ſay (*Sect.* 16,) concerning *Tertullian*'s deriving the Humane Soul from the *Flatus Vitæ* mentioned *Gen.* ii. 7; proves, not that he thought the Soul Mortal, becauſe you groundleſsly interpret that Text ſo; but that he underſtood that Text contrary to what you have done, becauſe he clearly declares the Soul

derived

derived thence to be immortal: As I have before ſhown particularly concerning *Irenæus*. And what you offer in the reſt of that Paragraph, concerning *proper Immortality* belonging only to God, is all entirely againſt your ſelf, and not in the leaſt againſt our Notion, as has likewiſe been proved before.

The Words you cite out of St *Cyprian*, (*Sect.* 18,) are evidently nothing to your purpoſe; being ſpoken only concerning *regeneration* or the *new birth* in the *moral* Senſe, without any the leaſt hint of any *natural* mortality of the *Souls* of thoſe who are *not regenerated*. *Arnobius*, you your ſelf acknowledge to *have his Paradoxes on this Subject*; that *he was but a Catechumen, when he wrote his Book*; and *was not truly inſtructed in the Chriſtian Doctrine*. *But*, you ſay, *he is more to be regarded, when he ſpeaks conformably to the Senſe of other Catholick Doctors of that early Age*, that is, when you think he ſays any thing agreeable to that Notion which you not truly attribute to the Fathers. And yet even *He*, does not ſay any thing really agreeable to that Notion. For though he does indeed blame the boldneſs of certain Platoniſts for ſuppoſing the Soul to be * *neceſſarily Immortal*, to have come from Heaven, and to return thither again of courſe at the diſſolution of the Body; running out with much oratorical Liberty upon the weakneſs of thoſe Mens Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul; and does himſelf contend that the Soul is of a † middle Nature, neither mortal, nor immortal, but capable of either condition according to its behaviour; yet all this he

* Animus, qui immortalis a vobis & *Deus* eſſe narratur, &c. *lib.* 2.

† Medietas ergo quædam, & animarum anceps ambiguaq; natura, *&c. lib.* 2.

does purely upon *That* Argument, that whatever had a beginning muſt alſo neceſſarily be capable of being deſtroyed; and that whatever is *Paſſible*, muſt needs in its Nature be liable to periſh; and accordingly therefore applies it to Angels * and all other Created Beings whatſoever, in the very ſame Senſe as he does to Men: which is not the Notion of Mortality *You* are contending for. And when he ſuppoſes the Souls of the Wicked to periſh finally, (which you imagine to be for your purpoſe;) he underſtands it of *all* the damned, as well thoſe that *had heard* the Goſpel, as thoſe that *had not*; and thoſe that *had received the Spirit*, as thoſe *that had not*; conceiving them *all* to be deſtroyed by the Power of God inflicting ſuch Puniſhment upon them, and not that *any* die by a *natural* mortality.

* Omnes omnino, Dii, Angeli, Dæmones, aut nomine quocunq; ſunt alio, qualitatis & ipſi ſunt mediæ, & ambiguæ ſortis conditione mutabiles. *lib.* 2.

Lactantius is throughout his whole Work as full and expreſs againſt you, as any Author that ever wrote either before or ſince. So that your perverting his Words to favour your Notion, is really, what upon ſecond Thoughts you your ſelf will hardly excuſe. I ſhall firſt ſhow briefly, how clearly he aſſerts the natural Immortality of the Soul, and then conſider in how very extraordinary a manner you miſrepreſent him.

He approves that † Notion of *Plato*, which you ‡ ſo often condemn, concerning the natural Immortality of the Soul: He declares that ‖ *the Soul does not periſh nor is diſſolved, but endures for ever*: He

† Licet verum de animæ immortalitate ſentiret, *&c. lib.* 7. §. 8.

‡ *pag.* 33, 66, *&c.*

‖ Apparet animam non interire, neq; diſſolvi, ſed manere in Sempiternum. *lib.* 7. §. 9.

He is very large and particular * in confuting all *Lucretius*'s Arguments againſt the natural Immortality of the Soul: He affirms, that † at Death *the Body returns to the Earth; but That part of ourſelves, which God breathed into us, endures and lives for ever*; And again, that ‡ *the Soul is not corruptible, but endures for ever; becauſe it proceeded from an eternal Original:* And concludes; ‖ *I think*, ſaith he, *I have ſufficiently proved the Soul is not diſſolvable.* He expreſſes himſelf in the very ſame manner concerning the natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good ones. *The Effect of that Death*, ſaith * he, *which wicked Souls are ſubject to, is not the extinguiſhing of them, but the puniſhing them eternally: This Puniſhment we call the ſecond Death; which is itſelf alſo perpetual, as eternal Happineſs is; The ſecond Death is the ſuffering eternal Torment; the damnation of Souls to eternal Puniſhment, according to their Deſerts.* Again: *As the Life of the Soul*, ſaith † he, *is eternal, in which it enjoys divine and unſpeakable Happineſs; ſo its Death alſo muſt needs be eternal, in which it indures everlaſting Puniſhment and endleſs Torments for its Sins.*

* *Lib.* 7, §. 12, &c.

† Quod ex terra fuit, in Terram reſolvitur; quod ex cæleſti Spiritu, id conſtat ac viget Semper, quoniam divinus Spiritus ſempiternus eſt. *lib.* 7. §. 12.

‡ Ergo anima, quæ fragilis non eſt, in æternum manet; quoniam Origo ejus æterna eſt. *Ibid.*

‖ Declaravi, ut opinor, animam non eſſe ſolubilem. *lib.* 7. §. 13.

* Cujus [mortis] non ea vis eſt, ut injuſtas animas extinguat omnino, ſed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pœnam, ſecundam mortem nominamus, quæ eſt & ipſa perpetua, ſicut & immortalitas —— Mors Secunda, eſt æterni doloris perpeſſio; Mors eſt animarum pro meritis ad æterna ſupplicia damnatio. *lib.* 2. §. 12.

† Sicut Vita Animæ ſempiterna eſt, in qua divinos & ineloquibiles immortalitatis ſuæ fructus capit; ita & mors ejus perpetua ſit neceſſe eſt, in qua perennes pœnas & infinita tormenta pro peccatis ſuis pendet. *lib.* 7. §. 11.

And again: *Death*, ſaith * he, *does not deſtroy and extinguiſh the Soul, but ſubjects it to eternal Torments.* And that all this might not poſſibly be underſtood either of your *immortalizing Spirit*, or of the *mere Will and Pleaſure of God*, ſuſtaining the Soul, and cauſing it to endure beyond the original capacity of its own Nature; he adds expreſsly in the very next Words, (as if he had foreſeen and deſigned to prevent your Hypotheſis,) that the reaſon why the Soul is ſubject to ſuch endleſs Puniſhments, is becauſe it was created originally immortal, and therefore cannot die: For *the Soul*, † ſays he, *cannot utterly periſh and be extinguiſhed, becauſe it has its Original from the Spirit of God* [he means that which you call the πνοὴ *Gen.* ii. 7,] *which is eternal.* And again; in Anſwer to that Objection, ‡ *how that which is immortal, can be capable of ſuffering*; he has theſe remarkable Words: *Mens Souls*, ſaith ‖ he, *though they are not capable of being utterly extinguiſhed, becauſe they are of Divine Original; yet by being immerſed in Senſe, and depraved by Sin, they become liable to Miſery and Torment.* And again: * *What wonder is it*, ſaith he, *if Souls, notwithſtanding that they are immortal, are yet capable of having Puniſhment inflicted upon them by God?*

* Mors autem non funditus perimit ac delet, ſed æternis afficit cruciatibus. *lib.* 7. §. 12.

† Nam interire prorſus anima non poteſt; quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui eſt æternus originem cepit. *ibid.*

‡ Si eſt immortalis Anima, quomodo patibilis inducitur & pœnæ ſentiens? *lib.* 7, 20.

‖ Ejus naturæ reddi animas ut, ſi non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo ſunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quæ peccatis inuſta ſenſum doloris attribuit. *ibid.*

* Quid ergo mirum, ſi cum ſint immortales animæ, tamen patibiles ſint Deo? *ibid.*

Moſt

Moſt of theſe Paſſages, which are as remarkably full and clear againſt you, as if the Author had written on purpoſe to oppoſe your Hypotheſis, you inexcuſably paſs over without notice. And from theſe Paſſages any one may eaſily obſerve, how very groſsly, I had almoſt ſaid beyond Example, you miſrepreſent thoſe other places which you *do* cite from him. The Paſſages which you cite, *pag.* 70, wherein *Lactantius* affirms *Immortality*, not to be the neceſſary Condition of our *Nature*, but the Reward of our *Virtue*; are all plainly meant, not of Perpetuity of Duration, (which he every where affirms to belong neceſſarily to our Nature) but of the eternal indefectible Happineſs of Heaven; which this Author always means by the word *Immortality*, as alone deſerving that glorious Title; notwithſtanding that at the ſame time he expreſsly and conſtantly affirms the oppoſite ſtate to be of equal duration and perpetuity. Thus when, ſpeaking of that ſecond Death, *which*, he ſays, * *does not extinguiſh wicked Souls, but ſubjects them to endleſs Miſery*, he ſays, that That likewiſe is of *perpetual Duration*, as *Immortality* alſo is; it is evident that by *Immortality* he means to expreſs, not Duration, but Happineſs: And in the place which you cite to prove that he did not think *Immortality* natural to Men, he in expreſs words declares that by *Immortality* he means † *the unſpeakable and eternal Happineſs of Heaven*: And when he ſays ‖ *there would be no difference betwixt juſt and unjuſt, no ſuch thing as Re-*

* Cujus non ea vis eſt, ut injuſtas animas extinguat omnino, ſed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pœnam, ſecundam mortem nominamus; quæ eſt & ipſa *perpetua*, ſicut & *immortalitas*. *lib.* 2, 12.

† Ne *Immortalitatem* delicate aſſequerentur ac molliter, ſed ad *illud æternæ vitæ ineloquibile præmium* ſumma cum difficultate, *&c. lib.* 7. §. 5.

‖ Nam nihil intereſſet inter

ward

juſtum & injuſtum; ſiquidem omnis homo natus, *immortalis* fieret. *ibid.*

ward and Puniſhment, if all Men were born Immortal; it is very evident from the Thread of his Diſcourſe, that he means, if Men were born originally, and without undergoing any Tryal, into ſuch a State, as * the *Good Angels* are now in, and the Saints ſhall be in after the Reſurrection, namely a State of Indefectible Virtue and Happineſs; then the Nature of Rewards and Puniſhments, would be taken away. Again; Thoſe Paſſages which you cite, *pag.* 71, wherein you ſuppoſe that *Lactantius* by that *immortal Spirit* which *God put or inſpired into an Earthly Body*, means, not the *natural Soul of Man*, but the *Divine Spirit received in our Saviour's regenerating Baptiſm*, as a new *Principle of Immortality*: Theſe Paſſages, I ſay, if to any one that pleaſes to compare the places, they do not appear to be † all and every one of them clearly ſpoken on the contrary, concerning that *natural Soul*, which God is ſaid to have breathed into Man, *Gen.* ii. 7; it will not be eaſy to conceive how any Man can poſſibly expreſs his meaning in Words: And when from this Paſſage, [*Ficto corpore, ſpiravit ei animam de vitali fonte Spiritus ſui, qui eſt perennis; ut ſi* Anima *ſuperaverit, quæ ex Deo oritur, ſit* Immortalis *& in perpetua luce verſetur*] you infer that the Soul is Immortal, only *conditionally, if it be victorious*; your miſrepreſentation of the Paſſage, is very extraordinary: For the Words are not one entire Sentence, as any one would imagine them to be by your manner of citing them; but two Paſſages, at a Page diſtance

* Cum poſſet ſemper Spiritibus ſuis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare ſicut *Angelos* genuit, quibus *Immortalitas* ſine ullo malorum periculo ac metu conſtat, &c. *ibid.*

† *lib.* 7, 12. *lib* 2, 12. *lib.* 7, 4 & 5.

diſtance from each other; and not *Anima* (as you ſeem to underſtand it) but *Homo* is the Nominative Caſe to *ſit immortalis & in perpetua Luce verſetur*; And ſo far is the Author from making the Soul's Immortality *conditional*, by theſe Words; that directly on the contrary he in this very Sentence means to ſay, that the Soul muſt of Neceſſity be *Immortal* in all circumſtances; only with this difference, that * if *a Man lives after the Spirit, his* Immortality *ſhall be a* Happy *one*; *but if he live after the Fleſh, his* Immortality *muſt be a* Miſerable *one*. When therefore you ſay that *the way, according to* Lactantius, *taken by Providence, for making Man's actual Mortality or Immortality the Reward or Puniſhment of his Free-will was to join his Soul to his Body immediately, which being it ſelf Frail and Mortal, could not ſecure the Soul from actual Mortality*; and That *this he ſuppoſes would make the Complex of the Soul and Body actually Mortal*; you might with the *ſame Truth*; and with as much *appearance of Reaſon*, have ſaid, that *Lactantius* wrote his Book with a deſign to diſprove the whole Chriſtian Religion, or any other particular Article of it whatſoever. Again, when *Lactantius* ſays, that † *ſince this Temporal Life is ſucceeded by Temporal Death, it follows that the Soul muſt* riſe again *to eternal Life, becauſe temporal Death has an End*; It is a very great and palpable

* Ex rebus diverſis ac repugnantibus *Homo* factus eſt; —— ut, ſi Anima ſuperaverit, quæ ex Deo oritur, ſit immortalis & in perpetua luce verſetur; ſi autem Corpus vicerit, —— ſit in tenebris ſempiternis & in Morte. Cujus [Mortis] non ea vis eſt, ut injuſtas animas extinguat omnino, ſed ut puniat in æternum. *lib.* 2, 12.

† Quia temporalem vitam temporalis mors ſequitur, conſequens eſt ut *reſurgant* animæ ad vitam perennem, quia finem mors temporalis accepit. *lib.* 7. §. 10.

palpable misrepresentation, to infer from these words, (as you do, *pag.* 73,) that *Lactantius was so far from owning the Immortality of the Soul, as natural to it, that he seems to own its actual Death, for the space between the Death of the Body and the Resurrection; and therefore ascribes the Resurrection to the Soul as well as the Body:* For what can be a grosser misrepresentation of any Author, than from one single Passage (even supposing that Passage not reconcileable with the rest,) to affirm that his Opinion was just contrary to what he largely and expressly almost in every Page of his Book declares it to be? But after all, this Passage is not difficult to be reconciled: For when he who says a hundred times in his Book, that the Soul has no dependance on the Body, but subsists as well and better after it is separated from it, says in one single Passage that Mens Souls do [*resurgere*] *rise again* to eternal Life; can any thing be more evident than that his meaning is, that the Souls shall be * *united again* to their Bodies at the *Resurrection* before the Judgment? It is an easy Figure, and very usual in the best Authors, and in the Scripture it self, to signify by the Word [*Soul*] the same as [*Person*] in general: Thus *Gen.* xlvi. 26, *All the Souls that came with Jacob* into *Egypt*, &c. And *Lev.* v. 2, *If a Soul touch any unclean thing*, &c. In which places nothing can be more absurd than to understand *Soul* in the strict and proper Sense of the Word: And yet there is just as much Reason so to do, as, from the Passage now cited, to conclude that *Lactantius*, contrary to what he expressly declares in almost every Page of his

* A Deo corporibus induentur. *lib.* 7, 23. rursus carne induentur. *ibid.* 21.

his Book, was of Opinion that *the Soul died with the Body.* Had not the World deſervedly an Opinion of your great Learning, there would be no need to take notice of ſuch extraordinary miſconſtructions: Which really, Sir, in your repreſentation of this Author, appear to have proceeded from greater Prejudice, or greater Want of Care, than Men of your known Abilities are ordinarily guilty of. At laſt you come off, *pag.* 75, with ſaying that *Lactantius*'s Reaſonings *either prove or are conſiſtent with a precarious Immortality; at leaſt even by our modern Reaſonings, do not imply any Neceſſity of an Immortality by Nature:* And who, I beſeech you, ever taught any other Immortality of the Soul, than a *precarious* one; that is, depending on the pleaſure of God Almighty? Or who ever imagined, that any thing which was γεννητὸν and had a beginning, was not alſo capable of Being deſtroyed and having an end, if God ſhould ſo pleaſe?

You begin with St *Athanaſius* (*Sect.* 21,) very ominouſly; Acknowledging that *he does indeed own the Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality, as a Doctrine of the Church:* Which he does, not only in * the Words you cite from him, but alſo largely and fully in many other places of his *Oratio contra Gentes*; ſtiling the Soul † *rational and immortal*; affirming that ‖ *when it is ſeparated from the Body, it will have a much clearer knowledge of its own Immortality*; *and* proving its Immortality diſtinctly from ſeveral Topicks and Arguments:

* Ὅτι ὃ κὴ ἀθάνατον γέγονεν ἡ ψυχὴ, ⸂τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι⸃ ⸂ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησιαστικῇ διδασκαλίᾳ.⸃ *Orat. cont. Gent.*

† τί ἓν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πάλιν, ἢ ψυχὴ λογικὴ κὴ ἀθάνατον, *ibid.*

‖ Πῶς ἐχὶ μᾶλλον κὴ πολλῷ πλέον, ἀπολυθεῖσα τοῦ σώματος, —— φανερωτέραν ἕξει τὴν τῆς ἀθανασίας γνῶσιν. *ibid.*

ments: *If the Soul*, ſaith * he, *be diſtinct from the Body; as we have before ſhown; and the Body is mortal; It follows neceſſarily, that the Soul, being diſtinct from the Body, muſt be immortal:* And again; *The Soul*, ſaith † he, *therefore meditates and thinks upon things immortal and eternal, becauſe it is itſelf Immortal; For as the Body, being it ſelf Mortal, has all its Senſes employed about mortal things; ſo the Soul, whoſe Faculties are employed about immortal things, muſt it ſelf of neceſſity be immortal and live for ever:* Theſe Arguments are plainly drawn from the *Nature* of the *Soul it ſelf*, and are directly contrary to your Notion of an *Immortalizing Spirit or Will* of God: And accordingly, ſpeaking of the Heathens, he expreſſes himſelf in the very ſame manner concerning *Their* Souls in particular; *If they pretend to believe*, ſaith ‖ he, *that they have a Soul, and value themſelves upon their Rational Faculties, as they juſtly may; why, as if they had no Soul, do they act contrary to Reaſon, and not think as they ought to do, but make God a Being meaner than themſelves? For having themſelves an* immortal *and inviſible Soul, yet they make God like to things viſible and mortal.* When therefore to *Athanaſius*'s general Aſſertion concerning the *Immortality of the Soul*, you anſwer, that That does not concern your Cauſe, becauſe

* Εἰ γὰρ ἄλλῳ αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξε παρὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ σῶμα φύσει θνητόν· ἀνάγκη τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τῷ μὴ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. *ibid.*

† Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ ἀθάνατα καὶ αἰώνια λογίζεται καὶ φρονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ. Καὶ ὥσπερ τῷ σώματι θνητῷ τυγχάνοντος, θνητὰ καὶ αἱ τούτῳ θεωροῦσιν αἰσθήσεις, οὕτως ἀθάνατα θεωροῦσαν καὶ λογιζομένην τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ ζῆν. *ibid.*

‖ Εἰ δὲ ψυχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν [*al.* αὐχοῦσιν] ἔχειν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ λογικῷ μέγα φρονοῦσιν, εἰκότως τοῦτο ποιοῦντες· διοτὶ ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες ψυχὴν, παρὰ λόγον τολμῶσι, καὶ οὐκ ἃ δεῖ φρονεῖν φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ χρείττονας ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τοῦ Θείου ποιοῦσι; ψυχὴν γὰρ ἀθάνατον ἔχοντες καὶ μὴ βλεπομένην αὐτοῖς, τὸν θεὸν ὡς τοῖς βλεπομένοις καὶ θνητοῖς ἀπεικάζουσιν. *ibid.*

becauſe your Queſtion is not whether the Soul be *Immortal*, but whether it be *Immortal in its own Nature*; you are guilty of a very great Fallacy: For if by the Soul's being *Immortal in its own Nature*, you intend to expreſs what we mean, that the Soul by the powers given it at its firſt Creation is naturally able to continue for ever; then *Athanaſius*'s Aſſertion *does concern* your Cauſe; becauſe, in all the places now cited, he expreſsly maintains the *natural Immortality* of the Soul in that Senſe: But if by *Immortal in its own Nature*, you mean *neceſſarily Immortal*, as God is; then neither *Athanaſius*, nor we, nor perhaps any Body elſe, ever meant that the Soul was *Immortal in its own Nature*.

From the Paſſages therefore now cited, wherein *Athanaſius* ſo expreſsly and very largely aſſerts the *natural Immortality* of the Soul, it is very reaſonable to conclude, that all thoſe Paſſages in His Book *de Incarnatione verbi Dei*, which you underſtand to imply a *natural Mortality of the Soul*, ought (that they may not be inconſiſtent with what he ſo fully and expreſsly aſſerts elſewhere) to be underſtood concerning that natural Mortality which is the Diſſolution of the Body and Separation of the Soul, without determining what becomes of the Soul after that Separation. And thoſe Paſſages may the better be underſtood in that Senſe, becauſe they are all ſpoken concerning that Mortality *Adam* incurred by his Sin in Paradice; the Conſequence of which Mortality, with reſpect to the State of the Soul ſeparated thereby from the Body, antecedent to the Promiſe of Chriſt, was not a Queſtion neceſſary to be entered into. And this is ſtill the more confirmed by

This,

This, that even those Phrases, θανάτῳ κρατήσαντος, φθορᾶς παραμυθίας ἐν τῇ τοῦ θανάτου φθορᾷ μένειν and the like; which seems at first sight to make the most for your purpose; it is plain need not to be understood to express the *total Extinction or utter Annihilation* of *Adam*, if Christ had never been promised; but either his having no ground to expect any Restoration to his former state by a *Resurrection of the Body*; which seems to be the meaning of them in some places; or else (which is evidently their Signification in some other places,) *Death's continuing to prevail and extend it self over his Posterity*: Thus, *When Adam had sinned*, saith* he, *Death entred into the World; and this Destruction prevailed more and more over the whole Race of Mankind. For Men increased and multiplied their Sins beyond measure: And therefore Death prevaiing more and more, and this Destruction continuing to have Dominion over Men, the whole Race of Mankind was lost.*

* Τούτου ὖ γενομένου, οἱ μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἀπέθνησκον, ἡ ὖ φθορὰ λοιπὸν κατ' αὐτῶν ἤκμασεν. καὶ πλείων τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἰσχύουσα καθ' ὅλου τοῦ γένους· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλημμελήμασιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἄχρις ὁρων ὡρισμένων εἰστήκεισαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπεκτεινόμενοι, λοιπὸν καὶ εἰς ἄμετρον ἐληλύθασι.——Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα πλεῖον ὖ θανάτου κρατήσαντος, καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς παραμυθίας κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐφθείρετο. *De Incarnat. Verbi.*

The same thing (namely, that the Phrases before-mentioned do not signify the total Extinction of *Adam* both Soul and Body, if Christ had never been promised; but only That Mortality which is the Dissolution of the Body, and separation of the Soul;) may also be gathered from those other Expressions of the same Author in his Book *de Incarnatione Christi*, from some of which you very unreasonably endeavour (*pag.* 85,) to conclude the direct contrary. For when he speaks of the Soul's being

held [ἐν δεσμοῖς] *in Bonds*, and [ἐν δεσμοῖς θανάτου] *in the Bonds of Death*; it is plain this does not ſignify *the Extinction* of the Soul, but its confinement to [Ἅιδης] *the ſeparate State*. And therefore, ſpeaking of Chriſt's delivering Men from that Mortality which was the Conſequence of *Adam*'s Sin, he ſaith *; *To that place where the Body of Man was corrupted, thither did the Body of Chriſt go; and to that Place, where* the Soul of Man was detained *in Death, thither did Chriſt go with his Humane Soul*, &c. In which Paſſage it is evident, that by the Words [κεκράτητο ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ Ἀνθρωπίνη ἐν θανάτῳ] *the Soul of Man was detained in Death*, is not meant the *Extinction* of the Soul, but its *Confinement to* [Ἅιδης] *that ſeparate State*, to which the Soul of Chriſt deſcended. And in that very Paſſage, where from the Souls being concerned in the Sentence [θανάτῳ ἀποθανῇ] *thou ſhalt ſurely die*, you would infer the *Extinction* of the Soul; if you had cited the Words at length, it would have appeared that *juſt the contrary* was intended: The Words are theſe; *God*, ſaith* he, *paſſed upon Man a double Sentence of Puniſhment; ſaying to his earthly Body, Duſt thou art, and unto Duſt ſhalt thou return; and ſo the Body turned into Corruption; And to his Soul, Thou ſhalt ſurely die; and ſo the Man was ſeparated, and condemned to depart into two different places*: From the laſt of which Words it

* Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὅπου διεφθάρη τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα, ἐκεῖ προῆλθεν Ἰησοῦς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα. Καὶ ὅπου κεκράτητο ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐν θανάτῳ, ἐκεῖ ἐπιδείκνυται ὁ Χριστὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἰδίαν ἔσαν, &c. *De Incarn. Chriſti contra Apollinar. lib.* 1.

* Διπλῆς τῆς τιμωρίας τὴν ἀπόφασιν δέδωκε· τῷ μὲν γηΐνῳ εἰρηκὼς, Γῆ εἶ, καὶ εἰς γῆν ἀπελεύσῃ. καὶ ἕως ὑποδέχεται φθορὰ τὸ σῶμα, δεσπότου ἐπιφθεγξαμένου· Τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ, θανάτῳ ἀποθανῇ· ἕως ὅτου δίχα διαιρεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐν δυσὶ τόποις οἴχεσθαι καταδικάζεται. *ibid.*

is very evident, that by applying that Threatning [θανάτῳ ἀποθανῇ] *thou ſhalt ſurely die*, to the Soul; he did not mean its *Extinction*, but its *Separation* and *Confinement to* [Ἅιδης] *the ſeparate State.*

Your laſt Citation out of this Author, (*pag.* 86,) is very remarkable. Againſt certain Hereticks who taught that the Soul was *corporeal*, he argues from thoſe Words of our Saviour, *Fear not them that kill the Body, but cannot kill the Soul. If*, ſaith * he, *the Soul be, as you Appollinariſts contend, corporeal; why cannot it be killed and periſh with the Body? And why doth St* Peter, *ſpeaking of ſeparate Souls, call them Spirits? Here* you ſay, *the* [σαρκικὴ ψυχὴ] fleſhly or corporeal Soul, *is plainly oppoſed to the* [πνευματικὴ] Spiritual Soul, *and for that reaſon is ſuppoſed as capable of being killed by Men, as the Body it ſelf.* Is not this very extraordinary? when the plain and expreſs Meaning of *Athanaſius*, is to ſhow that there can be no ſuch thing at all as [σαρκικὴ ψυχὴ] *a fleſhly or corporeal Soul*; becauſe, if there was, it would be capable of being killed, which our Saviour ſays cannot be.

* Πῶς εἰ σαρκικὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' ὑμᾶς, ὐ σωθνήσκει τῷ σώματι, ἢ συμφθείρεται; πῶς ὃ ὁ Πέτρος τὰς ἐν Ἅιδῃ κατεχομένας ψυχὰς, πνεύματα ὀνομάσας, &c. *De adventu Chriſti contra Apollinar. lib.* 2.

All that you ſay, *Sect.* 23, ſeems to be utterly Unintelligible: And thoſe words in particular, *pag.* 91, (which I have before had an occaſion to take notice of,) where you ſuppoſe the Soul to be *Something diſtinct* both *from Spirit*, and alſo from *Matter and Motion*; that is to ſay, a *Material Form*; an *active Subſtantial Principle, diſtinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter* in eſſe, in fieri, in operari, *and*

which muſt accordingly be diſſolved on the diſſolution of that Matter on which it depends: Theſe words, I ſay, appear ſo very abſurd and contradictory in themſelves, that no Confutation of them can be ſtronger than the bare tranſcribing them.

You ſeem very certain, *Sect.* 24, that your Doctrine can have no *ill Influence* upon Mens preſent *Practice*; becauſe, though you aſſert indeed the *natural Mortality* of the Soul, yet you teach at the ſame time, that the Souls of all thoſe, who hear of the Goſpel, whether they imbrace it or no, ſhall be *actually immortalized*; and ſo bad Men can take no advantage of the Doctrine concerning the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, to encourage themſelves in their Wickedneſs with the Hopes of Impunity. But can you really think, Sir, that it is a thing of no ill conſequence in Practice, to raiſe new diſputes, to fill the Minds of weak and unſtable Men with endleſs Doubts and Scruples, and the Mouths of the Profane with new Topicks of Scepticiſm and Raillery, againſt the moſt important and fundamental Doctrines of all Religion? Or can you be indeed perſwaded, that ſuch Men as are pleaſed with ſome of your Notions, will as readily admit all the reſt alſo? You are forced to make a new and diſtinct Hypotheſis upon every particular occaſion: You firſt ſuppoſe the Soul of Man naturally Mortal; and then, to ſecure to good Men the Unchangeable State of Heaven, you are forced to ſuppoſe *their* Souls præternaturally immortalized to Happineſs by the Divine Spirit: Yet, becauſe all who receive that Divine Spirit, do not ſo behave themſelves as to be capable of the Happineſs of Heaven, you are forced

(though

* *Præmon.* p. 22. compared with your *Diſcourſe pag.* 8 & 31.

(though * unwillingly) to ſuppoſe ſome of them immortalized by the ſame Divine Spirit to Puniſhment; And after this, leaſt thoſe who reject the Goſpel, and never receive the Divine immortalizing Spirit at all, ſhould take advantage of the Soul's natural Mortality to encourage themſelves with hopes of Impunity in their Wickedneſs, you are forced to ſuppoſe *Their* Souls made immortal without any immortalizing Principle at all, by the mere Omnipotence and Arbitrary Pleaſure of God. Now, all theſe Hypotheſes appearing very precarious and independent on each other; is it not very obvious to perceive that profane Men will very gladly and with great advantage make uſe of all your Arguments for the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul; and drop the following parts of your Hypotheſis? And indeed I cannot ſee, but you muſt in ſome meaſure be anſwerable for this ill Conſequence. For it is not enough to prevent the natural and obvious ill Conſequences of an Hypotheſis, that a learned and ingenious Man is able to invent ſuch further Suppoſitions, and to find out ſuch Shifts and Diſtinctions, by which he ſhall think he can evade the force of thoſe Conſequences. There is hardly any Opinion ſo extravagant or of ſo miſchievous conſequence, but an ingenious Man may maintain it in ſuch manner, as that upon his whole Hypotheſis it ſhall not be eaſy to charge him with any ill conſequence, for which he will not be able to find ſome evaſion: And yet he that maintains it, muſt nevertheleſs be anſwerable for ſuch ill Conſequences, as are naturally apt to follow from the Opinion it ſelf, without the additional Hypotheſes which are made uſe of to ſalve it. The Epicureans, who taught that *Pleaſure was the Chief Good*

Good, when they were charged with the obvious ill Conſequences of that Doctrine, were provided to make ſuch ingenious Explications of it, that they thought themſelves abundantly able to evade all thoſe ill Conſequences that could be drawn from it: Yet that Doctrine was evidently a very pernicious Doctrine; and they who maintained it, could not be excuſed (as *Cicero* has largely ſhown) from being anſwerable for thoſe Conſequences, which were but * too naturally drawn from it by the generality of Men, who would not attend to the Subtilties and Diſtinctions of thoſe Philoſophers. He that will ſuppoſe Men to have *no Soul at all*, but that their Life is entirely extinguiſhed at the Diſſolution of the Body; and at the ſame time ſuppoſes that at the Reſurrection their Life ſhall be reſtored again, and continue for ever; will be ſure to pretend that no ill Conſequence can be drawn from his Doctrine, becauſe he ſuppoſes Men actually and in event as much Immortal, as if they *had Souls really diſtinct from their Bodies*: And yet I believe you your ſelf make no doubt but That Opinion is a very pernicious one. He that will affirm that there is no other Subſtance in the World but *Matter*; and at the ſame time ſuppoſes Matter capable of all the ſame Powers and Attributes, which we aſcribe to Spirit; may likewiſe with the ſame Reaſon pretend, that no ill Conſequence can be drawn from his Opinion: And yet no Body can doubt but ſuch an Opinion leads directly to Atheiſm. It is not therefore ſo very clear, as you ſeem to ſuppoſe it to be, that none of thoſe Conſequences are to be charged upon you,

* Quaſi ego id curem quid ille *aiat* aut *negat*: illud quæro, quid ei *conſentaneum* ſit dicere, qui, &c. *Cicero*.

you, which (if your whole Hypotheſis be granted) you can find indeed a way of evading.

You attempt to prove (*Sect.* 25,) that *the Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no Ingredient in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themſelves*; by ſaying, *that the popular Heathens believed only their firſt Anceſtors to have been Gods*; *their next to have been Heroes or Demi-Gods, and the later Generations to have been pure Men*; *Unleſs the Supreme Being were pleaſed* (*even in the degenerous Ages*) *to confer the nobler Principle on ſome choice Favourites.* Here you ſeem to *forget*, that the *popular Heathens* (as you call them) had all a Notion of *Elyſian Fields* and of a *Tartarus*, that is, of a Place of future Happineſs or Miſery, where the Souls of thoſe which you call *pure* or mere *Men* were to be diſpoſed of, either to continue there for ever, or to come out upon new revolutions, but not to be extinguiſhed. Yet preſently after, (*pag.* 96,) you ſay that by the oldeſt Tradition, *all Souls were ſuppoſed to have the Divine Principle connatural to them*; And the reſt of the Section is wholly ſpent in explaining the Notions of thoſe whom you call (*pag.* 100,) the *Traditional travelling Philoſophers*, who believed that Human Souls underwent many Purgations and different Revolutions, but that *no part of the divine Seed might periſh finally*; and that *all Humane Souls were thus far at leaſt of a divine extraction, not as the Notion of Divine might intitle them to infinite Perfection, but as it might at leaſt intitle them to Immortality.* All which is ſo far from being any thing to your purpoſe, of proving that the *Immortalizing Principle was generally believed*

no

no ingredient, in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themſelves; that on the contrary it ſeems to me to prove rather directly againſt you.

Sect. 26, You all along confound either *neceſſary Immortality*, or elſe the Notion of *Præ-exiſtence* and Revolutions of Souls, with *natural Immortality*. That which any of the Primitive Chriſtian blamed *Plato* and *Origen* for, was not their aſſerting the *Immortality* of the Soul, but its *Præ-exiſtence* and everlaſting *Revolutions*. Their Maxim, that *whatever had a Beginning, muſt therefore be capable likewiſe of having an End*, does not at all prove againſt *natural*, but only againſt *neceſſary Immortality*, that is, *neceſſary and independent Exiſtence*: As is evident from what you your ſelf obſerve, that *upon this Principle they owned none Immortal but God himſelf*; *No, not the Angels*; And that the Apoſtle affirms of God, [ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, 1 *Tim.* vi. 16,] that *He only* has Immortality, *as being the* αὐτο ἀθανασία *from whom All that will pretend to Immortality, muſt derive it, and not from their own Nature*; that is, not from the *Neceſſity of their own Nature*, but from the *Will* of God: who was pleaſed to create them *Immortal*, and upon whom (notwithſtanding their Immortality, that is, notwithſtanding their natural Power of continuing for ever, without being liable to be deſtroyed by any created Force,) they nevertheleſs continually depend for their Preſervation.

Ariſtotle by affirming the immortal Soul to be [θυράθεν] *from without*, means plainly that it is *Something diſtinct from the Body*, and not (as you interpret him, *pag.* 101,) that it is *not*

ingredient in the Conſtitution of Mankind in general, or (as you * elſewhere expreſs your ſelf) that it is a *præternatural Principle*; as if, *naturally*, Men had no rational Souls at all.

* *Præmon. pag.* 24 & *Diſcourſe pag.* 300.

The other Maxim you mention, *That nothing that is paſſible can be Immortal*, proves likewiſe only againſt *neceſſary*, not againſt *natural Immortality*. For a Thing's being capable to be acted upon, does not at all prove that it is capable of being deſtroyed by any natural Power. Every perfectly ſolid Particle of Matter it ſelf, is incapable of being deſtroyed or even divided by any Power of Nature, though it is as capable of being moved and agitated and acted upon, as any compound Body. The Soul may in like manner be very capable of ſuffering and of being acted upon; and yet it will not at all follow, that it is capable of being deſtroyed by any natural Power. Thoſe of the Antients, who *proved that the Soul of the rich Man in the Parable, muſt have been Corruptible becauſe it ſuffered Torment*; you acknowledge, prove at the ſame time that it *muſt* likewiſe *have been Corporeal*: But the *Corporality* of the Soul, you know, was taught only by one or two Men. The reſt were all of a different Opinion. And *Lactantius* is very particular and expreſs in anſwering that Objection; * *If the Soul be immortal, how then is it paſſible and capable of enduring Puniſhment? and if it be capable of pain, how is it not capable of Diſſolution?* The Anſwer he gives, is; firſt, † *that* (according to the Notion of the Stoicks) *the Souls of Men, though by reaſon of their Divine Original they*

* Si eſt immortalis anima; quomodo patibilis inducitur, ac pœnæ ſentiens? *lib.* 7. §. 20.

† Ejus naturæ reddi animas, ut ſi non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo ſunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, &c. *ibid.*

they cannot indeed be extinguiſhed, yet by being immerſed in Senſe and depraved by Sin, they may become liable to Miſery and Puniſhment. Secondly, * *that though we indeed do not know how Immaterial Things can be acted upon, yet God has as much Power over them, as over corporeal Things:* And laſtly, † *that in order to endure Puniſhment, the Souls ſhall again be united to their Bodies.* All which Paſſages undeniably ſhow that *Lactantius* did not think the Soul naturally corruptible, and preſerved præternaturally by the Power of God; but on the contrary, that the Soul was naturally Immortal, but by the Power of God made capable of enduring Puniſhment.

* Tantam eſſe Dei poteſtatem, ut etiam incorporalia comprehendat, & quemadmodum voluerit, afficiat. Nam & Angeli Deum metuunt, &c. Quid ergo mirum, ſi cum ſint immortales animæ, tamen patibles ſint Deo? *ibid.* §. 21.

† Sed tamen docent nos ſanctæ literæ. quemadmodum pœnas impii ſint laturi. Nam quia peccata in corporibus contraxerunt, rurſus carne induentur, ut in corporibus piaculum ſolvant. *ibid.*

If there was any ſtrength in the Argument you make uſe of *Sect.* 27; that *becauſe the* actual *Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the Goſpel, therefore it is not capable of being proved by Reaſon from the Nature of the Soul it ſelf*; It would follow by the ſame Argument, that *Moral Obligations*, becauſe they are *Revelations* of the Will of God in the Goſpel, therefore are not capable of being proved by Reaſon, from the Nature of God, of Men, and of Things. Some things revealed in the Goſpel, are indeed of ſuch a Nature that they could not have been known *at all* without Revelation: But others (of which the *Immortality of the Soul* is one,) are ſuch as were capable of being in great meaſure diſcovered by the Light of Na-

ture and right Reaſon; but yet by the Revelation of the Goſpel, are made known with much greater *Certainty*, greater *Clearneſs*, greater *Authority*, and in a *Manner* much better *fitted* to all *Capacities*. This ſeems to be the proper Meaning of the Word [φωτίσαντος 2 *Tim.* i. 10,] *has brought to Light*, has *clearly diſcovered*, has *univerſally and evidently made known*, that which before was but *obſcurely* and *difficultly*, and *imperfectly* underſtood. The Alluſion you ſuppoſe to be between the Words [*has brought Life and Immortality to* Light *through the Goſpel*,] and thoſe other words of the Apoſtle, [*an Inheritance incorruptible, that fadeth not away, of the Saints in* Light,] is indeed ſome little Similitude of Words; the word *Light* being uſed in both places; but not the leaſt Alluſion or Similitude in Senſe. And indeed you ſeem your ſelf to be conſcious of the weakneſs of your Argument in this whole Matter; by your ſaying that the Immortality
* *pag.* 106. of the Soul, *at leaſt* * *in Heaven*, is plainly ſuppoſed not to be known without divine Re-
† *Pag* 104. velation; and again, *At leaſt* † *as to the giving us that immortal Life in Heaven*; and, That the Immortality of the Soul could not have been
‡ *pag.* 106. otherwiſe known with ‡ *that Certainty* that might *ſupport the Practice which Religion expects in conſequence of it*; and again, That it could not have
‖ *pag.* 104. been known, at *leaſt* ‖ *with that Aſſurance* which was *requiſite for the Practice which Religion requires purſuant to the Belief of it.*

That the *Sadducees*, (*Sect.* 28,) denied the *Immortality of the Soul*, is very true; But then it is worth obſerving, that the ſame Men aſſerted alſo that there was *no Reſurrection, neither An-*

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gel nor Spirit, Acts xxiii. 6. Your Interpretation of which words, is very extraordinary. *What is the meaning of* Spirit *here, as it is joined with* Angel, you ſay *is manifeſt: It is that* Immortalizing Spirit *which makes us* Ἰσαγγέλους, *that is, Immortal and entitled to Heaven, as well as the Angels are: That ſame Spirit indeed by which the Angels themſelves are entitled to Immortality.— This therefore obliged them* [the Sadducees] *to deny the actual Immortalizing of either Angels or Humane Souls, when they denied them Both that Spirit which could alone immortalize them.* Theſe Words, I think, need no Reflexion to be made upon them.

Your Interpretation (*Sect.* 31,) of that Text, 1 *Cor.* xv. 22, *As in Adam all die, even ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive*; ſeems very forced and unnatural. You underſtand it to ſignify, that as All who deſcended from *Adam*, muſt die; ſo All who are in Chriſt, that is, all Chriſtians, ſhall be made alive. But this Interpretation, if it was true, would prove too much for you; namely, that thoſe only who embraced, not thoſe who rejected the Goſpel, ſhould be raiſed again: And the general tenour of Scripture, which every where declares that Unbelievers, who never were *in Chriſt*, ſhall be raiſed to Condemnation; ſhows plainly that your Interpretation of this Text is wrong. And how the falſe Notion certain Hereticks had of a metaphorical Reſurrection, 2 *Tim.* ii. 18, tends to prove that St *Paul*'s true account of the literal Reſurrection, is to be underſtood in a particular and limited Senſe; is not eaſy to conceive.

Your Inference in the ſame place, againſt the Univerſality of the Reſurrection, from what the Apoſtle ſays concerning *Baptiſm*; ſeems likewiſe wholly precarious. For the Apoſtle does not in this Chapter ſay any thing, by which he might ſeem to ground the Reſurrection upon *Baptiſm:* But only, arguing againſt thoſe who pretended to be Chriſtians, and yet did not believe the Reſurrection of the Dead, he ſhows how abſurd it was for ſuch Perſons to be *baptized*, and thereby to expoſe themſelves to ſuch hazards as they muſt unavoidably do by their profeſſing Chriſtianity, if they had no expectation of a Reſurrection from the Dead. Whatever be the Meaning of that difficult Phraſe, of being *baptized for the Dead*; the Streſs of the Argument plainly lies upon theſe Words: *And why ſtand we in Jeopardy every Hour?* That *Baptiſm*, whatever it was, expoſed them to ſome hazard, and gave occaſion to their being perſecuted; and the Apoſtle's Argument is, that it was fooliſh for them to expoſe themſelves to ſuch danger needleſsly and to no purpoſe, if there was to be no ſuch thing as a Reſurrection from the Dead. The Apoſtle grounds the Reaſonableneſs of being baptized, and of embracing Chriſtianity, which was a perſecuted Religion; purely upon the Hopes of a Reſurrection from the Dead; But he does not at all ground the Reſurrection upon Baptiſm, nor ſays any thing which does in the leaſt inſinuate that the Reſurrection ſhould not be univerſal.

The Concluſion you draw (*Sect.* 32,) from what St *Paul* teaches, *Rom.* v. is very obſcure. The Sum of the Apoſtle's Doctrine, there, is

that

that That Condemnation which was brought upon Men by *Adam*, they are delivered from by Chriſt. How you can infer any thing from thence, againſt the univerſal Immortality of the Soul, I do not perceive. You ſuppoſe that thoſe over whom Death reigned between the times of *Adam* and *Moſes*, were extinguiſhed by a total Mortality both of Soul and Body; But the Death there ſpoken of, is plainly the ſame Death to which all other Men likewiſe are ſubject: For it is not ſaid, that Death reigned over *Them only*; but that Death reigned *even* over them alſo, as well as over the reſt of Mankind; notwithſtanding that they had not ſinned againſt any poſitive Law, as *Adam before*, and thoſe who lived under the Law did *after*; but were ſubject to Death, only as it was a natural Conſequence of *Adam*'s Tranſgreſſion: To infer from hence, that their Souls as well as Bodies, were ſubject to that Mortality, is begging the Queſtion which was undertaken to be proved. Thoſe who are ſubject to Death in conſequence of *Adam*'s Tranſgreſſion, are indeed ſtiled *Many*, *ver* 15 and 19; as thoſe to whom the Benefit of Chriſt's Death redounds, are alſo in the ſame place ſtiled *Many*: But thoſe *Many* who die through the Offence of One, are, *ver.* 12 and 18, expreſsly called *All Men*; and there is no good reaſon to ſuppoſe, but that the Death of Chriſt, who was promiſed immediately upon the Fall of *Adam*, may conditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit under different Diſpenſations, to all Men likewiſe. To ſay that the Dominion of Death, ſignifies in this place ſomething peculiar, under which *all Men are not included*; becauſe the Apoſtle affirms that *Death reigned from* Adam *to* Moſes,

even

even over them that had not ſinned after the ſimilitude of Adam's *Tranſgreſſion*; is very ſingular and groundleſs: For the Dominion of Death is not there *confined* (as you ſuppoſe it) *to the ſpace between Adam and Moſes*; ſo as to ſignify a particular kind of Death prevailing at that Time, an Extinction of Soul as well as Diſſolution of the Body; But the Apoſtle's Aſſertion is plainly This, that in Conſequence of *Adam*'s Tranſgreſſion, Death (in the common acceptation of Mortality) reigned in that ſpace of time alſo, even over them that had not tranſgreſſed any poſitive Law *after the ſimilitude of Adam's Tranſgreſſion*, as well as over thoſe who had in their own Perſons diſobeyed poſitive Laws. From whence how any thing can be collected to *your* purpoſe, is very difficult to imagine.

Whether that Text, *Joh.* i. 9, That *was the true Light, which lighteth every Man that cometh into the World*; was ever alledged by Any, *to prove that an Immortalizing Spirit is given to every Particular by Chriſt himſelf*; I cannot tell. But I think your Interpretation of it, (*Sect.* 33,) is utterly unintelligible. *The* πνοὴ, you
* *pag.* 136. * ſay, *is That which our Apoſtle* here *makes in all Men*, [*in every Man that cometh into the World,*] *inlightned by the viſitation of the* λόγος, *as an external Principle: Yet ſo as not to make any change in the Nature, in the Perſon ſo inlightned, without peculiar divine Favour, and diſpoſitions in the Recipient, for ſuch an Union with the* λόγος, *as may qualify it for the divine Favour of raiſing it above its own Nature: Till then, they are ſeparable again, and this external Viſitation of the* λόγος, *leaves the viſited* ψυχὴ, *as Mortal as it found it,*

where

where there is no particular deſign of God for Immortalizing it to Puniſhment. What the meaning of this, and all that follows in that Section is; and how you collect it from the fore-cited Text of St *John*; is not, I believe, poſſible to be underſtood.

When St *Paul* ſays, 1 *Theſſ.* iv. 16, that the *dead in Chriſt* ſhall *riſe firſt*; Theſe words do not indeed prove that there muſt afterwards be a Reſurrection of them that never heard of Chriſt: becauſe the *dead in Chriſt*, which are here ſaid to *riſe firſt*, are not, it is true, oppoſed in this place to the dead *out of Chriſt*, but to them that ſhall be found *alive in Chriſt* at the time of the Judgment: (Where note by the by, that you * miſinterpret this Text, by oppoſing the *dead in Chriſt*, and which are ſaid to *riſe firſt*, not, as the Apoſtle does, to them that ſhall be found *alive in Chriſt*, but to *thoſe who had been formerly in Chriſt and did not die in him*, or to *thoſe who might have been in him if they had pleaſed, but never were in him actually.*) But other places of Scripture, as has been before ſhown, do ſufficiently prove the Univerſality of the Reſurrection: And particularly that parallel Text, 1 *Cor.* xv. 23; where the ſame Apoſtle ſays, that *every Man* ſhall be raiſed *in his own Order*; *Chriſt the Firſt-fruits, afterwards they that are Chriſts at his coming*; And *then cometh the end*, &c. Which words being immediately ſubjoined to that univerſal declaration, *As in Adam all die, even ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive*; cannot, without great force, be interpreted to any other Senſe, but that *the End* muſt ſignify the general Reſurrection of all the Dead. See *Rev.* xx. *ver.* 5, 12 and 13.

* *pag.* 141.

Your

Your Interpretation (*Sect.* 35,) of that Text, Rom. ii. 12, *As many as have ſinned without Law, ſhall alſo periſh without Law, and as many as have ſinned in the Law, ſhall be judged by the Law*; is not only groundleſs; the word [ἀπολοῦνται, *ſhall periſh*] which you underſtand to ſignify *Annihilation*, or *bare ceaſing to be*, being evidently Synonymous to [κριθήσονται *ſhall be judged*;] But alſo (as I before obſerved upon your *Præmonition*, *Sect.* 6,) you thereby overthrow all the Threatnings of the Goſpel, which frequently expreſs the Puniſhment even of the worſt of Sinners by that ſame word [ἀπολοῦνται, *ſhall periſh*] which you here interpret to ſignify only *a bare ceaſing to be*. You are your ſelf ſenſible of this difficulty, *pag.* 143; where you confeſs, that *though the word, Periſh, may bear that milder Senſe of only ceaſing to be, yet it is alſo uſed in the Scriptures, concerning them whom all muſt believe liable to the ſevereſt poſitive Inflictions.* You ſeem indeed ſenſible, I ſay, of this difficulty upon your Interpretation: But yet you give no anſwer to it: Only you ſay, *pag.* 144, that though *the word will indeed bear a larger Signification, yet in this place Annihilation may perhaps be more natural.* Is not this a very ſingular manner of arguing? To * collect from the ſignification of the word ἀπολοῦνται, that thoſe of whom it is here ſpoken, ſhall only ceaſe to be; and yet at the ſame time to confeſs that in other places of Scripture That word has no ſuch Signification; only *in this place, Annihilation may, perhaps, be more natural.*

* See *Præmon. pag.* 35.

Your Interpretation of thoſe other words of the Apoſtle, that *when the Gentiles which have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, theſe having not the Law, are a Law*

unto

unto themſelves; is no leſs extraordinary; Namely, that the Gentiles being a *Law unto themſelves*; does not ſignify their Obligation to obey the Law of nature, with reſpect to future Rewards and Puniſhments; but only there * *owning the Reaſonableneſs of the things impoſed as a Law by God on the Jews, but not on themſelves*; which *would no further oblige Them to the Obſervation of them, than as their own Intereſts might prevail with them to obſerve them, as they would avoid the Puniſhments, and obtain the Rewards of Providence in This Life.* Is not this very wonderful; that the Gentiles ſhould be able to judge of the *Reaſonableneſs* of God's moral Law to the *Jews*, and yet not be ſenſible that the *Reaſonableneſs of the Thing* laid a ſtrong Obligation upon themſelves alſo? Or that they ſhould be ſenſible of an Obligation laid upon them to live virtuouſly (which it would ſometimes happen they could not do without expoſing even their Life it ſelf,) and yet not have any ground to expect a future Judgment, nor any other Rewards and Puniſhments than in the preſent Life? Is not this, deſtroying the very Nature of Virtue and Vice; and contrary to ſome of your own Arguments, *Sect.* 47, *and elſewhere?*

* *pag.* 144.

Is it not a very conſiſtent Notion, to ſuppoſe as you do, (*Sect.* 35, 36, *and elſewhere*,) that the Souls of Men, though naturally mortal, yet are neither diſſolved with their Bodies, nor yet periſh afterwards by any natural Decay; but ſurvive, and continue to ſubſiſt in a ſeparate State; and none of them ever periſh actually by that Decay and Mortality which you ſuppoſe natural to Them; but that thoſe who

ſhall

ſhall neither be immortalized to Happineſs nor to Puniſhment, ſhall yet ſubſiſt till the general Judgment, and then be diſſolved by that *exquiſite Fire which is to prevail in the laſt Conflagration, at leaſt ſo far as to deprive them of any ſenſibility of Pain?* Is not this Notion more properly a ſuppoſing them to be naturally Immortal, that is, capable of ſubſiſting for ever by the Powers given them at their original Production; but that God, by the interpoſition of his Almighty Power, præternaturally deſtroys at the laſt day, ſuch of them as are neither capable of eternal Happineſs, nor yet deſerve eternal Puniſhment? This certainly would have been rather the more conſiſtent Scheme of the two, and ſomewhat a more defenſible Explication of your Notion, (with reſpect to the *bare Reaſon* of the Thing,) than to affirm that all Souls are *naturally mortal*, and yet that none of them ever die by a *natural Decay and Mortality*. But your Hypotheſis however varied, would not yet have been truly conſiſtent. For why, I beſeech you, muſt it needs be ſuppoſed, that God cannot diſpoſe of all his rational Creatures into States ſuitable to their ſeveral Natures, and proportionable to their ſeveral Capacities and Deſerts, without deſtroying and taking away their Being? And what can be more forced and diſagreeable to Reaſon, than to ſuppoſe that the Sodomites and Ninevites, and other Heathens of all Sorts, muſt indeed all appear at the Day of Judgment, but yet that their appearance there will be * *with no Deſign of concerning them in the Judgment of the Day, but only in the retroſpective part of the day, for vindicating the Divine Providence, in relation to what had been tranſacted by it formerly?* You imagine

* *pag.* 148.

imagine indeed, * that *the Sodomites and Egyptians* and other wicked Men to whom the Goſpel was never preached, *may endure the Sufferings of the future eternal State, during the time of their Duration; that is, from the time of their Death to the Day of Judgment*; And that † *the Infelicities good Heathens may have ſuffered in this Life, may be ſufficiently rewarded by the Happineſs of the intermediate ſpace between their Death and the Judgment, though they have no ſhare in thoſe Eternal Rewards which are to follow after the Day of Judgment*: But, upon your Scheme, how can this be applied to thoſe who ſhall live at the End of the World, when there may be as good and as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were in any other Age, and yet theſe, according to your Notion, muſt All periſh together at the Conflagration? And beſides, becauſe I preſume you will not be leſs moved by Authority than by Reaſon; is not this extremely like one of thoſe very Notions, which *Tertullian*, whoſe Authority you are otherwiſe ſo very deſirous to make uſe of, blames the * *Stoicks* for, and ridicules them as vainly and † needleſsly imagining, that the Souls of their Diſciples ſhould continue capable of Inſtruction and Improvement in the ſeparate State, when at the ſame time they believed they were all to periſh in the approaching *Conflagration*?

* pag. 359.

† pag. 311.

* Qui animæ aliquod tempus indulgent, ab exceſſu uſq; in *conflagrationem* univerſitatis, ut Stoici, &c. *Tertull. de Anima.*

Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γενητήν τε καὶ φθαρτήν. Οὐκ εὐθὺς ὃ τῷ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν φθείρεσθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὴν μὴ τῶν σαρκοδαίων, μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων· &c. *Numenius apud Euſeb.*

† Quis autem illis poſthumæ Eruditionis uſus ac fructus, jamjam *conflagratione* perituris? *Tertull. de Anima.*

What you advance in your 41*ſt and following Sections*, concerning the State and Condition of *ſeparate Souls*,

Souls, is in every reſpect too uncertain to have any thing built upon it. Whether they who never heard of the Goſpel in This Life, ſhall hereafter have any new Offer made to them, and undergo any new Trial; or whether all Mankind, even thoſe who never heard of Chriſt at all, ſhall however, by virtue of the original Promiſe of the Meſſiah made to *Adam*, have ſo much Benefit of the Redemption purchaſed by the Blood of Chriſt, as that at the general Judgment they ſhall all in ſome Proportions, and according to their ſeveral Capacities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy of the Goſpel-covenant; (which ſeems, of the two, to be much the more probable Opinion: For how ſhall they who are found alive at the end of the World, undergo any new Trial?) Which ſoever, I ſay, of theſe ways be true, it makes little difference as to the main Queſtion. That, upon the whole, God is no Reſpecter of Perſons; and *that* our Saviour *could not confine his deſign, as a Saviour of Souls*, to any particular People, (as you prove largely and well in your 47th Section,) but will certainly in ſome manner or other extend the Offer of his gracious Covenant, or at leaſt the Benefit and Equity of it in ſome Proportions, to Men of all Ages and Nations in the World; muſt undoubtedly be allowed by all conſidering Perſons: And this very conſideration alone, if you had not at other times reaſoned inconſiſtently with your ſelf, might eaſily have ſaved you the whole trouble of inventing your wonderful Hypotheſis concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul, in order to diſpoſe of thoſe Gentiles who never heard of Chriſt: But then as to the particular Manner, how the Equity and Mercy of the

Goſpel ſhall be extended to thoſe to whom it never was preached; this, there is no Neceſſity of determining; And certainly your Notion, (*Sect.* 42,) concerning ſeparate Souls being of Neceſſity to be *baptized with Water*, even in the *literal Senſe*, in order to be made capable of any Favour of this kind; might very well have been ſpared.

As to what you teach in th 42*d and following Sections*, concerning *two diſtinct Souls* in Men; Many ancient Writers do indeed ſo expreſs themſelves, as if they ſuppoſed the *ſenſitive Soul* to be one Subſtance, and the *rational Soul* another: But both That Philoſophy itſelf, and your Explication of it particularly, is very unintelligible: And your Interpretation of that Text, where the Formation of Man is deſcribed, is really ridiculous: The Words are theſe; *And the Lord God formed Man of the Duſt of the Ground, and breathed into his Noſtrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul*, Gen. ii. 7. Upon this Text, you* ſay: *Here is a Man ſuppoſed before the Divine Breathing; Certainly not a dead Man, which is indeed no Man, but a Man animated with that lower Soul, which is common to him and Beaſts, and therefore cannot be imputed to a Divine Breathing.* Can any thing be more abſurd than this Interpretation? Or can any thing be more plain, than that the meaning of theſe Words is, that God firſt formed the *Body* of Man out of the Duſt, and then inſpired into it a living *Soul?* But which way ſoever the Philoſophy of this Queſtion be determined, it will ſtill be nothing to your purpoſe: For ſuppoſe, if you pleaſe, that the *Senſitive* and *Rational* Soul be really two diſtinct

* pag. 216.

Subſtances; yet how does this tend to prove that the *Rational Soul* is ever the more *Naturally Mortal?* Did not thoſe antient Philoſophers, who thought Man compoſed of three diſtinct parts, a *Body*, a *ſenſitive Soul*, and a *rational Spirit*; teach that the *rational Spirit* was *naturally Immortal?* As you your ſelf confeſs * concerning *Plato* and *Philo*; and you bring no Authority nor Reaſoning, in theſe Sections, to the contrary.

* *pag.* 22 & 23.

In like manner your long Excurſion, in the *55th Section*, concerning the *Separate State*, does not at all prove, nor indeed ſo much as ſuppoſe, that the Soul is *naturally Mortal*: On the contrary, the Authorities you there cite, do all ſuppoſe it *Immortal*. Wherefore the particular groundleſs, not to ſay abſurd Notions, which you there advance, concerning the *Habitations of ſeparate Souls*, and the *Extent of the Power of Evil Spirits over them*, &c. not being of any importance with reſpect to the main Queſtion; need not here be examined.

The Argument you propoſe, (*Sect.* 60,) that *a naturally mortal Soul is more ſuitable and agreeable to be joined with a naturally mortal Body, as a conſtituent of Human Nature, than a Soul that is naturally Immortal*. This Argument, if it proved any thing, would prove that the Soul ought to be of the ſame Nature and Duration with the Body, and that it ought to die at the ſame time with the Body, that is, that there ought to be no Soul at all. For it is juſt as much diſagreeable and unſuitable to the Body, to have ſuch a Subſtance united to it, as is capable of ſubſiſting at all after the Diſſolution of the

the Body; as to have ſuch a Subſtance united to it, as is capable of continuing to ſubſiſt for ever. Since therefore you your ſelf acknowledge that the Soul is naturally able to ſubſiſt ſeparate for many Ages after the Diſſolution of the Body; this Argument, if it had any ſtrength in it, would prove a great deal too much for you; and be of the ſame force againſt *your own* Notion of the Soul, as againſt *ours*; Unleſs you could perſuade the World to believe, that not only the *Immortalizing Spirit*, but even the *rational Soul*, that Soul which you ſuppoſe to be *naturally Mortal*, is it ſelf alſo a *præternatural Principle*, (as you * once or twice very abſurdly aſſert,) and not originally a conſtituent Part of Humane Nature.

* *Præmon. p.* 24, and *Diſcourſe p.* 300.

Neither has the Argument you draw from the Doctrine of *Original Sin*, any greater ſtrength in it. For there is no neceſſity of ſuppoſing, upon any Scheme, that ſuch Perſons as have no actual Sin of their own, ſhall ever be condemned to eternal Torments merely for the Sin of our firſt Parent. It is true we cannot peremptorily affirm in particular, how God will diſpoſe of ſuch Souls, as having no actual Sins of their own to anſwer for, yet have no expreſs Title, by the ordinary Means, to the Rewards of the Goſpel: But certainly it is a very weak and poor Argument, to conclude that numberleſs Souls muſt therefore neceſſarily be annihilated, merely becauſe we do not know in particular, what State and Condition it will pleaſe God to aſſign them.

The ſame may be ſaid of your Argument drawn from the Doctrine of *Reprobation*. You anſwer it your ſelf, by ſuppoſing that the Doctrine of *abſolute Reprobation* is not the Doctrine

of Scripture. And as to that *Præterition*, which is barely the not affording all Men the ſame Means of Knowledge; it is anſwered in your own Scheme, by what you ſay (*Sect.* 45, 46, and 47,) concerning the new Trial ſome Perſons may undergo in another State; and it is anſwered better by ſuppoſing that all Men may however be judged in proportion, according to the Equity of the Goſpel, though they never had any explicit Knowledge of it.

Laſtly, As to your Argument drawn from the Difficulty of reconciling eternal Puniſhments with the Goodneſs of God; That Difficulty does not ariſe chiefly from the *difference of the Perſons*, who may be concerned in thoſe Puniſhments proportionably in *different Degrees*; but the real Difficulty of the Queſtion lies in this, how it is reconcileable with the Goodneſs of God, to put *any Perſons at all* upon a neceſſity of making ſuch an *Option*, wherein if they chuſe amiſs, the Miſery they incur muſt be irrecoverable. And this Difficulty is evidently much better anſwered, by ſuppoſing the Souls of Men to be naturally immortal; ſo that they who render themſelves uncapable of Happineſs, muſt conſequently fall into remedileſs Miſery; than it can be anſwered in *your* Scheme, where none can be liable to endleſs Puniſhment, without being miraculouſly immortalized on purpoſe, by the Arbitrary Will and Power of God, beyond the original Capacity of their Nature.

And now, Sir, I cannot but earneſtly recommend it again to your moſt ſerious conſideration; whether the new and inconſiderate Notions you have advanced, and (the Arguments I will not

ſay,

ſay, becauſe I think you have not offered any that are of any real force, but) the Pretences of Reaſon and Authority, which you have put into the hands of ſceptical and profane Men, to confirm them in their Prejudices againſt the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul; are not likely to be of great diſſervice to Religion; And whether you ought not (as all good Men are of Opinion you ought) to think of ſome means of making ſatisfaction to the Church, to whom you have given ſo great Offence; and of preventing the effect of that Incouragement, which your Notions in this matter (though no Body doubts but it is contrary to your intention) have given to Immorality and contempt of Religion.

If Zeal for the Defence of a Doctrine of ſuch importance, has in any part of this Letter cauſed me to drop any Expreſſions, which may be thought too ſharp, and to carry in them too little of that Reſpect, which all the World acknowledges to be juſtly due to you upon account of your very great Learning; I know you will pardon it upon ſuch an occaſion as this; and I cannot doubt but upon ſecond Thoughts, you will be ſomewhat diſſatisfied with *your ſelf*, for having publiſhed a Book, at which all good Men are ſorry, and all profane Men rejoice.

ADVERTISEMENT.

WHEREAS the Author of certain Remarks upon the Sermons preached at Mr *Boyle*'s Lecture in the Year 1704, has publiſhed a Vindication of thoſe Remarks, with more Miſrepreſentation of the Doctrine contained in thoſe Sermons, and in thoſe preached in the Year 1705: The Author of the ſaid Sermons, humbly conceiving that there is no Objection either in the Remarks or in the Vindication of the Remarks, which has not been either prevented in the Sermons themſelves, or fully anſwered in the Preface to the ſecond Volume: And not thinking it fit to trouble the World with any further Reply to mere Calumny and ill Language; deſires to refer this Matter wholly to the impartial Reader, who by comparing the Books themſelves, with the Remarks, will judge on which ſide Truth and Reaſon ſtands.

A LET-

A

LETTER

To the LEARNED

Mr. *Henry Dodwell*;

CONTAINING

Some REMARKS on a (pretended) Demonſtration of the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the SOUL,

IN

Mr. *Clarke*'s ANSWER to his late *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*, &c.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year MDCC XXXI.

A LETTER

To the LEARNED

Mr. *Henry Dodwell*, &c.

SIR,

THERE is nothing more unreaſonable than to imagine there is any dangerous Conſequence in allowing Men fairly to examine the Grounds of received Opinions, or to ſuſpect the good Intentions of thoſe who do examine: For till Men have ſomething beſides *Reaſon* for their Direction, it is their duty to follow *that Light* wherever it leads them; and how they can uſe their Reaſon, when there is a Reſtraint laid on their Tongues and Pens, is as unconceivable to me, as how People ſhould be Chriſtians in *Japan*, or Proteſtants in *Spain*.

Every Man has the Faculty of Reaſoning, but without the uſe and exerciſe of that Faculty, will make little or no progreſs in any Science.

And what makes ſuch Suſpicions, if poſſible, ſtill more unaccountable, is, That Examination is really a mark of Sincerity; ſince the hazard of Suffering lies more on the ſide of Examination, than on that of ſubmitting to prevailing Opinions. And to be ſure it is a Diſpoſition of Mind much more favourable to Truth than the contrary one; becauſe Reaſon being the ſame in all Men, we ſhould more of us light upon Truth, did we rely on the Uſe of the ſame common Faculty, than we poſſibly can, by following the contradictory Orthodoxies of the ſeveral Countries in the World.

But ſince through the Artifices of deſigning Men, they who ſincerely ſearch after Truth meet with ſuch diſcouragement, eſpecially if there be any Blot in their Characters, or any thing done in the whole courſe of their Lives that is capable of having an invidious Turn given to it, I publickly return *You* my Thanks for your late *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*, wherein you have ſhowed a noble Example of Freedom and Liberty in attacking the received Opinion of the *Natural Immortality of the Soul*. Your Character of Piety towards God, Charity to the Neceſſitous, and Patience under Afflictions, occaſioned by adhering to your Principles (which were once thought Doctrines of the Church of *England*) is too well eſtabliſhed in the World by the Applauſes of thoſe Men, who now endeavour to make you as little in the Judgment of others, as you were great in theirs before, not to derive ſome Credit on thoſe who

who purſue your Steps, or at leaſt to abate the Edge of Satyr and Invective againſt them: For the World has now a great Inſtance not only of the Conſiſtency of Zeal for Religion with Liberty of Thinking, but that it is evidently your Zeal for Religion which has occaſioned the Liberty you have taken.

Under the Protection therefore of your Authority, I ſhall propoſe ſome of my Thoughts to the World on the great Subject of the *Natural Immortality of the Soul*, with all the Brevity that Perſpicuity will allow, and in ſome reſpect promote the Deſign of your late Diſcourſe: For though I do not pretend to prove the *Natural Mortality of the Soul* by Reaſon, yet if I can ſhow the Inconcluſiveneſs of the moſt cogent Argument for its *Natural Immortality*, they who lay a ſtreſs on that Argument will be better prepared to receive thoſe Proofs from the *Scriptures and the firſt Fathers*, urged in your *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*, to ſhow, That *the Soul is a Principle naturally Mortal.*

The principal Argument for the *Natural Immortality of the Soul* is founded on the Suppoſition of its Immateriality; and therefore great Endeavours have been made uſe of to prove the Soul an Immaterial Being, and particularly by the Reverend and Learned Mr. *Samuel Clarke*, who in his *Letter* * to you propoſes *to demonſtrate*, that the *Soul cannot poſſible be Material.* And what he has there ſaid being urged with very great Acuteneſs and Dexterity, I ſhall impartially conſider it.

* Pag. 22.

By *Soul*, I ſuppoſe, Mr. *Clarke* means a Subſtance with a Power of Thinking, or, as he expreſſes himſelf, with an *Individual Conſciouſneſs.*

By saying *the Soul cannot possibly be Material*, I conceive is meant, that the Substance which hath Solidity added to it, cannot have a Power of Thinking added to it; or, that the same Substance cannot be both Solid and have the Power of Thinking.

To demonstrate the Impossibility of this, it should be declared what is to be understood by the word *Substance*; and then, in what the Identity of the same Substance doth consist. But these things being omitted, I shall observe, that after an Enumeration of *Arguments which*, he says, *have been urged by the wisest and most considerate Men in all Ages* (so it is said, and so let it pass) we are told, *The same thing is demonstrable from the single Consideration of bare Sense or Consciousness. For*, says he, *Matter being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct Parts; it is plain, unless it were essentially conscious, in which case every Particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Consciousnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division can be an Individual conscious Being: For suppose Three or Three Hundred Particles of Matter at a mile, or any given distance, one from another; is it possible that all those separate Parts should in that state be one individual conscious Being? Suppose then all these Particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings than they were at the greatest distance? How then can their being disposed in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being? If you suppose God by his infinite Power superadding Consciousness to the united Particles, yet still those Particles being really and necessarily as di-*

P. 22, 23.

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ſtinct Beings as ever, cannot be themſelves the Subject in which that individual Conſciouſneſs inheres; but the Conſciouſneſs can only be ſuperadded by the addition of ſomething, which in all the Particles muſt ſtill it ſelf be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whoſe Power of Thinking is undeniably one individual Conſciouſneſs, cannot be poſſibly a Material Subſtance.

I have ſet down Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument at length, and in the full force of his own Expreſſions, that a Judgment may be made more eaſily of the Pertinency or Impertinency of the following Obſervations.

1. Since it is only required that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking, or at leaſt that it may be poſſible for God to ſuperadd to it a Power of Thinking; it is evident, by Mr. *Clarke*'s own account of Matter, which he makes to conſiſt of *actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts* (though I wonder that at the ſame time he ſhould make it *diviſible*, when by its conſiſting of ſeparate and diſtinct Parts it is actually divided.) That thoſe *ſeparate and diſtinct Parts* are capable of having a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Conſciouſneſs ſuperadded to each of them; becauſe the want of Individuality or Diſtinctneſs is the ſole Reaſon urged, why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Conſciouſneſs: And conſequently, according to Mr. *Clarke*'s own Reaſoning, Matter may have a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Conſciouſneſs.

2. Since an Individual Being, according to Mr. *Clarke*, can only be the ſubject of a Power of Thinking; Why may not ſeveral Particles of Matter, when united in one Syſtem, become

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an Individual Being, and be by the Power of God rendered incapable of any Diviſion or Separation by Natural Cauſes, and conſequently be a ſubject capable of Thinking? If ſeveral Particles of Matter can be ſo united as to touch one another, or cloſely to adhere; wherein does the Diſtinctneſs or Individuality of the ſeveral Particles conſiſt? The Diſtinctneſs or Individuality is as much loſt to me by this ſuppoſed Union, as the Diſtinctneſs of the Parts (if I may ſo ſpeak) of an Immaterial Being, upon ſuppoſition that Extenſion is not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality, as it is not by Mr. *Clarke*, if I rightly apprehend him. For if the Union of Material Particles be compleat and intire, I can as well conceive an *Immaterial Being* capable of Diviſion, as conceive thoſe Particles ſo united capable of Diviſion from one another. All the Difference perceivable by us, between ſuch a Material Subſtance and an Immaterial Subſtance, beſides Solidity in one and want of Solidity in the other, lies in this, That one perhaps continues as it was created, and the other becomes by the Power of God, what the other was by Creation. And what difference that will make as to one's being capable of the Power of Thinking, and the other's not being capable of that Power, does not appear to me, and never will, till Thinking and Solidity are proved to be incompatible in the ſame Subject.

3. But let us ſuppoſe with Mr. *Clarke*, that a Material Subſtance in any manner diſpoſed, is not an Individual Being; yet I cannot ſee but that an Individual Power may reſide in a Material Syſtem, which conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; and conſequently, that,

that an Individual Being is not indiſpenſably neceſſary to be the ſubject of an Individual Power. Now if an Individual Power can be lodged by God in, or ſuperadded to that which is not an Individual Being, or follows from the Compoſition or Modification of a Material Syſtem, conſiſting of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Particles; the very Soul and Strength of Mr. *Clarke*'s Demonſtration is gone. And Matter of Fact is ſo plain and obvious, that a Man cannot turn his Eye but he will meet with Material Syſtems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any one of the Particles that compoſe them when taken apart, and conſidered ſingly. Let us inſtance for example in a *Roſe*. *That* conſiſts of ſeveral Particles, which ſeparately and ſingly want a Power to produce that agreeable Senſation we experience in them when united. And therefore either each of the Particles in that Union contributes to the Individual Power, which is the external Cauſe of our Senſation; or elſe God Almighty ſuperadds the *Power* of producing that Senſation in us upon the Union of the Particles. And this, for ought I can ſee, may be the caſe of Matter's Thinking. Thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain, may under that Modification either have the Power of Thinking neceſſarily flowing from them, or elſe may have the Power of Thinking ſuperadded to them by the Power of God, though ſingly and ſeparately they may not have the Power of Thinking. The Fallacy of Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, by which, as I take it, he deceives himſelf, lies in this, That by an Individual Power he underſtands a Power that can only proceed from, or reſide in, an Indi-

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vidual Being; which is a plain Begging of the Queſtion, or ſuppoſing the thing in diſpute, that *Thinking is ſuch an Individual Power:* To prove which, he has not, though all he ſays depends on it, offered ſo much as one word, and I conceive cannot till he is perfectly acquainted with the Nature of Thinking. I readily acknowledge that we can diſtinguiſh the various Modes of Thinking from one another; but whether Thinking is ſuch a kind of Operation as proceeds from an Individual Being, or whether it proceeds from a Being which conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, I muſt be content to be ignorant, till ſome better proof is produced to place it in an Individual Being, than by calling it an Individual Power.

4. But after all, ſuppoſing Mr. *Clarke* had proved that Conſciouſneſs could only reſide in an Individual Being, and that That Individual Being muſt be an Immaterial Being, the Soul would not then be proved to be naturally Immortal; and conſequently all the pains taken to prove the Soul Immaterial, ſignify nothing. Nothing is proved naturally Immortal by the ſuppoſition of the Soul's Immateriality, but the Subſtance of the Soul. Now the Soul is ſuppoſed to be a Thinking Immaterial Being; and unleſs a Thinking Immaterial Being can be proved naturally Immortal, the Soul cannot be proved naturally Immortal. But how this can be done, I know not, but by ſhowing the inſeparable Connection between Immaterial Being and Thinking; and till then we have as much reaſon to believe, that Thinking is an Action which may commence after the exiſtence of its Subject, and

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may periſh or ceaſe to exiſt, its Subject ſtill remaining. And thus there is no more progreſs made in the proof of the Natural Immortality of the Soul by proving its Immateriality, than there would be in proving the natural Immortality of Mens Bodies, which are laid in the Grave, by ſhowing that Matter can only periſh by Annihilation: For as in the laſt Caſe no Proof is made of the neceſſary continuance together of the ſeveral Particles that compoſe our Bodies; ſo in the other Caſe we have no proof, that Thinking is an inſeparable Property of Immaterial Being. Of what uſe then is this Argument to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion? For if we have no ſecurity that we muſt hereafter exiſt in a State of Perception, as by only proving the Natural Immortality of the Subſtance of the Soul, we have not; it can be of no uſe to influence our Lives and Actions.

5. But let us ſuppoſe, that from the Power of Thinking, or Individual Conſciouſneſs, we can prove the Immateriality of the Soul, and from its Immateriality prove its natural Immortality, and then ſee what will be the conſequence. All the numerous ſenſible Creatures in the Univerſe are put in the ſame condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happineſs as well as he. Now, to avoid this Conſequence, there are two Things principally urged.

1. That all thoſe Creatures (which I call Senſible) are only mere Machines: Or,
2. That their Souls ſhall be annihilated upon the Diſſolution of their Bodies.

To the First I answer, That Experience as much convinces us, that they perceive, think, &c. as that Men do. They avoid pain, and seek pleasure, and give as good maks of Uneasiness under the one, and Satisfaction under the other, as Men do. They avoid pain, and seek pleasure, by the same Motives that Men do, *viz.* by reflecting on their past Actions, and the Actions of their fellows, with the Consequences of them; which is apparent from their acting more to their own advantage, the more experience they have had. But if after all, Brutes are only mere Machines, the Difficulty of proving the Soul Immaterial will be increased. For if the Operations of Brutes are not sufficient to distinguish them from Clocks and Watches, the Operations of Men will not prove *them* to be superiour to Machines.

To the Second Objection I answer: That if the Souls of Brutes are annihilated upon the dissolution of their Bodies, then the Proof of the Natural Immortality of Mens Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls shall really be Immortal; because mere Natural Immortality is not a Security from Annihilation, as is supposed in the Objection.

I shall now only add, That under the Uncertainty in point of Reason, both of the Soul's Immateriality and Natural Immortality, I am not the less certain of Man's Immortality from the Gospel of Christ; and therefore for the sake of those who may be offended with me for my freedom, I shall observe, That the same Zeal which engages one Man to maintain, that a certain Argument has a great deal of force in it to prove the Immortality of the Soul, may

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engage another Man to maintain, that it is weak and dangerous. They both aim at the ſame End; they differ only in judging of the Nature of an Argument. They ought both to abſtain from all ſuſpicious Expreſſions; to abſtain, I ſay, not in ſaying they will abſtain, for that makes an ill Impreſſion, but by a perfect Silence. I am,

SIR,

Your humble Servant.



A DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT

Made uſe of in a

LETTER

TO

Mr. *DODWELL*,

To prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the SOUL.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. late Rector of St. *James's Weſtminſter.*

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCC XXXI.

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A DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT, &c.

IN a Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, upon occaſion of his late *Diſcourſe* concerning the Nature of the *Soul*, the following Argument was among others particularly made uſe of to prove the *Immateriality* and *Natural Immortality* of the Soul.

" The ſame thing, *viz.* that *the Soul cannot* " *poſſibly be Material*, is moreover demonſtra- " ble from the ſingle conſideration even of " bare Senſe and Conſciouſneſs it ſelf. For, " Matter being a diviſible Subſtance, conſiſting " always of ſeparable, nay of actually Sepa- " rate and Diſtinct Parts ; it is plain, unleſs " it were eſſentially conſcious, in which caſe

Letter to Mr Dodwell. *pag.* 22, 23.

" every Particle of Matter muſt conſiſt of in-
" numerable ſeparate and diſtinct Conſciouſ-
" neſſes, no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Com-
" poſition or Diviſion can be an Individual
" conſcious Being. For ſuppoſe three, or
" three Hundred Particles of Matter, at a
" Mile, or any given diſtance, one from ano-
" ther; is it poſſible that all thoſe ſeparate
" Parts ſhould in that State be one Individual
" conſcious Being? Suppoſe then all theſe Par-
" ticles brought together into one Syſtem, ſo
" as to touch one another; will they thereby,
" or by any Motion or Compoſition whatſoe-
" ver, become any whit leſs truly diſtinct Be-
" ings, than they were at the greateſt diſtance?
" How then can their being diſpoſed in any
" poſſible Syſtem, make them one Individual
" Conſcious Being? If you ſuppoſe God by
" his Infinite Power ſuperadding Conſciouſneſs
" to the united Particles, yet ſtill thoſe Parti-
" cles, being really and neceſſarily as diſtinct
" Beings as ever, cannot be themſelves the
" Subject in which that Individual Conſciouſ-
" neſs inheres; but the Conſciouſneſs can only
" be ſuperadded by the addition of Something,
" which in all the Particles muſt ſtill it ſelf be
" but one Individual Being. The Soul there-
" fore, whoſe Power of Thinking is undenia-
" bly one Individual Conſciouſneſs, cannot
" poſſibly be a Material Subſtance".

To invalidate the force of this Argument, the following Objections have been offered to the publick.

* *A Letter containing ſome Remarks on a pretended Demonſtration, &c. pag. 78, 79.*

" I. *That* * an Individual Power *may* reſide
" in a Material Syſtem which conſiſts of actu-

ally

" ally ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; *That* an " Individual Power *can* be lodged by God in, " or ſuperadded to That which is not an Indi- " vidual Being; *or it may* follow from the " Compoſition or Modification of a Material " Syſtem conſiſting of actually ſeparate and " diſtinct Particles; *and if ſo, then* the very " Soul and Strength of the *foregoing* Demon- " ſtration is gone. *That as to this*, Matter of " Fact is ſo plain and obvious, that a Man " cannot turn his Eye, but he will meet with " Material Syſtems, wherein there are Indivi- " dual Powers, which are not in every one, " nor in any one of the Particles that compoſe " them, when taken apart and conſidered " ſingly. *That* a Roſe, *for Example*, conſiſts " of ſeveral Particles which ſeparately and " ſingly want a Power to produce that agreea- " ble Senſation we experience in them when " united; And therefore either each of the " Particles in that Union contributes to the In- " dividual Power which is the external Cauſe " of our Senſation; or elſe God ſuperadds the " Power of producing that Senſation in us, " upon the Union of the Particles. *That* this " may be the Caſe of Matter's Thinking. " Thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain " may under that Modification, either have " the Power of Thinking neceſſarily flowing " from them, or elſe may have the Power of " Thinking ſuperadded to them by the Power " of God, though ſingly and ſeparately they " may not have the Power of Thinking. *And* " *That* the Fallacy *of the fore-mentioned Argument* " lies in this, that by an Individual Power *is there* " *meant* a Power that can only proceed from,

" or

" or reſide in an Individual Being: Which is a " plain begging of the Queſtion.

II. *That though* a Syſtem *of Matter were allowed not to be capable of Thinking, yet* * " it is " evident, that, *according to the foregoing Ar-* " *gument*, the ſeparate and diſtinct Parts of " Matter are capable of having a Power of " Thinking, or an Individual Conſciouſneſs " ſuperadded to each of them; becauſe the " want of Individuality or Diſtinctneſs, is the " ſole Reaſon urged, why a Syſtem of Mat- " ter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an " Individual Conſciouſneſs; *and* it is only re- " quired that a Thing be an Individual Being, " in order to its being a proper Subject of a " Power of Thinking, or at leaſt *in order to* " *its being a Subject to which* it may be poſſible " for God to ſuperadd a Power of Thinking.

* *pag.* 77.

† *pag.* 80. " III. *That though it were allowed* †, that " Conſciouſneſs could reſide only in an Indivi- " dual Being; and *alſo* that That Individual " Being muſt be an Immaterial Being; yet *even* " then the Soul would not be proved to be " naturally Immortal; *that is, the* Thinking " Immaterial Being *would not be proved to be* " *Immortal, but only the* bare Immaterial Sub- " ject or Subſtance *it ſelf*; *Becauſe* Thinking is " an Action which may commence after the " Exiſtence of its Subject, and may periſh or " ceaſe to exiſt, its Subject ſtill remaining.

‖ *pag.* 78. " IV. *That if* ‖ an Individual Being can only " be the Subject of a Power of Thinking, " *then, according to the foregoing Argument, either* " *it will be proved that Material Subſtance is ca-* " *pable of thinking, or elſe that neither is Imma-* " *terial Subſtance capable of it: Becauſe either* " ſeveral Particles of Matter, when united in

" one Syſtem, may become an Individual Be-
" ing, and be by the Power of God rendred
" incapable of any Diviſion or Separation by
" Natural Cauſes, and conſequently be a Sub-
" ject capable of Thinking, *or elſe* Immaterial
" Subſtance *alſo* may as well be conceived capa-
" ble of Diviſion, upon Suppoſition that Ex-
" tenſion is not excluded out of the Idea of
" Immateriality.

" V. *That if* * from the Power of Thinking, * *pag.* 81.
" or Individual Conſciouſneſs, we can prove the
" Immateriality of the Soul, and from its Im-
" materiality prove its natural Immortality;
" *then* the Conſequence will be, that all the nu-
" merous ſenſible Creatures in the Univerſe are
" put in the ſame Condition with Man, and
" made capable of eternal Happineſs as well as
" he; *or elſe* to avoid this Conſequence, *it muſt*
" *be ſuppoſed, either* that all thoſe Creatures are
" only mere Machines, *or elſe* that their Souls
" ſhall be annihilated upon the Diſſolution of
" their Bodies; *And if ſo*, then the proof of
" the natural Immortality of *Men*'s Souls from
" their Immateriality, tends not to prove that
" their Souls ſhall *really be* Immortal".

The Queſtion being of great Importance, and the Objections very ingenious, as containing in brief all that can be ſaid in Favour of *Matter*'s being capable of Thinking; It is preſumed it may be acceptable to the impartial Reader, to ſee a clear Anſwer given to each of them as they are here repreſented in their full Strength, though (for Methods ſake) in ſomewhat a different Order than they were at firſt publiſhed.

I. To

I. To the First, *viz.* That *an Individual Power* may *reside in a Material System*; *as Sweetness, in a Rose*; *And that Thinking may be supposed to do so, as well as any other Individual Power*; It is answered, that it is so far from being true, as is alledged, that *Matter of Fact is so plain and obvious, that a Man cannot turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material Systems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any one, of the Particles that compose them, when taken apart and considered singly*; This, I say, is so far from being True, that on the contrary, it is both absolutely false in Fact, and impossible and a direct Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing it self, that *any Power whatsoever* should *inhere* or *reside in*, any System or Composition of Matter, different from the Powers residing in the single Parts. For the clearer and more distinct Explication and Proof of which Doctrine, it is to be observed that all *Powers* or *Qualities* may be distinguished into three sorts. *1st*, Some Qualities there are, which do *strictly* and *properly* speaking, *inhere* in the Substance to which they are ascribed. And concerning these, it is evident at first sight, that every Power or Quality, that is or can be *inherent* in any System of Matter, is nothing else than the Sum or Aggregate of so many Powers or Qualities *of the same kind*, inherent in all its Parts. The *Magnitude* of any Body is nothing but the Sum of the Magnitudes of all its Parts. Its *Motion*, is nothing but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if *Cogitation* in like manner could possibly be a Quality really *inherent* in a System of Matter, it must likewise necessarily be the Sum and Result of the Cogitations of the several

Parts: And ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts; Which I ſuppoſe will be granted to be very abſurd. Compoſitions or Diviſions of *Magnitude*, varied in infinite manners to Eternity, can produce nothing in the whole Syſtem, no Quality or Power whatſoever, but *mere Magnitude*; Compoſitions and Variations of *Motion*, nothing but *mere Motion*. And *Sound* may as well be added to a *Colour*, or *Colour* to a *Smell*; or any *Quality* be made to ſubſiſt, without any *Subject* at all; as that any Power whatſoever ſhould be ſuperadded to, and really made to *reſide* in, any Compoſitum or Syſtem of Matter, without being made to inhere *proportionably* in the Parts of that Whole, taken ſingly as well as together. This, I ſay, is evidently at firſt ſight True, of all real Qualities, which truly and properly *inhere* in the Subject to which they belong; ſuch as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in Matter. 2*dly*, Other Qualities there are, which are *vulgarly* looked upon as *Individual Powers*, reſulting from and reſiding in the whole Syſtem, without reſiding particularly in each or any of its ſingle and original Parts; ſuch as are the *Sweetneſs* of certain Bodies, their *Colours*, &c. But this is only a *vulgar* and very *groſs* Errour. For neither do theſe Qualities reſide in, or at all reſult from, the whole Syſtem, in any *proper Senſe*: Neither in *any Senſe at all*, in which they can be aſcribed to that Body or Syſtem of Matter to which they are vulgarly ſuppoſed to belong, are they truly *Individual Powers*. In the *firſt* place they are not *really Qualities* of the Syſtem, and evidently do not at all in any *proper Senſe* belong to it, but are only *Effects* occaſionally

casionally produced by it in some other Substance, and truly Qualities or Modes of that other Substance in which they are produced; Thus the *Sweetness of a Rose*, is well known not to be a Quality really inhering in the Rose; but a *Sensation*, which is merely in him that smells it, and a Mode of the *Thinking Substance* that is in the Man. In the *next* place, these Qualities, in no Sense wherein they can be ascribed to the System of Matter, are *Individual Powers*. They are Individuals, only as they are *Modes* of the Thinking Substance that perceives them; but in the Bodies themselves, they are *only specifically*, not *individually*, single Powers; that is, they are only a Number of *similar Motions* or *Figures* of the Parts of the Body. Nay, they are not always so much as *specifically* single Powers. Thus Compound Colours, as certain *Greens*, for Example, which are *Individual Modes* in the Thinking Substance that perceives them, may in the Objects be nothing but a number of Figures or Motions *even specifically* different, namely such as usually represent both *Blue* and *Yellow*. And the same may be said of *Heat*, *Light*, *Taste*, *Sound*, and all those others which we call *Sensible Qualities*. *3dly*, Other Powers, such as *Magnetism*, and *Electrical Attractions*, are not *real Qualities* at all, residing in any Subject, but *merely abstract Names* to express the *Effects* of some determinate Motions of certain Streams of Matter: And *Gravitation* it self, is not a *Quality inhering in* Matter, or that can possibly *result* from any Texture or Composition of it; but only an *Effect* of the continual and regular Operation of some other Being upon it; by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under these

three

three Heads muſt neceſſarily be contained all poſſible Qualities, Modes or Powers whatſoever: They muſt either be *Qualities really inhering in the Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed*; or *Modes produced by it in ſome other Subject*; or elſe *mere abſtract Names, ſignifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reſide in any Subject at all.* And now the Queſtion is, among which of theſe *Three* ſorts of Powers muſt *Conſciouſneſs* or *Thinking* be reckoned. I ſuppoſe it will neither be ſaid to be *a mere abſtract Name*, nor yet *an Effect* produced in or upon a Foreign Subſtance, (as the *Sweetneſs* or *Colour* of a *Roſe*, is not any individual Power in the Roſe it ſelf, but merely a *Senſation* excited in him that ſmells or ſees it;) but that it is certainly a *Power* or *Quality* truly and *really inhering* in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf. And therefore, if that Thinking Subſtance be a *Syſtem of Matter*, the former Reaſoning holds ſtrictly and demonſtratively true, that the Conſciouſneſs, muſt inhere in all and every one of the Particles of that Syſtem, taken ſingly, as well as together. To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to any *whole* Syſtem of Matter, without belonging to the *ſeveral Parts* of which that Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction: It is ſuppoſing either an *Univerſal* to exiſt, without *Particulars*; or an *Effect* to be produced without a *Cauſe*, or to have more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; or that a *Quality* is by the Power of God made ſo to ariſe out of Nothing, as to be ſuperadded to a *Subject*, and to ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject, to which it is at the ſame time ſuppoſed to belong. By this I preſume it ſufficiently appears with what poſſibility of Truth it is alledged,

that

that *the Particles of Matter which compose the Brain, may under that Modification either have the Power of Thinking necessarily flowing from them, or else may have the Power of Thinking superadded to them by the Power of God, though singly and separately they may not have the Power of Thinking.* And it will easily be judged, whether it be indeed a *Fallacy* and *a plain begging of the Question*, to affirm that *an Individual Power*, properly and strictly speaking, such as Consciousness or Thinking must needs be acknowledged to be, *can only proceed from, or reside in, an Individual Being*; or whether the contrary be not rather demonstrated to be a plain Contradiction.

II. To the Second, *viz.* That according to the Argument now under Consideration, if not a *System of Matter*, yet at least *the separate and distinct Parts of Matter, are capable of having a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Consciousness superadded to each of them*; seeing *it is only required that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking*: It is answered, First, That supposing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual, that is, an Indivisible or Indiscerpible Being; yet it would not therefore follow, that it could be capable of thinking. For though Divisibility or Discerpibility in any Subject, is a sufficient Proof that That Subject is not capable of such an Individual Power of Thinking; yet it does not from thence presently follow on the contrary, that whatever is Indiscerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. Though the present Argument proves indeed only, that whatever is Discerpible, cannot Think; that is, that Individuality is a *sine qua non*, or

a ne-

a neceſſary Qualification without which no Subject can be capable of Thinking; yet it does by no means exclude other Conſiderations, or at all imply that whatever has this Property of Individuality, muſt therefore neceſſarily be capable of Thinking, and cannot by any other Property be rendred, or by any other Argument proved to be, incapable of it. Though *the want of Individuality or Diſtinctneſs, is* indeed *the ſole Reaſon urged* in the preſent Argument, *why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Conſciouſneſs*; yet it ought not therefore to be ſaid, that *it is Only required that a Thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking.* Beſides; Suppoſing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual Being, and alſo that upon that account (which yet is by no means neceſſary) it could be capable of Thinking; yet ſtill the principal part of the Queſtion would be certain and unavoidable, that a Thinking Being muſt be, if not immaterial, yet however *naturally Immortal:* For whatever is Indiſcerpible, though it were ſuppoſed Material, could not by any Power of Time, or any Force in Nature, receive any ſuch Alteration, but that not only its Subſtance, but even all its Qualities alſo, muſt naturally remain for ever unchanged. But then, Secondly, it is anſwered further, That the Suppoſition it ſelf of this Objection, is utterly impoſſible, *viz.* that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Individual or Indiſcerpible Being. For it is neceſſarily included in the Nature of Solid Subſtance, how *ſmall* ſoever it be conceived to be, to conſiſt ſtill of Parts not eſſentially connected, and not at all depending upon each other for

their Existence. So that it is absolutely impossible and contradictory, to suppose any Particle of Matter so truly an Individual, but that by the Power of God (for the *Powers of Nature* here are nothing to the purpose) it may be divided into two or more Particles, which shall each of them separately be as Perfect and Compleat Matter, and continue to have all the very same Properties, as the whole Particle had before it was divided. Suppose then the smallest imaginable Particle of Matter, indued with Consciousness or Thought: Yet by the Power of God, this Particle may be divided into two distinct Parts; and then what will naturally and consequently become of its Power of Thinking? *If* That Power will continue in it unchanged; then there must either be two distinct Consciousnesses, in the two separate Parts; or else the Power continuing in the intermediate Space, as well as in the parts themselves, must there subsist without a Subject; or else, not the Material Substance, but some other Thing, is the Subject of the Consciousness. *If* the Power of Thinking will remain only in One of the separated Parts; then either That One Part only, had at first the Power residing in it; and then the same Question will return, upon the supposition of *Its* being likewise divided; or else it will follow that one and the same Individual Quality may be transferred from one Subject to another; which all Philosophers of all Sects in the World, have always confessed to be impossible. *If*, in the last place, it be said, that upon the Division of the Particle, the Power of Thinking, which was in it, will wholly cease; then it will follow, that That Power was never at all a real Quality inhering or residing in the Substance, (in which mere separation

ration of Parts, makes no Alteration;) but that it was *merely an external Denomination*, ſuch as is *Roundneſs* in a Globe, which periſhes at its being divided: And this, I ſuppoſe, will be granted to be ſufficiently abſurd. There is no way to evade this Argument, but by affirming either that a Particle of Matter may be ſo ſmall, as that it ſhall not be in the Power of God to divide it; or that if it be divided, it will conſequently and neceſſarily be annihilated; (neither of which, I ſuppoſe, will be affirmed;) or elſe that the ſame may be argued concerning Immaterial Subſtance alſo; which is the *Fourth* Objection, and will be conſidered preſently in its proper place.

III. To the Third, *viz.* That though *Conſciouſneſs* were allowed neceſſarily to infer *Indiviſibility*, and *Indiviſibility* to infer *Immateriality*: yet even then not *the Soul*, the *Thinking immaterial Being*, but only the *bare Immaterial Subject or Subſtance* itſelf, *would be proved to be naturally Immortal*; ſince *Thinking is an Action* (a *Power* it ſhould rather have been called) *which may commence after the Exiſtence of its Subject, and may ceaſe, its Subject ſtill remaining*: It is anſwered, that the contrary is evidently True; namely, that not only the *bare Immaterial Subject*, but the *Subject* and the *Power* together, the *Thinking Immaterial Being* it ſelf, is hereby proved to be *naturally Immortal*: Becauſe, whatever Subſtance is wholly *indiſcerpible*, is plainly, by Virtue of that Property, not only *it ſelf* incapable of being deſtroyed by any Natural Power, (for ſo alſo is the moſt *diſcerpible* Subſtance likewiſe;) but all its *Qualities* and *Modes* alſo, are utterly incapable of being af-

fected in any measure, or changed in any degree, by any Power of Nature; For all real and inherent Qualities of any Substance, are either Modifications of the Substance it self, or else Powers superadded and connected to the Substance, by the immediate Power of God; And in either of these cases, it is manifest no *Quality* can be altered by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make some Alteration (in the Disposition of the Parts at least) of the *Substance* it self; which in an *indiscerpible* Substance it is evident cannot be done. The *Soul* therefore, the *whole Conscious Being*; the *Power of Thinking* that resides in it, as well as the *bare Immaterial Subject or Substance* it *self*; (whatever may be said concerning the *Power of God* in this Question;) will clearly, notwithstanding what any *Finite* Power can do, of necessity be *naturally Immortal*. The Truth of this Reasoning is evident from what we cannot but observe even in the *Material World*; namely, that all the Changes which are caused therein by any Powers of Nature, are Nothing but Changes of the Order and Disposition of the Parts of compound Bodies. The original and perfectly solid Particles of Matter, which are, (not indeed absolutely in themselves, but) to any Power of Nature, indiscerpible; are utterly incapable of having not only their Substance, but even any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any measure by any Power of Nature: As is evident from the Form or Species of those we vulgarly call simple or elementary Bodies, remaining always unalterably the same, and indued continually with the same Powers and Qualities.

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IV. To

IV. To the Fourth, *viz.* That according to the Argument we are now conſidering, either a *Syſtem of Matter*, being by a ſtrict Union of Parts made an Individual Being, may become *capable of Thinking*; or elſe *Immaterial Subſtance* alſo *may as well be conceived capable of Diviſion*, and conſequently incapable of Thought; *ſuppoſing Extenſion not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality*: It is anſwered, that the Caſe is very different: Becauſe ſome of the *firſt* and *moſt obvious* Properties which we *certainly know* of *Matter*, as its having *partes extra partes*, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, that is, its conſiſting of ſuch Parts as are *actually unconnected*, and are *truly diſtinct Beings*, and *can* (as we ſee by Experience) *exiſt ſeparately*, and have *no dependance one upon another*; do neceſſarily and confeſſedly imply *Diſcerpibility*: But in *Immaterial Beings* we do *not know* of any ſuch Properties, as any wiſe imply Diſcerpibility. It cannot be collected from any Property we know of *Them*, but that they *may* be ſuch Beings as can no more be divided than annihilated, that is, whoſe whole Eſſence may be neceſſarily One, and their Subſtance eſſentially indiviſible, upon the ſame Ground as their Exiſtence continues: Nay, the *only* Properties we *certainly and indiſputably* know of them, namely *Conſciouſneſs* and its Modes, do prove (as has been before ſhown) that they *muſt neceſſarily* be ſuch Indiſcerpible Beings. As evidently as the *known Properties* of *Matter* prove it to be certainly a *Diſcerpible Subſtance*, whatever other *unknown Properties* it may be endued with; ſo evidently the *known and confeſſed Properties* of *Immaterial Beings* prove them to be *Indiſcerpible*, whatever

other *unknown Properties* They likewiſe may be endued with. How far ſuch *Indiſcerpibility* can be reconciled and be conſiſtent with ſome kind of *Expanſion*; that is, what *unknown Properties* are joined together with theſe *known ones* of Conſciouſneſs and Indiſcerpibility; is another Queſtion of conſiderable Difficulty, but of no Neceſſity to be reſolved in the preſent Argument. Only This: As the Parts of *Space* or *Expanſion* it ſelf, can demonſtrably be proved to be *abſolutely Indiſcerpible*; ſo it ought not to be reckoned an inſuperable Difficulty, to imagine that all *Immaterial Thinking Subſtances* (upon Suppoſition that *Expanſion* is not excluded out of their Idea,) may be ſo likewiſe.

V. To the Fifth, *viz.* That by the forementioned Argument, *all the ſenſible Creatures in the Univerſe are put in the ſame Condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happineſs as well as he*; or elſe that, *to avoid this Conſequence, all thoſe Creatures muſt either be ſuppoſed to be only mere Machines*, or elſe *that their Souls ſhall be annihilated upon the diſſolution of their Bodies*; And if ſo, *then the Proof of the natural Immortality of* Men's *Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls ſhall* really be *Immortal*: It is anſwered, that, Though all Senſible Creatures have certainly in them ſomething that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they muſt needs be annihilated upon the Diſſolution of their Bodies, or elſe that they muſt be capable of eternal Happineſs as well as Man. This is juſt ſuch an Argument, as if a Man ſhould conclude, that whatſoever is not exactly like himſelf,

ſelf, can therefore have no Being at all: Or that all the Stars of Heaven, if they be not exactly like our Globe of Earth, cannot poſſibly be any Globes at all. Certainly the Omnipotent and infinitely Wiſe God may, without any very great difficulty, be ſuppoſed to have more ways of diſpoſing of his Creatures, than we are at preſent let into the ſecret of. He may indeed, if he pleaſe, annihilate them at the Diſſolution of their Bodies; (And ſo he might, if he thought fit, annihilate the Souls of Men; and yet it would be never the leſs true, that they are *in their own Nature Immortal*;) or he may, if he pleaſes, without either annihilating them or ſuffering them to fall into a State of entire Inactivity, diſpoſe of them into *numberleſs* States, concerning the particular Nature of which, we are not now able to make the leaſt conjecture. I ſuppoſe, That Man does not do any great Honour either to God, or to the Chriſtian Religion, who will needs contend, that through a boundleſs Eternity there ſhall never exiſt any thing in the immenſe Univerſe, but what muſt needs partake either of the Happineſs or Miſery of *Mankind*.

A

REPLY

TO

Mr. *Clarke*'s Defence

Of his LETTER to

Mr. *DODWELL*:

WITH

A POSTSCRIPT relating to Mr. MILLES's Anſwer to Mr. DODWELL's Epiſtolary Diſcourſe.

——*Jeſus Chriſt, who hath aboliſhed Death, and hath brought Life and Immortality to Light through the Goſpel*, 2 Tim. i. 10.

M. Evolve igitur librum Platonis qui eſt de animo: amplius quod deſideres, nihil erit.

A. Feci mehercule & quidem ſæpius: ſed neſcio quomodo dum lego, aſſentior; cum poſui librum, & mecum ipſe, de immortalitate animorum, cœpi cogitare, aſſenſio omnis illa elabitur.

M. T. Ciceronis Tuſculanarum Quæſtionum lib. I.

LONDON:
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A

REPLY

TO

Mr. Clarke's Defence

OF his LETTER to

Mr. DODWELL:

WITH

A POSTSCRIPT relating to Mr. Miller's Answer to Mr. Dodwell's Epistolary Discourse.

A

REPLY

TO

Mr. *Clarke*'s Defence, &c.

SIR,

THE Importance of the *Queſtion concerning the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking*, and the Ability of Mr. *Clarke* to urge to the beſt Advantage, whatever can be ſaid on that ſide of it which he eſpouſes, make me preſume it will not be unacceptable to the impartial Reader, to ſee what Anſwer can be given to his *Defence of an Argument, made uſe of in a Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, *to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul*, by the Author of the Objections to that *Argument*; who ſtill thinks it inconcluſive, and propoſes to ſhow its Inconcluſiveneſs in the following Papers, and thereby to contribute towards the Eſtabliſhment of the Immortality of Man on that Evidence only that God

God has thought fit to afford us of it; and by a *new Inſtance* aſſert the Freedom and Liberty, ſo peculiar to the Country wherein we live, of examining the Grounds and Reaſons of prevailing Opinions. But if he happens to fail in the Execution of his Deſign, either through the Weakneſs of his Cauſe, or his own Inability to deal with ſo learned an Adverſary; yet he is very ſure not to err in any thing but a matter of Speculation. He is not diſpoſed to uſe any foreign or unmannerly Mixture in any Debate, much leſs when engaged with a Gentleman, who by confining himſelf ſolely to the Argument, ſet ſo unuſual an Example of fair dealing in Controverſy.

The Argument made uſe of by Mr. *Clarke*, to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul, was, *That the Soul cannot poſſibly be material, is demonſtrable from the ſingle Conſideration even of bare Senſe and Conſciouſneſs it ſelf: for Matter being a diviſible Subſtance, conſiſting always of ſeparable, nay, of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; it is plain, unleſs it were eſſentially conſcious, in which caſe every Particle of Matter muſt conſiſt of innumerable Conſciouſneſſes, no Syſtem of it, in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion, can be an Individual Conſcious Being. For ſuppoſe three or three hundred Particles of Matter at a Mile or any given diſtance one from another, is it poſſible that all thoſe ſeparate Parts ſhould in that State be one Individual Conſcious Being? Suppoſe then all theſe Particles be brought together into one Syſtem, ſo as to touch one another: Will they thereby, or by any Motion or Compoſition whatſoever, become any whit leſs truly diſtinct Beings, than they were at the greateſt diſtance? How then can their being diſpoſed in any poſſible*

Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, p. 22.

poſſible Syſtem, make them one Individual Conſcious Being? If you ſuppoſe God by his Infinite Power ſuperadding Conſciouſneſs to the united Particles; yet ſtill thoſe Particles being really and neceſſarily as diſtinct Beings as ever, cannot be themſelves the Subject in which that individual Conſciouſneſs inheres; but the Conſciouſneſs can only be ſuperadded by the addition of ſomething, which in all the Particles muſt ſtill it ſelf be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whoſe Power of Thinking is undeniably one individual Conſciouſneſs, cannot poſſibly be a material Subſtance.

Againſt this Argument I offered ſeveral Objections, which I ſhall repeat and defend, in the ſame Order that Mr. *Clarke* has thought fit to conſider them. The firſt is as follows:

" 1. Let us ſuppoſe, with Mr. *Clarke*, that " a material Subſtance in any manner diſpoſed, " is not an individual Being; yet I cannot ſee, " but that an individual Power may reſide in a " material Syſtem, which conſiſts of actually " ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; and conſe- " quently that an individual Being is not indiſ- " penſably neceſſary to be the Subject of an " individual Power. Now if an individual " Power can be lodged by God in, or ſuper- " added to that which is not an individual Be- " ing, or follows from the Compoſition or " Modification of a material Syſtem, conſiſt- " ing of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parti- " cles; the very Soul and Strength of Mr. " *Clarke*'s Demonſtration is gone. And Mat- " ter of Fact is ſo plain and obvious, that a " Man cannot turn his Eye, but he will meet " with material Syſtems, wherein there are in- " dividual Powers, which are not in every one,

" nor

" nor in any one of the Particles that compoſe
" them, when taken apart and conſidered ſing-
" ly. Let us inſtance, for example, in a *Roſe*,
" *that* conſiſts of ſeveral Particles, which ſe-
" parately and ſingly want a Power to pro-
" duce that agreeable Senſation we experience
" in them when united. And therefore either
" each of the Particles in that Union contri-
" butes to the individual Power, which is the
" external Cauſe of our Senſation; or elſe
" God Almighty ſuperadds the Power of pro-
" ducing that Senſation in us, upon the Union
" of the Particles: and this, for ought I can
" ſee, may be the caſe of Matter's Thinking.
" Thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain,
" may under that Modification either have the
" Power of Thinking neceſſarily flowing from
" them, or elſe may have the Power of Think-
" ing ſuperadded to them by the Power of
" God, though ſingly and ſeparately they may
" not have the Power of Thinking. The Fal-
" lacy of Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, by which as
" I take it he deceives himſelf, lies in this, that
" by an individual Power he underſtands a
" Power which can only proceed from or re-
" ſide in an individual Being; which is a plain
" Begging of the Queſtion, or ſuppoſing the
" thing in diſpute, that *Thinking is ſuch an in-*
" *dividual Power*: to prove which he has not,
" though all he ſays depend on it, offered ſo
" much as one word, and I conceive cannot,
" till he is perfectly acquainted with the na-
" nature of Thinking. I readily acknowledge,
" that we can diſtinguiſh the various Modes of
" Thinking from one another; but whether
" Thinking is ſuch a kind of Operation as
" proceeds from an Individual Being, or whe-
" ther

" ther it proceeds from a Being which conſiſts " of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, I " muſt be content to be ignorant till ſome bet- " ter proof is produced to place it in an Indi- " vidual Being, than by calling it an Indivi- " dual Power ".

To anſwer this Objection Mr. *Clarke* ſays, Pag. 92. *That all Powers and Qualities may be diſtinguiſhed into three ſorts.* 1. *Some Qualities there are which do, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, inhere in the Subſtance to which they are aſcribed. And concerning theſe it is evident, that every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syſtem of Matter, is nothing elſe than the Sum or Aggregate of ſo many Powers or Qualities of the ſame kind inherent in all the Parts. The Magnitude of any Body is nothing elſe but the Sum of the Magnitudes of all its Parts: Its Motion is nothing elſe but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if Cogitation in like manner could poſſibly be a Quality, really inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt likewiſe neceſſarily be the Sum and Reſult of the Cogitations of the ſeveral Parts, and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there are Particles of Matter.* 2. *Other Powers, which are vulgarly looked on as Individual Powers, reſulting from and reſiding in the whole Syſtem, without reſiding particularly in each or any of its ſingle and original Parts; ſuch as the Sweetneſs of certain Bodies, their Colours,* &c. *but this is only a groſs and vulgar Errour.* 3. *Other Powers, ſuch as Magnetiſm and Electrical Attractions, are not real Qualities at all reſiding in any Subject, but merely abſtract Names, to expreſs the Effects of ſome determinate Motions of certain Streams of Matter: And Gravitation it ſelf is not a Quality inhering in Matter, or that can poſſibly reſult from any*

Texture

Texture or Compoſition, but only an Effect of the continual and regular Operation of ſome other Being upon it, by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under theſe three Heads muſt neceſſarily be contained all poſſible Qualities, Modes or Powers whatſoever: And now the Queſtion is among which of theſe three Sorts of Powers muſt Conſciouſneſs or Thinking be reckoned. I ſuppoſe it will neither be ſaid to be a mere abſtract Name, nor yet an Effect produced in or upon a foreign Subſtance (as the Sweetneſs and Colour of a Roſe is not any Individual Power in the Roſe it ſelf, but merely a Senſation excited in him that ſmells or ſees it) but that it is a Quality or Power truly and really inhering in the thinking Subſtance it ſelf. And therefore if that thinking Subſtance be a Syſtem of Matter, the former Reaſoning holds ſtrictly and demonſtratively true, that the Conſciouſneſs muſt inhere in all and every one of the Particles of that Syſtem taken ſingly as well as together. To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind ariſing from or belonging to the ſeveral Parts of which the Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction: It is ſuppoſing either an Univerſal to exiſt without Particulars, or an Effect to be produced without a Cauſe; or that a Quality is, by the Power of God, made ſo to ariſe out of nothing, as to be ſuperadded to a Subject, and to ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject to which it is at the ſame time ſuppoſed to belong.

1. Before I make any Return to this Anſwer of Mr. *Clarke*, it will not be improper to fix and determine the preciſe Significations of ſome Words on which the Queſtion turns. The Queſtion being, Whether a Syſtem of Matter can have a Power of Thinking, or an individual Conſciouſneſs ſuperadded to it, or flow from

from any Modification of that Syſtem; it is evident, that by a *Power of Thinking* is underſtood, not a *Capacity to think*, but *actual Thinking*, for elſe *Conſciouſneſs* could not be properly employed, by Mr. *Clarke*, to ſignify the ſame thing with a *Power of Thinking*.

2. The Term Individual, when applied to Power, muſt likewiſe ſignify barely *One Power* without any Determination; whether that *Power* proceed from an individual or an actually divided or diviſible Being: for if an *individual Power* ſignifies a Power which proceeds from or inheres in an individual Being, and Conſciouſneſs be ſuppoſed ſuch an individual Power, and the Queſtion is, Whether Conſciouſneſs or any individual Power can reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, or a Being that is not individual; there is no ground to diſpute, whether a Syſtem of Matter can have Conſciouſneſs, or any other individual Power, on ſuch Suppoſitions. It is evident, that on thoſe Suppoſitions a Syſtem of Matter cannot poſſibly think; for a Syſtem of Matter being ſuppoſed to conſiſt of Parts and Thinking, or Conſciouſneſs being ſuppoſed to be a Power incapable of reſiding in a Being that conſiſts of Parts, the Queſtion of Matter's thinking will amount to this, *Whether that which cannot think, can think.* I do not, by what I have ſaid, exclude Mr. *Clarke* from contending for Conſciouſneſs or Thinking's being a Power that can only reſide in an individual Being. He is at his liberty to make that a Queſtion whenever he thinks fit, and I ſhall be very glad to ſee what ſo able a Gentleman can ſay to give me light into the Nature of Thinking. But all that I contend for is, that Thinking be not ſuppoſed an individual Power, in a

Senſe that begs the Queſtion between us, till it be proved individual in that ſenſe; and then I will allow, that there is no ground to diſpute whether a Syſtem can think. Theſe things being cleared, I anſwer to Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument:

1. That it is nothing elſe but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.* For by enumerating his three ſorts of Powers or Qualities of Matter, and ſhowing that the two laſt of the ſorts are improperly called Powers or Qualities, he does ſuppoſe that a Syſtem of Matter has, and can have only Powers of one ſort or kind, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; which, what is it elſe but to argue, That becauſe we know of no other Powers of a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it has and can have no other Powers of a different kind from Magnitude and Motion? Whereas he ought to have demonſtrated, if he would have proved the Point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; and then there might have been ſome ground to conclude, *That if Conſciouſneſs be really inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt be the Sum or Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts:* for till it is demonſtrated, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; it may as well be ſuppoſed, that there are Powers of different kinds in different Particles of Mater, or that God can ſuperadd different kinds of Powers to the different Parts of a material Syſtem; and

then

then the Action or Power exerted, reſulting from them when united, will be of a different ſort or ſpecies from any Power inhering in the Particles ſingly conſidered, and ſo far from being the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind, that the new Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of a different kind. And if ſo, then Mr. *Clarke* muſt prove, that Conſciouſneſs is not an Action or actual Power reſulting from an Union of different kinds of Powers, or elſe he will not be able to prove the Impoſſibility of Matter's thinking from its Diviſibility, or its being actually divided *in infinitum*; for on ſuppoſition that there are Powers of different kinds in different parts of the ſame material Syſtem, and that Conſciouſneſs cannot be proved to be, properly ſpeaking, an Individual Power, or a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being, there will be no reaſon to conclude, *That if Conſciouſneſs be really inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt be the Sum or Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts*: but on the contrary, That if Conſciouſneſs does inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt not be the Sum or Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and all Mr. *Clarke*'s Difficulties founded on Matter's conſiſting of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, will be removed; for it will then be no *Contradiction to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter, without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole conſiſts*, no more than it will be to conceive that a Whole is not the ſame with a Piece of a Clock: for the Power reſulting from the different contributing Powers in the Syſtem, neither belongs to any part of the Syſtem when conſidered by it ſelf, nor is it of the ſame ſort

or kind with any Power in any part of the Syſtem, nor will there be any ground to *ſuppoſe an Univerſal to exiſt without Particulars*, but a particular Power exiſting to which ſeveral particular Powers contribute, as every Man is a particular Man, though various Powers are neceſſary to conſtitute him of the Species: nor, laſtly, to *ſuppoſe an Effect produced without a Cauſe*; for the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, are the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of that Power which did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered. And thus it may be conceived, that there may be a Power in all thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain, to contribute to the Act of Thinking, before they are united under that Form; though while they are diſunited, they have no more of Conſciouſneſs than any Being which produces Sweetneſs in us (that is made up of Parts wherein different Powers inhere) when under a particular Form, has a Power to produce Sweetneſs in us, when its Parts are diſunited and ſeparated.

2. Though I have ſuppoſed different Parts of Matter, in the ſame Syſtem, to have actual Powers eſſentially different; yet I will allow that Matter is every where under the ſame Circumſtances, endowed with the ſame Powers; and that, taking the whole Material World together, every Particle thereof is capable of contributing to all the actual Powers of Matter equally with any other Particle whatever. But then if theſe actual Powers exiſt but only under ſuch and ſuch Regulations, and that a Diſpoſition of Parts by Motion be neceſſary to the Exertion of every Power, it will equally follow,

low, that the Power of every Syſtem will not be the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind, but be the Sum of Powers of different kinds; becauſe by the different Situation of Parts in a Syſtem, a different Power is exerted in every Particle, though each of them would exert the ſame Power under the ſame Circumſtance or Poſition. And I much rather take this to be the Caſe, than to ſuppoſe really different Powers founded on different Capacities in the different Parts of Matter; for by Experience we ſee that every thing by change of Form becomes every thing. The ſame Parts of Matter become Parts of *Dung*, *Earth*, *Graſs*, *Corn*, *Sheep*, *Horſes*, *Men*, &c. and act their parts under theſe Mutations: and I would add, as what ſeems equally matter of fact to me; That the Matter of which an Egg conſiſts, doth intirely conſtitute the young one, and that the Action of Senſation began under a particular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion, without the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, as the Powers of Vegetation, Gravitation, of producing the Senſation of Heat, Cold, Red, Blue, Yellow, are performed without the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul, had not the Syſtem-makers of *Europe* thought fit to deny it, in order to etch out their Hypotheſes.

3. Mr. *Clarke* has not rightly enumerated the known Powers of Matter. In order to make that appear, let us conſider what we mean by *Power*. By Power I underſtand, in the Queſtion between us, *An actual Ability to make or receive any Change, to act or be acted on.* The Queſtion then will be, whether there is in any Syſtem of Matter a Power to make or receive

a Change, to act or be acted on, that is not the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind? Now that there are Powers in Syſtems of Matter, that are not the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind, is apparent from this Conſideration, That not only mere Magnitude and Motion is neceſſary to the making or receiving ſome ſort of Change, but the particular Texture of a Being. Now the Texture, let it be of the Eye, Ear, or any other part of Man, is eſſentially different from the Texture of other Beings, and the Texture of the Parts of the Being it ſelf; and it is from its Texture, as well as from its Magnitude and Motion, that the Matter of which the Eye conſiſts, has a Power to make or receive a Change, to act or be acted on: which Power depends ſo intirely on the particular Texture, that upon the leaſt Alteration of ſome Parts of the Eye, it ceaſes to have a Power of being operated on by external Objects, or of contributing to the Act of Viſion. And if the Powers of a Syſtem of Matter may intirely ceaſe upon the leaſt Alteration of a part of that Syſtem, it is evident that the Powers of the Syſtem inhere not in its Parts in the ſame ſenſe with Magnitude and Motion: for divide and vary the Parts of Matter as much as you will, there will be Magnitude, and may be Motion; but divide or vary the leaſt Part of the Eye, and the Power of contributing towards the Act of Viſion is intirely at an end.

4. I had ſaid, "That the Fallacy of Mr. "*Clark*'s Argument, by which as I took it he "deceived himſelf, lies in this, That by an "Individual Power he underſtands a Power "which can only proceed from or reſide in an

Individual

" Individual Being, which is a plain begging " of the Queſtion, or ſuppoſing the thing in " diſpute, that Thinking is ſuch an Individual " Power. To prove which he has not, though " all he ſays depends on it, offered ſo much " as one word, and I conceive cannot till he is " perfectly acquainted with the Nature of " Thinking. I readily acknowledge that we " can diſtinguiſh the various Modes of Think- " ing from one another; but whether Think- " ing is ſuch a kind of Operation as proceeds " from an Individual Being, or whether it " proceeds from a Being that conſiſts of Parts, " I muſt be content to be ignorant, till ſome " better proof is produced to place it in an " Individual Being, than by calling it an Indi- " vidual Power ".

To manifeſt this, and ſhow yet farther the Weakneſs of Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, I obſerve that Mr. *Clarke* propoſed to demonſtrate that a Power of Thinking or Conſciouſneſs cannot inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, *from the ſingle Conſideration of bare Senſe or Conſciouſneſs it ſelf.* His Argument is in ſhort as follows: *Matter is a Subſtance conſiſting always of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; Conſciouſneſs is an Individual Power. An Individual Power cannot be added to a Subſtance, conſiſting of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, but by being added to all thoſe Parts of which that Subſtance doth conſiſt; whereby inſtead of one Conſciouſneſs, there will be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there be diſtinct Parts of that Subſtance.* This, if I miſtake not, comprehends the entire Strength of his Argument, with relation to which I ſhall lay down the following Particulars.

(1.) That our Idea, ſignified by the Term *Matter* in this Diſpute, is of a ſolid Being, which doth conſiſt of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts.

(2.) Saying, *That Conſciouſneſs is an Individual Power* (be they ever ſo many that ſay ſo) is but calling Conſciouſneſs by another Name. It is not giving an account of what Conſciouſneſs is, wherein it doth conſiſt, which is requiſite to demonſtrate from Conſciouſneſs, that Conſciouſneſs cannot be added to a Being that conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts. If a Man ſhould ſay, that Conſciouſneſs is a Quality that makes the Being to which it is added not to conſiſt of diſtinct Parts, he would (allowing the Truth of his Aſſertion) prove that it cannot inhere in a Being that conſiſts of Parts, becauſe of the obvious Repugnancy there is between the Co-exiſtence of theſe two Properties, Affections, Qualities (or call them as you pleaſe) in the ſame Being. But it is not enough to demonſtrate that Conſciouſneſs cannot be ſuperadded to a Being that conſiſts of Parts, to call Conſciouſneſs by another name. If one ſhould undertake to demonſtrate to me, that Conſciouſneſs can only inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, and for this purpoſe ſhould tell me, that Conſciouſneſs is an Organical Operation, I ſhould deſire him to tell me, wherein Thinking or Conſciouſneſs doth conſiſt? For if he would do that, I ſhould be able to know whether it is an Organical Operation or not: whereas his telling me that it is an Organical Operation, leaves me as ignorant what Thinking is, in what it does conſiſt, as I was before thoſe Sounds reached in my Ear; and does as much ſuppoſe the Thing in diſ-

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pute, *That Matter can only think*, as Mr. *Clarke*'s calling Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power, in his ſenſe of Individual Power, is ſuppoſing that Matter cannot think.

(3.) Therefore before it can be demonſtrated from Conſciouſneſs, that Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being that conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, it muſt be demonſtrated, that Conſciouſneſs is *an Individual Power* in Mr. *Clarke*'s Senſe of thoſe words, or that it is a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being: But Mr. *Clarke* has not ſaid any thing to this Queſtion, but barely by calling Conſciouſneſs *an Individual Power*. His Argument therefore, ſtript of all doubtful Expreſſions, and reſting on the Proofs by which he ſupports it, is this: *Matter is a Subſtance conſiſting always of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts, Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being which conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts; therefore Matter cannot think, or be conſcious.* To ſupport which Connexion he has no intermediate Ideas, but by ſaying, *Conſciouſneſs is an Individual Power, and an Individual Power cannot reſide in a Being that conſiſts of Parts; therefore Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being which conſiſts of Parts:* which carries the Mattter not one jot further than merely ſuppoſing Conſciouſneſs to be a Power, which can only reſide in an Individual Being.

(4.) Having made good my Charge againſt Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, as it ſtands in his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, which only could lie before me when I made my Objections, and from whence Mr. *Clarke* has urged nothing in his Defence, to ſhow that he did not beg the Queſtion, I ſhall conſider what I can find in his *Defence*, to ſhow that Thinking is a Power

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which muſt reſide in an Individual Being. He
P. 92. ſays, *That every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syſtem of Matter, is nothing elſe but the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind, inherent in all its Parts; and if Cogitation could be a Quality really inherent in Matter, it muſt be the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts, which is apparently abſurd.* Now though this does not ſuppoſe Thinking to be a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being, as Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument did, yet it ſuppoſes another Propoſition, *That all the Powers of any Syſtem of Matter are nothing elſe but the Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind.* From whence he infers, that Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, or, which is all one, that it is an Individual Power in his ſenſe; and therefore it lies upon him to prove that there can be no Power in a Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum and Reſult of Powers of the ſame kind.

(5.) Having fully examined the main Argument of the firſt Article of Mr. *Clarke*'s Defence, I proceed to take notice of two or three particular Incidents in it. As,

P. 92. 1. Mr. *Clarke* charges me with ſaying, *Sweetneſs is in a Roſe*; whereas I ſay quite the contrary in theſe words, "That a Roſe conſiſts of Particles, which ſingly and ſeparately want a Power to produce that agreeable Senſation we experience in them when united". And therefore Mr. *Clarke* had no
P. 93. reaſon to ſhow the *Vulgarneſs and Groſſneſs* of believing that Sweetneſs exiſts in Bodies, to me who agreed with him, as appears by my own words. I know no one more capable of inſtructing others than Mr. *Clarke*, and therefore I

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wiſh he had choſen ſome Topick wherein we differed; and then how well and cloſely ſoever he had argued, I ſhould have had the Satisfaction either of ſeeing my ſelf ingeniouſly oppoſed, or elſe have been convinced by him: Whereas now I appear ignorant where I am not ſo, and Mr. *Clarke* by no means advantagiouſly, when he gives himſelf the Trouble to diſpute with a Man in Print, that he makes ignorant of the firſt Rudiments of Natural Philoſophy.

2. Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *That the Powers in a Roſe are nothing elſe but a number of ſimilar Motions or Figures*; wherein there are two things to be proved: (1.) That the mere Figure and Motion of the Parts of a Roſe do produce, or are the ſole external Cauſe of the Senſation cauſed by them (2.) That thoſe Motions and Figures are perfectly ſimilar.

3. Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *That Gravitation is the* P. 94. *Effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter:* Whereas it does not appear but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally placed in it by God, and is now left to it ſelf to act by thoſe Original Powers. And it is as conceivable that Matter ſhould act by virtue of thoſe Powers, as that an Immaterial Being ſhould originally put it into Motion, or continue it in Motion.

Sect. 2. It was objected, "Since it is only "required that a thing be an Individual Be- "ing, in order to its being a proper Subject "of a Power of Thinking, or at leaſt that it "may be poſſible for God to ſuperadd to it "a Power of Thinking; it is evident by Mr. "*Clarke*'s own account of Matter, which he "makes to conſiſt of *actually ſeparate and di-*

"*ſtinct*

" *ſtinct Parts* (though I wonder at the ſame " time he ſhould make it *diviſible*, when by " its conſiſting of ſeparate and diſtinct Parts " it is actually divided) that thoſe *ſeparate* " *and diſtinct Parts* are capable of having a " Power of Thinking, or an Individual Con- " ſciouſneſs ſuperadded to each of them; be- " cauſe the Want of Individuality or Diſtinct- " neſs is the ſole Reaſon urged why a Syſtem " of Matter cannot have a Power of Think- " ing, or an Individual Conſciouſneſs: and " conſequently, according to Mr. *Clarke's* " own Reaſoning, Matter may have a Power " of Thinking, or an Individual Conſciouſ- " neſs". To this Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *That ſuppoſing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual, that is, an indiviſible or indiſcerpible Being; yet it would not therefore follow that it could be capable of Thinking: for though Diviſibility or Diſcerpibility in any Subject is a ſufficient proof that that Subject is not capable of ſuch an Individual Power as Thinking; yet it does not from thence follow on the contrary, that whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking.*

1*ſt*, But if Indiſcerpibility be what is only required in Mr. *Clarke's* Argument for a Subject of a Power of Thinking, then it muſt follow, not only that what is diſcerpible cannot think, but that whatever is indiſcerpible is capable of Thinking, till Mr. *Clarke* thinks fit to add ſuch Conſiderations to his *Argument*, whereby an individual material Being is excluded from a Capacity of Thinking, and an individual immaterial Being is not: For if Indiſcerpibility is all that is mentioned as requiſite in a Subject for a Power of Thinking, then wherever there is Indiſcerpibility, there is al

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that is required by that Argument. And ſo though it does not, from *Diſcerpibility in any Subject's being a ſufficient Proof that that Subject is not capable of Thinking*, univerſally follow, *that whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking*; yet it may and does follow from Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, as it ſtands at preſent, and I deſire him to ſhew me any one Principle, in the preſent Argument, from whence it cannot be as well inferred, that an Individual Material Being is a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking, as an Immaterial Being.

But Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *Though the want of Individuality or Diſtinctneſs is the ſole Reaſon urged in the preſent Argument, why a Syſtem of Matter cannot think; yet it ought not therefore to be ſaid, that it is only required that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking.* Upon which I obſerve, that Mr. *Clarke* owns the Truth of my Reaſoning upon the Suppoſition, that Individuality is only required by him in a Subject of a Power of Thinking; but denies that I have any reaſon to infer that Individuality is only required *from the want of Individuality's being the ſole Reaſon urged why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking:* which I cannot help thinking to be all one, till there is a Difference aſſigned between *only required* in the preſent Argument, and *the ſole Reaſon urged* in the preſent Argument.

(2.) Had I affirmed, from the Conſideration of Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, *That whatever is indiſcerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking*; I cannot ſee how Mr. *Clarke*, conſiſtently with the Principles on which his Argument proceeds, can urge any Conſiderations, whereby an Individual

dividual Material Being is excluded from a Capacity of Thinking: and if he cannot, then it follows universally from his Argument, that whatever is indiscerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. This I would show, but that
P. 97. Mr. *Clarke* does *deny the Supposition on which this Objection is grounded*, viz. *that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Indiscerpible Being*: and therefore I shall spare the Reader, by not arguing longer on a Supposition denied on both sides; though when I urged it, I took it to be Mr. *Clarke*'s Opinion, because he said, *Matter consisted of actually separate and distinct Parts*: by which words since he understands improper Parts, or Parts that seem so to us (for according to him Matter has no Parts) I own the Ground of my Objection, as founded on his Words, is intirely taken away.

Sect. 3. It was objected, "Supposing Mr. "*Clarke* had proved, that Consciousness could "only reside in an Individual Being, and "that an Individual Being must be an Immaterial Being, the Soul would not then be "proved naturally Immortal, and consequently all the Pains taken to prove the Soul Immaterial signify nothing. Nothing is proved "naturally Immortal by the Supposition of "the Soul's Immateriality, but the Substance "of the Soul. Now the Soul is supposed to "be a Thinking Immaterial Being; and unless a Thinking Immaterial Being can be "proved naturally Immortal, the Soul cannot "be proved naturally Immortal. But how "this can be done, I know not, but by showing the inseparable Connexion between Immaterial Being and Thinking; and till then "we have as much reason to believe that "Thinking

" Thinking is an Action which may com-
" mence after the Exiſtence of its Subject, and
" may periſh or ceaſe to exiſt, its Subject ſtill
" remaining. And thus there is no more pro-
" greſs made in the Proof of the natural Im-
" mortality of the Soul, by proving its Im-
" materiality, than there would be in proving
" the natural Immortality of Men's Bodies
" which are laid in the Graves, by ſhowing
" that Matter can only periſh by Annihilati-
" on: for, as in the laſt Caſe, no proof is
" made of the neceſſary Continuance together
" of the ſeveral Particles that compoſe our
" Bodies; ſo, in the other Caſe, we have no
" proof that Thinking is an inſeparable Pro-
" perty of Immaterial Being. Of what uſe
" then is this Argument to the Ends and
" Purpoſes of Religion? For if we have no
" ſecurity that we muſt exiſt hereafter in a
" ſtate of Perception, as by only proving the
" natural Immortality of the Soul we have
" not, it can be of no uſe to influence our
" Lives and Actions".

To this Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *That all the* P. 99, 100.
Qualities and Modes of an Indiſcerpible Being are utterly incapable of being affected in any degree by any Power in Nature; for all real and inherent Qualities, of any Subſtance, are either Modifications of the Subſtance it ſelf, or elſe Powers ſuperadded and connected to the Subſtance by the immediate Power of God: And, in either of theſe Caſes, it is manifeſt no Quality can be altered by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make ſome Alteration in the Subſtance (in the Diſpoſition of the Parts at leaſt) it ſelf, which in an Indiſcerpible Subſtance cannot be done.

1. Upon

1. Upon this Answer I observe, That it is inconsistent with Matter of Fact, or else supposes the Soul a Material Being: For we know by experience, that the Soul or Thinking Being undergoes several Changes or Alterations. It has not only different Passions, as Anger, Love, *&c.* at different times, which are Modifications of the Soul, that begin and have their Period, but has Qualities or Powers, such as Seeing and Hearing, which by the Defect of our Organs plainly cease for a time. Now when Mr. *Clarke* reconciles our having different Passions at different times, and our enjoying of Powers, and then losing of them, with his Notion, *That all the Qualities and Modes of an Indiscerpible Being are utterly incapable of being affected in any measure, or changed in any degree by any Power of Nature*; I promise him to account for the Possibility of Thinking's ceasing in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature. But if he cannot, what remains, but from the Actions of our Souls which must then, according to him, be inconsistent with their Existence in an Indiscerpible Being, to conclude the Soul to be material?

2. *The Powers of Nature* signify material and finite immaterial Beings, and their several Powers and Operations one on another. Now till Mr. *Clarke* has a compleat Idea of both sorts of Beings, their Powers and Operations one on another, it is impossible for him in many respects to tell how far they can affect one another's Operations: For instance, there are Beings in the World that think, of whose Substance I have no other Idea but that it is indiscerpible by the Powers of Nature; but yet

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I underſtand not the manner how theſe indiſcerpible Beings think, nor how they are capable of other Qualities, nor what other Qualities and Powers they have. Nor do I underſtand all the Powers of material or other immaterial Beings, and the manner of their Operations; how then can I poſſibly tell how that, of which I have no Idea, may affect an Action or Power of another Being of which I have no Idea, how it is performed, how it inheres in its Subject, or wherein the Nature of that Power conſiſts?

3. But Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *No Quality or Mode can be altered by any natural Power, which is not able to affect and make ſome alteration of the Subſtance it ſelf; which in an Indiſcerpible Subſtance cannot be done.* In anſwer to which I ask Mr. *Clarke*, whether God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, without making ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf? If Mr. *Clarke* replies, That God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality, without making ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf; then there is no repugnancy in the Nature of the thing, that a Mode or Quality may be deſtroyed, without any alteration of the Parts of that Subſtance which was the Subject of that Mode or Quality. If he ſays, That God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality in an immaterial Subſtance, without making any alteration in the Subſtance, but that a created Being by any Powers that it is capable of receiving from the Hand of God cannot; I deſire him to give me any Argument upon his Principles to prove created Beings cannot, that will not equally conclude againſt God's deſtroying ſuch a Power, unleſs at the ſame time he annihilates the Subject of that

Power. He cannot make it impoſſible for the Powers of an Immaterial Being to ceaſe, by the Operations of created Beings on it, from its Indiſcerpibility, without excluding God from putting an end merely to thoſe Powers; for, according to Mr. *Clarke*, God himſelf can no more make any alteration in the Parts of an immaterial Subſtance, than a created Being can. If Mr. *Clarke* replies, That God cannot deſtroy a Mode or Quality of an immaterial Being, without making an alteration in the Parts of the Subſtance: I anſwer, That if God does make any alteration in the Parts of the Subſtance, upon deſtroying the Power or Quality that he has ſuperadded; then an immaterial Subſtance is plainly as diſcerpible by the Power of God as a material Subſtance: and all Mr. *Clarke*'s Arguments againſt the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking, turn upon him; for alteration of Parts in a finite Being is as much an Evidence of Diſcerpibility, as Solidity is. But, laſtly, if Mr. *Clarke* replies, That no Power or Quality can be deſtroyed, without the Annihilation of the Subject of that Power, I deſire a Reaſon may be given why God can *ſuper-*
P. 100. *add a Power* to an immaterial Being, as Mr. *Clarke* acknowledges he can, and not cauſe it to ceaſe, its Subject remaining as it was before the Power was ſuperadded.

4. But to give him all the Satisfaction I can, I ſhall inſtance in a Quality of immaterial Being, that may owe its continuance to the Actions of created Beings, and may ceaſe without making any alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf. Extenſion not being excluded out of Mr. *Clarke*'s Idea of Immaterial Being, it is plain, whenever our Bodies are carried from one place

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to another, our Souls muſt likewiſe move along with them; though Motion is no doubt incompatible with Immaterial Being, in caſe Immaterial Being has no Extenſion. Now this ſuppoſed Motion of our Souls is intirely owing to external and material Cauſes, not only as to the Degree of Motion, but as to the Determination of the Motion; for both the Degree of Motion, and the particular Determination thereof will ceaſe upon withdrawing the external material Cauſes: and if any particular Motion of an Immaterial Being be owing to external material Cauſes, then all its Motions, for all we know to the contrary, may be ſo too; and if ſo, there can be no repugnancy, in ſuppoſing it poſſible for an Immaterial Being to be deſtitute of the Quality of actual Motion. And if there is no repugnancy in ſuppoſing, that Motion may be continued in an Immaterial Being by the Powers of Nature, and may ceaſe by withdrawing of thoſe Powers; then Mr. *Clarke*'s Affirmation, *That no Quality of an Immaterial Being can be altered by any natural Power, which is not able to make an Alteration (in the Diſpoſition of the Parts at leaſt) of the Subſtance it ſelf*, is very precarious.

5. Laſtly, Suppoſing Mr. *Clarke* had proved in this Article, what I conceive he has not, That the whole Soul, the Thinking Immaterial Being, is indiviſible by the Powers of Nature, or naturally Immortal in that ſenſe, yet this Indiviſibility, this Natural Immortality, is no more than he allows to ſome Particles of Matter; for he ſays, *That there are original, and perfectly ſolid Particles, which are to any Power of Nature indiſcerpible:* and he corrects me for calling any Particle of Matter an *Indi-* P. 100.

P. 98. *vidual Being*, becauſe it cannot be divided by natural Cauſes, or the Powers of Nature: and therefore if a Particle of Matter, notwithſtanding its Indiſcerpibility by natural Cauſes, is not naturally immortal, or indiviſible in that Senſe, in which Mr. *Clarke* requires the Subſtance of the Soul to be, *viz.* to be indiſcerpible by the Power of God, neither can the whole thinking Being be proved naturally Immortal in that ſenſe, unleſs it can be ſhowed, that the whole thinking Being is indiſcerpible by the Power of God. But to that Queſtion he has not ſaid any thing, and therefore I may conclude, that ſuppoſing *Thinking* muſt reſide in an individual Being, or a Being that is indiſcerpible by the Power of God, yet it does not follow, that the thinking immaterial Being is indiſcerpible by the Power of God, or naturally Immortal.

It was objected, 4. "Since an individual "Being can only be the Subject of a Power "of Thinking, Why may not ſeveral Particles "of Matter, when united in one Syſtem, be"come an individual Being, and be by the "Power of God rendered incapable of any "Diviſion or Separation by natural Cauſes, "and conſequently be a Subject capable of "Thinking? If ſeveral Particles of Matter "can be ſo united as to touch one another, "or cloſely adhere; wherein does the Diſtinct"neſs or Individuality of the ſeveral Parti"cles conſiſt? The Diſtinctneſs or Individua"lity is as much loſt to me by this ſuppoſed "Union, as the Diſtinctneſs of the Parts of "an immaterial Being, upon Suppoſition that "Extenſion is not excluded out of the Idea "of Immateriality, as it is not by Mr. *Clarke*,

"if

" if I rightly apprehend him: For if the " Union of material Particles be compleat and " intire, I can as well conceive an immaterial " Being capable of Diviſion, as conceive thoſe " Particles ſo united, capable of Diviſion from " one another. All the Difference perceiva- " ble by us, between ſuch a material Sub- " ſtance, beſides Solidity in one and want of " Solidity in the other, lies in this, That one " perhaps continues as it was created, and the " other becomes by the Power of God what the " other was by Creation. And what difference " that will make as to one's being capable of " the Power of Thinking, and the other's not " being capable of that Power, does not ap- " pear to me, and never will till Thinking " and Solidity are proved to be incompatible " in the ſame Subject".

To this Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *That the Caſe is very different*, between ſuch a Material Being and an Immaterial Being, though it be ſuppoſed to be extended, *becauſe ſome of the firſt and moſt obvious Properties, which we certainly know of Matter, as its having* partes extra partes, *ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, and its conſiſting of ſuch Parts as can exiſt ſeparately, and have no Dependance on one another, do neceſſarily and confeſſedly imply Diſcerpibility: But in Immaterial Beings we do not know of any ſuch Properties as any wiſe imply Diſcerpibility.* P. 101.

The Caſe is not different between ſuch a Material Being as I have deſcribed, and a finite extended Immaterial Being: for though all Matter does conſiſt of Parts, that have no dependance on one another for their Exiſtence; yet by the Suppoſition in the Objection, it is as indiſcerpible by natural Cauſes as an Im-

material Being. Now this Supposition Mr. *Clarke* is so far from denying to be possible,
P. 100. that he grants it to be true in fact, *That there are Particles of Matter which are to any Powers in Nature indiscerpible.* And if there are or may be Systems of Matter, which imply Indiscerpibility by natural Causes, though they are allowed discerpible by the Power of God, there can be no difference between those Systems of Matter, and any other finite extended Beings, as to their Divisibility by the Powers of Nature. Nor can there be any difference as to their Divisibility by the Power of God, for all finite extended Beings must so far consist of Parts, that the Part of one side is not the Part of the other side. They can only consist in a Continuity of the same Substance: and why such a Substance should not be as divisible as a perfectly continued solid Substance, I can see no reason. Let Mr. *Clarke* show that a continued solid Substance is discerpible by the Power of God, and the same Argument will equally show the Discerpibility of any other finite continued Substance. Suppose the Substance of the Soul to be four Inches square (for when once Extension is allowed to the Soul, such a Supposition becomes reasonable) I ask Mr. *Clarke*, If that Substance at its Creation did not depend entirely on the Will of God as to the Degree of its Extension, as much as any of those perfectly solid Particles of Matter did, which are allowed to be indiscerpible by the Powers of Nature? And whether God could not have made it two Inches square, had he pleased, as well as any of those Particles smaller? Both which, I suppose, Mr. *Clarke* will allow. Then I ask him,

If God can make Immaterial Beings of different Dimenſions, what can hinder him from making an Immaterial Being leſs than when he firſt created it, that will not hinder him from making a *continued* ſolid Being leſs than when he firſt created that? It does not appear to me, that an Inch on one ſide of an Immaterial Being is more dependent on an Inch on the other ſide, as to each other's Exiſtence, than two ſides of a perfectly ſolid Particle of Matter are. So that I think we have as clear Evidence, *we do as much know* of a Property in Immaterial Subſtance, which implies Diſcerpibility, as we do in ſome Particles of Matter; continued Extenſion in a Being as much implying Diſcerpibility, as continued Solidity. But Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *As the known Parts of Space can demonſtrably be proved to be abſolutely indiſcerpible; ſo it ought not to be reckoned an inſuperable Difficulty, to imagine extended Immaterial Subſtance may be ſo likewiſe.* Though the known Parts of Space can be demonſtrated to be abſolutely indiſcerpible; yet it may be, and is an inſuperable Difficulty to imagine an Immaterial Subſtance may be ſo likewiſe, becauſe Space is infinitely extended, and becauſe it is nothing but the mere Abſence or Place of Bodies; whereas Immaterial Being is ſomething extended and finite. Now if all finite extended Beings are diviſible by the Power of God, then all Mr. *Clarke* ſays againſt Matter's Thinking has equal Force (if it has any at all) againſt an Immaterial Being's Thinking, as will appear by his own Words, if we put immaterial or extended Being in the Place of the Term Matter or material Being. *Suppoſe*, ſays he, *an Extended Being as ſmall as you pleaſe, indued with* P. 98

Conſciouſneſs or Thought; yet if by the Power of God this Extended Being *may be divided into two parts, what will naturally and conſequently become of its Power of Thinking? If that Power continue in it unchanged; then there muſt be two diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes in the two ſeparate Parts; or elſe the Power continuing in the intermediate Diſtance or Space, as well as in the Parts themſelves, muſt there ſubſiſt without a Subject; or elſe not the material Subſtance, but ſome other thing is the Subject of the Conſciouſneſs. If the Power of Thinking will remain only in one of the ſeparated Parts; then either that one Part only had at firſt the Power reſiding in it, and then the ſame Queſtion will return upon the Suppoſition of its being likewiſe divided; or elſe it will follow that one and the ſame Individual Quality may be transferred from one Subject to another, which all Philoſophers of all Sects in the World have always confeſt to be impoſſible. If in the laſt Place it be ſaid, that upon the Diviſion of an* Extended Being, *the Power of Thinking which was in it will wholly ceaſe; then it will follow, that that was never or at all a real Quality inhering and reſiding in the Subſtance (in which mere Separation of Parts makes no Alteration) but that it was a mere external Denomination, as the Roundneſs of a Being which periſhes at its being divided: And this* he ſuppoſes *will be granted to be ſufficiently abſurd.*

It was objected, in the fifth and laſt Place. "But let us ſuppoſe, that from the Power of "Thinking or Individual Conſciouſneſs, we "can prove the Immateriality of the Soul, "and from its Immateriality prove its natural "Immortality, and then ſee what will be the "Conſequence. All the numerous ſenſible

"Creatures

" Creatures in the Univerſe are put in the ſame " Condition with Man, and made capable of " Eternal Happineſs as well as he. Now to " avoid this Conſequence there are two things " principally urged.

" 1. That all thoſe Creatures (which I call " ſenſible) are only mere Machines: Or,

" 2. That their Souls ſhall be annihilated " with their Bodies.

" To the firſt I anſwer, That Experience as " much convinces us, that they perceive, " think, *&c.* as that Men do: They avoid " Pain and ſeek Pleaſure, and give as good " Marks of Uneaſineſs under the one, and Sa- " tisfaction under the other, as Men do; they " avoid Pain, and ſeek Pleaſure by the ſame " Motives that Men do, *viz.* by reflecting on " their paſt Actions, and the Actions of their " Fellows, with the Conſequences of them; " which is evident from their acting more to " their own Advantage, the more Experience " they have had. But if after all Brutes are " only mere Machines, the Difficulty of prov- " ing the Soul Immaterial will be increaſed: " for if the Operations of Brutes are not ſuf- " ficient to diſtinguiſh them from Clocks and " Watches, the Operations of Men will not " prove *them* to be ſuperiour to Machines.

" To the ſecond Objection I anſwer, That " if the Souls of Brutes are annihilated on the " Diſſolution of their Bodies, then the proof " of the natural Immortality of Mens Souls " from their Immateriality, tends not to prove " that their Souls really be Immortal, be- " cauſe mere natural Immortality is not a Se-

" curity

" curity from Annihilation, as is ſuppoſed in " the Objection ".

P. 102. To which Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *That though ſenſible Creatures have certainly ſomething in them that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they muſt needs be annihilated upon the Diſſolution of their Bodies, or elſe be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man. This is juſt ſuch an Argument as if a Man ſhould conclude, that whatſoever is not exactly like himſelf, can therefore have no Being at all.* The Strength of this Anſwer lies in my ſuppoſing either a Neceſſity of Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the Diſſolution of their Bodies, or elſe that they become capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man; which ſhould I allow to be what I intended, yet it would not be *juſt ſuch an Argument as if a Man ſhould conclude, that whatſoever is not exactly like himſelf can therefore have no Being at all*; becauſe it does not place an Oppoſition between a Capacity of the Soul's Eternal Happineſs, and not exiſting at all, but between a Capacity of Eternal Happineſs, and not exiſting after the Diſſolution of their Bodies. And therefore though it may follow from the Argument, that whatever Immaterial Being has not a Capacity of Eternal Happineſs cannot exiſt after the Diſſolution of the Body to which it was joined; yet it by no means follows, That no Immaterial Being or Soul can exiſt at all, unleſs it has a Capacity of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man; or, in Mr. *Clarke*'s words, *is not exactly like himſelf* as to that Capacity. But it was very far from my Intention to argue, that there was either a Neceſſity of the Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes on the Diſſolution of their Bodies, or elſe that they

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would be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man; but only to argue either the Neceſſity of Annihilation ſome time or other, or elſe that Brutes would be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man. For when I objected to my ſelf, *That the Souls of Brutes ſhall be annihilated with the Diſſolution of their Bodies*, I conſidered, that thoſe who would ſuppoſe an Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes, would be moſt likely to pitch on the Diſſolution of the Body as the proper Term or Period for the Exiſtence of their Souls, as I could ſhow from the ſeveral Anſwerers of Mr. *Dodwell*; who only from his ſuppoſing the Soul to be naturally mortal, though capable of Immortality, conclude the time of the Diſſolution of the Body the proper time for the actual Mortality of the Soul. And therefore I crave leave to underſtand Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument after this manner, *That though all ſenſible Creatures have certainly in them ſomething that is Immaterial; yet it does not at all follow either that they muſt needs be annihilated, or elſe that they muſt be capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man.* To which I reply, That ſince Mr. *Clarke* does allow, that all the ſenſible Creatures in the Univerſe are not mere Machines, by acknowledging *that they have all ſomething in them that is Immaterial*, I deſire him to tell me, conſiſtently with the Principles of his foregoing Argument for the natural Immortality of the thinking Immaterial Being in us, what elſe remains reaſonable, but that they be ſuppoſed ſometime or other to be annihilated, or elſe be ſuppoſed capable of Eternal Happineſs as well as Man: for they having ſomething Immaterial in them, muſt, according to Mr. *Clarke*, for ever, without Annihilation, enjoy the Power

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of Perception; and if they must have for ever a Power of Perception, they must have either agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions; and if they must have either agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, they must be supposed capable of eternal agreeable Perceptions, unless Mr. *Clarke* will say, that they are only capable of an eternal Mixture of agreeable and disagreeable Perceptions, or only capable of eternal disagreeable Perceptions: which, since they are unreasonable Suppositions, and would destroy all proof of Man's Capacity for a happy Immortality from the Argument now in question, I dare say he will not affirm.

My last Objection therefore cleared from all doubtfulness arising from Expression, and to which I should be glad to receive a good Answer, stands thus, That if from the Power of Thinking we can prove the Immateriality of the Soul of Man, and from its Immateriality prove its natural Immortality, and consequently its Capacity of Eternal Happiness; the Power of Thinking must prove the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, the Immateriality of their Souls must prove their natural Immortality, and consequently their Capacity of Eternal Happiness. If it be supposed that the Souls of Brutes may be sometime or other annihilated, then this Argument is not useful to the End for which it is intended; because natural Immortality will then be no proof of the real Immortality of the Soul of Man.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the finiſhing this Reply to Mr. *Clarke*, I have met with Mr. *Milles*'s Anſwer to Mr. *Dodwell*'s *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe*; in the Preface whereof he has endeavoured to defend Mr. *Clarke's Argument for the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul* againſt my Objections, but upon Principles which intirely overthrow it, and by putting ſuch a Senſe on Mr. *Clarke*'s Words as is inconſiſtent with what Mr. *Clarke* underſtands by them in his *Defence*. As for inſtance, Mr. *Milles* ſays, *If that which thinks within us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts*; and *that by Individual Being, in Mr.* Clarke's *Reaſoning, we are to underſtand an unextended Being*: And again, *That I did not rightly apprehend Mr.* Clarke, *when I ſaid Extenſion was not excluded by him out of his Idea of Immateriality*. Whereas Mr. *Clarke* is ſo far from objecting any ſuch miſtake to me, and from ſuppoſing, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts*, that in the fourth Article of his *Defence* he argues with me as not miſtaking his Meaning, by allowing *Extenſion not to be excluded out of his Idea of Immateriality*, and gives up his Argument, in caſe I prove that whatever is finitely extended muſt conſiſt of Parts; that is, prove what Mr. *Milles* grants to be true, and inſiſts on in Defence of Mr. *Clarke*. Therefore inſtead of returning any particular Anſwer to Mr. *Milles*'s Obſervations, I refer him for Satisfaction to Mr. *Clarke*'s *Defence*, where he may not only ſee that he has miſtaken Mr. *Clarke*'s Meaning, but that Mr.

Preface, P. 6. P. 7. P. 10.

Clarke's Argument cannot be defended by him till he retracts his *Preface:* For if an Immaterial Being or Soul be, according to Mr. *Clarke*, an extended Being, and yet indiſcerpible both by the Powers of Nature and the Power of God, then Mr. *Milles*'s Aſſertions, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts, and that it is impoſſible that what has Parts ſhould be the Subject of Thought*, do overthrow Mr. *Clarke*'s Demonſtration of the Immateriality of the Soul; for if whatever is extended muſt conſiſt of Parts, and if that which conſiſts of Parts cannot think, then Mr *Clarke*'s Immaterial Being cannot think, and conſequently the Immateriality of the Soul, in Mr. *Clarke*'s Senſe, is deſtroyed by Mr. *Milles*'s Defence: and therefore if Mr. *Milles* undertakes again Mr. *Clarke*'s Defence, he muſt firſt retract this Principle in his Preface, *That if that which thinks in us be extended, it muſt conſiſt of Parts*, before he can demonſtrate the Indiſcerpibility of an extended Being; that is, before he can prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul, in Mr. *Clarke*'s Senſe.

Though Mr. *Milles* has thus egregiouſly miſtaken Mr. *Clarke*, yet it is but juſt to let the Reader ſee the Reaſon he aſſigns why Mr. *Clarke* muſt underſtand by Immaterial Being, Unextended Being. *The Remarker*, ſays he, *has done Mr.* Clarke *a great deal of wrong in ſaying he does not exclude Extenſion out of the Idea of Immateriality; ſince it is plain our Argument would have no force, but upon ſuppoſition that the immaterial thinking Subſtance within us is proved not to be extended.* For which Argument I ſhall not return him the Civility he beſtows on me,

P. 10.

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in *ſuppoſing that I deſpiſe Logick*, but take the Liberty to attribute it to a more indiſputable Cauſe, notwithſtanding he has the Modeſty to ſay, *He has taken the Liberty to imitate the great Mr.* Chillingworth *throughout his Treatiſe.* P. 16. P. 22.

As Mr. *Milles* does not ſufficiently agree with Mr. *Clarke* in Principles, in order to defend him; ſo Mr. *Milles* and I are not ſufficiently agreed in common Principles to diſpute with one another. In a Matter of Speculation it is not the Authority of *Tully* himſelf, could his Opinions be known (I ſay could they be known, becauſe he does not always tell us on what ſide he is in his Philoſophical Dialogues) nor all the Philoſophers that ever lived, much leſs the Fathers of the Church, that has any weight with me. It is Reaſon alone, from what hand ſoever it comes, to which I am ready to pay my Submiſſion, and it is by that alone that Mr. *Clarke* and I propoſe to be determined: and therefore when Mr. *Milles* urges no other Argument to prove the Power of Thinking inſeparable from Immaterial Being, but by ſaying, *The Power of Thinking has been always looked upon, and is now by every one acknowledged to be a neceſſary Property of Immateriality*; I think it fruitleſs to contend with a Man who knows not that the Queſtion between Mr. *Clarke* and me is not a Queſtion that depends on the Opinion of any Man, nor that Mr. *Clarke* propoſed only by the *Argument* I have examined to demonſtrate the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul by Reaſon. In ſhort, his arguing from Fact is as foreign to the Matter, as if I ſhould uſe ſome topical Arguments to prove the Fathers profound Philoſophers, when P. 16, 17.

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that Question can only be determined by an Induction of particular Passages out of their Works, to which end Mr. *Milles*'s and Mr. *Dodwell*'s Writings may perhaps be allowed very useful.



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A SECOND

DEFENCE

OF AN

ARGUMENT

Made uſe of in a

LETTER

TO

Mr. *DODWELL*,

To prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of *A Reply to Mr.* Clarke's *Defence*, &c.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. late Rector of St. *James's Weſtminſter.*

LONDON:
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SIR,

IN abſtract and *Metaphyſical* Speculations, it is hardly poſſible that any thing ſhould ever be ſo clearly expreſſed, or ſo ſtrongly proved; but Thoſe who are not very much verſed in ſuch Enquiries, will perpetually be apt to miſ-apprehend what is ſaid; and Men of Wit and Parts will always be able to raiſe new Difficulties, and perplex their Readers with intricate and endleſs Diſputations.

Since you have not thought fit in your *Reply*, to offer any new Arguments, but only to urge again the ſame Objections which you had before advanced, againſt what I perſuade my ſelf I have already explained with as much Clearneſs

as can reaſonably be expected in Queſtions of this Nature; I think I might very well, without entering into any further Debate, have now left it wholly to the judicious and impartial Reader, to conſider and determine with himſelf on which ſide the greateſt Strength of Reaſon and Argument lies. Nevertheleſs, the Candour and Ingenuity with which you have written, have once more engaged me to endeavour to give you Satisfaction in this matter; by pointing out to you ſome of the principal Inſtances, wherein you ſeem either to have miſtaken the Queſtion it ſelf, or to have miſunderſtood my Argument upon it. But hereafter, unleſs any new Objections ſhall be propoſed, and not merely Repetitions and ingenious Repreſentations of the former Difficulties, you muſt excuſe me if I think not my ſelf obliged to do ſo any more.

In repeating my Anſwer to your firſt Objection, you cite my Words thus; * *To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to the ſeveral Parts of which the Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction*: Whereas my Words were; *To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind ariſing from or belonging to* [*any whole Syſtem of Matter, without belonging to*] *the ſeveral Parts of which the Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction* †. I make no queſtion but this is only a Fault of the Preſs in your *Reply*. Yet it was proper to take notice of it, becauſe perhaps every Reader will not be at the Pains to compare the Books; and it happens, as the Paſſage ſtands in your Citation to give a very diſadvantagious Repreſentation of my Senſe.

* *Reply, pag.* 112.

† *Defence, page* 95.

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In your preliminary defining the Signification of the Terms *, I cannot ſee any Reaſon, (unleſs it be to perplex the Reader with a new Queſtion, *Whether the Soul always Actually thinks or not*, which is wholly foreign to the Matter at preſent in Diſpute;) I cannot ſee any Reaſon, I ſay, why you ſhould affirm that *Conſciouſneſs cannot be properly imployed to ſignify the ſame thing with a Power of Thinking, unleſs by a Power of Thinking, be underſtood, not a Capacity to Think, but Actual Thinking.* For, the thing to be proved, being This, that a Diviſible Subſtance is not capable of a Power of Thinking; what difference can it make, whether by a *Power of Thinking* you underſtand *actual Thinking*, or a *Capacity to think?* For I preſume you will not deny, but whatever is proved incapable of *actual Thinking*, is alſo proved incapable (*pardon the Expreſſion*) of a *Capacity of Thinking*; and whatſoever is proved incapable of a *Capacity of Thinking*, is alſo proved incapable of *actual Thinking*. Wherefore there was no need of indeavouring at this time to perplex and multiply the Queſtion by any ſuch diſputable Diſtinction; Which kind of Difficulties, foreign to the thing at preſent under Conſideration, they who are deſirous to come at Truth, and to come at it the neareſt Way, ought always very carefully to avoid.

* *Reply*, page 112, 113.

Conſciouſneſs, in the moſt ſtrict and exact Senſe of the Word, ſignifies neither a *Capacity of Thinking*, nor yet *Actual Thinking*, but the *Reflex Act by which I know that I think, and that my Thoughts and Actions are my own and not Another's.* But in the preſent Queſtion, the Reader needs not trouble himſelf with this Nicety of Diſtinction; but may underſtand it indiffe-

rently in all or any of these Significations; because the Argument proves universally, that Matter is neither capable of this *Reflex Act*, nor of the first *Direct Act*, nor of the *Capacity of Thinking* at all.

By an *Individual Power* I mean (in the Sense that Logicians commonly use the Word *Individual* when they oppose it to *Specifick*,) such a Power as is *really and truly* in the Nature of the Thing it self *One Power*, in opposition to its being such merely in our *abstract Complex Notion*. For Instance: When I speak of my own Consciousness, and call it an *Individual Power*; I mean thereby to express that it is really and truly one undivided Consciousness, and not a Multitude of distinct Consciousnesses added together: But when I speak of the Blueness, (suppose) or Redness, or Sweetness of a Body, as of a *single Power* belonging to that Body; it is evident I can mean only, that it is such merely in the *abstract Complex Notion* or *Idea* I frame in my Mind; that is, in the same Sense as we say an *Army* or a *City* is *One*; But that really and indeed it is a vast Multitude of Blueneſſes, Redneſſes, or Sweetneſſes; or rather (to speak strictly and properly) a vast Multitude of such Parts as excite in us the Sensations of Blueness, Redness, or Sweetness. Now the thing to be proved, was that such an Individual Power as Consciousness, cannot possibly inhere in or result from a divisible Substance. And this I did prove; not by *defining* or *supposing* an *Individual Power* to be *a Power that cannot possibly inhere in, or result from a divisible Substance*; (which would indeed have been a Begging of the Question;) but by *demonstrating*, that it would necessarily imply a

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plain and direct Contradiction, for any Power which is really *One* and not *Many*, (ſuch as your ſelf acknowledged Conſciouſneſs to be, by confeſſing it does not reſide * in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of the Brain,) to inhere in or reſult from a diviſible Subſtance. Wherefore it is altogether without Reaſon, that you endeavour to perplex your Reader by telling him that † a *Syſtem of Matter being ſuppoſed to conſiſt of Parts, and Thinking being ſuppoſed to be a Power incapable of reſiding in a Being that conſiſts of Parts, the Queſtion of Matter's Thinking will amount to this, Whether that which cannot think, can think*; When you well know that I made uſe of no ſuch Suppoſition, but endeavoured to *prove*, (and, I hope, *have proved* with ſome Strength and Clearneſs) what you ſeem to inſinuate as if I only *ſuppoſed*.

* *pag.* 116.

† *pag.* 113.

I. You reply to my Anſwer to your firſt Objection; that ‖ it is nothing elſe but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*: that *in enumerating the ſorts of Powers or Qualities of Matter, I ſuppoſe that a Syſtem of Matter has and can have only Powers of one ſort or kind, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the ſame kind; Which, what is it elſe but to argue, That becauſe we know of no other Powers of a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it Has and Can have no other Powers?* Now I cannot think, Sir, but a Man of your Underſtanding, if you pleaſe to conſider the Matter a ſecond time, will find it is by no means *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*. For if a Disjunction be complete, (as that in which I enumerate the ſeveral ſorts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either is; or elſe

‖ *pag.* 114.

you ought to have proved that another Member could be added to it, to ſhow that it was not;) it contains in it all the poſſible Particulars, as well the *unknown*, as thoſe that are ever ſo well *known*. For how many Particulars ſoever be ſuppoſed to be *unknown*, and how impoſſible ſoever it be ſuppoſed to come at the Knowledge of thoſe Particulars; yet if the Heads or Kinds be rightly diſtributed, they muſt of Neceſſity contain under them all the *unknown* Particulars as certainly as thoſe that are the *moſt known*. All the poſſible Qualities, I ſaid, or Powers of Matter, (whether *known* or *unknown*,) muſt of Neceſſity be either *Qualities really inhering in the Subject it ſelf to which they are aſcribed*; or *Modes produced by it in ſome other Subject*; or elſe *mere abſtract Names ſignifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reſide in any Subject at all*. Now if this Disjunction be true; and Thinking be at all a Quality or Power of Matter; and be confeſſed not to belong to either of the two latter ſorts; it muſt of neceſſity (how *unknown* ſoever the Nature of it be otherwiſe ſuppoſed to be,) be included in the former. And then the Argument holds unanſwerably good; that *Thinking*, (or, if you pleaſe to imagine any other even yet more abſtruſe Qualities or Powers of Matter, even theſe alſo) as well as Magnitude and Motion, which I inſtanced in; and whatever elſe may be reducible to this Kind; by truly and really inhering in the Subject it ſelf; muſt of neceſſity inhere in all and every one of the Particles of the Syſtem, taken ſingly as well as together. Becauſe, as I ſaid before, to ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to any *whole* Syſtem

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of Matter, without belonging to the *ſeveral Parts*, of which that whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiction: It is ſuppoſing either an *Univerſal* to exiſt, without *Particulars*; or an *Effect* to be produced without a *Cauſe*, or to have more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; or that a *Quality* is by the Power of God made ſo to ariſe out of Nothing, as to be ſuperadded to a *Subject*, and to ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject to which it is at the ſame time ſuppoſed to belong.

To this you reply, * that *to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter, without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole conſiſts; is not to ſuppoſe an* Univerſal *to exiſt without Particulars, but a* Particular *Power exiſting, to which ſeveral Particular Powers contribute; as every* Man *is a* Particular *Man though various Powers are neceſſary to conſtitute him of that Species.* But, Sir, if the Whole or Reſult, which you call a *Particular* Power, be entirely and *Specifically* different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it; as *Thinking* manifeſtly is, from all the Powers of Particles not indued with *Thought*; you will find, if you pleaſe to conſider it carefully, that it is as certain and evident as any *Arithmetical* Demonſtration, that ſuch a *Particular* Power is a *Whole* bigger than *all its Parts*; a *Whole*, that contains ſomething in it beſides All and every one of its *Parts*; that is, I think, an *Univerſal* without *Particulars*. It is exactly as if you ſhould aſſert, that a *Smell* and a *Colour* could be joined together to make up a *Sound*; or as if *Hardneſs* and *Figure* could be the Particulars contributing to conſtitute a *Motion*. A *Man*, if you mean the whole Man, the Thinking Perſon; (as the Reader may be apt to think you do;) and ſuppoſe

* pag. 116.

poſe him to be conſtituted of mere Matter, whoſe ſingle Particles are none of them indued with Thought; is ſuch a contradictory Whole: But if you mean, (as you ſeem to do,) the Body only, with its Mechanical Powers; then there is nothing in it, differing from the Powers of the ſingle Parts; except only the bare Name, the Abſtract Notion of its being a *Whole*; which is a complex Idea in our Mind; but in the Thing it ſelf it is nothing at all, but its being the Sum of the Magnitudes, Figures, and Motions of all the ſeveral Parts; from which conſtituent Parts no Whole can (without an evident Contradiction) differ any otherwiſe, than as in Numbers a *Thouſand* differs from *Ten Hundred*, or as in Weights a *Pound* differs from *Sixteen Ounces*, or as an *Army* differs from all the *Men* that compoſe it; that is, in nothing but the bare *Name*.

You add: *Neither is it a ſuppoſing an Effect produced without a Cauſe: For the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, are the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of that Power which did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered. And thus in thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain*, &c. Now here, Sir, I really cannot but wonder how a Gentleman ſo well skilled in Philoſophy, as you are, can ſuffer himſelf to be impoſed upon by ſo very groſs and palpable a Fallacy. For though the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, (as, for inſtance, their Magnitude, Situation, Figure and Motion,) may by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of another Power *of the ſame Species*, which did not exiſt in

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the Particles ſingly conſidered; that is, may conſtitute another Magnitude, another Figure, another Motion, than was in the ſingle Particles; juſt as twenty different Numbers added together, conſtitute a new Number different from any of the Particulars: Yet thoſe Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of any other Power of a *different Species*; (as *Thinking* is confeſſedly of a *different Species* from *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Motion*, or whatever other Properties may belong to *Unthinking* Particles of Matter;) for the ſame Reaſon as the Addition of different Numbers in Arithmetick, cannot without a manifeſt Contradiction, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of a Line or a Figure; or the Mixture of Taſtes, conſtitute a Colour; Namely, becauſe thus the *Effect* would contain more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; that is, ſomething would without any Efficient, be produced out of Nothing. In like manner; though the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, (their Magnitude *ſuppoſe*, Situation, Figure and Motion,) may, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of a Power *to affect ſome foreign Subſtance*, which Power did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered; that is, certain Particles united, may prick the Skin and cauſe Pain, which the ſingle ones could not do; or may ſtrike the Eye ſo as to excite the Senſation of Blue or Red, which the ſingle ones could not do; Juſt as a Wedge may force it ſelf a Paſſage, where a Body of ſome other ſhape could not: Yet thoſe Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the Cauſe of the Exiſtence of any new Quality

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really inhering in the Subject it ſelf; (as *Thinking* confeſſedly is a Quality *really inhering in the Thinking Being it ſelf*, and not barely an *abſtract Notion*, or *Power of affecting ſome foreign Subſtance*;) for the ſame Reaſon as the ſharpning of the Point of a Needle cannot poſſibly be the Cauſe that the Needle it ſelf ſhould feel Pain.

From hence it eaſily appears how defective your Similitude is *, when you ſay it is *no Contradiction to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter, without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole conſiſts; no more than to conceive that a Whole is not the ſame with a Piece of a Clock*; Wherein *the Power reſulting from the different contributing Powers in the Syſtem, neither belongs to any Part of the Syſtem when conſidered by it ſelf, nor is it of the ſame ſort or kind with any Power in any part of the Syſtem.* For that which you call the *Power* of a Clock, to ſhow the Time of the Day, is evidently nothing *in the Clock it ſelf*, but the Figure and Motion of its Parts; and conſequently not any thing of a different ſort or kind from the Powers inherent in the Parts: Whereas *Thinking*, if it was the Reſult of the Powers of the different Parts of the Machine of the Body, or of the Brain in particular, would be ſomething really inhering *in the Machine it ſelf*, ſpecifically different from all and every one of the Powers of the ſeveral Parts out of which it reſulted: Which is an expreſs Contradiction, a ſuppoſing the *Effect* to have more in it than the *Cauſe*. And therefore, though you are pleaſed to make uſe of it as a *Similitude*; yet in reality this Power of Thinking, which truly and properly inheres in its Subject, has not in any reſpect the leaſt Appearance of *likeneſs* to the *Power of a Clock* to ſhow

* *pag.* 115.

the Time of the Day, which is merely an *abſtract Complex Notion* in the Man that beholds it, and nothing at all really in the Clock itſelf.

In like manner, when you ſay * *it may be conceived that there may be a Power in all thoſe Particles which compoſe the Brain, to contribute to the Act of Thinking, before they are united under that Form; though, while they are diſunited, they have no more of Conſciouſneſs, than any Being which produces Sweetneſs in us (that is made up of Parts wherein different Powers inhere) when under a particular Form, has a Power to produce Sweetneſs in us, when its Parts are diſunited and ſeparated*; you fall again into the ſame Fallacy. For the Power of a Body to excite in us the Idea of Sweetneſs, is nothing elſe but a certain Figure and Motion reſulting from different Figures and Motions, of its original conſtituent Parts; juſt as the Power of a Pin to cauſe Pain in us, is nothing but its Motion and the ſharp Figure of its Point, reſulting from different Motions, Figures and Situations of its conſtituent Parts. And if the Effect of the Powers, by which the ſeveral Particles that compoſe the Brain, contribute (as your Phraſe is) to the Act of Thinking, was likewiſe only the exciting of certain *Thoughts* in ſomething which was before a *Thinking Subſtance*, your Similitude would have ſomething of likeneſs in it. But that Particles which in themſelves have no *Thought*, ſhould ever contribute any thing towards making the Subſtance, which they conſtitute, a *Thinking* Being; this I am ſure you can no more be able to clear from being an expreſs Contradiction; (though I doubt not but you can argue upon it as acutely as any One;) than if you ſhould undertake to prove, that

* *pag.* 116.

that a Solid Maſs of Marble is made up of Particles, which without having any Solidity themſelves, contribute by other unknown Powers to conſtitute a Solid Maſs; or that a Foot-ſquare of any Matter, is made up of Particles, which without having any Extenſion themſelves, contribute by other different and unknown Powers, to conſtitute an extended Solid Quantity.

And here I cannot but take notice, that beſides the Contradictions before-mentioned, you have, by chooſing to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain or the Spirits in it, fallen into another very great Abſurdity. For if the Brain or Spirits be the Subject of Conſciouſneſs; and the Parts of the Brain or Spirits be (as they certainly are, whatever Queſtion may be made concerning any original *Solid Stamina* of the Body,) in perpetual flux and change; it will follow that That Conſciouſneſs, by which I *not only Remember* that certain Things were done many Years ſince, but alſo *am Conſcious that they were done by Me, by the very ſame Individual Conſcious Being* who now remembers them; it will follow, I ſay, that That Conſciouſneſs is transferred from one Subject to another; that is to ſay, that it is a real Quality which ſubſiſts without inhering in any Subject at all.

But to return to the Argument before us. You ſuppoſe that the Particles which compoſe the Brain, though themſelves *void of Conſciouſneſs* when taken ſingly, may yet by other different Powers contribute towards the making up One *Conſcious Whole*. This I affirm to be, and I think I have proved to be, an expreſs Contradiction; an aſſigning more to the *Effect*

fect than was in the *Cauſe*; a making the *Whole* bigger than all its *Parts*, and Specifically different from All and every One of them. The Occaſion, the common Ground and Foundation of Mens Erring in this whole Matter, I have * elſewhere largely diſcovered; and ſhall here repeat what I think may be ſufficient to ſatisfy an inquiſitive and unprejudiced Perſon. "Whatever can ariſe from, or be compounded "of any Things; is ſtill only thoſe very "Things, of which it was compounded: And "if infinite Compoſitions or Diviſions be made "eternally, the Things will ſtill be but eter-"nally the ſame: And all their poſſible Ef-"fects, can never be any thing but Repetitions "of the ſame. For Inſtance: All poſſible "Changes of *Figure*, are ſtill nothing but *Fi-"gure:* [All poſſible Variations, Compoſitions and Diviſions of *Magnitude*, are ſtill nothing but *Magnitude:*] "All poſſible Com-"poſitions or Effects of *Motion*, are ſtill no-"thing but *mere Motion*": All Compoſitions of *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion* together, are ſtill nothing but *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion:* And how many other Qualities ſoever, *known* or *unknown*, the Particles of Matter be ſuppoſed to be indued with; thoſe Qualities can never in any Compoſition or Diviſion produce any new Power ſpecifically different from themſelves, unleſs a *Cauſe* could give more to the *Effect* than is in it ſelf. And conſequently, if the Matter of the Brain be the Subject in which Conſciouſneſs inheres, That Conſciouſneſs cannot poſſibly be the Reſult of any other known or unknown Powers of the ſeveral conſtituent Particles, but what muſt themſelves have been originally of the ſame *Species*, that

* *Demon. of the Being and Attributes of God.* Prop. 8. Sect. 2.

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is to ſay, ſo many ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes.

" That which has been apt to deceive Men in " this Matter, is this; that they imagine Com- " pounds to be ſomewhat really [ſpecifically] " different from the Things of which they " are compounded. Which is a very great " Miſtake. For all the Things, of which " Men ſo judge; either, if they be really dif- " ferent, are not Compounds nor Effects of " what Men judge them to be, but are ſome- " thing totally diſtinct; as when the Vulgar " thinks Colours and Sounds to be Properties " inherent in Bodies, when indeed they are " purely Thoughts of the Mind: Or elſe, if " they be really Compounds and Effects, then " they are not different, but exactly the ſame " that ever they were; As when two Triangles " put together make a Square, that Square is " ſtill nothing but two Triangles; or when a " Square cut in halves makes two Triangles, " thoſe two Triangles are ſtill only the two " halves of a Square; or when the Mixture of " Blue and Yellow Powder makes a Green, " that Green is ſtill nothing but Blew and Yel- " low intermixt, as is plainly viſible by the " Help of Microſcopes: And in ſhort, every " thing by Compoſition, Diviſion or Motion; " is nothing elſe but the very ſame it was be- " fore, taken either in whole or by Parts, or in " different Place or Order, [ſo as to excite in our Minds different *complex Notions*, and occaſion new *abſtract Names* of Things; but by no means to produce any new real Quality in the Things themſelves, ſuch as *Conſciouſneſs* is agreed to be, inhering truly and properly in the Subject it is aſcribed to.]

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The true State of this Caſe, ſeems in brief to be This. Sometimes we conſider one and the ſame Quality of a Thing, in different Circumſtances and Reſpects, and with relation to other different Things; which relation may be changed by the Alteration or Removal of thoſe other things, and a new Effect be produced, without any alteration at all of the Thing it ſelf or any of its Qualities; and yet then we give it a *new Name*, and are apt to think that *new Name* a *new Quality*. Sometimes we conſider ſeveral diſtinct Qualities of different parcels of Matter, together; and, becauſe ſome new Effect is thereby occaſioned in ſome other Being, we give the *imaginary Whole* a *new Name*, and think that *new Denomination* a *new Quality*. But with how little Reaſon this is done, will abundantly appear by the following Inſtances. The ſame Particle of Matter, which makes a Point in the Surface of a *Globe*, may, by other Parts being ſhaved off, become the Point of the Angle of a *Cube*, without undergoing any alteration it ſelf; and produce an effect, which it could not produce before: But is this truly a new *Quality* or *Power* in the Point it ſelf? *Blue* and *Yellow* Powder mingled together, occaſion a new Effect, and are called by a *new Name*, *Green*: But is this really a new *Quality* or *Power*? Is it not plainly the ſame two Qualities, which they had when ſeparate, acting ſtill diſtinctly, as appears in a Microſcope? That *particular and determinate Degree of Velocity* in a Wheel, whereby it turns once round preciſely in Twelve Hours, is that which you call the *Power of a Clock* to ſhow the Time of the Day: And becauſe ſuch a determinate *Velocity of Motion* is made uſe of by Us for the Meaſure

of Time, and has an *abſtract Name* given it to expreſs that uſe; is it therefore really a new *Quality* or *Power* diſtinct from the *Motion* it ſelf? And, to mention no more; When a *Weight* in one Scale of a Balance, does, by taking out part of the Weight that was in the other Scale, begin to *preponderate*, which it did not before; is this any new *Quality* or *real Power* in the Weight that is not altered, different from what it had before?

I ſhall obſerve but one Thing more upon this Head; and that is, that Whereas I affirmed *every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any Syſtem of Matter, to be nothing elſe than the Sum or Aggregate of ſo many Powers or Qualities* of the ſame kind *inhering in all the Parts*; meaning that the Powers inhering in the ſeveral Parts, muſt be of the *ſame Kind*, or Species *of that Power, which is the Reſult of the Whole*; you ſeem all along to underſtand it as if I had aſſerted, that the Powers or Qualities inhering in the ſeveral Parts, muſt needs be all of *the ſame Kind* or Species *one with another*; Thereby diverting your Reader from the true Strength of the Argument, and perplexing him with that which has no relation to the Queſtion: For whether the Powers of the ſeveral Parts be all of the *ſame kind one with another*, or of ever ſo *different kinds one from another*; that which I affirmed, is ſtill equally certain and neceſſary; that the Power of the Whole, being but the Sum or Mixture of the Powers of the Parts, cannot poſſibly be of a *different Kind* or Species from all the ſeveral Powers of the Parts, as *Thinking* is of neceſſity ſpecifically different from all and every one of the Powers, known or unknown, of Particles which are

confeſſed

confeſſed to be *void of Thought*. Wherefore when you ſay, * *he ought to have demonſtrated, if he would have proved the Point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of* the ſame *kind*; And that † *till it is demonſtrated, that there can be no other Power in any Syſtem of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of* the ſame *kind, it may as well be ſuppoſed that there are Powers of* different *kinds in different Particles of Matter*; And that it is ‡ *ſo far from being the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the* ſame *kind, that the new Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of a* different kind; And that ‖ *the Power of every Syſtem will not be the Sum of Powers of the* ſame *kind, but the Sum of Powers of* different *kinds:* All this is entirely beſides the Purpoſe.

* pag. 114.

† ibid.

‡ pag. 115.

‖ pag. 117.

Your Suppoſition, * *that the Matter of which an Egg conſiſts, doth entirely conſtitute the young one; and that the Action of Senſation began under a particular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion, without the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul*; is in every part contrary to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philoſophy: For ſo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Diſpoſition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or *entirely conſtitutes* the young one, that it does not *conſtitute it at all*, not ſo much as the *Body* of it; but only ſerves it for *nouriſhment* and *growth*: It being as impoſſible that the Organized Body of a Chicken ſhould by the Power of any Mechanical Motions be formed out of the unorganized Matter of an Egg; as that the Sun, Moon and Stars, ſhould by mere Mechaniſm ariſe out of a Chaos. And that

* ibid.

Senſation ſhould be added to it by ariſing from a *particular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion*, is ſtill more impoſſible; becauſe it is ſuppoſing ſomething to come out of that, in which it never was: Than which, nothing in the World can be a more expreſs Contradiction. You think it ridiculous to recur to the *Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul:* Let it be ſo: I can as eaſily ſuppoſe, if you muſt needs have an Hypotheſis, that the immaterial Subſtance was not *Added* afterwards, but was in it from the Beginning, from the Time that the Seminal Principle it ſelf of the Organized Body was framed: And who ſhall tell us when That was? The deeper Diſcoveries every Age makes in Anatomy by Microſcopial Obſervations, the further all theſe things are found to be removed backwards from the Search and common Notions even of the moſt inquiſitive Men. Suppoſe therefore we could not frame any probable Hypotheſis at all, *when* and *how* the immaterial Principle of Senſation came in; yet why ought this to incline any Man to doubt the Truth of a certain Proof which ſhows him that there Is ſuch a Principle; any more than the Difficulty (which is altogether as great an one) of framing an Hypotheſis *how* and *whence* the Organized Body came, make him disbelieve his Senſes which diſcover it to him?

* *pag.* 117. You tell me again, * that I have *not rightly enumerated the known Powers of Matter.* To prove which Charge, you repeat what you had before ſaid, concerning *Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind*; wherein I have already ſhown that you lay ſtreſs upon that which is wholly foreign to the Queſtion. And what you add concerning the *particular Texture of a Body*, as being

being ſomething that is different from the *Magnitude* and *Motion of its Parts*, and on which depend certain Powers, as the Power of the *Eye*, for inſtance, to *be operated upon by external Objects*, and to *contribute to the Act of Viſion*; which Power, becauſe it ceaſes *wholly* upon the leaſt Alteration of the Texture of *any part* of the Eye, it is evident does not *inhere* in *the Parts* of the Syſtem, in the ſame Senſe with *Magnitude* and *Motion*: This alſo is altogether foreign to the Queſtion. For the *Eye's Power of Seeing*, is not, as your Argument ſuppoſes, one of thoſe Powers which I ranked under the *firſt* Head, that is, a Power which really inheres in the Syſtem, and conſequently in all the Parts of it; But it is one of thoſe Powers which I called the *third* ſort, *viz.* which are *mere abſtract Names ſignifying certain Powers or Effects which do not at all reſide in the Subject.* For the *Eye* does not *See*, in the ſame Senſe as the *Thinking* Subſtance *Thinks*; But *Seeing* in the *Eye*, is what *Magnetiſm* is in the *Load-ſtone*; not a real inherent Quality, but merely a Situation of Parts and Pores, ſo as to be the Occaſion of an Effect wholly extrinſical to it ſelf, an Effect produced in ſome other Subſtance by Rays tranſmitted through the Pores of the Eye, juſt as the Magnetick Effluvia are through a Loadſtone, or Corn through a Sieve. So that you might exactly as well have compared the Power by which the Soul *Thinks*, to the Power by which a *Sieve* tranſmits *Corn*, as to the Power by which the *Eye ſees*.

You obſerve, * that *Saying Conſciouſneſs is an individual Power, is but calling Conſciouſneſs by another Name, and not giving an account of what Conſciouſneſs is, or wherein it conſiſts; which is* * pag. 120.

requiſite to demonſtrate from Conſciouſneſs, that Conſciouſneſs cannot be added to a Being that conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts. It is true, my affirming Conſciouſneſs to be an individual Power, is not giving an account of what Conſciouſneſs is; neither was it intended to be ſo. Every Man feels and knows by experience what Conſciouſneſs is, better than any Man can explain it: Which is the Caſe of all ſimple Ideas: And it is not at all neceſſary to define more particularly what *it is*; but abundantly ſufficient that we know and agree what it *is not*, viz. that it is not a Multitude of diſtinct and ſeparate Conſciouſneſſes; in order to prove that it does not and cannot inhere in a Being, that conſiſts of a Multitude of ſeparate and diſtinct Parts. You your ſelf acknowledge that the Parts which conſtitute the Brain, are not ſeparately and diſtinctly conſcious; that is, that the Conſciouſneſs of a Man, is not a Multitude of Conſciouſneſſes, but One. This is all that I *ſuppoſe*, when I call Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power; and from hence I think it is *proved* ſtrongly, that Conſciouſneſs cannot reſide in a Being that conſiſts of a Multitude of ſeparate and diſtinct Parts: Becauſe if it could, it muſt neceſſarily follow, either that it would become a Multitude of diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, contrary to the Suppoſition which you your ſelf allow; or elſe that an Individual Quality of each ſingle Particle, would become the Individual Quality of every one of the reſt likewiſe, which is a Contradiction in Terms; or elſe, that the Conſciouſneſs would be one Power reſulting from the contributing Powers of all the ſeveral ſeparate and diſtinct Particles; in which caſe, it would be, as I have before proved in enume-

rating

rating the ſeveral kinds of Powers, a *mere abſtract Name* or *complex Notion*, and not a real Quality reſiding in any Subject at all. It is therefore wholly without reaſon, that you ſay * *Mr.* Clarke's *calling Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power, in his Senſe of an Individual Power, is* ſuppoſing *that Matter cannot think*; and that you inſinuate to your Reader, † *that Conſciouſneſs being an Individual Power, in Mr.* Clarke's *Senſe of thoſe Words, is* ſuppoſing *that it is a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being*; to prove which *he has not ſaid any thing, but barely by calling Conſciouſneſs an Individual Power.* For an *Individual* Power, in my Senſe of the Word, does not *mean in the Definition a Power which can only reſide in an Individual Being*; but it ſignifies *One Power*, in oppoſition to *a Multitude*; and I have *proved* that ſuch a Power can only reſide in an Individual Being, (not by Suppoſing it, but) by reducing the contrary Suppoſition to an expreſs Contradiction.

* *pag.* 121.

† *ibid.*

What you ſay again ‡, concerning Sums and Aggregates of Powers of *the ſame kind*; is repeating the ſame Miſtake, which I have before ſhown you to have fallen into, in underſtanding Powers of *the ſame kind* with *one another*, inſtead of Powers of the *ſame kind* [or Species] with the *Whole that reſults from them.*

‡ *pag.* 122.

You are pleaſed to entertain your ſelf and your Reader ||, upon my accuſing you with ſuppoſing *Sweetneſs to be in a Roſe.* But I hope this will appear very pardonable, ſince it ſeemed neceſſary to me to underſtand you as I did, becauſe I could not otherwiſe apprehend what you ſaid concerning it, to be pertinent to your purpoſe. For you compared the Power which reſults from the ſeveral Particles of a *Roſe*, without being in the Particles themſelves

|| *ibid.*

ſeparately and ſingly; to the Power which reſults from the ſeveral Particles of the *Brain*, without being in the Particles themſelves ſeparately and ſingly: Now the Power which you ſay reſults from the Diſpoſition of the ſeveral Particles of the Brain, is *Conſciouſneſs reſiding in the Brain it ſelf*: Either therefore by the Power reſulting from the Diſpoſition of the ſeveral Particles of the *Roſe*, you muſt mean *Something reſiding* likewiſe *in the Roſe it ſelf*; or elſe your Similitude is not at all parallel. Now that Power which reſides in the Roſe it ſelf, as Conſciouſneſs does in the Brain, and yet belongs not to the ſeveral conſtituent Particles of the Roſe, can neither be *Magnitude*, nor *Figure*, nor *Motion*, (for theſe belong to the ſeveral Parts ſingly;) nor *Texture*, (for That, ſo far as it differs from the former, is nothing but a *mere abſtract Notion*, and nothing really in the thing it ſelf) but muſt be either Sweetneſs it ſelf, or ſomething elſe equally unintelligible and inexplicable. If you will ſay you mean a Power not reſiding *in* the Roſe at all, but reſulting *from* it, then, (beſides that, as I ſaid before, it is not pertinent to your purpoſe,) what is this, but ſuppoſing a Power ſubſiſting without any Subject at all? a *mere Name?*

In my Aſſertion, that the Powers in a Roſe are nothing elſe but a Number of *ſimilar* Motions or Figures, you * tell me *there are two things to be proved.* 1ſt, *That the mere Figure and Motion of the Parts of a Roſe, do produce, or are the ſole external Cauſe of the Senſation cauſed by them.* 2dly, *That thoſe Motions and Figures are perfectly ſimilar.* By *Similar*, I meant that they were ſo far *ſimilar*, as the Smell or Colour of the Roſe was ſimilar or homogeneous: But whether

* *pag.* 123.

whether they be *ſimilar*, or no, is of no concern at all in the preſent Queſtion, unleſs you ſtill continue in your former Miſtake about Powers of *the ſame kind* with *one another*, inſtead of *with the Whole*. And as to the other thing which you ſay wants proof; I think I may appeal to your ſelf, whether you can find or conceive any thing elſe in the Roſe, which can be the Cauſe of our Senſation, beſides the mere *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Situation*, and perhaps *Motion* of its Parts.

You find fault with me * for aſſerting, that Gravitation is the Effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter; *whereas*, you think, *it does not appear but that Matter gravitates by virtue of* Powers *originally placed in it by God, and is now left to it ſelf to act by thoſe Original Powers.* This Opinion of yours, I cannot but think, Sir, to be a great Miſtake in your Philoſophy. For when a Stone that was at Reſt, does of it ſelf, upon its Support being removed, begin to fall downward; what is it that cauſes the Stone to begin to move? Is it poſſible to be an Effect produced without a Cauſe? Is it impelled without any Impeller? Or can a *Law* or *Power*, that is to ſay, a *mere abſtract Name* or *complex Notion*, and not any *real Being*, impel a Stone and cauſe it to begin to move? In any other Caſe you would not doubt but this implied an abſolute Contradiction.

* *pag.* 123.

II. When in my Anſwer to your ſecond Objection, I ſaid that though the Want of Individuality is indeed the ſole Reaſon urged in the *preſent Argument*, why a Syſtem of Matter cannot think; yet that it ought not therefore to be

ſaid

ſaid that Inviduality is the *only thing required*, to render a Being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking; (Becauſe I would not exclude any *other Argument*, by which other inquiſitive Perſons might prove other Conditions alſo, as well as Individuality, to be neceſſary Requiſites in order to a Subject's being capable of Thinking:) You hereupon make the following
*pag. 125. Remark; * *Upon this I obſerve that Mr.* Clarke *owns the Truth of my Reaſoning, upon the Suppoſition, that Individuality is only required by him in a Subject of a Power of Thinking*; (you ſhould have added; and upon Suppoſition alſo, that a Particle of Matter, could be truly an Individual;) *but denies that I have any reaſon to infer that* Individuality *is only required, from the* Want of Individuality's *being the ſole Reaſon urged why a Syſtem of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking; Which I cannot help thinking to be all one, 'till there is a Difference aſſigned between* only required *in the preſent Argument, and* the ſole Reaſon urged *in the preſent Argument.* Now This is a very unfair Obſervation: Becauſe the Difference to be aſſigned, and which I did aſſign expreſsly, was between *the ſole Reaſon urged* in the *preſent Argument*, and what was *only required* (not in *the preſent* but) in any *new Argument* which Others might make uſe of.

†*pag.* 128. III. The Queſtion concerning the † *Alterations of the Modes or Qualities* of Immaterial Beings, ſeem indeed to have ſome Difficulties in it, but not ſuch as any way affect our preſent Argument. The Thing you objected was, that though the Subſtance of the Soul were proved to be both Immaterial and Immortal, yet it would not follow that it muſt be an Immortal

Thinking

Thinking Subſtance, becauſe its *Thinking* might periſh, though its *Subſtance* did not. To this I replied; that the *Power of Thinking* could no more be deſtroyed by any Natural Power, than the *Subſtance* it ſelf; becauſe the Qualities or Modes of any Subſtance not being alterable otherwiſe, than by ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf; it is manifeſt that an Indiſcerpible Subſtance not being it ſelf alterable by any natural Power, it muſt follow that neither can any of its Qualities be altered by any natural Power. When therefore I ſaid, that all its Qualities and Modes are utterly incapable of being affected in any meaſure, or *changed* in any degree, by any Power of Nature; you had no reaſon to underſtand this, as if I had aſſerted, that an Indiſcerpible Subſtance could not be *acted upon at all* by any Power of Nature; But my Meaning was, that it could not be ſo acted upon, as to *deſtroy*, *change* or *alter* any of its inherent Qualities or Powers; which was all that the Thing in Queſtion required me to prove. And that this was my Meaning, you might have underſtood from the Compariſon I uſed, of the original and perfectly ſolid Particles of Matter. For as thoſe Particles, being, (not abſolutely in themſelves, but) to any Power of Nature, indiſcerpible; are evidently incapable of having any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any meaſure by any Power of Nature; that is, their Figure, their Magnitude, their Hardneſs, and all the reſpective Effects or Powers depending upon theſe, can by no natural means be changed; and yet you could not imagine me to mean, but theſe Particles might be *acted upon*, might be *ſtruck* by each other, might be removed this way or that way, upwards

wards or downwards; all which makes no real alteration in them: So an indiſcerpible immaterial thinking Subſtance, though it may be transferred from one part of the Univerſe to another, though it may be *acted upon* by a Multitude of things, though it may have different Idea's repreſented to it, though the Organs of the Senſes may at times tranſmit different Species, or hinder them from being tranſmitted to it; yet all this makes no real Alteration either in the Subſtance or its inherent Powers; nor can its Power of *Thinking* (which was the Thing in Queſtion) be deſtroyed or altered by theſe or any other natural Powers; any more than the *Mobility* or *Hardneſs* of the original perfectly ſolid Particles of Matter can be deſtroyed by any of their Actings one upon another.

There is ſtill leſs weight in what you add;

[a] *pag.* 128. * *Now till Mr.* Clarke *has a compleat Idea of both ſorts of Beings,* [Material or Immaterial,] *and of their Powers and Operations one on another; it is impoſſible for him, in Many Reſpects, to tell how far they can affect one another's Operations.* This is true indeed; but what follows from it? Becauſe, in *Many Reſpects,* I cannot tell how far they *can* affect one another's Operations; does it therefore follow, that I cannot in *any reſpect* tell wherein they *cannot* affect one another's Operations? All that I pretend to, is to deny the Poſſibility of ſuch Effects, as plainly imply a Contradiction; and this, I preſume, I may be allowed to do, though I were in *moſt reſpects* ignorant how far Material and Immaterial Beings *can* affect one another.

As to the *Power of God* to deſtroy any Mode or Quality in an immaterial indiſcerpible Subſtance,

ſtance, I ſaid nothing concerning it, neither is our Queſtion at all concerned in it. But ſince you have thought fit to put the Queſtion whether, according to my Principles, God can deſtroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, without making ſome alteration in the Subſtance it ſelf; I cannot but take notice, that all the Anſwers you have made for me to this Queſtion, are ſuch as I cannot approve, and that therefore I am not concerned in any of their Conſequences. The Anſwer I would make for my ſelf, is, that ſuppoſing God to deſtroy any Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, it is reſonable to imagine that he muſt do it by making ſome ſuch *Alterations in that Subſtance*, as may be analogous or equivalent to *altering the Diſpoſition of the Parts in a Material Subſtance*. But you ought not to have jumbled * theſe two things together, (which I carefully diſtinguiſhed) by ſuppoſing me to anſwer, that God muſt do it by making an Alteration in the *Parts* of the *Immaterial Subſtance* (to which it is not *proper* to aſcribe any *Parts*,) and thence concluding that an Immaterial Subſtance is as *diſcerpible* by the Power of God, as a Material Subſtance.

* *pag.* 129, 130.

Laſtly, you tell me † that after all I make the Immaterial Thinking Subſtance to be in no other Senſe *Immortal*, than I make the original ſolid Particles of Matter to be *indiſcerpible*; that is to ſay, that the one is *immortal* and the other *indiſcerpible*, only with reſpect to the Powers of Nature; but that in reſpect to the Power of God, neither is the one *indiſcerpible*, nor the other *immortal*. Your Expreſſions in this whole Section lie under ſo much Obſcurity, that I can hardly be ſure whether I underſtand you right

† *pag* 131.

or

or not. But if this be your Senſe; I confeſs I do indeed make it ſo; and I ſuppoſe no conſiderate Man ever made the Soul *immortal* in any other Senſe. For though I believe it is not *diſcerpible*, even by the Power of God; yet he is undoubtedly able to deſtroy it, either by *annihilating* it, or perhaps by otherwiſe *depriving* it of all its Faculties, in ways which we can know nothing of.

IV. To the Difficulties ariſing from the *Suppoſition* of Immateriality not excluding Extenſion; I anſwer,

1. That all theſe Difficulties are wide of the main Queſtion. For if the foregoing Proof, that Matter is incapable of Thinking, cannot be ſhown to be defective; it follows neceſſarily that the Soul muſt be an *Immaterial indiſcerpible Subſtance*. But the Difficulties that ariſe from any following Hypotheſis concerning other Properties of that Immaterial Indiſcerpible Subſtance, as whether it be *Extended* or *Unextended*, whether it ever acts *wholly ſeparate*, or always *in ſome material Vehicle*, finer or groſſer, and the like; the Difficulties, I ſay, that ariſe from any of theſe particular Hypotheſes, affect only the particular Hypotheſis, from which they ariſe, and not at all the foregoing general Proof. I take it to be demonſtrated, that the Soul is an *Immaterial Indiſcerpible Subſtance:* He that thinks the Difficulties ariſing from the Suppoſition of that Immaterial Indiſcerpible Subſtance being *Extended*, to be unſurmountable; may try if he can find fewer Difficulties in ſuppoſing it *Unextended*; And he that thinks the Difficulties that ariſe from ſupoſing it *Unextended*, are not to be got over; may try to

ſolve

ſolve the Difficulties that ariſe from ſuppoſing it *Extended:* But the main Argument remains firm either way; and no difficulty ariſing from following Hypotheſes can be ſo great, as to leſſen the Force of the foregoing poſitive Proof.

2. But conceiving Immateriality not to exclude Extenſion, and ſuppoſing the Difficulties ariſing from that Hypotheſis to be ſuch as could not be clearly anſwered; yet this would not weaken the foregoing Proof, unleſs that Argument could otherwiſe be ſhown to be in it ſelf defective. For there are many Demonſtrations even in abſtract Mathematicks themſelves, which no Man who underſtands them can in the leaſt doubt of the Certainty of, which yet are attended with difficult Conſequences that cannot perfectly be cleared. The *infinite Diviſibility of Quantity*, is an inſtance of this kind. Alſo the *Eternity of God*, than which nothing is more ſelf-evident; and yet the Difficulties conſequent upon it, are ſuch as have reduced moſt of the Schoolmen to entertain that unintelligible Notion of a *Nunc Stans*. And his *Immenſity*, attended with much the like Difficulties.

3. But neither is this the true State of the Caſe. For the Difficulties ariſing from the Suppoſition of Immaterial indiſcerpible Extenſion, are by no means like thoſe before-mentioned. Space, (which you *unphiloſophically* call the mere Abſence of Bodies, and yet confeſs it to be poſitively infinite,) is without difficulty confeſſed by you to be an Inſtance of ſuch an Extenſion; An Extenſion whoſe Parts (improperly ſo called) depend on each other for their Exiſtence, not only becauſe of its Infinity, but becauſe of the Contradiction which a Separation

of

of them manifeſtly would imply. And the only Thing required in the preſent Caſe, is, to conceive that God can create a finite Subſtance, which ſhall not, like the ſolid, rigid, determined Extenſion of Matter, conſiſt of Parts which are actually ſo many diſtinct Beings independent on each other for their Exiſtence; but be a Subſtance perfectly and eſſentially One, ſo that to ſuppoſe any Diviſion of it, ſhall neceſſarily infer a Deſtruction of the Eſſence of that Subſtance. This muſt indeed be confeſſed to be a conſiderable Difficulty: But if the Difficulties ariſing upon any other Hypotheſis, be (as they certainly are) *at leaſt* as great; nothing can thence be inferred to the weakening of the foregoing Proof.

Your applying the Argument, by which I proved that Matter could not Think, in the ſame Words, to prove that neither could Immaterial Subſtance be capable of Thinking; is fallacious in the firſt Sentence. For the Suppoſition of the Subſtance being by *the Power of God divided into two Parts*, which concerning Matter is confeſſed to be always poſſible, may concerning Immaterial Subſtance (even though Extenſion be not excluded) be denied to be poſſible, as being a Suppoſition which deſtroys the very *Eſſence* of the Subſtance it ſelf.

V. As to your laſt Difficulty concerning Brutes, I anſwer, that your Disjunction is ſtill imperfect, when you ſay * they muſt either neceſſarily be annihilated ſome time or other, or elſe be capable of Eternal Happineſs *as well as Man*. For though they ſhould never be annihilated, yet why muſt they needs be capable of Eternal Happineſs *as well as Man*; any more than

*pag. 138. and again p. 140.

than their preſent Subſiſting, implies that they muſt needs be capable of the *Expectations* and *Conditions* of Eternal Happineſs, *as well as Man?* But what is all this, to our purpoſe? Cannot God, if he pleaſes, cauſe them to periſh at the Diſſolution of their Bodies? Or cannot he, if he pleaſes, annihilate them at any other time, when he ſhall ſo think fit? Or cannot he, if he pleaſes, without ever annihilating them at all, diſpoſe of them into States ſuitable to their particular Natures; which yet may in no Propriety of Speech be ſtiled a Capacity of Eternal Happineſs, as that of *Man* is?

Having thus at large endeavoured, to give you particular Satisfaction, in every one of the Difficulties you propoſed; I ſhall conclude with briefly repeating the Strength of the Argument, in a few plain and eaſy *Propoſitions*; and ſo leave it to the Judgment of the inquiſitive and impartial Reader.

NOTE; *by* Conſciouſneſs *in the following Propoſitions, the Reader may underſtand indifferently either the* Reflex Act, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his own Thoughts; (*which is the ſtrict and propereſt Senſe of the Word*;) *or* the Direct Act of Thinking; *or* the Power or Capacity of Thinking; *or* (*which is of the ſame Import*,) ſimple Senſation; *or the* Power of Self-Motion, or of beginning Motion by the Will: *The Argument holding equally in all or any of theſe Senſes; as has been before ſaid.*

I.

Every *Syſtem of Matter* conſiſts of a *Multitude of* diſtinct *Parts.*

This, I think, is granted by all.

II.

Every *real Quality* inheres in ſome *Subject*.

This alſo, I think, is granted by All. For whatever is called a *Quality*, and yet inheres not in any *Subject*, muſt either ſubſiſt of it ſelf; and then it is a *Subſtance*, not a *Quality*; or elſe it is nothing but a *mere Name*.

III.

No *Individual* or *ſingle Quality* of one Particle of Matter, can be the *Individual* or *ſingle Quality* of another Particle.

The *Heat* of one Particle, is not the *Heat* of another. The *Gravity*, the *Colour*, the *Figure*, of one Particle, is not the ſame individual *Gravity*, *Colour*, or *Figure* of another Particle. The *Conſciouſneſs* or *Senſation* of one Particle, (ſuppoſing it to be a Quality of Matter,) is not the *Conſciouſneſs* or *Senſation* of another. If it was; it would follow, that the ſame Thing could be *Two*, in the ſame Senſe, and at the ſame Time, that it is but *One*.

Note, From hence may be drawn an evident Confutation of that abſurd Notion which Mr. *Hobbes* ſuggeſts in his Phyſicks, (*Chap.* 25. *Sect.* 5.) that *All Matter* is eſſentially *endued with an obſcure actual Senſe and Perception*, but that there is required a Number and apt Compoſition of Parts to make up *a clear and diſtinct Senſation or Conſciouſneſs*. For from this Notion it would follow, that the reſulting *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* at laſt, being but One diſtinct *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* (as

(as is that of a Man;) the *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* of every One of the conſtituent Particles, would be the individual *Senſation* or *Conſciouſneſs* of All and Each of the reſt.

IV.

Every *real Simple Quality*, that reſides *in* any *whole material Syſtem*, reſides *in* All the *Parts* of that Syſtem.

The *Magnitude* of every *Body*, is the Sum of the *Magnitudes* of its ſeveral *Parts*. The *Motion* of every *Body*, is the Sum of the *Motions* of its ſeveral *Parts*. The *Weight* of every *Body*, is the Sum of the Weights of its ſeveral *Parts*. The * *Heat* of every *Body*, is the *Heat* of its ſeveral *Parts*. The *Colour* of every *Body* is the *Colour* of its ſeveral *Parts*. And the ſame is univerſally true of *every Simple Quality* reſiding *in* any *Syſtem*. For reſiding in the *Whole*, and not reſiding in the *Parts*, is *reſiding* in a Thing, and not *reſiding* in it, at the ſame time.

* Note by *Heat* here, is meant that *Motion* which cauſes in Us the Senſation of Heat; By *Colour*, that *Magnitude* and *Figure*, which cauſes particular Rays to be tranſmitted to us; *&c.*

V.

Every *real compound Quality*, that reſides *in* any whole material *Syſtem*, is a Number of ſimple Qualities reſiding *in* all the *Parts* of that Syſtem; ſome in one part, ſome in another.

Thus in the Inſtance of *mixt Colours*; When the Simples, *Blue*, ſuppoſe, *and Yellow*, make the *Whole* appear *Green*; In this Caſe, That *Portion* of the Syſtem, in which any one of the particular Simple Qualities reſides, is a *Whole* Syſtem with reſpect to that Quality, and the Quality reſiding in it, reſides in the

ſeveral *Particles* of which That *Portion of the Syſtem* is conſtituted: And ſo of the reſt.

VI.

Every *real Quality*, *Simple* or *Compound*, that *reſults from* any whole material *Syſtem*, but does not *reſide in it*, that is, neither in All its diſtinct Parts, nor in All the Parts of ſome Portion of it, according to the Explication of the two foregoing Propoſitions; is the Mode or Quality of ſome *Other Subſtance*, and not of *That*.

All ſenſible ſecondary Qualities, *Heat*, *Colour*, *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Sound*, and the like, are of this kind; being in reality not *Qualities* of the *Bodies* they are aſcribed to, but *Modes* of the *Mind* that perceives them.

VII.

Every *Power*, *Simple* or *Compound*, that *reſults from* any whole material *Syſtem*, but does not *reſide in it*, that is, in all its Parts, in the manner before explained; nor yet reſides in any *Other Subſtance*, as its Subject; is no *real Quality* at all; but muſt either be it ſelf a real Subſtance, (which ſeems unintelligible;) or elſe it is nothing but merely an *abſtract Name* or *Notion*, as all *Univerſals* are.

Thus the Power reſulting from the Texture of a *Roſe*, to excite in us the Senſation of Sweetneſs, is nothing but an *abſtract Name*, ſignifying a particular Motion and Figure of certain Parts emitted. The Power of a *Clock*

to

to ſhow the Hour of the Day, is nothing but one *new Complex Name*, to expreſs at once the ſeveral Motions of the Parts, and particularly the *determinate Velocity* of the laſt Wheel to turn round once in twelve Hours: Upon the ſtopping which *Motion* by the Touch of a Finger or any other Impediment, without making any alteration at all in the Number, Figure, or Diſpoſition of the Parts of the Clock, the *Power* wholly ceaſes: and upon removing the Impediment, by which nothing is reſtored but *mere Motion*, the *Power* returns again, which is therefore no new real Quality of the *Whole*, but only the *mere Motion* of the *Parts*. The Power of a *Pin* to prick, is nothing diſtinct from its mere Figure permitting it to enter the Skin. The Power of a *Weight* in one Scale of a Balance, to aſcend or deſcend, upon increaſing or diminiſhing the Counterpoiſe in the other Scale; is not a *new real Quality*, diſtinct from its *abſolute Gravity*, though it occaſions a new *Effect*; there being no Alteration at all made in the *Weight it ſelf*. The *Power of the Eye to ſee*, is not a real Quality of the *Whole Eye*, but merely an *abſtract Name* ſignifying a Tranſmitting and Refracting of the Rays of Light in a certain manner through its ſeveral Parts; Which Effect, by the Interpoſition or Removal of an Opake Body, is deſtroyed or renewed, without any Alteration at all in the Eye it ſelf. A *Key*, by having many new Locks made fit to it, acquires a *new Power* of producing Effects, which it could not before; and yet no new real Quality is produced, nor any alteration at all made, in the *Key* it ſelf. And ſo univerſally of all Powers of this kind. If theſe

Powers were any thing elſe, but *mere abſtract Names*; they would ſignify Qualities ſubſiſting without any Subject at all; that is, ſuch as muſt themſelves be diſtinct Subſtances. Which is unintelligible.

VIII.

Conſciouſneſs is neither a *mere abſtract Name*, (ſuch as are the *Powers* mentioned in *Prop.* VII; nor *a Power of exciting or occaſioning different Modes in a foreign Subſtance*, (ſuch as are all the *ſenſible Qualities* of Bodies, Prop. VI;) but *a real Quality, truly and properly inherent in the Subject it ſelf, the Thinking Subſtance.*

If it was a *mere abſtract Name*; it would be nothing at all in the Perſon that Thinks, or in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf; but only a Notion framed by the Imagination of ſome Other Being. For all thoſe Powers which are only *abſtract Names*, are not at all in the *Things whoſe Powers they are called:* but are only *Notions* framed in Imagination, by the Mind that obſerves, compares and reaſons about different *Objects without itſelf.*

If it was a *Power of exciting or occaſioning different Modes in a foreign Subſtance*; Then the *Power of Thinking* muſt be before in that foreign Subſtance; and that foreign Subſtance alone would in reality be Conſcious, and not *This* which excites the different Modes in *That foreign Subſtance.* For the Power that is in one Subſtance, of exciting different Modes in another Subſtance; preſuppoſes neceſſarily in that other Subſtance the *Foundation* of thoſe Modes. Thus in the

Caſe

Caſe of all the *ſenſible Qualities* of Bodies; the *Power of Thinking* is beforehand in that Being, wherein thoſe Qualities excite or occaſion *different Modes* of Thinking.

It remains therefore that it muſt of neceſſity be a *real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject it ſelf, the Thinking Subſtance*; there being no other *Species* of *Powers* or *Qualities* left, to which it can poſſibly be referred. And this indeed is of it ſelf as evident by every Man's Experience, as it can be rendred by any Explication or Proof whatſoever.

IX.

No *real Quality* can reſult from the *Compoſition* of *different Qualities*, ſo as to be a new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a *different Kind* or *Species* from all and every one of the *Component Qualities*.

If it could, it would be a *Creation of Something out of Nothing*: From compound *Motions*, can ariſe nothing but *Motion*: From *Magnitudes*, nothing but *Magnitude*: From *Figures*, nothing but *Figure*: From Compoſitions of *Magnitude*, *Figure*, and *Motion* together; nothing but *Magnitude*, *Figure*, and *Motion*: From *Mechanical Powers*, nothing but *Mechanical Powers*: From a Compoſition of *Colours*, nothing but *Colour*, which it ſelf (as appears by Microſcopes) is ſtill the *ſimple Colours* of which it was compounded. From Mixtures of *Chymical Liquors*, nothing but *Ferments*; which are only mere *Motions* of the Particles in mixing, ſuch Motions as ariſe from the placing of *Iron* and a *Load-Stone* near each other. *Gravity*, is not a Qua-

lity of Matter, arising from its Texture or any other Powers in it; but merely an *Endeavour* to *Motion*, excited by some foreign Force or Power. *Magnetism* and *Electricity*, are not new Qualities, resulting from different and unknown Powers; but merely Emissions of certain Streams of Matter, which produce certain determinate Motions. Compositions of *Colours*, can never contribute to produce a *Sound*; nor Compositions of *Magnitude* and *Figure*, to produce a *Motion*; nor *necessary and determined Motions*, to produce a *free and indetermined Power of Self Motion*; nor any *Mechanical Powers* whatsoever, to produce a *Power not Mechanical*. And the same must of necessity hold universally true, of all Qualities and Powers whatsoever, whether known or unknown: Because otherwise, as hath been before said, there would in the Compound be something created out of Nothing.

X.

Consciousness therefore being a real Quality, (*Prop.* VIII.) and of a Kind *specifically different* from all other Qualities whether known or unknown, which are themselves acknowledged to be *void of Consciousness*; can never possibly result from any Composition of such Qualities.

This is as evident from the foregoing Propositions, as that a *Sound* cannot be the Result of a Mixture of *Colours* and *Smells*; nor *Extension* the Result of a Composition of Parts *unextended*, nor *Solidity* the Result of Parts *not solid*; whatever other different Qua-

lities, known or unknown, thoſe conſtituent Parts may be ſuppoſed to be endued with.

XI.

No Individual *Quality* can be *transferred* from one *Subject* to another.

This is granted by All.

XII.

The *Spirits* and *Particles* of the *Brain*, being *looſe* and in perpetual *Flux*, cannot therefore be the Seat of that *Conſciouſneſs*, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years ſince; but alſo is Conſcious that *He himſelf*, the ſame *Individual Conſcious Being*, was the Doer of them.

This follows evidently from the foregoing.

XIII.

The *Conſciouſneſs* that a Man has at one and the ſame time, is *One Conſciouſneſs*; and not a *Multitude of Conſciouſneſſes*; as the *Solidity*, *Motion*, or *Colour* of any piece of Matter is a Multitude of diſtinct *Solidities*, *Motions*, or *Colours*.

This is granted by All, who deny that the Particles of the Brain, which they ſuppoſe to conſtitute a Conſcious Subſtance, are themſelves each of them Conſcious.

XIV.

Conſciouſneſs therefore cannot at all reſide in the Subſtance of the *Brain*, or *Spirits*, or in any other *material Syſtem* as its

Subject;

Subject; but must be a Quality of some *Immaterial Substance.*

This follows necessarily from the foregoing Propositions compared together. For since every possible Power of Matter, whether known or unknown, must needs be either, 1st, a *real Quality* of the Matter to which it is ascribed; and then it must inhere in the several distinct Parts; Or, 2dly, a Power of exciting or occasioning certain *Modes* in some *other Subject*; and then it is truly the Quality, not of the *Matter*, but of that *other Subject*: Or, 3dly, a *mere abstract Name* or *Notion* of what is, properly speaking, no real Quality at all, and inheres in no real Subject at all: And *Consciousness* is acknowledged to be none of these: It follows unavoidably, that it must of necessity be a Quality of some *Immaterial Substance.*

XV.

Difficulties that arise afterwards, concerning *Other Qualities* of that *Immaterial Substance*, as whether it be *Extended* or *Unextended*; do not at all affect the present Argument.

For thus even abstract Mathematical Demonstrations; as those concerning the *Infinite Divisibility of Quantity*, the *Eternity of God*, and his *Immensity*; have almost insuperable Difficulties on the other Side: And yet no Man, who understands those Matters, thinks that those Difficulties do at all weaken the Force, or diminish the Certainty of the Demonstrations.

RE-

REFLECTIONS

ON

Mr. *Clarke*'s Second Defence

OF HIS

LETTER

TO

Mr. *DODWELL.*

——*Vimq; omnem eam, quâ vel agamus quid, vel ſentiamus, in omnibus Corporibus vivis æqualiter eſſe fuſam, nec ſeparabilem eſſe a Corpore, quippe quæ nulla ſit, nec quicquam, niſi corpus unum & ſimplex, ita figuratum ut temperatione naturæ vigeat & ſentiat:* affirmat Dicæarchus apud Cicer. Tuſc. Quæſt.

Nos autem animam corporalem & hic profitemur, & in ſuo volumine probamus, habentem proprium genus ſubſtantiæ, ſoliditatis, per quam quid & ſentire & pati poſſit. Tertullian. de Reſurrectione Carnis.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

REFLECTIONS

ON

Mr. Clarke's Second Defence

OF HIS

LETTER

TO

Mr. DODWELL.

—Ring, omnem eam, quæ vel agamus quid, vel sentiamus, in omnibus Corporibus vivis æqualiter esse sæpe, nec separabilem esse a Corpore, quippe quæ nulla sit, nec quicquam, nisi corpus unum & simplex, ita figuratum ut temperatione naturæ vigeat & sentiat: affirmat Dicæarchus apud Cicer. Tusc. Quæst.

Nos autem animam corporalem & hic profitemur, & in suo volumine probamus, habentem proprium genus substantiæ, solidatis, per quam quid & sentire & pati possit. Tertullian. de Resurrectione Carnis.

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REFLECTIONS

ON

Mr. *Clarke's* Second Defence, &c.

IF the Reader is not already tired with the Continuance of this Diſpute, concerning the *Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking*, I will preſume ſo far on his Underſtanding and Candour, as (without endeavouring to lead him into my Side of the Queſtion by making a previous Judgment of Mr. *Clarke's Second Defence of his Argument, made uſe of in a Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, *to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul*) to proceed directly to the Queſtion it ſelf, after I have performed a Piece of Juſtice to Mr. *Clarke* and the Reader, by acknowledging, that in my *Reply* to Mr. *Clarke*'s former *Defence*, I did omit a Line in citing his Anſwer to my firſt Objection; which, whether it was owing to *a Fault in the Preſs*, or to my Negligence in tranſcribing, I cannot ſay: but I can aſſure the Reader, it was out of no Deſign to give *a diſadvantagious Repreſentation of his Senſe*, and I hope he will be induced to believe ſo, when he conſiders that I made no manner of uſe of that

Repre-

Representation to the Disadvantage of his Argu-
2d Defence, p. 148. ment, and to excuse me in the same ingenuous Manner that Mr. *Clarke* has done.

The Question is, Whether a System of Matter can have a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Consciousness superadded to it, or flow from any Modification of that System.

2d Def. p. 150, 151. By the Term *Individual*, when applied to *Consciousness*, both Mr. *Clarke* and I understand *one Consciousness*, in opposition to a Multitude of distinct *Consciousnesses*.

By *a Power of Thinking*, I did understand on this Occasion *Actual Thinking*, and not *a Capa-*
Reply, p. 113. *city of Thinking*; " for else, as I said, Consci-
" ousness could not be properly employed by
" Mr. *Clarke* to signify the same thing with a
" Power of Thinking". But to this State of the Question Mr. *Clarke* excepts by saying,
2d Def. p. 149. *That he can see no reason for such a Nicety of Distinction: For*, says he, *the thing to be proved being this, that a divisible Substance is not capable of a Power of Thinking; What difference can it make, whether by a Power of Thinking I understand actual Thinking, or a Capacity of Thinking? For* he *presumes, I will not deny, but whatever is proved incapable of actual Thinking, is also proved incapable of a Capacity of Thinking; and whatever is proved incapable of a Capacity of Thinking, is also proved incapable of actual Think-*
2d Def. p. 149, 150. *ing*. And further to shew the *Needlessness* of distinguishing between *actual Thinking*, and *a Capacity of Thinking*; he says, *The Reader may understand* the Term Consciousness *indifferently for either a Capacity of Thinking, or actual Thinking, or the reflex Act of Thinking; because* his *Argument proves universally, that Matter is nei-*

ther

ther capable of the reflex Act, nor of the direct Act, nor of the Capacity of Thinking.

1. Now allowing this to be as Mr. *Clarke* repreſents it, what occaſion was there for contending with me about the Senſe I fixed to the Terms, *Power of Thinking* and *Conſciouſneſs?* All that could be hoped for by him in this Diſpute, is, by his own Account of the Matter, as well attained by my underſtanding *a Power of Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs*, in that Senſe wherein I underſtood thoſe Terms, as if either of them ſtood for three Significations at once. For if his *Argument proves univerſally, that Matter can neither have the direct Act, nor the reflex Act, nor the Capacity of Thinking*; And that *whatever is proved incapable of actual Thinking, is proved incapable of a Capacity of Thinking:* And I may add likewiſe, and that whatever is proved incapable of *actual Thinking*, is proved incapable of the reflex Act of Thinking: Have I not then underſtood him, in a Senſe that anſwered all the Ends and Purpoſes of his Argument? *2d Def.* p. 149. p. 149.

2. But there is ſtill the leſs Reaſon, if poſſible, to diſpute with me about this Matter; becauſe he expreſsly ſays, *The Reader may underſtand* the Term Conſciouſneſs *indifferently in all or any* of the before-mentioned *Significations.* So that I have taken but the ſame Liberty he allows to every other *Reader*; and till I am ſhown a Difference between an Anſwerer and a *Reader* in this reſpect, I ſhall think my ſelf juſtified by what Mr. *Clarke* allows to his *Reader.* But that the Reader may ſee the Ground of his Complaint againſt me, and that I may do Mr. *Clarke* Juſtice, I will cite the whole Sentence that he uſes on this occaſion, becauſe it ſeems to me to contain one of the niceſt Diſtinctions

that

2d Def. p. 149, 150. that ever I met with. Says he, *The Reader need not trouble himself with the Nicety of Distinction, between a Capacity of Thinking, actual Thinking, and the reflex Act of Thinking, but may understand Consciousness indifferently in all or any of these Significations.* Which is as much as to say, that the Reader need not understand Consciousness indifferently in any of the before-mentioned Significations, and yet may understand it indifferently in any of these Signification: for I cannot see, but that whoever understands *Consciousness* in any one of those Significations, must use that *Nicety of Distinction* he complains of whether he will or no: For by restraining Consciousness to any *one* of those Significations, he necessarily distinguishes that *one* from the other *two*. And therefore I must own, I cannot see the least Reason Mr. *Clarke* had to blame me for a *needless Nicety of Distinction*, when he allows me to understand Consciousness indifferently in three Significations; one of which I did assign as my Meaning or Idea of that Word.

3. Since then it is evident that I have understood him in a Sense that answered all the Ends and Purposes of his Argument, and in a Sense wherein he allows his Reader to understand him; he ought not to have supposed such a Reason as he is pleased to assign for me, why I distinguish between actual Thinking, and a Capacity of Thinking, as he does, when he says,

2d Def. p. 149. *That* he *cannot see any Reason (unless it were to perplex the Reader with a new Question, Whether the Soul always actually thinks or not; which is wholly foreign to the Matter at present in Dispute) why I should affirm,* "That Consciousness could not be properly employed by Mr.

"*Clarke*

" *Clarke* to ſignify the ſame Thing with a " Power of Thinking, unleſs by a Power of " Thinking be underſtood not Capacity to " think, but actual Thinking". I ſay, he ought not to have aſſigned ſuch a Reaſon for me; for if I have underſtood him in one of thoſe Senſes that he allows his Reader to underſtand him in, and by conſequence acknowledges that I do not *perplex* the Reader with a new Queſtion, by underſtanding *a Power of Thinking* to ſtand for *actual Thinking*, but that I keep my ſelf to the old Queſtion by underſtanding him in that manner; What ground could he have to imagine, that I had any deſign to *perplex* the Reader with a new Queſtion, but by either making the ſame Queſtion to be both new and old, or two different Queſtions, one and the ſame Queſtion? I ſhall not preſume to enter ſo far into his Thoughts, as to ſay, That though he acknowledge his Argument to be directed againſt the Senſe in which I underſtand *Power of Thinking* and *Conſciouſneſs*, and that all that he requires from his Argument, equally follows from Matter's being proved incapable of actual Thinking, as if I underſtood him in any other Senſe that he can contend for; I ſay, I ſhall not preſume to enter ſo far into his Thoughts as to tell the Reader, that I can ſee no reaſon for his imagining that I had any deſign *to perplex him with a Queſtion foreign to the Matter*, (unleſs it be to *perplex* this Diſpute in that part where it is moſt neceſſary to be clear) but chuſe rather to demand a Reaſon of his Conduct, when I cannot aſſign a good one for him. And that is what I think I had reaſon to expect from him, if he means any thing by attributing *Candour and Ingenuity to what I have written* 2d Def. p. 148.

written beſides mere Compliment, whether I could have given a good Reaſon or no for underſtanding Conſciouſneſs to ſignify in this Diſpute *actual Thinking*, and conſequently for diſtinguiſhing between actual Thinking and a Capacity of Thinking.

4. But to give Mr. *Clarke* and the Reader full Satisfaction on this Head, I will ſhow that the whole Diſpute turns upon that Diſtinction, That my Objections were entirely founded on that Diſtinction, and that Mr. *Clarke*'s not attending to it has rendered all his Anſwers foreign to the Matter of my Objections. Mr. *Clarke* had ſaid, *It is plain, unleſs Matter were eſſentially Conſcious — no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can be an individual Conſcious Being.* Now upon my Principles, and I ſuppoſe the Principles of all thoſe who ſay a diviſible Being may have a Power of Thinking, it is impoſſible to give any Anſwer at all to this Propoſition, but by reſtraining the Senſe of the Term *Conſciouſneſs*: becauſe on Suppoſition, that Conſciouſneſs ſtands at one and the ſame time for the direct Act, for the reflex Act, and for the Capacity of Thinking, what is meant by thoſe Words cited out of Mr. *Clarke*'s Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, will be allowed by me to be partly true and partly falſe. I grant the Reaſoning to be good thus far, That if Matter be not made by God capable of Thinking, or eſſentially conſcious in that Senſe, *That no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can be an individual conſcious Being*; that is, No Motion whatever can give Matter a Capacity of Thinking: and only deny them to be true, underſtood after this manner, That unleſs all Matter did actually think, or was eſſentially conſcious

Letter to Mr. D. p. 22.

conſcious in that Senſe, no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can actually think. So that what I maintain is in ſhort this, That either Matter was made originally capable of Thinking, or may be made by God capable of Thinking after its beginning to exiſt; and notwithſtanding that no Part of it may really or actually think, yet by virtue of that Capacity ſome Syſtems may by Compoſition and Diviſion become Subjects of Thinking. All that I ſuppoſe ariſes new from Compoſition and Diviſion is nothing elſe but a new Operation or actual Thinking; and therefore my Principles led me to underſtand by a *Power of Thinking*, actual Thinking, and conſequently to diſtinguiſh between actual Thinking, and a Capacity of Thinking. And had any end of Truth been to be ſerved by further diſtinguiſhing, I had taken the ſame Liberty to have ſpoken of *Conſciouſneſs in the moſt ſtrict and exact Senſe of the Word, as it ſtands for the reflex Act of Thinking, by which I know that I think* as I have now done in uſing it for *actual Thinking*. 2 *Def.* P. 149.

5. As I could not make any Objections to Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument but by diſtinguiſhing between *actual Thinking* and a *Capacity of Thinking*; ſo in fact my firſt Objection is grounded on that Diſtinction. I ſpeak directly of *Thinking* as an *Operation:* And when I ſay, "That "Matter of Fact is ſo plain that a Man can- "not turn his Eye but he will meet with ma- "terial Syſtems, wherein there are Individual "Powers which are not in every one, nor in "any one of the Particles that compoſe them "when taken apart and conſidered ſingly, and "inſtance in a Roſe that produces in us the *Reply*, P. 109, 110.

" Senſation of Sweetneſs; I plainly ſuppoſed " the Matter of which thoſe material Syſtems " conſiſted, eſſentially capable of thoſe Indi- " vidual Powers which are obſervable upon the " different Diſpoſition of their Parts, and like- " wiſe the Matter of which a Roſe conſiſted " eſſentially capable of producing that Senſa- " tion in us; and that it was from the Com- " poſition of that Matter, of which it did con- " ſiſt, into the Form of a Roſe, whence the " particular Operation that cauſes our Senſa- " tion ariſes".

Sect. 1. In order to prove that Conſciouſneſs could not inhere in, or reſult from a diviſible Subſtance, Mr. *Clarke* enumerated all the poſſible Powers of Matter under three Heads.

1ſt Def. p. 92, 93, &c.

1. *Powers really inhering in the Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the ſame Kind.*

2. *Modes produced in ſome other Subject, as for inſtance, the Sweetneſs and Colour of a Roſe, which are vulgarly looked upon as Individual Powers. But this,* ſays he, *is only a vulgar and groſs Errour.*

3. *Certain Effects or Powers that do not properly reſide in any Subject at all, ſuch as Magnetiſm, and Electrical Attractions.*

From whence it follows, that according to Mr. *Clarke* no Powers can inhere in Matter, but ſuch Powers as Magnitude and Motion, which are only Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind: And therefore *if Conſciouſneſs can inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt neceſſarily be the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts, aud ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there are Particles of Mat-*

1ſt Def. p. 92, 93.

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ter of which the Syſtem conſiſts, which he ſuppoſes will be granted to be very abſurd. Now in anſwer to this Argument I ſaid, "That it was nothing elſe but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*; for by enumerating his three ſorts of Powers or Qualities of Matter, and ſhowing that the two laſt are improperly called Powers or Qualities, he does ſuppoſe that a Syſtem of Matter has and can have only Powers of one ſort or kind, ſuch as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sums and Aggregates of Powers of the ſame kind: which what is it elſe but to argue, That becauſe we know of no other Powers in Matter of a different Kind from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it has and can have no other Powers of a different Kind"? *Reply,* p. 114.

But Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *If a Disjunction be complete (as that in which* he *enumerates the ſeveral ſorts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either is; or elſe* I *ought to have proved that another Member could be added to it, to ſhow that it was not) it contains in it all the poſſible Particulars, as well the unknown as thoſe that are ever ſo well known.* 2d Def. p. 151, 152.

1. It is very true, If a Disjunction be complete, it muſt contain in it all poſſible Particulars both known and unknown; but this amounts to no more than to ſay, that if a Diſjunction be complete it is complete, and does by no means reach the Queſtion, which is, how he can know that his Disjunction is complete (if ranking all the true and proper Powers of Matter under one Head, can be called a Disjunction) when he produces no Proof that his Heads are rightly diſtributed, and do contain under them all the poſſible Powers of

Matter both known and unknown; and till he can prove that, he can never clear his Argument from being *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*. He therefore miſtakes the Objection of *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*, when he ſays, *That his Disjunction either is complete, or elſe I ought to have proved that another Member could be added to it to ſhow that it was not*: For the Nature of that Objection does not oblige me to add another Member to his Disjunction, but obliges him to prove that another Member cannot be added to his Disjunction; for unleſs Mr. *Clarke* can prove it impoſſible for another Member to be added to his Disjunction, he can never know that another Member cannot be added to it, and conſequently an Argument drawn from a Disjunction which is not demonſtrated to be complete, is purely an *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*; and to put me upon adding another Member to it, is to put me upon more than my Objection obliged me to, nay is inconſiſtent with the Nature of ſuch an Objection, and mixing things that are foreign together.

2. But I did not only tell him that his Argument was an *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*, which was ſufficient to overthrow a precarious Disjunction, but did inſtance in ſeveral Powers of Matter that did not fall in with his Disjunction. I inſtanced particularly in the Power of the Eye to contribute to the Act of Seeing, (for though I certainly think the Eye to be the Organ of Seeing, as I do the Noſe of Smelling, or the Lungs of Breathing, and I may add the Brain of Thinking, yet I attribute in my Argument in this place no more to that Syſtem of Matter called the Eye, that I might not beg the Queſtion between us, than ſuch undoubted

Reply, P. 118.

doubted Matter of Fact as I think no one will deny, *viz.* that by the Diſpoſition of its Parts it is operated on in a peculiar Manner by external Objects, and that it does contribute by its own Operation towards the Act of ſeeing) as an Operation of a Syſtem of Matter, that did not inhere in its Parts in the ſame Senſe with Magnitude and Motion in Body: "For "divide and vary the Parts of Matter as "much as you will, there will be Magnitude "and may be Motion; but divide or vary "the leaſt Part of the Eye, and the Power of "contributing towards the Act of Viſion is "entirely at an end".

But that I may explain my ſelf more fully on this Head, I ſhall obſerve, that not only the Power of the Eye to contribute towards the Act of Seeing, is a Proof that there are Powers in Syſtems of Matter that inhere not in the Parts of thoſe Syſtems ſingly conſidered, but almoſt every thing we ſee, feel, hear, taſte or ſmell, may convince us of the Exiſtence of ſuch Powers. Does not a muſical Inſtrument, by being operated on in a peculiar Manner, operate on us again, and produce in us ſeveral agreeable Senſations? And is not that *Power or Ability to be acted on by us, and to act on us*, peculiar to the Modification of that Body, and not the Reſult of Powers of the ſame kind, ſince there are parts of that Syſtem of Matter abſolutely neceſſary to the Continuance of that Power in them which produces our Senſations? For as the Strings of a Violin are not ſufficient of themſelves, ſo neither are the remaining Parts of that Inſtrument to produce in us thoſe harmonious Sounds that are cauſed by the

whole Syſtem of that Matter, being modified into that peculiar Form.

What are particular Figures in Bodies, ſuch as Roundneſs or Squareneſs, but Qualities or Powers in Bodies that are not the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind? For divide a round Body into what Number of Parts you pleaſe, and it will never be found to conſiſt only of round Parts, no more than a ſquare or cubical Body will be found to conſiſt only of ſquare or cubical Parts; ſince a round Body may by the Motion or Alteration of its Parts become cubical, and a cubical Body by the Motion or Alteration of its Parts become round.

2d Def. *p.* 165. But Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *That Seeing in the Eye is not a real inherent Quality, but merely Situation of Parts and Pores, ſo as to be the Occaſion of an Effect wholly extrinſical to it ſelf, an Effect produced in ſome other Subſtance by Rays tranſmitted through the Pores of the Eye; and is one of thoſe Powers,* &c. *ranked under his third Head of Powers,* viz. *an Effect that does not reſide in any Subject at all.*

In this Paragraph Mr. *Clarke* ſeems to confound his ſecond and third Heads together, by making the Power of the Eye to ſee to be both *an Effect produced in ſome other Subject*, and *an Effect reſiding in no Subject at all* at the ſame time. But I will ſhow Mr. *Clarke*, that it is neither the one nor the other; for what is *the Tranſmiſſion of Rays* in a peculiar Manner, but an Operation particular to the Parts of the Eye under ſuch a Modification? And is there not then a peculiar Motion of the Eye whereby the Soul is made capable of ſeeing Objects tranſmitted, which Operation or Mode of Motion entirely ceaſes upon the leaſt Alteration

of the Parts? Is not the whole Being affected, and does it not act in a different Manner from each of its Parts ſingly conſidered, and from the whole Syſtem under another Modification? Now it is that manner of acting peculiar to the Structure of the Eye, that I call the *Power of the Eye* (which does not inhere in the Parts of the Eye in the ſame Senſe that it inheres in that whole Eye) in the Idea whereof is not only contained an Effect wrought in another Subject, viz. *Actual Seeing in the Soul*, but an Operation on the Subject of Seeing: As I ſuppoſe Thinking not to be merely an effect wrought on another Subject, *viz.* Ideas and the Images of things, but is likewiſe the Action of the Brain, or Spirits of the Brain on thoſe Ideas and Images of things. And therefore if the Power of the Eye to contribute towards ſeeing be a Mode of Motion peculiar to that Syſtem of Matter, and Motion be allowed truly and properly to inhere in the Subject that moves; then the Power of the Eye to contribute towards ſeeing, is neither a Mode produced in another Subject, nor an Effect reſiding in no Subject at all. But to this Inſtance, and all other Inſtances that I have mentioned before, it may be anſwered, That the Power to contribute towards ſeeing, and the Power of a muſical Inſtrument to produce an harmonious Sound, being really nothing elſe but an Impreſſion of a particular Kind or Mode of Motion which thoſe Syſtems are capable of receiving from the particular Diſpoſitions of their Parts, and the Actions of other Beings on them; and Roundneſs or Squareneſs being nothing elſe but Modes of Figures, the Power of the Eye, of a muſical Inſtrument, and the Qualities of Round-

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neſs and Squareneſs are only the Sums of the Motions and Figures of the Parts, or Sums of Powers of the ſame Kind, and conſequently fall in with the Powers of Matter that Mr. *Clarke* ranked under the firſt Head of Diſtribution of the Powers of Matter, and are defective Similitudes to prove the real Exiſtence of ſuch Powers as inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without inhering in the Parts of the Syſtem ſingly conſidered.

This, if I miſtake not, comprehends the intire Strength of all that can be ſaid againſt my Inſtances; and an Anſwer to it will ſet this Diſpute in a clearer Light than poſſibly it has hitherto been, and perhaps give Mr. *Clarke* particular Satisfaction with relation to the Inconcluſiveneſs of his Argument, by detecting what I conceive has particularly impoſed upon him. In anſwer therefore to this Objection, I own, ſince I undertook to give a Proof drawn from Matter of Fact, that there are Individual Powers peculiar to Syſtems of Matter, without belonging to each of their Parts ſingly conſidered, I am obliged either to clear thoſe Inſtances I have given, or aſſign other Inſtances, or elſe own that there are no known Powers in Matter, but what are the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind. And therefore to ſhow that my Inſtances are pertinent, I diſtinguiſh between *Numerical Powers* and *Generical Powers*. By *Numerical Powers* I underſtand ſuch Powers as Motions and Figures of the ſame Species. The Power of the Eye to contribute towards ſeeing, is a Species of Motion, and the Roundneſs of a Body is a Species of Figure. By *Generical Powers* I underſtand all the ſeveral Species of *Numerical Powers*; as Motion ſignifies all the

various

various Species of Motion, and Figure all the various Species of Figure. Now if the Reader will be pleaſed to apply the foregoing Diſtinction, he may ſee that the whole of the Objection is founded on an *Equivoque* of the Terms, *Powers of the ſame kind*: for if *Powers of the ſame kind* be underſtood *generically*, then I do agree that the known Powers of Matter are nothing elſe but the Sums or Powers of the ſame kind; that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body conſiſt of the Figures and Motions of the Parts. But if the Terms *Powers of the ſame kind* be taken *numerically*, (that is, as Powers really exiſt) then there are Powers inhering in Syſtems of Matter that are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind: As the Roundneſs of a Body is not the Sum of the Roundneſſes of the Parts; nor the Power of a muſical Inſtrument to cauſe an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the ſame kind in the Parts ſingly conſidered. I ſhall now apply what I have ſaid to Conſciouſneſs, or a Power of Thinking; and to make my ſelf the more intelligible, will ſuppoſe Conſciouſneſs (of whoſe Nature I may be ſuppoſed ignorant) to be a Mode of Motion, and not a Mode of ſome unknown Power; and the rather, becauſe I have to do with a Gentleman that underſtands the Rules of arguing too well, to impute that to me as my Opinion, which I only take the Liberty to ſuppoſe. If Conſciouſneſs then be conſidered as a Mode of Motion, as Roundneſs is a Mode of Figure, it will be ſo far from being true, that if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts, that it will be a Contradiction to make it the

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Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts, as it is a Contradiction to make Roundneſs to conſiſt in the Roundneſſes of the Parts: though I would readily grant, that was Conſciouſneſs a generical Power like Figure and Motion, it would be likewiſe the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts; which I do allow to be very abſurd. What I have now ſaid I think ſufficient to ſhow, that my Inſtances to prove that there are Powers in Matter that are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame kind, were rightly choſen, and conſequently to ſhow that Conſciouſneſs, of whoſe Nature we are ignorant, may inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts. Wherefore I take the Liberty to conclude, that beſides ſuch generical Powers, as Motion, Figure, *&c.* that Mr. *Clarke* only conſiders under his firſt Head (which according to him contains all the true and proper Powers of Matter) there are Numerical (or if Mr. *Clarke* pleaſes, Individual) Powers, ſuch as particular Modes of Motion, and particular Modes of Figure in certain Syſtems of Matter, which he has omitted the Conſideration of: for had he conſidered *Conſciouſneſs* as a Mode of ſome Power in Matter, he could never have ſaid, *If Conſciouſneſs could poſſibly be a Quality inherent in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt likewiſe neceſſarily be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts*; but the contrary, If human Conſciouſneſs be a Mode of ſome generical Power in Matter, it muſt not be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts.

1ſt Def. P. 92, 93.

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To make this Matter ſtill clearer, and anſwer all that I think can be alledged, I take the Liberty to examine a Paſſage relating to the Argument that I am now upon, in the *Hiſtorical and Critical Dictionary* of that learned and acute Philoſopher Mr. *Bayle*, a zealous Aſſerter of the Immateriality of the Soul, who denied Thinking could be a Mode of Matter: * *Becauſe*, ſays he, *all Modes of which we have any knowledge, are of ſuch a Nature that they never periſh, but to make room for another Mode of the ſame kind. There is no Figure that is deſtroyed but by another Figure, and no Colour but what makes room for another Colour. Therefore if we would reaſon from what we obſerve in Matter, we ought to ſay, that no Thought ceaſes in Matter, but to make room for ſome other Thought by which it is ſucceeded, divide and confound this Matter how you will.* I am very far from denying what is ſelf-evident, that no Mode ever ceaſes but to give place to another Mode: and though it ſhould be always to a Mode of the ſame generical Kind, as one Colour or Figure is conſtantly ſucceeded by another, ſince all Matter muſt neceſſarily exiſt under ſome Figure, and appear under ſome Colour to the Eyes of Animals; yet it is no good Conſequence, that every Mode muſt unavoidably be ſucceeded by a Mode of the ſame numerical Species, as that

* Car toutes les modalitez dont on a quelque connoiſſance ſont d'une telle nature, qu'elles ne ceſſent que pour faire place à une autre modalité de meme genre. Il n'y point de figure qui ſoit detruite que par une autre Figure, ni point de couleur qui ſoit chaſſé que par une autre couleur. Ainſi pour bien raiſonner l'on doit dire qu'il n'y a point de ſentiment qui ſoit chaſſé de ſa Subſtance que par l'Introduction de quelque autre Sentiment, *P.* 1044.

Round

Round or Blue must still be succeeded by Round or Blue; which would entirely destroy all Change or Succession of Modes whatever, and so deprive the Universe of all Motion or Diversity. Now if Thought be supposed a Species of Motion, then it never ceases indeed, but to make room for some other Motion (the Particles of all Bodies being in perpetual Action, as well as under some Figure or Colour) but it follows not that the succeeding Motion must always be a Thought for the Reasons and Examples already alledged, no more than that the Motion of a going Clock existed in the several Parts of it before, or continues after they are separated. Now that human Consciousness or Thinking is a Mode of some generical Power in Matter, will, in my Opinion, seem evident to every Man that consults his own Experience, and suffers it not to be contradicted or confounded by unintelligible Distinctions or Sophistry. Thinking or Human Consciousness begins, continues and ends, or has Generation, Succession and Corruption, like all other Modes of Matter; as like them it is divided and determined, simple or compounded, and so on. But if the Soul or Principle of Thinking be undivided, how can it think successively, divide, abstract, combine or ampliate, retain or revive Impressions in the Memory? And how can it be capable, partly or wholly, to forget any thing? All which *Phænomena* are naturally conceived, and may be commodiously explained by the Springs and Movements, and Receptacles; by the Vigour, Perfection, Disorder or Decay of a bodily Organ, but not by any thing indivisible.

Does not Experience further convince us, that our ordinary Habits, no leſs than all our Actions, are corporeal; thoſe of contemplating and meditating, as well as thoſe of ſinging and dancing? Are we not frequently as much tired by the one, as by the other? Which could never be, if Contemplation and Meditation were Immaterial. The Reaction of our Thoughts and Words on one another does manifeſtly prove the Corporeity of both; the Word being no ſooner ſpoken than the Idea is excited, and the revived Idea bringing its Name immediately into our Remembrance: If we forget the one or the other, it betokens ſome Defect in the Organ, as it is viſible in Children and old People; the Fibres of whoſe Nerves, and the Conſiſtence of whoſe Brains are ordinarily too moiſt and remiſs in the one, as they are too dry and rigid in the other. Nor does Want of Memory, or Slowneſs of Conception appear in Perſons of a middle Age, but from ſome aſſignable Cauſe that diſcompoſes the Organ. Human Thinking being therefore a Mode of Matter, all Parts of Matter may be ſuppoſed capable of producing it, not neceſſarily indeed, and at all times, no more than any other Modes, but only under a convenient Structure and Diſpoſition.

Upon the Principles I have now more fully explained, I think I might leave it to the intelligent Reader, or to Mr. *Clarke* himſelf, to ſolve the remaining Difficulties that he urges: but to ſhow my Willingneſs to give Satisfaction to thoſe who are of opinion I ſhould not otherwiſe pay reſpect enough to a Man of his Ability, I proceed to conſider whatever I conceive affects the Bottom of the Cauſe between us.

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Reply, p. 116. I had ſaid, " That to ſuppoſe a Power ari-
" ſing from Matter, without belonging to the
" Parts of which the whole conſiſts, is not to
" ſuppoſe an Univerſal to exiſt, but a particu-
" lar Power exiſting, to which ſeveral parti-
" cular Powers contribute; as every Man
" is a particular Man, though various Powers
" are neceſſary to conſtitute him of that
" Species".

2d Def. P. 153. To this Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *That if that Whole or Reſult, which* I *call a particular Power, be entirely and ſpecifically different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it, as Thinking is from all the Particles not endued with Thought*; I *ſhall find if* I *conſider it carefully, that it is as certain as any Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a whole bigger than all its Parts.* To ſhow the Want of Force in this Anſwer, let us apply it to Roundneſs; for if it concludes againſt Thinking's ariſing out of Particles not ſingly endued with Thinking, it will equally conclude againſt the Poſſibility of the Exiſtence of Roundneſs in Body, which no more conſiſts of ſeveral Roundneſſes, (ſince in a round Body of an Inch diameter, it is as impoſſible that any one Particle of the Surface ſhould be round, as it is needleſs that any other ſhould be ſo; and therefore probable in many caſes, that not one Particle of a round Body is round in particular) no more, I ſay, than Thinking or Conſciouſneſs does of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes, and is as ſpecifically different from other Figures, as Conſciouſneſs is from a circular Motion. *If the Whole or Reſult, which* I *call a particular Power, be ſpecifically different from all and every one of the particular Powers contributing to it, as*

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Roundneſs *is from all the Particles not endued with* Roundneſs, *I ſhall find if* I *conſider it carefully, that it is as certain as any Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a whole bigger than all its Parts.* But in behalf of Roundneſs as well as Thinking, I anſwer, That it is ſo far from being as certain as an Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a Whole bigger than all its Parts, that it is an Arithmetical Demonſtration that ſuch a particular Power as Roundneſs is, is but juſt equal to all the Parts of which that Roundneſs conſiſts: For what more goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs? And agreeably to the Suppoſition I lately made, what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles, not each endued with that Species of Motion called Thinking?

2. But to proceed a Step further, ſuppoſing we could not account for the Beginning of Conſciouſneſs or Roundneſs from the various Compoſition of Matter, yet I cannot ſee what Reaſon there is to exclude even created Beings from ſuperadding Powers to Matter, that are not always exiſting in Matter. If Matter is not eſſentially active, as I preſume Mr. *Clarke* contends it is not, I would ask, upon the Suppoſition of ſome Parts of it being at abſolute reſt, whether finite material Beings in Motion were not ſufficient of themſelves to put them into Motion, though they had no Motion before? Was not Matter's Capacity of Motion ſufficient to make it move, as ſoon as it was impelled by another Being? In like manner, a Capacity to think may be ſufficient to cauſe us

to think, though we are ſometime without thinking; as a Capacity to think of a Triangle is ground enough to make us think upon it whenever that Figure is placed before our Eyes, though we never have as yet thought upon it at all. And this I take to be the Caſe of Operations of all kinds in finite Beings, *viz.* That it is ſo far from being a Repugnancy, to ſuppoſe them to have a Beginning of their Exiſtence, that if we don't ſuppoſe a Beginning of Operations, we muſt deſtroy all Change or Succeſſion whatever, and ſo entirely deprive the Univerſe of all Diverſity.

2d Def. p. 158. It is urged by Mr. *Clarke*, *That to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain, or the Spirits in it, is a very great Abſurdity: For if the Parts of the Brain or Spirits be (as they certainly are) in perpetual flux and change; it will follow, that Conſciouſneſs, by which* I *not only remember that certain things were done many Years ſince, but alſo am conſcious that they were done by the very ſame individual conſcious Being who now remembers them; it will follow*, he ſays, *that Conſciouſneſs is transferred from one Subject to another; that is to ſay, that it is a real Quality which ſubſiſts without inhering in any Subject at all.* In the Examination of this Argument I think ſomething will appear quite contrary to what Mr. *Clarke* imagines, That it is ſo far from being abſurd to annex human Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain, that it will rather be abſurd to annex it to any other Subſtance but ſo flux a one as the Brain: For if we utterly forget, or ceaſe to be conſcious of having done many things in the former Parts of our Lives which we certainly did, as much as any of thoſe things which we are conſcious that

that we have done; and if in fact we do by degrees forget every thing which we do not revive by frequent Recollection, and by again and again imprinting our decaying Ideas; and if there be in a determinate Time a partial or total flux of Particles in our Brains: What can better account for our total Forgetfulneſs of ſome things, our partial Forgetfulneſs of others, than to ſuppoſe the Subſtance of the Brain in a conſtant Flux? And what can better ſhow that Conſciouſneſs is not transferred from one Subject to another, than our forgetting totally or partially, according to the Brain's being more or leſs in a Flux? But I will ſuppoſe that I am conſcious to have done ſome things. without having one Particle of the Brain the ſame that I had when I did thoſe things; how then can I be conſcious that I did them, without allowing Conſciouſneſs to be transferred from one Subject to another? This I think contains the Strength of Mr. *Clarke*'s Objection. In anſwer to which, I will ſuppoſe my ſelf conſcious at Forty of having been carried to a Market or Fair at five Years old, without any Particle of Matter about me, the ſame which I had at that Age: Now in order to retain the Conſciouſneſs of that Action, it is neceſſary to revive the Idea of it before any conſiderable flux of Particles, (otherwiſe I muſt totally loſe the Memory of it, as I do of ſeveral things done in my Childhood) and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprint afreſh the Conſciouſneſs of having done that Action, by which the Brain has as lively an Impreſſion of Conſciouſneſs (though it be not entirely compoſed of the ſame Particles) as it had the Day after it did the Action, or as it has of a

Triangle, or any other new Idea not before imprinted on it. Conſciouſneſs of having done that Action is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into view our Ideas before they are quite worn out; which Idea continues in me, not only the Memory of the Action it ſelf, but that I did it. And if there is every now and then a Recollection of a paſt Action, Mr. *Clarke* may, by what I have ſaid, conceive a Man may be conſcious of things done by him, though he has not one Particle of Matter the ſame that he had at the doing of thoſe things, without *Conſciouſneſs's being transferred from one Subject to another* in any abſurd Senſe of thoſe words.

I did incidentally, in my *Reply* to Mr. *Clarke*'s firſt *Defence*, whither I refer the Reader for the Occaſion, make this Suppoſition, "As "what ſeemed Matter of Fact to me: That "the Matter of which an Egg conſiſts, doth "entirely conſtitute the young one; and that "the Action of Senſation began under a par- "ticular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion, "without the Addition of an immaterial and "immortal Soul": Which Mr. *Clarke* ſays *is in every part contrary to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philoſophy; for ſo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Diſpoſition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or conſtitutes the young One, that it does not conſtitute it at all, not ſo much as the Body of it, but only ſerves it for Nouriſhment and Growth: It being as impoſſible that the unorganized Body of a Chicken ſhould, by the Power of any mechanical Motions, be formed out of the unorganized Matter of an Egg; as that the Sun,*

Reply, p. 117.

2d Def. p. 163.

Moon

Moon and Stars ſhould, by mere Mechaniſm, riſe out of a Chaos.

In anſwer to which I aver, that my Suppoſition is ſo far from being contrary to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philoſophy, that if Mr. *Clarke* has given a juſt Account of all thoſe Diſcoveries in Anatomy and Philoſophy in this Paragraph, it is agreeable to them all, except his ſaying, *That the organized Body of the Animal is no part of the Matter of the Egg.* And as for that Diſcovery *made in Anatomy by Microſcopical Obſervations*, I take it to be *not only removed backwards from the Search and common Notions even of the moſt inquiſitive Men*, but contrary to ſuch undoubted Matter of Fact, that I will venture to inſiſt on it in oppoſition to all the Diſcoveries in Anatomy Mr. *Clarke* is acquainted with; for if by our Eyes we can perceive the organized Body of the Animal to be part of the Matter of the Egg, no Microſcopical Obſervation can deſtroy ſuch Matter of Fact. Microſcopical Obſervations may help us to diſcover the Exiſtence of ſome things, the Beauty and Contrivance of others, which by our mere Organs we are unable to do; but can never make us ſee nothing where we do ſee ſomething.

I no where deny the organized Body of the Animal to have been formed long before it is comprehended in the Shell: All that I affirm is, that when the organized Body is comprehended within the Shell, it then becomes part of the Matter of the Egg; and I continue to ſuppoſe that Senſation doth not begin in the Animal till ſome of the other Parts of the Egg become Parts of the Animal by Motion, or *by ſerving it for Nouriſhment and Growth*; though

I muſt at the ſame time confeſs, that I ſee no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing the organized Body of the Animal to be formed by Mechanical Motions out of ſuch Matter, as the unorganized Parts of an Egg, if they may be called *unorganized*: Thoſe Parts are not indeed Legs, Wings, Eyes, *&c.* and ſo are not organized in that ſenſe; but yet they are ſo diſpoſed or organized as to contribute by their Motion towards ſomething orderly and regular, and to become Parts of the Leg or the Eye of an Animal. I conceive, no Matter, in the preſent State of the Univerſe, can be compared to a Chaos; from whence I grant no regular Work can be produced by mere Mechaniſm, but all is diſpoſed by the Power of God in a State of Regularity: and as there was no Contradiction for the organized Body of the Animal to be firſt formed by Matter regularly moved, nor no Contradiction for other Parts of Matter to be joined to that Body by a regular Motion; ſo it is no more a Contradiction to ſuppoſe ſuch an Union of Parts to begin in an Egg, whereby the Body of an Animal may be formed, than it was for ſuch an Union of Parts to begin a Thouſand Years before, or than it is that thoſe Parts ſhould grow in the Manner they do by the Addition of other Particles to them. Mr. *Clake* adds, *And that Senſation ſhould begin under a particular Diſpoſition of the Parts, is ſtill more impoſſible; becauſe it is ſuppoſing ſomething to come out of that in which it never was.* Senſation is by me ſuppoſed to be in the Parts of the Animal, as Roundneſs is in the Parts which compoſe a round Body; each Part has as much of Senſation, ſingly conſidered, as each Part of a round Body has of Roundneſs: and when

the

the Parts are duly diſpoſed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundneſs exiſts by the Conjunction of Parts.

2. But ſuppoſing Senſation did not exiſt in the Parts antecedent to their Union, as Motion does not in thoſe Parts of Matter that are at abſolute reſt; why may not the one have actual Senſation by virtue of an antecedent Capacity to have Senſation, without having always actual Senſation, as well as Matter at abſolute reſt may have actual Motion by virtue of an antecedent Capacity to have Motion, without being always in actual Motion?

I did indeed think it abſurd *to recur to the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul*, to ſolve the Phenomenon of Senſation in Animals; becauſe I cannot conceive it poſſible for all the numerous ſenſible Creatures which Microſcopical Obſervations do diſcover to us to exiſt in all Parts of the Univerſe, even in our own Bodies, and the Liquors that we drink, to be proper Subjects of eternal Rewards and Puniſhments. Mr. *Clarke* goes on: *Let it be ſo*, (that is, let it be abſurd to have recourſe to the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul to account for Senſation in Animals) he *can as eaſily ſuppoſe, if* I *muſt needs have an Hypotheſis, that the Immaterial* and Immortal Soul *was not added afterwards, but was in it from the Time that the ſeminal Principle it ſelf of the organized Body was framed.* I am againſt all mere Hypotheſes, and was, particularly in that Place Mr. *Clarke* refers to, contending againſt an Opinion that I take to be a mere Hypotheſis: and though I did not expreſsly mention that Hypotheſis which Mr. *Clarke* is pleaſed to ſuppoſe for me, yet I conceive that that Hypotheſis is as much

Reply. p. 117.

2d Def. p. 164.

excluded by my ſuppoſing that an Animal conſiſts only of mere Matter, as if I had directly mentioned it; and therefore I wonder that Mr. *Clarke* could imagine that one of thoſe Hypotheſes ſhould content me any more than the other, or that I have any fondneſs at all for any Hypotheſes. I ſatisfy my ſelf with obſerving Matter of Fact, and believe what I ſee, till ſubſequent Matter of Fact convinces me of the firſt falſe Appearances of Things, and then I correct my firſt Opinion from the ſecond Appearance. Micrography and Aſtronomy do help us to ſettle ſeveral important Facts, which without their Aſſiſtance we ſhould be apt to miſtake; but as for any Suppoſitions, to account for any Matters of Fact or Effects that we obſerve, I deny them all, unleſs it involves a Contradiction not to make ſuch Suppoſitions; and I will allow Mr. *Clarke* to aſſign One or Twenty unknown Beings in every Animal, when it is a Contradiction not to ſuppoſe One or Twenty: But till that time I think it not proper to go beyond my Eye-ſight, nor, as I ſee nothing but Matter in Animals, to believe there is any thing but Matter in them.

One thing more under this Head I think my ſelf obliged to take notice of: Mr. *Clarke* had ſaid, *That Gravitation is the Effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter.* Upon which I ſaid, "That it does "not appear but that Matter gravitates by "virtue of Powers originally placed in it by "God, and is now left to it ſelf to act by "thoſe original Powers. And it is as con-"ceivable that Matter ſhould act by virtue of "thoſe Powers, as that an Immaterial Being "ſhould put it into Motion, or continue it in "Mo-

1ſt Def. p. 94. *Reply,* p. 123.

"Motion". This *Opinion of mine Mr.* Clarke *thinks is a great Miſtake in my Philoſophy; for when a Stone that was at reſt, does of it ſelf, upon its Support being removed, begin to fall downwards, what is it that cauſes the Stone to begin to move? Is it poſſible to be an Effect without a Cauſe? Is it impelled without an Impeller? Or can a Law or a Power, that is to ſay, a mere abſtract Name, or a complex Notion, and not any real Being, impel a Stone, and cauſe it to begin to move?* 2d Def. p. 169.

1. The Queſtion is not, whether *any real Being* moves a Stone that was at reſt, when it begins to fall downwards, upon its Support being removed; but whether *another Being*, or a Being diſtinct from Matter, does continually impel it, either immediately or mediately, (for I deny not the Neceſſity of a Being impelling another, in order to cauſe that Mode of Motion called *Gravitation*) and therefore Mr. *Clarke* changes the Queſtion, when he introduces ſome *real Being* as neceſſary to impel a Stone, or cauſe it to begin to move upon its Support being removed, inſtead of what he firſt affirmed, *That Gravitation is the Effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome other Being on Matter:* and conſequently his Queſtions, *What is it cauſes the Stone to move? Is it poſſible to be an Effect without a Cauſe? Is it impelled without an Impeller? Or can a Law or Power, that is to ſay, an abſtract Name, or complex Notion, and not any real Being, impel a Stone, or cauſe it to move?* reach not the Queſtion of the Neceſſity of the regular and continued Operation of an immaterial Being on Matter, in order to cauſe that Mode of Motion called *Gravitation.* 1ſt Def. p. 94.

2. As

2. As I did not exclude the Impulſe of other Bodies contiguous to the Body gravitating, but only the continued and regular Operation of an immaterial Being on it, from being a conſtant Cauſe of Gravitation; ſo I do not think the mere Impulſe of the ſurrounding Bodies to be the ſole Cauſe of that Motion: And to ſpeak my own Opinion, it ſeems Matter of Fact to me, that the external Figure and internal Configuration of the Parts of Matter, are thoſe Powers in Matter by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravitation, from the circumambient impelling Bodies. For drop a Pound of Lead, in the Form of a Bullet, from the Top of a Tower, and it deſcends in a very quick Space to the Ground: Vary the external Figure of the Bullet, by beating it out broad with a Hammer, and its Tendency downwards decreaſes; vary the Configuration of its Parts by Fire, and it will aſcend inſtead of deſcending; the ſame Action of the circumambient Bodies producing theſe three different Effects by this three-fold Diſpoſition of the ſelf-ſame Quantity of Lead: So that Matter's Determination ſeems purely owing to the Cauſes and Powers I have aſſigned. And I have often admired that Gravitation ſhould be eſteemed a Matter of ſuch Difficulty among Philoſophers; for when once Motion is ſuppoſed, and that all Matter is in conſtant Motion, and perpetually ſtriking one part againſt another, as I think no body doubts, one part of Matter muſt be determined one way, and another part another way; and Gravitation being one Mode of Motion, *viz.* a Tendency towards a Centre, (whether it be of the whole Vortex, or only of our Earth, or the

the particular Center of that peculiar Motion which depends upon the Sphere of its Activity) ſome Parts of Matter muſt as neceſſarily gravitate, as others have different Motions. Nay, properly ſpeaking, there is no Motion whatever but is Gravitation reſpectively; for whatever aſcends with reſpect to us, deſcends with reſpect to other Bodies; and whatever deſcends with reſpect to us, aſcends with reſpect to others: ſo that if there is any Motion in the Univerſe, there muſt be Gravitation.

3. When therefore I ſaid, "It does not ap- *Reply*, "pear but that Matter gravitates by virtue P. 123. "of Powers originally placed in it by God, "and that it is as conceivable that Matter "ſhould act by virtue of thoſe Powers, as "that an immaterial Being ſhould put Matter "into Motion, or continue it in Motion"; I did not lay it down as my Opinion, that Matter did act without a direct Impulſe from Matter, but ſuppoſed it as intelligible, that Matter might act without Impulſe by Powers placed in it by God, as that an immaterial Being ſhould move Matter without being able to impel it by Contact. And whenever Mr. *Clarke* gives me an Idea how an immaterial Being can move Matter, or in what place God can be conceived beginning a Motion of Gravity or Levity in the Univerſe, when in the Univerſe there is no up or down in reality, (for to ſay that God acts reſpectively, ſhows but the Pertinency of my Queſtion the more, ſince he muſt then be neceſſarily placed with reſpect to an aſſignable Center) then I promiſe to give him an Idea how Matter ſhould move by Powers placed in it by God, without the Impulſe of other

other Bodies, or even *by* what *Mr. Clarke* calls *an abſtract Name*, or a *complex Notion.*

4. But was it my Opinion that Matter did act by virtue of Powers placed in it by God, without the Impulſe of Matter, I think I have *Mr. Clarke* of my Opinion, when he ſays, *All Matter conſiſts of actually ſeparate and diſtinct Parts:* For if it is actually divided *in infinitum*, it can never act by Impulſe, but muſt act by other Powers; unleſs Mr. *Clarke* will ſay, that it is an immaterial Being, that conſtantly and immediately moves every Particle of Matter. But whether I take Mr. *Clarke* right or no, the Incomparable Sir *Iſaac Newton* is of Opinion, * That *ſeveral Phenomena of Nature may depend on certain Forces, whereby from Cauſes (or Powers) yet undiſcovered, the Particles of Bodies are mutually impelled againſt each other, and cohere according to regular Figures, or whereby they recede or are driven from one another; which Forces* or Powers *being yet unknown, the Philoſophers hitherto have attempted Nature in vain.*

Letter to Mr. D. p. 22.

Sect. 2. Beſides anſwering directly to Mr. *Clarke*'s pretended Demonſtration, I did endeavour to ſhow, that if it proved the Impoſſibility of Matter's Thinking, it would equally prove the Impoſſibility of an immaterial Being's Thinking, ſince Mr. *Clarke* did not exclude

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* Suſpicor ea omnia (viz. Phænomena Naturæ) ex viribus pendere poſſe, quibus Corporum particulæ per cauſas nondum cognitas vel in ſe mutuo impelluntur, & ſecundum figuras regulares cohærent, vel ab invicem fugantur & recedunt: quibus viribus ignotis Philoſophi hactenus naturam fruſtra tentarunt. *Newtoni Præfatio ad Philoſophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica.*

Extenſion

Extenſion out of his Idea of immaterial Being. For his Argument being founded on the Proof of this Propoſition, that Diviſibility and Thinking cannot cohere or exiſt together in the ſame Subject; and Mr. *Clarke* allowing, *That there are Particles of Matter which are to any Powers in Nature indiſcerpible*; I obſerved, " That if there may be Matter which implies " Indiviſibility by natural Cauſes, no Argu- " ment can be brought to prove the Indiviſibi- " lity of ſuch Particles of Matter, but what " will equally prove the Diviſibility of any " finite extended Being": and conſequently, either all Matter is not diviſible, and ſo, by Mr. *Clarke*'s Principles, is not excluded from a Poſſibility of Thinking; or elſe an immaterial Being is no more capable of Thinking than a material one.

1ſt Def. p. 100. *Reply,* p. 130.

But Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *That ſuch a Difficulty is wide of the main Queſtion; for if the foregoing Proof, That Matter is incapable of Thinking cannot be ſhown to be defective, it neceſſarily follows, that the Soul muſt be an indiſcerpible Subſtance*, though extended. 1. Though Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument could not be ſhown to be defective, it does not follow that an extended Being muſt be indiſcerpible; for if I have as clear Evidence of the Diviſibility of an immaterial Being by the Power of God, as of a material one, (as I contend we have, and have ſhown in my *Reply*, whither I refer the Reader) and if I have likewiſe clear Evidence that a diviſible Being cannot think, as I am likewiſe ſuppoſed to have, what remains for us but Darkneſs, and Confuſion, and Scepticiſm, under ſuch a Ballance of Evidence; A View of Mr. *Clarke*'s Way of arguing againſt the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking,

2d Defence, p. 174.

Reply, p. 134.

ing, urged againſt the Poſſibility of an immaterial Being's Thinking, will make it evident to the Reader, that there is no more ground from that Argument to conclude againſt Matter's Thinking, than againſt an immaterial Being's Thinking. And therefore as Mr. *Clarke* endeavours to ſhow that Matter cannot think, becauſe by the Power of God it is diviſible; ſo I who ſee no manner of Difference between any other finite extended Being and Matter in that reſpect, urge Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, to prove that an immaterial Being cannot think, thus: Whatever is diviſible by the Power of God, cannot, according to him, have a Power of Thinking: An immaterial Being is extended, and conſequently muſt be diviſible by the Power of God, (if it be true that all Matter is diviſible, becauſe no Argument can be brought to prove all Matter diviſible that will not prove all finite extended Beings diviſible) therefore an immaterial Being cannot think. And if it be proved that an immaterial Being cannot think, then it follows, that the Being which thinks in us muſt be material. If it is further objected, to weaken the Force of the foregoing Proof, That all material Subſtance is likewiſe diviſible, Mr. *Clarke*'s Anſwer in behalf of immaterial Subſtance will ſerve the Caſe of material Subſtance; and it may be ſaid, *That this Difficulty is wide of the main Queſtion; for if the foregoing Proof, that immaterial Being is incapable of Thinking, cannot be ſhown to be defective, it follows neceſſarily, that the Soul muſt be an indiſcerpible material Subſtance.*

2d Def. p. 175. 2. But Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *There are many Demonſtrations, even in abſtract Mathematicks themſelves, which no Man who underſtands them can*

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in the leaſt Doubt of the Certainty of, which yet are attended with difficult Conſequences, that cannot be perfectly cleared. The infinite Diviſibility of Matter is an Inſtance of this kind; alſo the Eternity of God and his Immenſity are attended with the like Difficulties. In anſwer to this, I ſay, That if there are any ſuch Demonſtrations, from whence any Contradictions or Abſurdities follow in our way of conceiving things, thoſe Abſurdities and Contradictions ſhould affect a Demonſtration ſo far that I ought to ſuſpend my Aſſent. In our Aſſent or Diſſent to Propoſitions, we have no other ground of either, than the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Ideas, for which the Terms in Propoſitions ſtand. And if things make ſuch an appearance to our Underſtandings, that we do *a priori* perceive, or imagine we perceive demonſtrative Proof of the Truth of a Propoſition, and perceive or imagine that we perceive Abſurdities and Contradictions follow from that Propoſition which we imagined we perceived to be demonſtrative; what have we but two repugnant Demonſtrations, which ought to leave the Mind in ballance or ſuſpence? For on which ſide can I ſuſpect that my Underſtanding fails me? There is no more reaſon to ſuſpect that my Underſtanding fails me, when I think that I perceive an Abſurdity, Contradiction, or Diſagreement of Ideas, than when I think I perceive the Agreement of Ideas.

3. But I deny that there are any Inſtances of this kind in Nature, and particularly that the *Infinite Diviſibility of Matter, the Eternity and Immenſity of God*, are ſuch Inſtances. And I deſire Mr. *Clarke* to define thoſe foregoing Terms, and tell me, what they ſtand for in his Mind:

Mind: and if his Meaning of those Terms agree to the Reality of Things, instead of making real Beings of abstract Notions, I require him to prove that any Absurdity or Contradiction follows either from the *infinite Divisibility of Matter, the Eternity* or *Immensity of God*, in our way of conceiving; and if he cannot, he has no ground from those Instances to put human Nature in such a State of Scepticism and Absurdity.

2d Def. p. 175. 4. As to his urging again his Instance of Space, which I readily own to be indiscerpible, to show the Possibility of immaterial Substance's being indiscerpible, though extended, I tell him again, that Space (which Mr. *Clarke* says is only *an abstract Idea of Immensity*) will by no means reach his purpose: for Space is infinite, and not only infinite, but being incapable of being considered, either as *acting or being acted on*, is no Being or Substance at all, and therefore its Indivisibility cannot prove the Possibility of a finite extended Substance's being indivisible, but the contrary: for Space is only indivisible by having those two before-mentioned Qualities that make it differ from the immaterial Being in question.

5. To shew the Difference between an immaterial and material Substance as to their Divisi-

2d Def. p. 176. bility, Mr. *Clarke* says, *The Supposition of an immaterial Substance's being by the Power of God divided into Parts, (which concerning Matter is allowed to be possible) may be denied to be possible, as being a Supposition which destroys the Essence of the Substance it self.*

What signifies the Confession of some or all Men, that all Matter is divisible, or Mr. *Clark*'s Denial that immaterial Substance is divisible, to

show

ſhow a Difference between an immaterial and material Subſtance as to Diviſibility? Material Subſtance is not upon that account proved diviſible, nor immaterial Subſtance indiviſible. The Diviſibility or Indiviſibility of either Subſtance depends not upon ſuch Confeſſion or Denial; if it did, I might retort his Argument upon him thus: That immaterial Subſtance is by me confeſſed to be diviſible, but may concerning material Thinking Subſtance be denied to be poſſible, *as being a Suppoſition which deſtroys the Subſtance it ſelf*; for I have juſt as much reaſon to make that Suppoſition concerning a material Being, *that cannot by natural Cauſes be made ſmaller*, as he has concerning an immaterial Being; that is, both Suppoſitions are equally precarious.

But he had no Reaſon at all to ſay, That all Matter was confeſſed to be diviſible; becauſe I was ſo far from making any ſuch general *Confeſſion*, that I did in my *Reply* deny all Matter could be proved diviſible by any Argument that would not equally conclude for the Diviſibility of an immaterial Being; and conſequently, if thoſe Arguments were not ſufficient to prove the Diviſibility of immaterial Subſtance, neither would they, according to me, prove the Diviſibility of all material Subſtance. And therefore I ſhall be ſo far from allowing all Matter to be diviſible, that whenever Mr. *Clarke* proves to me the neceſſary Indiviſibility of any finite extended Subſtance, I will then deny that all Matter can be proved to be diviſible.

Sect. 3. I offered two Arguments to ſhow that the Suppoſition of the Immateriality of

the Soul, was of no uſe to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion, were it capable of Demonſtration: For I ſaid, " Unleſs a Thinking immaterial Subſtance can be proved naturally " Immortal, the Soul cannot be proved naturally Immortal; and I asked, Of what uſe " then is this Argument to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion? For if we have no Security that we muſt exiſt hereafter in a State " of Perception, as by only proving the natural Immortality of the Subſtance of the " Soul, we have not; it can be of no uſe to " influence our Lives and Actions". From which Paſſages it is plain, that the Queſtion of this Article was, whether an immaterial Being, or the Subſtance of the Soul could be proved to be in a perpetual State of Thinking; or elſe ſuppoſing that though it could not by this Argument be proved to be always in a State of Perception, whether it was ſtill of uſe to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion.

Letter to Mr. D. p. 80.

To prove the Poſſibility of Thinking as an Action's ceaſing in an immaterial Being, I did in my *Reply* obſerve, " That the Soul has " not only different Paſſions at different times, " ſuch as Anger, Love, *&c.* which are Mo- " difications that begin and have their Period, " but has Qualities and Powers, ſuch as ſeeing " and hearing, (which by the Defect of our " Organs plainly ceaſe for a time.) I likewiſe " inſtanced in the Motion of the Soul from " one place to another, which might be entirely owing to external and material Cauſes".

P. 128.

P. 130, 131.

And what Anſwer has Mr. *Clarke* given to ſhow the Uſefulneſs of his Argument to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion, but by changing

ging the Terms of the Queſtion, and not only the Terms themſelves, but the Meaning of thoſe Terms? For inſtead of conſidering Thinking as an *Action*, he uſes the Terms *Power of Thinking*, (by which I now find that he meant *Capacity of Thinking*;) and in his *Second Defence* changes the Term *Motion* into *Mobility*, and the Powers of ſeeing and hearing urged on him to prove the Poſſibility of Thinking's ceaſing in an immaterial Being, into a Capacity of hearing and ſeeing; whereby my Argument is turned to quite another purpoſe than it was intended by me, and the Reader is diverted from the true State of the Queſtion; and Mr. *Clarke* himſelf, inconſiſtently with his Cenſure of me for *nice Diſtinguiſhing*, does diſtinguiſh between actual Thinking and a Capacity of Thinking, actual Motion and a Capacity of Motion, *&c.* But yet I ſhould not have cenſured him for this, had he not really *perplexed* the Reader with a new Queſtion, as I aver this Queſtion, *Whether the Soul muſt for ever be capable of Thinking*, to be, and to have no relation to the Queſtion in diſpute: For allowing the Soul can never exiſt without a Capacity to think; of what uſe is a Proof that the Soul muſt always have that *Capacity*, in order to influence Mens Actions, when notwithſtanding that, the Soul may no more exiſt in a State of Perception, or Rewards and Puniſhments, than a Man born blind ſees Colours, or a deaf Man hears Sounds?

1ſt Def. p. 99. *P.* 172.

What follows being founded on this Change of the Queſtion, needs no other anſwer than what I have already given.

Reply, p. 140. Sect. 4. My laſt Objection was, " That if " from the Power of Thinking we can prove " the Immortality of the Soul of Man, and " from its Immateriality prove its natural Im- " mortality, and conſequently its Capacity of " eternal Happineſs, the Power of Thinking " muſt prove the Immateriality of the Souls " of Brutes, the Immateriality of their Souls " muſt prove their natural Immortality, and " conſequently their Capacity of eternal Hap- " pineſs".

2 *Def.* p. 177. To which Mr. *Clarke* anſwers, *Cannot God, if he pleaſes, cauſe them to periſh at the Diſſolution of their Bodies, or elſe annihilate them at any other time?* Now by all the Rules of anſwering, Mr. *Clarke* ought to have taken notice of the Reply I made in the Cloſe of the Objection it ſelf to the Anſwer he here gives me, and ought either to have confeſſed its Force, or elſe ſhowed the Inconcluſiveneſs thereof; but ſince he has thought fit to do otherwiſe, I take the Liberty to repeat that part of my Objection again, that I eſteem perfectly ſatisfactory to his Anſwer, and which is as follows: " That if it " be ſuppoſed that the Souls of Brutes may " be ſometime or other annihilated, then Mr. " *Clarke*'s Argument is not uſeful to the End " for which it was intended, becauſe mere na- " tural Immortality will then be no Proof of " the real Immortality of the Soul of Man". But Mr. *Clarke* has a ſecond Anſwer: *Cannot God*, ſays he, *diſpoſe of them into States ſuitable to their particular Natures, which yet may in no Propriety be ſtiled a Capacity of eternal Happineſs, as that of Man is?* Mr. *Clarke* lays the Streſs in a wrong Place. I meant no more by ſuppoſing Brutes capable of eternal Happineſs as well as

Man, but only a State wherein they might enjoy conſtant agreeable Perceptions, as Mr. *Clarke* may ſee if he conſiders the 144th Page of my *Reply*; and had no deſign to compare the ſeveral Degrees of Happineſs among created Beings in the next World. But ſince Mr. *Clarke* acknowledges all the numerous ſenſible Creatures to be Subjects of eternal Rewards, I ask him whether Mites, Fleas, Lice, Oyſters, Rats and Mice, may be puniſhed eternally, as well as enjoy eternal Rewards? If he anſwers, that they muſt only enjoy eternal Rewards, then he elevates Brutes above Men, and places them in a much more eligible Condition. If he anſwers, that they are Subjects both of eternal Rewards and Puniſhments; I ask, for what it is that eternal Rewards are beſtowed on ſome Animals, and eternal Puniſhments beſtowed on others? If they are to have eternal Rewards or Puniſhments, they muſt have them either according as they act agreeably or diſagreeably to ſome Rules of Action; and then they muſt be allowed to be moral Agents, and conſequently to have all the Powers in them which Men have that are neceſſary to make their Actions eſteemed *Moral*; or elſe they muſt be puniſhed or rewarded, that thoſe who have received Injuries in this Life may be compenſated in the next, and thoſe who have been proſperous in the Rapine and Slaughter of their fellow Animals may be puniſhed, whereby there may be a perfect Equality in God's Dealing with them; agreeably to what Mr. *Arnaud* relates in *Reflexions ſur le Syſteme du P. Mallebranche: Quand on leur demandoit* (that is, ſome *Jews* that maintained Brutes were proper Subjects of eternal Rewards and Puniſh- Liv. 2. p. 246.

Puniſhments) *quelle juſtice il y avoit dans la mort des bêtes, quelle peché elles avoient commis, & pourquoi Dieu vouloit, puis que ſa providence s'etendoit à tout, qu'un Rat Innocent fût dechiré par un Chat, I'ls repondoient, Que Dieu l'avoit ainſi ordonné, mais qu'il recompenſeroit ce Rat dans le ſiecle a venir.*

From theſe and ſome other Conſequences flowing from the foregoing Argument, we have ſo ſtrange a View of the State of Man, that I conceive there can be no greater Service to Religion, than to ſhow the Uſeleſneſs of that Argument to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion; eſpecially ſince there are ſuch ſolid Arguments for a future State from Topicks that can neither be anſwered by Infidels, nor loaded with any abſurd Conſequences.

Mr. *Clarke*, in the Concluſion of his *Defence*, has ſummed up his Argument in Fifteen Propoſitions, which I now propoſe to conſider, that my Anſwer to him may be compleat, though all that he advances in them is overthrown in the foregoing Reflections.

His Propoſitions are:

1. *Every Syſtem of Matter conſiſts of a Multitude of diſtinct Parts.*

This Propoſition, which he *thinks is granted by all*, is, I am ſure, denied by a great many. However, I ſhall not at preſent enter into any Debate with him concerning it, but continue to ſuppoſe it as I have hitherto done.

2. *Every real Quality inheres in ſome Subject.*

3. *No individual or ſingle Quality of one Particle of Matter can be the individual or ſingle Quality of another Particle of Matter.*

Theſe two I grant.

4. *Every*

4. *Every real ſimple Quality that reſides in any whole material Syſtem, reſides in all the Parts of that Syſtem.*

5. *Every real compound Quality that reſides in any whole material Syſtem, is a Number of ſimple Qualities reſiding in all the Parts of that Syſtem, ſome in one part, ſome in another.*

Theſe two Propoſitions I ſhall not contend with him about, though he ſeems to me to confound *ſimple and compound Qualities* together; for in his Explication ſubjoined to his Fourth Propoſition, as an Example of what he means by a *ſimple Quality*, he inſtances in the *Motion of a Body*; *which*, ſays he, *conſiſts in the Sum of the Motions of its ſeveral Parts.* And in his Explication ſubjoined to his Fifth Propoſition, as an Example of what he means by *compound Qualities*, he ſays, *The Simples Blue and Yellow make the compound Colour called Green.* Now the Motion of a Clock is to me as much a *compound Quality* as the Colour *Green* is a *compound Quality*; for the various Motions of a Clock, its circular, perpendicular, and other Motions, are as ſpecifically different from one another, as Blue and Yellow are from one another: and therefore I confeſs that I have no clear Ideas from Mr. *Clarke*'s Explications to the Terms *Simple and Compound.*

6. *Every real Quality, ſimple or compound, that reſults from any whole material Syſtem, but does not reſide in it, that is, neither in all its diſtinct Parts, nor in all the Parts of ſome Portion of it, according to the Explication of the two foregoing*

Propoſitions, is the Mode of ſome other Subſtance, and not of that.

This Propoſition I grant, on Condition that inſtead of *other Subſtance* be ſubſtituted the Words *other Subject:* for I grant Sweetneſs does not reſide in a Sugar-Loaf; that is, *neither in all the diſtinct Parts, nor in all the Parts of ſome Portion of a Sugar-Loaf, but is produced in another* Subject (and not in another *Subſtance*) as all other Senſations or Modes of Thinking are; which Subject I contend is material.

7. *Every Power, ſimple or compound, that reſults from any whole material Syſtem, but does not reſide in it, that is in all its Parts, in the Manner before explained, nor yet reſides in any other Subſtance as its Subject, is no real Quality at all; but muſt be either it ſelf a real Subſtance (which ſeems unintelligible) or elſe it is nothing elſe but merely an abſtract Name, as all Univerſals are.*

8. *Conſciouſneſs is neither a mere abſtract Name, (ſuch as the Powers mentioned in* Prop. 7.*) nor a Power of exciting or occaſioning different Modes in a foreign Subſtance, (ſuch as are the ſenſible Qualities of Bodies,* Prop. 6.*) but a real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject it ſelf, the Thinking Subſtance.*

Before I anſwer to this Propoſition, it is neceſſary to be very preciſe in unraveling what ſeems to be very much perplexed in it. Mr. *Clarke* confounds two things that ought to be ſeparated, *viz. The Power of exciting Modes in a foreign Subject*, and the Modes that are excited, when he ſays, *ſenſible Qualities in Bodies*

are

are *Powers of exciting Modes in another Subject*; whereas Sweetneſs, Sounds, *&c.* which are vulgarly termed *ſenſible Qualities in Bodies*, are only Ideas, Senſations, or Modes of Thinking in us, and exiſt not at all in thoſe Bodies of which they are ſaid to be ſenſible Qualities; and therefore the Powers in Bodies muſt be ſomething very different from thoſe Qualities, as different as a Cauſe is from an Effect; and (that I may proceed with the greater Clearneſs) I will ſuppoſe thoſe Powers to excite Modes in another Subject to be peculiar Modes of Motion in certain Syſtems of Matter.

Having thus diſtinguiſhed, I ſhall anſwer to this Propoſition in each of the foregoing Senſes.

1. I do agree that Conſciouſneſs is neither a mere abſtract Name (ſuch as are the Powers mentioned in *Prop.* 7.) nor does it exiſt in the Brain, as Sweetneſs is vulgarly ſuppoſed to do in a Roſe, and as all ſenſible Qualities in Bodies are ſuppoſed to do; but is a real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the Subject it ſelf, the Brain, as Modes of Motion do in ſome Bodies, and Roundneſs does in others.

2. I do agree again that Conſciouſneſs is not a mere abſtract Name, but is a Power of the Brain anſwering to the Powers in Matter that produce Senſations in us. For as thoſe Powers or Modes of Motion are peculiar to certain Syſtems of Matter, and are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame numerical Kind; ſo neither is Conſciouſneſs the Sum of Powers of the ſame numerical Kind: And as thoſe Syſtems of Matter do by peculiar Modes of Motion produce Ideas in us; ſo we by the Power of Thinking can enlarge or abſtract Ideas, that is, modify them,

them, or cauſe Changes in them, as well as external ſenſible things can cauſe Modes or Changes in us. And therefore Conſciouſneſs anſwers, or may be likened to thoſe Powers in ſome Syſtems of Matter that are Occaſions of Modes in another Subject; and is at the ſame time a Quality as much inhering in Matter as the Motion of a Clock does in the Parts of a Clock, or as Roundneſs, or any other particular or individual Figure in a Body.

9. *No real Quality can reſult from the Compoſition of different Qualities, ſo as to be a new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a different Kind or Species from all and every one of the component Qualities.*

According to Mr. *Clarke*'s Explication of this Propoſition, I allow this likewiſe to be true; for *from Motion nothing but Motion can ariſe, and from Figure nothing but Figure*: But this reaches not the Caſe of Numerical Powers, and particularly reaches not the Caſe of Conſciouſneſs. A real Numerical Power, as I ſuppoſe Conſciouſneſs to be, and ſuch as Roundneſs is, may reſult from the Compoſition of different Qualities, as Roundneſs does from different Species of Figures; and is conſequently a new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a different Kind or Species from all the component Qualities conſidered together: but Motion being a generical Power, does, I agree, conſiſt of the Motions of the Parts, as Figure does of the Figures of the Parts; and did Conſciouſneſs anſwer to Figure and Motion, that would likewiſe conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts.

10. *Con-*

10. *Conſciouſneſs therefore being a real Quality* (Prop. 8.) *and of a Kind ſpecifically different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledged to be void of Conſciouſneſs, can never poſſibly reſult from any Compoſition of ſuch Qualities.*

Though Conſciouſneſs be a real Quality, and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledged to be void of Conſciouſneſs, it can or may reſult from ſuch Qualities as ſingly conſidered are void of Conſciouſneſs. Roundneſs is a real Quality ſpecifically different from other Qualities void of Roundneſs, and yet may be the Reſult or Compoſition of ſuch Qualities. But in Mr. *Clarke*'s Senſe of real Qualities, I allow this Propoſition to be true: but then it reaches not the Caſe of Conſciouſneſs, which I deny to be a generical Power, but affirm to be only a Mode of a generical Power.

11. *No individual Quality can be transferred from one Subject to another.*

This Propoſition I allow to be true: The Quality of a Subject can only be the Quality of that Subject wherein it exiſts, and not of another Subject. The Motion of a Syſtem of Matter can only be the Motion of that Syſtem. The Conſciouſneſs of any Being can only be the Conſciouſneſs of that particular Being. And I further obſerve, that the Motion of a Syſtem of Matter one Day can never be the Motion of the ſame numerical Syſtem the next Day, nor the Conſciouſneſs of Yeſterday be the ſame numerical Conſciouſneſs that I have to Day, let the Being that is conſcious in me

be

be diviſible or indiviſible. The ſame individual Quality can no more be transferred to the ſame *individual Subject* that was formerly the Subject of it, than it can be transferred to another Subject.

12. *The Spirits and Particles of the Brain, being looſe and in a perpetual flux, cannot therefore be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years ſince, but alſo is conſcious that he himſelf, the ſame individual Being, was the Doer of them.*

Though the Spirits or Particles of the Brain cannot by being in a perpetual Flux be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which I know my ſelf to Day to be the ſame individual conſcious Being that I was a Year ago (for I deny that we have any Conſciouſneſs at all that we continue the ſame individual Being at different times) yet if it be not abſurd for Matter to think, Matter muſt at the ſame time know that it thinks, or be conſcious of its thinking: and if it can know at this inſtant that it thinks, I can ſee no reaſon why it may not remember To-morrow what it thinks of To-day, though ſome Particles will be then wanting which it has at preſent. And if it can remember at all, then the Memory of Things may be continued even after we have loſt all the Particles of Matter that we had at the Time of the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating, or imprinting afreſh our Ideas before they are quite loſt or worn out. And it is thus as intelligible to me that the Memory of Things ſhould be preſerved by a Being in a Flux, as by a Being that is not ſo. For the individual Conſciouſneſs To-day, can neither in an individual or diviſible

diviſible Being be the individual Conſciouſneſs To-morrow: that Conſciouſneſs is a perfectly diſtinct Action in both Beings from the preceeding Conſciouſneſs the Day before. And whenever Mr. *Clarke* accounts for an indiviſible Being's remembrance of an Action or Thought, I promiſe to account for Memory in a diviſible Being.

13. *The Conſciouſneſs that a Man has at one and the ſame time is one Conſciouſneſs, and not a Multitude of diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes; as Solidity, Motion, or Colour of any Piece of Matter, is a Multitude of diſtinct Solidities, Motions, or Colours.*

14. *Conſciouſneſs therefore cannot at all reſide in the Subſtance of the Brain or Spirits, or in any other material Syſtem as its Subject, but muſt be a Quality of ſome immaterial Subſtance.*

Taking Conſciouſneſs for a numerical Power, either as anſwering to Roundneſs in a Body, or to a Motion peculiar to a Syſtem of Matter, and this Propoſition by no means follows from thoſe foregoing: For if Conſciouſneſs be a numerical Power, then it anſwers to never a one of the Heads under which he ranks the Powers of Matter; for it neither anſwers to an Effect reſiding in no Subject at all, (if there is any ſuch Thing in Nature, which I utterly deny there is) nor does it anſwer to Sweetneſs, or any other ſenſible Qualities exiſting in Bodies external to us (for they are only Modes of Thinking or Perceptions in us, and exiſt not at all in thoſe external Bodies.) Nor, laſtly, is it a Power which anſwers to Figure and Motion, which I agree conſiſt only in the Figures

gures and Motions of the Parts, but agrees or anſwers to Modes of Figure and Motion. From all which it is plain, that all Mr. *Clarke*'s Propoſitions are founded on his conſidering Conſciouſneſs to be ſomething elſe than what I contend it is; and ſo though he may demonſtrate the Impoſſibility of Matter's being conſcious in his Senſe of the Term Conſciouſneſs, yet I deny that he has ſaid one word to prove the Impoſſibility of Matter's Thinking in the Senſe for which the Term Conſciouſneſs ſtands with me, and I ſuppoſe with all thoſe that contend for the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking or being conſcious. So that his Demonſtration may be granted by me, without affecting the Queſtion between us, ſince it relates to a Chimera or Idea of his own framing; and thus endleſs Demonſtrations may be made, without underſtanding Things as they really exiſt, or any Truth beſides the Relations of chimerical Ideas: For I grant his Demonſtration to be good, if Conſciouſneſs be conſidered either as a generical Power like Motion and Figure, or as anſwering to the Sweetneſs of a Roſe, (which is a Senſation or Mode of thinking in us) or as an Effect reſiding in no Subſtance at all; then Conſciouſneſs cannot inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, and his Demonſtration reaches no farther. But Conſciouſneſs anſwering to never a one of theſe Powers, in demonſtrating that Conſciouſneſs in his Senſe cannot inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, he has no more reached the Queſtion, than if he had talked of any thing elſe in the World: for his Uſage of the Term Conſciouſneſs does not make him one jot nearer the Queſtion, than if he had uſed a different Term, or a Term that

no

no one would ſuſpect ſtood for the thing really ſignified by the Term *Conſciouſneſs.*

15. *Difficulties that ariſe afterwards concerning other Qualities of that immaterial Subſtance, as whether it be extended or unextended, do not at all affect the preſent Argument.*

How far the Difficulty of making immaterial Being extended, affects Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument, I refer the Reader to Page 220, *&c.* of my *Reflections.* And as for the Difficulty of making it *unextended*, I will ſpeak to that whenever Mr. *Clarke* defines the Terms *Unextended* and *Being*, that I may ſee what they ſtand for when joined together; and then I will ſhow how far conſidering immaterial Being to be an unextended Being affects his Argument, as I have ſhown how far conſidering immaterial Being to be an extended Being affects it.

Thus I have gone through Mr. *Clarke*'s Propoſitions, and ſhown wherein they fail to clear the Point that he ought to have aimed at: And I conclude with this further Obſervation, that he has not drawn up one Propoſition to ſhow that his Argument is of any uſe to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion, allowing it to be ever ſo true and juſt; and therefore for Proof that it is of no uſe to that end, I refer the Reader to the 225th and the ſubſequent Pages of the foregoing *Reflections.*

A THIRD

A THIRD DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT

Made use of in a

Letter to Mr. *DODWEL*,

To prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of the *Reflexions on Mr.* Clarke's *Second Defence*, &c.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. late Rector of St. *James's Westminster.*

Arguments seldom work on Men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion.

Mr. Hobbes.

We have as much Reason to be satisfied with our Notion of *Immaterial Spirit*, as with our Notion of *Body*; and the Existence of the One, as well as the Other For it being no more a Contradiction that *Thinking* should exist separate and independent from *Solidity*, than it is a Contradiction that *Solidity should exist* separate and independent from *Thinking*; they being Both but *Simple Ideas*, independent one from another; And having as clear and distinct Ideas in us, of *Thinking*, as of *Solidity*; I know not why we may not as well allow a *Thinking Thing without Solidity*, that is, *Immaterial*, to exist; as a *Solid Thing without thinking*, that, is, *Matter*, to exist. Mr. *Lock's* Essay, Book II. *Ch.* 23. §. 32

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A Third DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT, &c.

SIR,

IN my Laſt Reply I perſuaded my ſelf I had ſet the Queſtion between us in ſo clear a Light, that there would have been no need of any new Debate, or of giving our Readers any further trouble in this Matter. But ſeeing you have found out a ſeemingly new *Diſtinction*, by which you ſtill endeavour to evade the Force of the Argument; And, though your Evaſion ſeems to Me indeed extreamly ſlight, yet ſeeing you have thought fit to inſiſt upon it in ſuch a Manner, as if you your ſelf really believed there was ſome Strengeh and Weight in it; I ſhall endeavour to gratify the ſincere Deſire you pro-

feſs to have of diſcovering the Truth, by ſhowing briefly the Weakneſs and Inconcluſiveneſs of what you have advanced in your *Reflections*.

In order to prove that *Thinking* cannot poſſibly be a Quality or Power of *Matter*; I ſaid that all the Qualities or Powers, which either Are in Matter, whether they be known or unknown; or are vulgarly Aſcribed to it; muſt of neceſſity be either,

1*ſt*, Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are aſcribed: Such as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in Matter. Theſe are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of *the ſame Kind*, inhering diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Material Subject. Which not being true of *Thinking*, it is manifeſt that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Sort*, inhering in a Syſtem of Matter.

Or 2*dly*, Qualities, not really inhering in the Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed, but being indeed Modes excited and reſiding in ſome other Subject: Such as are *Colours*, *Sounds*, and all thoſe which are commonly called the Senſible Qualities of Matter. Theſe do not exiſt at all in That Subject to which they are uſually aſcribed; but in ſome Other Subject. And this alſo not being applicable to *Thinking*, it is manifeſt therefore that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Kind*, in a Material Subject.

Or 3*dly*, Qualities, not really inhering in any Subject at all, but being mere Abſtract Names, or external Denominations, to expreſs certain complex Ideas framed in our Imaginations; or certain general extrinſick, and relative Effects, produced upon particular Syſtems of Matter by

by foreign Agents; or certain Diſpoſitions of the particular Syſtems of Matter, requiſite towards the producing of thoſe Effects. Such as are *Magnetiſm*, *Electricity*, *Attraction*, *Reflexibility*, *Refrangibility*, and the like. Theſe have no real Exiſtence by way of *proper inhering* in any Subject. Which likewiſe ſince it cannot be ſaid of *Thinking*, it is manifeſt that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality in a Material Syſtem, of *this Kind* neither.

You grant that *Thinking*, for the Reaſons I urged, cannot be a Power or Quality of any of Theſe Kinds: But you *Diſtinguiſh* upon the Firſt Sort; and alledge,

That there are ſome Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are aſcribed; which yet are not, like Magnitude and Motion, Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of the *ſame Kind*, inhering diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Subject: And that therefore *Thinking*, though it be not an Aggregate of Powers of the *ſame Kind*, may yet nevertheleſs be a real Quality inhering in Matter.

That Numerical Powers, or *particular and Individual Modes*, are ſuch real inherent Qualities, reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter, without inhering diſtinctly in its ſeveral Parts: in contradiſtinction to *generical Powers*, ſuch as *Magnitude and Motion*, which you acknowledge to be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of the ſeveral Parts. *Reflections*, p. 203, 204.

That, for Inſtance, the *Power of the Eye, to contribute to the Act of Seeing*; the Power of a *Clock*, to ſhow the Hour of the Day; the Power of a *Muſical Inſtrument*, to produce in *pag.* 198. *pag.* 199.

pag. 199, 200. us harmonious Sounds; the particular *Figures* in Bodies, such as *Roundneſs* or *Squareneſs*; and pag. 200. particular or individual *Modes of Motion*, are such *Numerical Powers*, not at all resulting from any Powers of the *same Kind* inhering in the Parts of the System: And that *Thinking* therefore in like manner, not being an Aggregate of Powers of the *same Kind*, may yet inhere in a System of Matter, as one of these pag. 203, 204. *Numerical* or *Individual Modes* of some *Generical Power*.

That, upon this Supposition, of *Thinking* being a *Numerical Mode* of some *Generical Power* pag. 203. of Matter; it may be conceived, that *as the Roundneſs of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundneſſes of the Parts*; nor the *Squareneſs* of a Body, the Sum of the *Squareneſſes* of the Parts; pag. 203 nor *the Power of a Muſical Inſtrument to cauſe an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the same Kind in the Parts ſingly conſidered*; nor any particular *Mode of Motion*, the Sum of the same *Modes of Motion* in all the several Parts; pag. 204. So the *Conſciouſneſs* that *inheres in a Syſtem of Matter*, may yet *not be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts*.

pag. 208. *That* the Argument therefore drawn from *Conſciouſneſs* not being made up of *ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes*, concludes no more againſt the Poſſibility of its reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter; pag. 208. than the like Argument would *conclude againſt the Poſſibility of the Exiſtence of* Roundneſs, *or any other* Numerical Mode, *in a Body*.

pag. 208. For *Roundneſs no more conſiſts of ſeveral Roundneſſes, than Thinking or Conſciouſneſs does of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes*.

And

And *Roundneſs is as ſpecifically different from other Figures* of which it may be compoſed, *as Conſciouſneſs is from a Circular Motion.* pag. 208.

So that *Senſation* may be conceived to be *in the Parts of an Animal's* Body, juſt *as Roundneſs is in the Parts that compoſe a Round Body: Each Part has as much of Senſation, ſingly conſidered; as each Part of a Round Body, has of Roundneſs: And when the Parts are duly diſpoſed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundneſs exiſts by the Conjunction of Parts.* pag. 214, 215.

For *Conſciouſneſs*, being *ſuppoſed to be a real Numerical Power, ſuch as Roundneſs is; may reſult from the Compoſition of different Qualities, as Roundneſs does from different Species of Figure: And is conſequently a new Quality in the ſame Subject, of a different Kind or Species from all the component Qualities conſidered together.*

Wherefore, *though Conſciouſneſs be a real Quality, and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themſelves acknowledged to be void of Conſciouſneſs; yet it may reſult from ſuch Qualities as ſingly conſidered are void of Conſciouſneſs*; In like manner as *Roundneſs is a real Quality ſpecifically different from other Qualities void of Roundneſs, and yet may be the Reſult or Compoſition of ſuch Qualities.*

That Conſciouſneſs may be conſidered particularly, as an individual *Mode* or *Species of Motion.* pag. 203.

For, as nothing more *goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs*; ſo upon *This Suppoſition*, nothing more needs *go to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with That Species of Motion called Thinking.* pag. 209.

This, if I underſtand you aright, is the Sum and full Strength of what you have urged in your *Reflections*.

And to This, I anſwer as follows.

It is abſolutely impoſſible and an evident Contradiction, that any Real Quality ſhould truly and properly inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers or Qualities, reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem, and being always of the *ſame Kind* with the Whole that reſults from them. For, as the *Subſtance it ſelf* of a Syſtem of Matter, is nothing but the Sum of its Parts, exiſting diſtinctly and independently from each other; and the Whole cannot but be of the *ſame Kind* with the Parts that conſtitute it: So no *Power* or *Quality of the Subſtance* can be any thing elſe, but the Sum or Aggregate of the Powers of the ſeveral Parts; and That Sum or Aggregate, without a Creation of ſomething out of Nothing, cannot but be of the *ſame Kind* with the Powers that conſtitute it. If the Parts of the Subſtance be *ſimilar*, then the Syſtem it ſelf is an *uniform* or *homogeneous* Subſtance: If the Parts be *diſſimilar*, then the Subſtance is *difform* or *Heterogeneous*: But ſtill always of the *ſame Kind* or *Kinds* with the Parts that compoſe it. In like manner, if the Powers of the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem be *ſimilar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *ſimple* and *uniform* Power: If the Powers of the ſeveral Parts be *diſſimilar*, the Power of the whole will be a *compound difform* Power: But ſtill always neceſſarily of the *ſame Kind* or *Kinds* with the Powers of which it is compounded. Since therefore you acknowledge *Thinking*

to

to be a Power not compoſed of a Multitude of *Thinkings*; and it is evident (as ſhall in the Sequel be made fully appear) that no Powers void of Thinking, can be of the *ſame Kind* with the Power of Thinking, ſo as to be Parts of it, and that from a Compoſition of Them the Power of Thinking may ariſe; it follows that *Thinking* is not a Power made up at all of Parts, and conſequently that it cannot reſide in a Subſtance that conſiſts of diſtinct and independent Parts, ſuch as all Matter is confeſſed to be.

From the clear Explication of which whole Argument, and to vindicate the Notion from all the Objections and pretended Inſtances you have brought to the contrary; it is to be obſerved, that the Terms, *Kind*, and *Species*, and *of the ſame Kind* or *Species*, are very ambiguous Terms, and uſed in great Variety of Significations: Though among Men who ſeek Truth, and endeavour to expreſs themſelves with the greateſt Clearneſs they can, and are willing to underſtand each others meaning; they do not often cauſe any conſiderable Miſtakes.

For Example: It is an evident Truth, that *All Circles of four Foot Diameter*, are of *one and the ſame Kind* or *Species*; and this is what the Logicians call *Species ſpecialiſſima*. It is true in another Senſe, that *All Circles whatever*, are of the *ſame Species*: In another Senſe, that *All curvilinear Figures*, are of the *ſame Species*: In another, that *All plain Figures both ſtreight-lined and curvilinear*, as oppoſed to Solids, are of the *ſame Speeies*: And in another, that *All Figures whatſoever, whether plain or ſolid*, are of the *ſame Kind* or *Species*; as contradiſtinguiſhed from

from Motion or Thinking, or from any Thing elſe of a totally different Kind. This is what they call the *Genus generalius*. And beyond This, it is neither *True* nor *good Senſe*, nor can it in any manner be ſaid, that *Figure* and *Motion*, or *Figure* and *Colour*, or *Figure* and *Thought*, are of the *ſame Kind*; Becauſe there is nothing Common in their Idea's, by which they can be ranked or compared together; ſave only as they are all comprehended perhaps under the mere Abſtract Name of *Quality* in general.

In like manner; *All Squares of two Foot Diameter* are *ſpecifically* different from *All Squares of one Foot Diameter*; but not in the ſame Senſe, nor ſo much, as Both are from *Parallelograms*: And *All Parallelograms* differ *ſpecifically* from *All Squares*; but not ſo, as Both do from *Triangles*: And *All Triangles* differ *ſpecifically* from *All quadrilateral Figures*; but not ſo, as Both do from *Spheres* or *Cylinders*: And *Spheres* or *Cylinders* differ *ſpecifically* from all Streight-lined Figures; but not ſo, as They and All Other Figures differ from *Motion*, or from a *Taſte* or a *Sound*; or as *Figure* or *Motion* does from a *Thought*. Which makes it appear by the Bye, with what Truth and Senſe you affirm,

pag. 208. that *Roundneſs is as ſpecifically different from all other Figures, as Conſciouſneſs is from a Circular Motion*; That is, that a *Circle* differs from an *Ellipſis* (ſuppoſe) or from a *Parabola*, not only as much as it differs from a *Cube*, but even as much as it differs from the *Reaſon of a Man*: Or, as Logicians would expreſs it, that the *Species ſpecialior* differs as much from the *Species* next and immediately ſuperiour to it, as it does from the *Genus generaliſſimum*; and not only ſo,

but

but as it does alſo from any thing that is not ſo much as included even in *That Genus.*

Again: *All light Blue Colours* differ *ſpecifically* from *All dark Blues*; but not ſo as Both do from *Yellow* or *Scarlet:* And *Scarlet* differs *ſpecifically* from *Blue*; but not ſo, as Both do from the *Sound of a Trumpet.*

Now to apply This to our preſent Queſtion. When I affirm that every real Power or Quality inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, muſt of neceſſity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers *of the ſame Kind* reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of that Syſtem; it is manifeſt that by this Term, *of the ſame Kind*, is not to be underſtood the *Species ſpecialiſſima*, but ſome of the *Species generaliores.* For Example: When I ſay the *Magnitude* of a *Cubic Foot* of Gold, is the Sum or Aggregate of the *Magnitudes* of its Parts; I do not mean to ſay, that it is an Aggregate of *Cubic Feet*, but of other *Magnitudes* which conſtitute a Cubic Foot, and which are of *the ſame Kind* with it, in the Senſe that *All Magnitudes* are of *the ſame Kind*, and may be Parts one of another: But *Magnitude* and *Motion*, or *Magnitude* and *Figure*, are not in any Senſe *of the ſame Kind*, and cannot be Parts one of another; Neither can *Figure* or *Motion* be a *Piece* of a *Thought.*

In like manner: When I ſay the Number *Twenty* is made up of Parts *of the ſame Kind* with the Whole; it is evident I do not mean that it is made up of *Twenties*, but of Other *Numbers*, which are *of the ſame Kind* with it, in the Senſe that *All Numbers*, are of *the ſame Kind*, and may be Parts one of another: But *Number* and *Sound*, or *Number* and *Colour*, are not in any Senſe *of the ſame Kind*, and cannot

be Parts one of another; Neither can *Number* or *Figure*, *Motion* or *Magnitude*, be a *Piece* of a *Thought*.

Again; When I say *Roundneſs* or *Globoſity* or any other Figure of a Body, muſt needs be the Sum of Qualities *of the ſame Kind* inhering in the ſeveral Parts; it is plain I do not mean to affirm, that *Globoſity* is made up of *Globoſities*, any more than the Number *Twenty* is made up of *Twenties*, or the *Motion of a Cubic Foot* of Matter made up of the *Motions* of *Cubic Feet*; but that a *whole Round Figure* muſt neceſſarily be made up of *Pieces of Roundneſs*, which are all of the *ſame Kind* with it; juſt as the *Numbers*, which are Parts of *Twenty*, are of the *ſame Kind* with the Whole, and the *Motions* of the Particles of a Cubic Foot of Matter, which are Parts of the Motion of the Whole, are of the *ſame Kind* with the Whole Motion. But *Figure*, and whatever is not *Figure*, are not in any Senſe *of the ſame Kind*; Neither can any thing that is *void of Figure* be part of any *Figure* whatſoever; nor any thing that is *void* of *Curvity* in particular, be part of a *round Circumference*; nor any thing that is void of that *particular Degree of Curvity* which makes a Circle of a certain determinate Diameter, be part of the *Circumference of That Circle*; nor any thing that is *void of Thinking*; be a Part or Conſtituent of a *Thought*.

From hence it clearly appears, that your Diſtinction of *Generical* and *Numerical* Powers, is of no Service to your Cauſe. For thoſe Powers which you call *Numerical*, muſt as neceſſarily be Aggregates of Powers of *the ſame Kind*, as thoſe which you call *Generical*. It is as evident, that the *Round Figure* of a *Globe*, [its

ſuperficial

Superficial Figure,] is the Sum of the *Convex Surfaces* of its outward Parts: and its *Solid Figure*, the Sum of all its *Solid Parts taken together*, conſidered like ſo many *concentrick Shells* or any other Figures which can be conſtituent Parts of the ſolid Content of a Globe; as it is that the *Motion* of a Globe, is the Sum of the *Motions* of its Parts. And the *Convex Outſides* of its outward Parts, and the *Concentrick Roundneſſes* of its inwards Parts, are as much *of the ſame Kind* with the *Whole Roundneſs* or the *Whole Globoſity*, of which they are pieces; as the ſeveral diſtinct *Motions* or *Magnitudes* of its Parts, are of the *ſame Kind* with the *Whole Motion* or *Magnitude* which they conſtitute. For why is not a *Semicircle* or the *Arch of a Quadrant*, of the *ſame Kind* with the Circumference of a *Circle*; and *concentrick round Fignres*, or any other *Figures* which can be *conſtituent* Parts of the ſolid Content of a Globe, of *the ſame Kind* with the Figure of the *Globe*; as much as the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of *half a Foot Cube* of Matter, is of the *ſame Kind* with the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of the *Whole Foot Cube?*

In reality, no other Powers but *Numerical* Powers, can properly in the preſent Queſtion come under Conſideration at all. For *Generical* Powers, conſidered as ſuch, are nothing but Univerſals, having no being but in the Imagination conſidering and comparing ſeveral Particulars. In the Individuals themſelves, wherein alone Powers really exiſt, they are not *General*; They are only made *General* by the conſidering and comparing together of Particulars; Which Compariſon has no Exiſtence but in the Idea; And conſequently *General* or *Generical Powers*, having no real Exiſtence in things without

without us, have really neither Parts nor Whole, nor can properly come at all under Consideration in the preſent Queſtion. It is not *Motion* or *Figure* in *general*, that is made up of Motions and Figures; but it is the *Individual Numerical Motion* or *Figure* of a Body, that is made up of the Motions or Figures of its Parts. The *Numerical Mode of Motion* of the Whole; is always the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Motion* of the Parts: The *Numerical Mode of Superficial Figure* of the Whole, is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Figure* of the *Outſides* of its *Superficial* Parts: And the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of the Whole; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of all the Parts taken together. In like manner, if *Thinking* could inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it would not be *Thinking* in *general*, but always ſome particular *Numerical Thought*, that would be the Reſult of the *Thinkings of the ſeveral Parts.*

If you will reply, that by *Generical* Powers you do not mean *General* Powers, or *Univerſals*, which have no real Exiſtence; (though when you reckon *Figure* among your *Generical* Powers, in Oppoſition to any *particular Figure*, as *Roundneſs*; your words cannot eaſily bear any other than this abſurd Senſe;) If, I ſay, you will reply, that by *Generical* Powers you do not mean *General* Powers, but only ſuch *Sorts* of *particular* Powers, as *Are* Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the *ſame Kind*, in Oppoſition to ſuch other *particular* Powers or Qualities, as *Are not* Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the *ſame Kind*: I anſwer, that there is no ſuch Diſtinction in Nature; But all Powers or Qualities whatever that inhere in Syſtems

of

of Matter, whether they be ſuch as you inſtance in for *Generical*, or ſuch as you inſtance in for *Numerical* Powers; are equally and alike Sums or Aggregates of Powers *of the ſame Kind*. For if by this Term, *of the ſame Kind* or *Species*, you underſtand the *Species ſpecialiſſima*; in that Senſe neither the One Sort of Qualities, nor the Other, nor any Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts *of the ſame Kind*. It being no more true, that the *Magnitude or Motion* (which you call the *Generical* Qualities) of a *Foot Cube* of Matter, are made up of *Cubic Feet Magnitudes*, or *Cubic Feet Motions*; than it is true that the *Roundneſs* (which you call the *Numerical* Quality) of a *Globe*, is made up of the *Like Roundneſſes*. But if by the Term, *of the ſame Kind*, be underſtood (as common Senſe requires, and as I before explained,) the *Species generalior*; then both the One Sort of Qualities and the Other, and All Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts *of the ſame Kind:* It being equally true and evident, that the *Round Figure* of a Globe, (the *Numerical* Quality,) is, as to its *Surface*, made up of *Pieces of Surfaces ſpherically and concentrically Convex*; and, as to its *Solid Content*, made up of *concentrick round Figures*, or of *Shells ſpherically and concentrically Convex*; which, being Pieces of the whole Spherical Surface, or of the whole Spherical ſolid Content, are reſpectively *of the ſame Kind* with it: as that the *Magnitude* of a *Foot Cube* of Matter, (the *Generical* Quality,) is made up of *Inches Cube*, or of any *other Magnitudes*, which, being Pieces of a Foot Cube, are *of the ſame Kind* with it.

When

pag. 203. When therefore you ſay; *If Powers of the ſame Kind be underſtood* Generically, *then* you *Do agree that the known Powers of Matter are nothing elſe but the Sums of Powers of the ſame Kind; that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body*, [the *Magnitude* and *Motion* you ſhould more properly have inſtanced in,] *conſiſt of the Figures and Motions* [the *Magnitudes* and *Motions*] *of the Parts: But if the Terms, Powers of the ſame Kind, be taken* Numerically, (*that is, as Powers really exiſt,*) *then there are Powers inhering in Syſtems of Matter that are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame Kind; As, the Roundneſs of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundneſſes of the Parts:* Your Diſtinction is evidently very groundleſs. Becauſe in the ſame Senſe that *the Roundneſs of a Body is not the Sum of the* Like *Roundneſſes of the Parts*, (for of *Other* Roundneſſes, as of innumerable *concentrick Roundneſſes*, and of the *convex Outſides* of its minute external Particles, it may be and always is the Sum:) In the ſame Senſe (I ſay,) that *the Roundneſs of a Body* is not *the Sum of the* [Like] *Roundneſs of the Parts*; in that ſame Senſe it is true alſo, that *neither* does *the Magnitude nor Motion of a Body conſiſt of the* [Like] *Magnitudes nor Motions of the Parts.* And on the contrary: In the ſame Senſe that it is true, that the *Magnitude and Motion of a Body* does *conſiſt of* [not the *ſame*, but the *Different*] *Magnitudes and Motions of the Parts*; in that ſame Senſe it is true likewiſe, that the *Numerical Round Figure of a Body*, that is, the *Round Figure of its Surface*, is the Sum of the *Roundneſſes*, that is, of the *round* or *convex Outſides*, of its *ſuperficial* Parts; and its *Solid Figure*, is the Sum of all its ſolid Parts taken together, which (as I before

before ſaid) may be conſidered as ſo many *concentrick Shells* or any other Figures that can be *conſtituent* Parts of the ſolid Content of a Globe.

And when you ſay; It is *a Contradiction to make Conſciouſneſs the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts, as it is a Contradiction to make Roundneſs to conſiſt in the Roundneſſes of the Parts*; *Though* you *would readily grant, that was Conſciouſneſs a generical Power like Figure and Motion, it would be likewiſe the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts*; *and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts*; *which* you *do allow to be very abſurd*: And again; *If humane Conſciouſneſs be a* Mode *of ſome generical Power in Matter, it muſt not be the Sum of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts*: And; *Did Conſciouſneſs anſwer to Figure and Motion,* [the generical Powers;] *That would likewiſe conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts*: And again; *Conſciouſneſs may reſult from ſuch Qualities, as ſingly conſidered are void of Conſciouſneſs*; In like manner as *Roundneſs is a real Quality ſpecifically different from other Qualities void of Roundneſs, and yet may be the Reſult or Compoſition of ſuch Qualities*: And; *Nor is Conſciouſneſs a Power which anſwers to Figure and Motion* [the generical Powers,] *which* you *agree conſiſt only in the Figures and Motions of the Parts*; *but it agrees or anſwers to* [Numerical] *Modes of Figure and Motion*: All this, is only amuſing your Reader with inſignificant Words. For 1ſt *Conſciouſneſs*, (as I ſhall hereafter have occaſion more particularly to obſerve) is truly a *more generical* Power, than either *Figure* or *Motion*. For *Figure* contains under it, nothing

pag. 203, 204. pag. 204. pag. 234. pag. 235. pag. 237, 238.

but the Modes of *Figure*; and *Motion*, nothing but the Modes of *Motion*: But *Conſciouſneſs* comprehending under it all the Modes of *Thinking*, contains in it ſelf the Ideas of all the Modes of *Figure*, and the Ideas of all the Modes of *Motion*, and infinite *Other Ideas* beſides. *Conſciouſneſs* therefore being a *generical Power*, not *like*, but infinitely *more* ſo, than *Figure and Motion*; muſt be (according to your own Confeſſion) *the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts*; *and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts*; *which* you *do allow to be very abſurd.* But 2dly, Let us endeavour to imagine *Conſciouſneſs* to be, not a *Generical*, but a *Numerical* Power or Quality, ſuch as *Roundneſs* is; and ſee what will follow from thence. It cannot be conceived that *Conſciouſneſs in general* is a *Numerical* Power, any more than *Figure in general*, or *Roundneſs in general.* But, as the *individual Roundneſs* of a *Globe*, is a *Numerical* Quality of that *individual Globe*; ſo you can only ſay that the *individual Conſciouſneſs*, which I find in my ſelf at any particular Moment of Time, is a *Numerical* Mode of ſome Power inhering in that Syſtem of Matter which conſtitutes my Brain. Now as the *individual Roundneſs* of a *Globe*, is not indeed made up of a Number of the *Like whole Roundneſſes*; (even as the Number *a Hundred*, is not made up of *Hundreds*, nor the *Magnitude of a Foot Cube*, made up of *Feet Cube*; nor any *Whole* whatever, made up of a Number of the *like Wholes*;) but yet muſt needs be made up of *ſuch Figures*, as are *Parts of Roundneſs*, nay Parts endued with that *particular numerical Degree of Curvity or Round-*

pag. 204.

neſs; and cannot be made up of *ſtraight Lines*, nor of any *Figures* which are *not Pieces* of *Roundneſs*, or *not Pieces* endued with that *particular determinate Degree of Curvity or Roundneſs*: So the *individual Conſciouſneſs* that I find in my ſelf at any particular Moment of Time, (ſuppoſing it to be a Quality inhering in a Syſtem of Matter,) muſt be made up, though not indeed of a Number of the *very ſame Conſciouſneſſes*, yet of ſuch Powers as are as much *of the ſame Kind* with that *Numerical Conſciouſneſs*, as *Arches of Circles* are of *the ſame Kind* with the whole *circular Circumference*; or *Pieces of Surfaces ſpherically and concentrically Convex*, are of the *ſame Kind* with the whole *Spherical Surface* compoſed of them all: That is, it muſt be made up of *Different* Conſciouſneſſes indeed, but ſtill *Conſciouſneſſes* only, and not *Motions* or *Figures*, or any thing elſe; any more than the *Roundneſs of a Circle* can be made up of *ſtraight Lines*, or of *Colours*, or *Sounds*, or any thing elſe beſides *Pieces of circular Roundneſs*; or than the *Surface of a Sphere*, can be made up of any thing elſe than *little Surfaces having every one of them the very ſame ſpherical and concentrick Convexity*; or than an *Extended* or *Solid* Subſtance, can be made up of any other Ingredients, than ſuch as are Themſelves *Pieces* of *Extended* or *Solid Subſtance*. It is by no means true, which you affirm, that *Roundneſs* is *a new Quality, of a different* Kind *or* Species *from all the component Qualities conſidered together*; or that *it may be the Reſult or Compoſition of Qualities void of Roundneſs*; Since it cannot be affirmed of any part of the *Arch of a Circle*, that it is wholly *void of Circularity*; as a *ſtraight Line* is: And in like manner, it is by no means poſſible,

pag. 234.

pag. 235.

pag. 235. that *Conſciouſneſs may reſult from ſuch Qualities, as ſingly conſidered are void of* [all kind of] *Conſciouſneſs*; as *Motion* or *Figure* is. Nay further: *Every Part* of the Circumference of *a* Circle, is not only *not wholly void of Roundneſs*, but has really *as much Roundneſs* or *Curvity* (as much in *Degree*, though not ſo much of it in *Quantity*,) as the *whole* Circle it ſelf has; For the ſame Reaſon as *one Circle* has *as much Roundneſs*, as *Twenty*; or *one Inch Cube* of boiling Water, *as much Heat* [in Degree] as *Twenty*; or *one Foot Square* of a white Surface, *as much Whiteneſs* as *Twenty*: And therefore *Conſciouſneſs* in like manner, if it was a Quality anſwering to, or that could be compared with, the Roundneſs of a Circle; muſt conſiſt of Parts, every one of which would have *as much Conſciouſneſs* [in Degree] as the Whole.

From the ſame Principles may eaſily be ſhown the Abſurdity of all the reſt that you have advanced, upon your favourite Inſtance of *ROUNDNESS*.

You ſay that the Argument drawn from Conſciouſneſs's not being made up of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes, concludes no more againſt the Poſſibility of Its reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter;

pag. 208. than the like Argument would *conclude againſt the Poſſibility of the Exiſtence of Roundneſs in Body; which no more conſiſts of ſeveral Roundneſſes, than Thinking or Conſciouſneſs does of ſeveral Conſciouſneſſes; and is as ſpecifically different from other Figures, as Conſciouſneſs is from a circular Motion.* But I think I have ſhown, that the Inſtances are not alike; and that *Roundneſs* does not conſiſt of Qualities *ſo* different from *Roundneſs*, as you ſuppoſe *Conſci-*

ouſneſs

ouſneſs to be made up of Qualities different from *Conſciouſneſs*; that is, that the *Roundneſs of the whole Circumference of a Circle*, is not ſo ſpecifically different from the *Convexity of the little Arches*, of which it conſiſts; or the *Roundneſs of a whole Globe*, from the *little ſpherically and concentrically Convex Pieces of Surfaces*, of which it is compoſed; as *Conſciouſneſs* is from a *circular Motion*, or from *Motion in a Square*, or *any Motion at all*, or *any other thing whatever that is wholly void of Conſciouſneſs*. For *Roundneſs* can conſiſt of nothing but *Pieces of Roundneſs*, that differ from it *ſpecifically* only in the very loweſt Senſe of the Word *ſpecifically*; or rather they do not differ from it at all *ſpecifically*, but *in Magnitude* only, as the *Part* from the *Whole*; it being hardly good Senſe, to ſay that the *Number Twenty* differs *ſpecifically* from the *Number Ten*; or that 360 Degrees, or 60 Degrees, differ *ſpecifically* from 20 Degrees, or from 20 Seconds, or from any other Part of *One and the ſame Arch*; Every *part* of which, has neceſſarily (as I before ſaid) juſt as much Roundneſs or Curvity [in Degree,] as the *whole* Arch or *whole* Circle it ſelf has: But *Thinking*, if it be made up of Qualities *utterly void of Thought*, as *Motions*, *Figures*, and the like; muſt conſiſt of Qualities *generically* different from it ſelf, in the higheſt Senſe of the Word *generically*; they being under no common *genus*, and having no ſimilitude, nothing common one with another in their Ideas; and conſequently cannot with any Senſe be compared at all one with another, or be compounded one of another; any more than *Circles and ſtraight Lines*, or *Colours* and *Sounds*, *Numbers* and *Taſtes*, *Figures* and

Motions, or any things whoſe Ideas have nothing common or alike betwixt them.

pag. 209. Again: You alledge *in behalf of Roundneſs as well as Thinking, that it is ſo far from being as certain as an Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power is a Whole bigger than all its Parts; that it is an Arithmetical Demonſtration, that ſuch a particular Power as Roundneſs is, is but juſt equal to all the Parts of which that Roundneſs conſiſts. For what more goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs? And —— what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with —— Thinking?* But here alſo your Compariſon is nothing to the Purpoſe. For, when you ask, *what more goes to the Compoſition of Roundneſs, than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not ſingly endued with Roundneſs?* If by *not ſingly endued with Roundneſs*, you mean *not ſingly endued with* [the ſame whole] *Roundneſs*; then your Aſſertion is no more than this, that the *Parts* of *Roundneſs* are not a Number of the ſame *Wholes*; or that the ſeveral *Pieces* of the *Circumference of a Circle*, are not ſo many *Whole* [Same] *Circumferences*: And then I anſwer, neither would the *Parts* of *Thinking* (if it inhered in a Syſtem of Matter) be ſo many *Whole* [the Same] *Thoughts*. But if you mean, that a Round Figure is a Compoſition of Particles *not ſingly endued with* [any Part of] *Roundneſs*, any [Curvity] *at all*; then your Aſſertion is directly falſe: And ſuch a *Roundneſs*, would be a *Whole* bigger than *all its Parts*; juſt as I ſaid *Conſciouſneſs* would be, if it was made up of Motions or any other Qualities *void of Conſciouſneſs*.

ouſneſs. If you imagined *Thinking* to be made up of innumerable different *Conſciouſneſſes*, as the *Roundneſs of the Circumference of a Circle* is made up of innumerable *convex Arches*, which are *Pieces of Roundneſs*; then indeed, and then only, your Compariſon would be good: But to ſuppoſe *Thinking* made up of Powers *utterly void of Conſciouſneſs*, is like ſuppoſing the *Circumference of a Circle* to be made up of *ſtraight Lines utterly void of Convexity*; (or rather like ſuppoſing it to be made up of *Sounds* or *Colours*, or whatever elſe can be imagined even ſtill more remote from the Idea of *Roundneſs:*) And This is evidently making a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*, that is, containing ſomething different from, ſomething over and above, ſomething more than All its Parts taken together; nay, ſuch a Whole, the Sum of whoſe Parts neither make up the Whole it ſelf, nor any Part of it: Which is a plain Contradiction. It is evident, that no *Whole* can poſſibly differ from *All its Parts* in any thing elſe, but only in the Abſtract Name, the mere external Denomination of its being a *Whole*; which is nothing at all in the Thing itſelf, but merely a manner of Conception, a Conjunction of Ideas in the Imagination of the Perſon that beholds or thinks upon it. *Thinking*, if it was the Quality of a Syſtem of Matter, that is, the *Sum* or *Whole* of the Powers of its Parts; muſt differ from the diſtinct Powers of thoſe Parts, no otherwiſe than as the Idea of the Roundneſs of a *Circle* differs from the Idea of the Roundneſs of *two Semicircles* (or of *four Quadrants*) *joined together*; or as the Idea of *Twice Six*, differs from the Idea of the Number *Twelve*. If therefore *Thinking* was, as you ſuppoſe, a

Compoſition or Reſult of ſeveral Powers; and thoſe Powers ſuch, as were Themſelves *utterly void of Conſciouſneſs*; *Thinking* would be either a *mere outward Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf; juſt as *a Dozen* is only a mere Name, and nothing at all differing really in the thing it ſelf from *Twelve Units*; Which is what you will not affirm: Or elſe it muſt unavoidably be a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*; that is, containing *All its Parts*, and *Thinking* beſides: Juſt as the *Curve Circumference of a Circle* would contain *more* of Curvity in it than *All its Parts taken together*, if it could be compoſed of Lines that had none of them ſingly any *Curvity at all*; or a *Cube* would be *bigger* than *All its Parts*, if it were made up of Parts that had none of them ſingly any *Magnitude at all*.

[If upon this you will forſake your firſt Inſtance, and, ſeeking ſtill for new Similitudes, alledge that a *Square* Figure (ſuppoſe) may conſiſt of Parts, that are none of them ſingly endued with any thing like Squareneſs: I anſwer, that the *Squareneſs* of the Figure of a Body, is a mere *external Denomination*, *a mere relative comparing together* in the Imagination the *Bounds of a Surface*, *the Situation of four ſtraight Lines with reſpect one to another*; and has not properly any real Exiſtence in Things themſelves, ſo as *Conſciouſneſs* is acknowledged to have in the Thinking Subſtance. The like may be ſaid concerning all other Qualities, whoſe Eſſence conſiſts merely in the *relative comparing the Situation* or other *Reſpects of the Parts of a Body one towards another*: Such kind of Qualities having really no *proper Numerical* Exiſtence, ſave only in the Idea. And Round-

neſs

neſs it ſelf, being conſidered in the ſame manner, might *this way likewiſe* afford a juſt Anſwer to your Argument drawn from thence.]

Laſtly, You affirm that *Senſation is in the Parts of an Animal, as Roundneſs is in the Parts which compoſe a round Body: Each Part has as much of Senſation, ſingly conſidered, as each Part of a round Body has of Roundneſs; And when the Parts are duly diſpoſed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundneſs exiſts, by the Conjunction of Parts.* But from what has been already ſaid, I preſume it is evident enough, that *Senſeleſs Figure* or *Motion* cannot be *ſo* a *Part of Senſation* or a *Piece of a Thought*, as a *Semicircle* or *Quadrant* is a *Piece of a Circle.* To affirm that it can; *viz.* that Figure or Motion *wholly void of Senſe*, can be *ſo* a *Part of Senſation*; is plainly (as I have before ſhown) the very ſame Thing, as if you ſhould affirm that a Line *wholly void of Curvity*, could be *ſo* a *Piece of the Circumference of a Circle*, as the *Arch of a Quadrant* is; or that ſomething that has *no Solidity* and *no Extenſion*, might yet be a Conſtituent Part of an *Extended* and of a *Solid* Subſtance. pag. 214, 215.

I have ſhown that no part of the Circumference of a Circle, is wholly void of Roundneſs. If therefore *Senſation is* (according to your Aſſertion) *in the Parts of an Animal, as Roundneſs is in the Parts that compoſe a round Body*; and *each part has as much of Senſation, ſingly conſidered, as each part of a round Body has of Roundneſs*; It will follow, not (as you intended) that *Senſation* can ariſe from a Conjunction of Particles *utterly void of Senſe*; (for the *Circumference of a Circle* cannot be made by a Conjunction of *Lines*, or the *Superficies of a Sphere*

Sphere by a Conjunction of *Surfaces, utterly void of Curvity*:) but, on the contrary, it will follow that *some Degree of Senſation* is really in *every part* of the Animal, ſingly conſidered; as *ſome Degree of Curvity* is neceſſarily in *every part* of the *Circumference of a Circle*, or of the *Surface of a Sphere*. And ſo you run unavoidably into that confeſſedly *abſurd* Notion, that there are *as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the* Thinking *Syſtem conſiſts*.

pag. 204.

I am afraid our Readers are ſufficiently tired with *ROUNDNESS*. The other Inſtances you alledge, to prove that a Quality or Power inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, needs not be the Reſult of Powers or Qualities *of the ſame Kind*, reſiding in the Parts of the Syſtem; are ſtill leſs to your purpoſe. For it is very evident concerning Thoſe and all other poſſible Inſtances, that they never are nor can be any thing elſe, but the Sums of Powers or Qualities *of the ſame particular uniform Kind* with the Whole, when that Whole is *Simple and Homogeneous*; or *of the ſame General Kind* with it, when it is *Complex and Heterogeneous*. Which ſince you acknowledge cannot be the Caſe of *Thinking*, it will follow that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality reſiding in a Syſtem of Matter.

The *Power of a Clock* to ſhow the Hour of the Day, is not indeed a Reſult from the *like individual Powers* reſiding in the ſeveral Parts; any more than the Number *a Thouſand*, is the Reſult of a Compoſition of *Thouſands*; or *Any Whole*, a Compoſition of a Multitude of *the ſame Wholes*: But, as the Number *a Thouſand* is the Sum of a great many *Numbers*, but cannot

not with any Senſe be imagined to be a Compoſition of *Sounds* or *Colours*; ſo the *Numerical Power of a Clock*, being it ſelf nothing but *Motion* and *Figure*, cannot be the Reſult of any other Powers in the Parts, but ſuch as are themſelves ſingly *of the ſame Kind*, in the manner before explained; namely, *Motions* and *Figures*. And in like manner *my preſent Numerical Conſciouſneſs*, if it were at all a Quality inhering in a Syſtem of Matter; though it need not indeed be the Sum of a Multitude of the *like individual Thoughts*, inhering in the ſeveral diſtinct Parts of the Syſtem; yet it muſt be the Sum of *Such* Powers in the Parts, as would themſelves ſingly be of *the ſame Kind*, namely *Conſciouſneſſes* or *Thoughts:* It being equally, and for the very ſame Reaſon, impoſſible that my *Conſciouſneſs* ſhould be the Reſult of ſuch Powers in the Parts of my Brain, as are *toto genere* different from *Thinking*, and have nothing in their Ideas common with it or alike to it; (ſuch as are *Figure* and *Motion*, and all other Powers which are *void of* Conſciouſneſs;) as that the fore-mentioned Number *a Thouſand*, ſhould be a Compoſition of *Sounds* or *Colours*, or of any thing elſe but *Numbers*.

The *Power of a Muſical Inſtrument to pro-* pag. 199.
duce Harmonious Sounds, is not indeed a Reſult from the *like individual Powers* reſiding in the ſeveral Parts of the Inſtrument; any more than the *Circumference of a Circle* is made up of a Number of the *like whole Circumferences:* But, as the *Circumference of a Circle* is the Sum of a Multitude of *convex Arches of like Curvity*, but cannot be an Aggregate of *Straight Lines*, or of *Cubic Bodies*, or of *Arches of unlike Curvity*; So the *Harmony* produced by a Muſical Inſtrument,

ſtrument, being it ſelf, in the Mind that perceives it, nothing but *Sound*; and, in the Inſtrument, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Senſation, nothing but a *Motion of Parts*; cannot be the Reſult or Compoſition of any other Powers, but what are themſelves ſingly *of the ſame Kind* in the ſeveral Subjects reſpectively; namely, in the Mind that perceives them, *Sounds* likewiſe; and, in the Inſtrument it ſelf, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Senſation, *Motion of the Parts*. And in like manner *Conſciouſneſs*, if it were a Power inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, could not be the Reſult of any other Powers in the Parts, but *ſome ſorts of Conſciouſneſs*; for the very ſame Reaſon as the *Circumference of a Circle* cannot (as was before ſaid) be an Aggregate of *ſtraight Lines*, or of *Cubic Bodies*; nor an *Harmonious Sound* a Compoſition of *Colours*, or of any thing elſe beſide *Sounds*.

pag. 198, 199. The *Power of the Eye* to ſee, is nothing elſe but ſuch a Power, as is in the *Object Glaſſes* of Teleſcopes, of *Tranſmitting* and *Refracting* Rays of Light, ſo as to paint the Image of the Object in the Bottom of the Eye. And This is evidently nothing but the Sum of Powers *of the ſame Kind*, namely, Powers of *Tranſmitting* and *Refracting* of Rays, reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the *Eye* or of the *Glaſs*. Every Part of the Eye, *Tranſmits* and *Refracts* Rays; and thoſe Rays paint ſeveral Parts of the Image: And the *Whole Image*, differs no otherwiſe from *all its Parts*; nor That which you call the *Numerical Power of the Whole Eye*, from the *ſingle Powers of all its Parts*; than the Idea of *a Dozen* differs from the Idea of *Twelve Units*: Which, if it be as great

great a Difference, as is between the Idea of *Conſciouſneſs* and the Idea of a *Circular* or *any other Motion*, I will confeſs I have loſt my Underſtanding. pag. 208.

But there is ſtill a further peculiar Unhappineſs in your chooſing to inſtance in the *Power of the Eye to contribute to the Act of ſeeing*, as a *Numerical Power* of a *Syſtem of Matter*, that does *not inhere in the Parts* of that Syſtem; and in your affirming, that upon *dividing or varying the leaſt Part of the Eye, the Power of contributing towards the Act of Viſion is entirely at an End.* pag. 199. For ſo far is this from being true, (excepting only *accidentally* upon account of the Softneſs and Fluidity of the Matter of the Eye,) that on the contrary, not only *every Part* of the Eye (as I now ſaid) *Tranſmits* and *Refracts* Rays, in order to paint at the Bottom the ſeveral Parts of the Image of the Object; (and the Power of the *Whole Eye*, is nothing more than the *Sum* of thoſe *Tranſmiſſions* and *Refractions:*) but moreover even *every Part* of the Eye has the ſame Power as the *Whole*, (differing only in *Degree*,) of painting at the Bottom the *Whole Image* of the Object. For, as each Half of a broken Object Glaſs of a Teleſcope, or any Piece of it that retains the Poliſh on both Surfaces, will repreſent diſtinctly the Whole Object, only with leſs Brightneſs and Luminouſneſs than the whole Glaſs would do; ſo each part of the Eye, paints every part of the whole Object: And, if half of the Eye, or almoſt the Whole Eye be covered, ſo that you look only through a Pinhole placed on the right ſide, or on the left ſide, or upon the middle of the Pupil; ſtill the whole Object is ſeen diſtinctly, even by that very ſmall

Part

Part of the Eye; And conſequently the Power of the Eye is the ſame both in the *Whole*, and in *every Part*.

And the ſame that has been ſaid concerning theſe ſeveral Inſtances you choſe to inſiſt upon, may with very little Variation be ſaid likewiſe concerning all other Powers whatſoever that do or can reſide in any Syſtem of Matter; The right Explication of the Nature of which Powers, ſhows even your own Inſtances to be ſo many unanſwerable Arguments againſt the Aſſertion you brought them to ſupport.

This, I preſume, may be ſufficient to prove againſt you in the *general*, that Every Power or Quality reſiding in any Syſtem of Matter, muſt of Neceſſity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers *of the ſame Kind*, reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem: And conſequently, that Whatever Power is not an Aggregate of ſuch Powers; as you confeſs *Conſciouſneſs* or *Thinking* is not; cannot be at all a Power or Quality of Matter.

Not without ſome Unwillingneſs you ſeem at laſt to determine in *particular* what Sort of Generical Power in Matter, you imagine *Thinking* to be a Numerical Mode of. You *ſuppoſe Conſciouſneſs to be a Mode of Motion*: You ſpeak of *Thought* as *a Species of Motion*: And you conceive it a proper Expreſſion, to mention a certain *Species of Motion, called Thinking*.

pag. 203. pag. 206. pag. 209.

You deſire indeed it may not be *imputed to you as your Opinion*, ſince you *only take the Liberty to Suppoſe it*. But This will not ſerve you for an Evaſion, when the Abſurdity of the Notion is proved upon you. For you declare it

pag. 203.

as

as your positive *Opinion, that Human Consciousness or Thinking is a Mode of* Some *Generical Power in Matter.* What that Generical Power is, you will not positively determine; But you *Suppose* it to be *Motion.* Now I presume you *Suppose* That which you judge the most probable, and which you think will best serve your purpose in explaining the Nature of *Thinking.* I shall prove presently, that Nothing can be more absurd, than to Suppose *Thinking* to be a *Mode of Motion.* The same Arguments will prove no less strongly, that it is not possible for *Thinking* to be a *Mode of Figure,* or of any other *known* Property of Matter; And also that it is not possible for it to be a *Mode* of any *unknown* Power of Matter, which in the general is *void of Thinking*; Because every *unknown* Power which is *void of Thinking,* is as different from *Thinking,* as *Motion* it self is, or *Figure,* or any other *known* Power; for the same Reason that a *Smell* or a *Taste,* or any other *known* or *unknown* Quality which is *not a Colour,* must of Necessity be as different from *Blue* or *Scarlet,* as *the Sound of a Trumpet* is. When therefore I have shown the Absurdity of your *Supposition,* that *Thinking* is a *Mode of Motion*; I shall likewise have shown the Absurdity of your *declared Opinion,* that *Human Consciousness or Thinking is a Mode of* Some *Generical Power in Matter.*

pag. 206.

pag. 203.

pag. 206

Now to prove the Absurdity of Supposing *Consciousness* to be a *Mode of Motion,* I offer the following Arguments.

1. Every *Mode* of any *Power* or *Quality,* is nothing else but *That Power* or *Quality* of which it is a *Mode,* understood with some particular Limitation; that is to say, it is nothing but a *particular Instance* of that *general Power* or *Quality*;

Quality; nothing but the *general Power* or *Quality*, considered under this or that *particular Modification*. *Blue* and *Red*, and all other *Modes* of *Colour*, are nothing but several particular *Colours*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Colour*. *Acute* and *Grave*, and all other *Modes* of *Sound*, are nothing but several particular *Sounds*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Sound*. *Circular* and *Triangular*, and all other *Modes* of *Figure*, are nothing but several particular *Figures*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. In like manner All *Modes* of *Motion*, are nothing else but *merely* particular *Motions*; and cannot contain any thing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*. Now if *Simple Ideas* be the Foundation of all our Knowledge; and *clear and distinct Perception* of the *Agreement or Disagreement* of those Ideas, be the best and greatest *Criterion* of Truth, that our Faculties inable us to attain to; then it is as evident as any Truth in the World, that *Consciousness* cannot possibly be a *Mode of Motion*. For I have as *clear and distinct a Perception*, that the Idea of *Consciousness* contains something in it besides and beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*, as I have that it contains something in it beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. The Idea of *Consciousness* is as totally and *generically* different from the Idea of a *Circular Motion*, or an *Elliptical Motion*, or any other *Mode of Motion* whatsoever, as it is from the Idea of a *Circle* or a *Cube*, or any other *Mode of Figure* whatsoever. I have therefore exactly the same *intuitive Certainty*, that *Consciousness* cannot be a *Mode of Motion*, as I have that a *Circle* or a *Cube* is not a *Thought*, or

or that an *Acute Sound* is not a *Purple Colour*, or that any one thing in the World is not another, whoſe Idea is the remoteſt and moſt different from it, that can be imagined. To ſuppoſe *Conſciouſneſs* to be a *Mode of Motion*, is really a greater Abſurdity, (if poſſible) than it would be to ſuppoſe *Roundneſs* to be a Property of a *Square*; Becauſe the Idea of *Local Motion* and the Idea of *Thinking*, having *no common Genus*, nothing wherein they agree or can be compared together; are evidently *more different* one from another, than the Ideas of *any two plain Figures* can be, which have *a common Genus*. And your Queſtion, *What more goes to the Power of* Thinking, *than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with That Species of* Motion *called* Thinking? Is truly more ridiculous, than if a Man ſhould ask, *What more goes to the making up of a* Scarlet Colour, *than the Conjunction of ſeveral Particles not each endued with That Species of* Sound, *called* Scarlet? Becauſe no two ſenſible Qualities are in their Ideas ſo different one from another, as the Idea of *Conſciouſneſs*, is from the Idea of *Local Motion*. pag. 209.

Local Motion can have no other effect upon any Syſtem of Matter, than only producing in it a different *juxta poſition* of Parts. To which to aſcribe Thinking, Mr. *Lock* himſelf, who had no Prejudice againſt the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking, acknowledges it is very Abſurd. *To ſuppoſe*, ſaith he, *the Eternal thinking Being* [or any finite thinking Being] *to be nothing elſe but a Compoſition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative; is to aſcribe all the Wiſdom and Knowledge of that Eternal Being* [or the Wiſdom and Knowledge, and all the Book IV. ch. 10. §. 16.

Powers of the Finite thinking Being] *only to the juxta-poſition of Parts. Than which nothing can be more abſurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new Relation of Poſition, which it is impoſſible ſhould give Thought and Knowledge to them.*

2. If *Thinking* was any *Mode or Species of Motion*, it would follow that *All Motion* would be ſome *degree* or *kind* of *Thinking*. For *Motion*, in the Thing Moved, excepting only the Difference of *Degrees* of its Swiftneſs or Slowneſs, is a *Similar Quality*, and has no Variety in it: All its different *Determinations*, or thoſe which you call its *Modes* and *Species*, being *nothing really* in the *Body it ſelf* that is moved; but *mere Abſtract Notions* or *external Denominations*, conceived *only in our Imagination*. For, moving with one Determination, or with another; from North to South, or from South to North; is *merely* relative, and not really a different thing in the Body moved; that one of thoſe Motions ſhould be *Conſciouſneſs*, the other not. In like manner *Circular Motion*, or *Motion in any other Figure*, is not any thing really and truly inhering in the Body it ſelf, different from Motion in a *ſtraight Line*. For the Determination of any Body that *moves in a Circle*, is nothing elſe, at any given Point of Time, but a Determination to *move in a certain ſtreight Line*; and, at another given Point of Time, to *move in another ſtreight Line*; and ſo on: ſo that there is no ſuch thing as a *circular Motion* of any Particle of Matter, coexiſtent at once; but all Motion is, ſtrictly and properly-ſpeaking, a ſimilar and uniform Quality, *viz.* a Body's *Going on* according to its Determination;

mination; Which Determination is always in a ſtraight Line; and cauſes the Body to go on actually in a ſtraight Line, where it meets with no Reſiſtance; and where it meets with Reſiſtance by Intervals, there to go on into new ſtraight Lines ſucceſſively, into which it is diverted by ſuch Reſiſtance; and, where it meets with continual Reſiſtance, there to go on in a Curve Line, into which it is continually diverted: And every ſuch *curvilinear Motion*, whether *circular* or of *any other Species whatſoever*, is but the Idea of a Number of Succeſſive Motions of a Body, never exiſtent together; a pure *Ens Rationis*, or Operation of the Mind; which conſidering Paſt Motion and Future, and recollecting *the Whole* by the Memory and Fancy, calls * *That Whole* ſometimes by one Denomination and ſometimes by another. How then can any of thoſe *Modes of Motion* be the *Efficient* of *Thought*, or (according to your Suppoſition) be themſelves *Thought*; when they are evidently nothing but the *Effect and Product* of it, *viz.* Ideas framed merely by the Imagination and Memory?

* *See* Biſhop of *Norwich's* Sermon on Immortality of the Soul, *p.* 9. *And* Dr. *Bentley's* Sermon II at *Boyle's* Lecture, *pag.* 55.

And the ſame that has been ſaid concerning the *Modes of Motion* of a *ſingle Body*, may eaſily be applied to the *Modes of Motion* of *any Number of Bodies*, in any *Syſtem* or *Compoſition* whatſoever. It being very evident, that if the *Progreſſion* of *One Particle* of Matter *directly in a ſtraight Line*, be not *Conſciouſneſs* or *Thought*; the *like Progreſſion* of *Twenty Particles* at the ſame time *in ſtraight Lines*, cannot be *Conſciouſneſs* neither: The Poſition of thoſe Lines with reſpect one to another, which determines the particular *Mode of Motion* of the whole Syſtem, being merely *imaginary*, *relative*, and *comparative*;

rative; a figment only in the Mind or Imagination, and not any thing really exiſting in the Bodies themſelves, at any one and the ſame Moment of Time.

In like manner the *Impulſe* alſo, or *Beating of one Particle of Matter againſt another*, is a thing ſimilar and in all Caſes alike; differing in nothing but in the *Degrees* or Quantity of the Force: And therefore muſt always and in all Caſes, if ever in Any Caſe at all, be ſome *Degree* of *Thought*. From whence it would follow, that there muſt be as many ſeveral incoherent *Conſciouſneſſes*, as there are Particles of the Brain or Spirits, or of any other Matter in any Syſtem, that ever daſh one againſt another: Which is what you are not willing to affirm.

3. If *Conſciouſneſs* were a *Mode* or *Species of Motion*; then *Motion* would be the *more generical* Power; containing *Thinking* under it, as (in the Language of Logicians) the *Genus* does the *Species*. But on the contrary it is evident (as I before obſerved) that *Thinking* (though ſimple and not compounded of Parts,) is, in the Senſe we are now ſpeaking of, a Power infinitely *more generical* than either *Motion* or *Figure*, or any other *Power of Matter*; and conſequently cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of any of them. There are as many *Ideas of Figure*, as there are *Figures*; and as many *Ideas of Motion*, as there are *Modes of Motion*; and as many *Ideas of other things*, as there are *other things* in the World, that *can be thought upon*: And all theſe *Ideas*, are Modes and Sorts, or Kinds of *Thinking*. Now if *Thinking* is a Power more various, more extenſive, more *generical*, than *Motion*; it is manifeſt it cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*, as *Roundneſs* is a

Mode or *Species* of *Figure*. If *Thinking* is a Power *more generical*, than *Figure*, or *Motion*, or any other *Power of Matter*; if it is a Power as univerſal, as all things taken together, that can be thought upon; it is certainly a *generical* Power in the *higheſt Degree*; And conſequently, (if it be at all a *Power of Matter*,) it will oblige you to run into the *Abſurdity* you declare you would avoid. For, by your own Confeſſion, you *would grant readily, that, was* pag. 204. *Conſciouſneſs a* generical *Power like Figure and Motion* (*like* Figure and Motion it is not, but infinitely *more generical* than either of them,) *it would be likewiſe the Sum and Reſult of the Conſciouſneſſes of the ſeveral Parts; and ſo there would be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the Syſtem conſiſts; Which* you *do allow to be very Abſurd.*

As *Figure* is the *Genus* of *all the Species of Figure*, ſo the *Idea of Figure* is the *Genus* of *all the Ideas of all the Species of Figures*: And ſo the *Idea of Motion*, is the *Genus* of *all the Ideas of all the Species of Motions*; and the *Idea of Colour*, is the *Genus* of *the Ideas of all the Species of Colours*; and the *Idea of Sound*, is the *Genus* of *the Ideas of all the Species of Sounds*; and the *Idea of an Animal*, is the *Genus* of *the Ideas of all the Species of Animals*. The General Ideas of *Figure*, *Motion*, *Colour*, *Sound*, *Animal*, &c. are *generical* Powers of the Mind; And *Thinking* is the *Genus generalius* of all thoſe Powers. With what Senſe then can it be ſaid to be one of the *lower Species*, or a *Numerical Mode* of One of thoſe Powers?

4. *If it was the Motion* of the Parts of a Corporeal Syſtem, *on which its Thinking depends; all the Thoughts There, muſt be unavoidably acci-*

dental and limited; becauſe each one of *the Particles, that by Motion cauſe Thought, being in it ſelf without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions; much leſs be regulated by the Thought of the Whole; ſince that Thought* of the Whole, *is not the Cauſe of Motion, (for then it muſt be antecedent to it, and ſo without it,) but the Conſequence of it: Whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wiſe thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that ſuch a thinking Being, would be no better nor wiſer, than pure blind Matter; ſince to reſolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the ſame thing: Not to mention the Narrowneſs of ſuch Thoughts and Knowledge, that muſt depend on the Motion of ſuch Parts. But there needs no Enumeration of any more Abſurdities and Impoſſibilities in this Hypotheſis, (however full of them it be,) than That before-mentioned; ſince, let this thinking Syſtem be All or a Part of the Matter of the Univerſe, it is impoſſible that any one Particle ſhould either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle; or the Whole know the Motion of every particular; and ſo regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought reſulting from ſuch Motion.* This Argument, is Mr. *Lock*'s own Words, (Book IV. ch. 10. *Sect.* 17.) to which I cannot but ſuppoſe you will give ſome Deference.

5. If *Thinking* was a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*; then in like manner as it is a proper Expreſſion to ſay, that *Circularity* is one *Species* of *Figure*, and *Squareneſs* a ſecond, and *Cubicalneſs* a third, and *Ellipticalneſs* a fourth; ſo it would be proper alſo to ſay, that *Circular Motion* is one *Species* of *Motion*, and *Motion in a*

Square a ſecond, and *Motion in an Ellipſis* a third, and *Thinking* or *Conſciouſneſs* a fourth; and, I appeal to the common Senſe of all Mankind, whether I may not add with exactly the ſame Reaſon, that a *Tree* is a fifth, and a *Syllogiſm* a ſixth, and *Perſonality* a ſeventh, *&c.*

[If to this you will reply, that you do not mean as you ſay, that any *particular Motion* is it ſelf *Thought*, but that *Thought* may be the *Reſult* of ſome *particular Motion*; I anſwer in the Words of Mr. *Hobbes*, that * no *Reſult* of Motion can ever be any thing elſe but *mere Motion* ſtill: (With a different Juxta-poſition of Parts perhaps; of which before, *pag.* 273.) And conſequently all the foregoing Arguments hold equally good, againſt one Notion as againſt the other.]

* *Motus nihil generat præter Motum.* Leviat. c. 1.

Some of theſe Abſurdities are ſo very groſs, and yet ſuch obvious Conſequences of your Notion, that it can hardly be imagined you ſhould have over-looked them. And indeed you do at laſt endeavour to obviate them in a *very effectual manner*; In ſuch a manner, by which you may, whenever you pleaſe, anſwer all the Arguments upon any Queſtion in the World; and remove out of your way, not only any *Demonſtration*, but even *Intuitive Knowledge* it ſelf. You tell me, that I imagine *Conſciouſneſs to be Something elſe than what* you *contend it is*; That *the Term of Conſciouſneſs ſtands with* You, *in* another *Senſe* than with Me: That with You, it ſignifies *a Numerical Power, anſwering to Roundneſs in a Body, or to a Motion peculiar to a Syſtem of Matter*; but that with Me, *it relates to a Chimera or Idea of my own framing.* *pag.* 238. *pag* 238. *pag.* 237. *pag.* 238.

Now to This I reply in the Words of Mr. *Lock*; (Book IV. ch. 1. *Sect.* 4.) *A Man infallibly knows, assoon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the Ideas he calls* White *and* Round, *are the very Ideas they are; and that they are not other Ideas, which he calls* Red *or* Square.

I think I know infallibly, assoon as ever I have it in my Mind, that the Idea I call *Consciousness*, *Perception* or *Thinking*, is the very Idea it is; and that it is not another Idea, which I call *circular Motion*, or *Elliptical Motion*, or *Motion in a Square*, or the *Motion of a Watch or of any other Machine*. And I appeal to what every Man finds in his own Mind; whether my Account of *Consciousness*, or yours which makes it to be merely a *Mode of Motion*, be the more *Chimerical* Idea.

Simple Ideas cannot be defined nor described. When any Dispute is carrried so far, as to terminate in questioning the *Idea it self*; there is nothing then left but to appeal to the Idea which every Man has in his own Mind. If I affirm that this Paper is *White*, and you will contend that it is *Red*; we cannot confute one another by Arguments, but must appeal to the Judgment of the World. If a Man will tell me, that by *Scarlet-Colour* he does not mean That Chimerical Idea which I frame in my own Mind and call by that Name; but that He means thereby, only a certain *Numerical Mode* of *Sound*, I know not how he can be confuted, but by appealing to every Man's own Ideas. The *Idea of Consciousness* which I have in my Mind, appears to Me an Idea, which I think I clearly and distinctly perceive to be altogether as different from the *Idea of any possible Numerical Mode of Figure or Motion*, as my Idea of

Scarlet-

Scarlet-Colour is different from my Idea of *the Sound of a Trumpet.* If any other Perſon thinks his Idea of *Conſciouſneſs*, to be the ſame with his Idea of a *circular Motion* or of any *other numerical Mode of Motion*; I conceive there is nothing more to be done, but to permit him to have the Pleaſure of continuing to think ſo, as long as he pleaſes.

The Sum is This. I affirm that *Thinking*, cannot poſſibly be a mere *Mode of Motion*; becauſe the Idea of *Thinking* and the Idea of *Motion or any of its Modes*, have not the leaſt Likeneſs or Affinity between them. This, you ſay, proves nothing; becauſe My Idea of *Thinking*, is a mere Chimera; but Your Idea of it, is the ſame as your Idea of ſome *Numerical Mode of Motion.* I reply; If this proves nothing, then neither can any Argument in the World ever prove any thing. For, Suppoſe the Thing in diſpute be, whether *a Square is a Circle*, or whether *Blueneſs* is *a Taſte*: I contend this cannot poſſibly be, becauſe my Idea of *a Square* includes in it nothing of that *Roundneſs* which is my Idea of *a Circle*; and my Idea of *Blueneſs* includes in it nothing like *That Senſation*, which is my Idea of *a Taſte.* May not another Perſon anſwer, that This proves nothing? Becauſe my Idea of *a Square*, or of *Blueneſs*, is a mere Chimera; but His Idea of *a Square*, is the ſame as his Idea of *a round Figure*; and his Idea of *Blueneſs*, the ſame as his Idea of ſome certain *Taſte.*

To conclude. In reviewing this whole Matter, I can hardly perſuade my ſelf, but that you have miſtaken your own Argument. Some ingenious Perſons in the preſent Age have indeed undertaken to maintain, that God, by the

the immediate Exercise of his Omnipotence, may make Matter Think; notwithstanding it be impossible that *Thinking* should result naturally, from any Composition or Division of the original Properties of Matter. I suppose they meant, that to Matter disposed in a certain Manner, and put into some particular Modes of Motion, Omnipotence could *Superadd* the Power of *Thinking*. I think the Argument drawn from the Divisibility of Matter, proves that Matter is not a Subject capable of such a *Superaddition*: And if it be not; then recurring to the Divine Omnipotence for the making out an Impossibility, is not *magnifying* but *destroying* the Power of God; as indeed all contradictory Apprehensions concerning any of his Perfections, are really and in event destructive of our whole Notion of God; and have no other Effect, than to give profane Men an occasion of scoffing at Religion. However, that Assertion had the Appearance (though a very false one) of being founded in a certain modest Apprehension concerning the Inconceivable Extent of the Divine Power. But that any *Mode of Motion* should be (not a previous Disposition or Qualification, towards capacitating Matter for the Addition of such a Power; but that it should be) *Thinking it self*; when all the Matter supposed to be in that Motion, is acknowledged otherwise to be *void of Thought*: This is such an extravagant Absurdity, as may justly cause Wonder how it should ever enter into the Heart of any rational Man; especially in an Age, wherein Philosophical Knowledge has received so considerable Improvements.

Having

Having thus particularly anſwered the Argument wherein you placed your main Strength; It remains that I take notice of ſome Incidents in your *Reflections*, wherein I think you have either greatly miſrepreſented Me, or give very diſadvantagious Repreſentations of your own Philoſophy.

In the Queſtion, *Whether a Syſtem of Matter can have a* Power of Thinking, *or an* Individual Conſciouſneſs *ſuperadded to it, or flowing from any Modification of that Syſtem*; you ſaid, you underſtood by a *Power of Thinking*, only *Actual Thinking*, and not a *Capacity of Thinking*.

I replied, there was no need of making any ſuch Diſtinction; becauſe my Argument was of equal force, in whatever Senſe the Term *Conſciouſneſs* was underſtood; whether to ſignify the *Capacity of Thinking*, or *Actual Thinking*, or the Reflex Act of being *Conſcious that I Think*.

Upon this, you make a long Expoſtulation, *what occaſion* I had *for contending with* you *about the Senſe* you *fixed to the Terms*. I did not *contend* much about it: But the *Occaſion* of ſaying what I did, was, becauſe in all Queſtions, the greater Latitude of Signification the Terms may be allowed to be underſtood in, without making any Alteration in the Strength of the Proof, the clearer and ſtronger ſuch Proof always is; and the leſs Perplexity, or room for quibbling, remains in the Queſtion it ſelf. *pag.* 191.

You ask; *Have* you *not underſtood* me *in a Senſe that anſwered all the Ends and Purpoſes of* my *Argument?* My Argument was indeed concluſive in the Senſe you underſtood me in: *pag.* 191.

But

But I had no reaſon to approve of your confining me to that Senſe only, when the Argument was equally concluſive in any other Senſe the Reader might happen to underſtand the Terms in.

pag. 191. You ſay, you *have taken but the ſame Liberty I allow to every other Reader.* But, if I miſtake not, there is ſome Difference between allowing the Reader to take the Term *Conſciouſneſs* in which of the Three fore-mentioned Senſes he pleaſes; and allowing You to confine it to One of thoſe Senſes, excluſive of the others.

I affirmed that *the Reader needs not trouble himſelf with the Nicety of Diſtinction between a Capacity of Thinking, actual Thinking, and the Reflex Act of Thinking; but may underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in all or any of theſe Significations.*

pag. 191, 192. This Sentence, you think, *contains one of the niceſt Diſtinctions that ever* you *met with*; being *as much as to ſay, that the Reader* need *not underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in any of the before-mentioned Significations, and yet* may *underſtand it indifferently in any of theſe Significations.* But Where is the *Niceneſs* (the *Ridiculouſneſs* I ſuppoſe you mean) of ſaying that the Reader *may* take a Word in a Senſe, which yet he is not under a *Neceſſity* of taking it in, but *may* likewiſe take it in ſome Other Senſe if he pleaſes?

pag. 192. You add: *For* you *cannot See, but that whoever underſtands Conſciouſneſs in any one of thoſe Significations,* muſt uſe *that Nicety of Diſtinction I complain of, whether he will or no; For by* Reſtraining *Conſciouſneſs to any* One *of thoſe Significations, he neceſſarily diſtinguiſhes That One from the other Two: And* that *therefore* you *muſt*

needs

needs own, you *cannot See the leaſt Reaſon* I *had to blame* you *for a needleſs Diſtinction, when* I *allow* you *to underſtand Conſciouſneſs indifferently in three Significations, one of which* you did *aſſign as* your *Meaning or Idea of that Word.* But, if you pleaſe to look once again, I ſuppoſe you will *be able to See*, that there is no abſolute Neceſſity for *him that underſtands Conſciouſneſs in any* One *of thoſe fore-mentioned Significations, to* Reſtrain *it to That One Signification*; as you deſired to do.

Laſtly, You alledge that *the whole Diſpute turns upon the* preſent *Diſtinction* of the Significations of the Word *Conſciouſneſs*; And to prove that it does ſo, you cite a Sentence out of my Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, wherein the Word *Conſcious* cannot be underſtood in any other Senſe, than to ſignify *actual Thinking*. It is true; in that Sentence the Word was ſo uſed; And in the very ſame Sentence it was alſo uſed Otherwiſe. Now, becauſe in that Paſſage which you made *the Occaſion* of our preſent Debate, I once uſed the Word in ſuch a Manner, as that the Nature of the Thing accidentally confined it to that Signification; though in the more emphatical Part of the very ſame Sentence, it was uſed in a larger Senſe; Does this prove that *the whole Diſpute* now *turns upon* any Diſtinction of the Signification of that Word? You might as well have ſaid, it proves the remoteſt Thing in the World from our preſent Queſtion. The Sentence it ſelf was This: *It is plain, unleſs Matter were eſſentially Conſcious, —— no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion can be an Individual Conſcious Being.* My Meaning was, that unleſs Matter were eſſentially *Conſcious*, that is, unleſs *pag.* 194.

unleſs it were eſſentially indued with *actual Thinking*; it might be proved from its Diviſibility, that no Syſtem of it in any poſſible Compoſition or Diviſion, could ever be an individual *Conſcious* Being, that is, could ever either *actually Think* or attain a *Capacity of Thinking*. How does it follow now from hence, that becauſe in the former Part of this Sentence, the Word *Conſcious* happens to ſignify only *actual Thinking*; therefore in the Queſtion, [Whether *Conſciouſneſs can inhere in a Syſtem of Matter*,] the Word *Conſciouſneſs* may not be underſtood at large, to ſignify either *actual Thinking*, or a *Capacity of Thinking?* Between which, after all, there is no great Difference at the Bottom.

Upon the whole; why you ſhould be diſpleaſed with me for allowing the Terms of the Queſtion to be underſtood in the greateſt Latitude, and for endeavouring to prove more than you expected, *viz.* that no Syſtem of Matter could either have *actual Thinking*, or ſo much as any *Capacity of Thinking*; I could not imagine. And why you made ſuch a Stir about a Diſtinction, which did and ſtill does appear to me to be very needleſs; I could conceive no other Cauſe, but only that you might *perplex* the Queſtion.

Pag. 193. Thus I have given you the *Reaſon*, you *Demanded, of my Conduct* in this Matter: I do not *Demand* of *You*, but leave it to your Diſcretion, to chooſe whether you will give any *Reaſon* of *yours*, or no: For, (if you will *Pag.* 193 give me leave to uſe your own Expreſſion) *I cannot aſſign a good one for you.*

You

You ask; *If the Soul or Principle of Thinking be Undivided, how can it think ſucceſſively, divide, abſtract, combine or ampliate, retain or revive Impreſſions in the Memory? And how can it be capable, partly or wholly to forget any thing?* And the *Corporeity* of the Soul, you think, is further proved experimentally, from our being *tired with contemplating*, as much as with *ſinging and dancing*; from the *Reaction of our Thoughts* or of our Ideas *and Words*, mutually exciting each other; and from the *Forgetfulneſs* of *Children and Old People*, upon any *cauſe that diſcompoſes the Organ.* pag. 206.

To this I anſwer. The Reaſon why the Soul or Principle of Thinking, though it ſelf *Undivided*, yet thinks ſucceſſively, divides, abſtracts, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impreſſions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets Things; is becauſe *The Whole Soul* thinks ſucceſſively, divides, abſtracts, combines or ampliates, retains or revives Impreſſions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets things: And none of theſe Phænomena can be explained by the various Acts of the *various Parts of a Bodily Organ* alone.

Our being *tired with Contemplation*; the mutual *Reaction of our Ideas and Words*; our *Forgetfulneſs* that follows upon certain *Defects* or *Diſcompoſures* of the Brain; *&c*; do not prove that the *Soul it ſelf* is a *Bodily Organ*; but only that it *Acts upon*, and *is Acted upon by* Bodily Organs; and is aſſiſted by them, as Inſtruments in its Operations. Experience ſhows us, that the *Sight* is bettered by good Teleſcopes, and the *Hearing* by Inſtruments of conveying Sounds; but not that thoſe Inſtruments therefore *Hear* or *See*: That all *Senſation* is bettered by

by good Organs of Senſe; but not that the Organs themſelves are *Senſible*: That *Imagination* and *Memory* depend on the Brain; But not that the Brain *imagines* or *remembers*. The Organs of the Senſes are entirely diſtinct from one another; But the Thing which perceives by thoſe different Organs, is One and the Same Thing; one Thinking Being, which every Man calls *Himſelf*. And this One Thinking Being, has not ſome Powers in ſome Parts, and other Powers in other Parts; ſome Actions in ſome Parts, and other Actions in other Parts; But all its Powers, are the Powers of the Whole; and All its Actions, are the Actions of the Whole. The Whole Thinking Subſtance, Sees both the Whole Object, and every Part of it; The ſame Whole Subſtance Hears every Sound, Smells every Odour, Taſtes every Sapour, and Feels every thing that Touches any Part of the Body. Every Imagination, every Volition, and every Thought is the Imagination, Will, and Thought, of that Whole Thinking Subſtance, which I call I *my ſelf*. And if this One Subſtance (which we uſually ſtile the *Soul* or *Mind*) has no Parts, that can *Act* ſeparately; it may as well be conceived to have none, that can *Exiſt* ſeparately; and ſo, to be abſolutely *Indiviſible*.

I alledged that it is *Abſurd to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain or Spirits; becauſe if ſuch a Subſtance could be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years ſince, but alſo is Conſcious that He himſelf, the ſame individual Being, was the Doer of them; it would follow that Conſciouſneſs could be transferred from one Subject to another; that is, that a Quality could ſubſiſt without*

out inhering in any Subject at all; which all rational Men allow to be impossible. To this you reply; that *in order to retain the Consciousness of an Action, it is necessary to revive the Idea of it, before any considerable Flux of Particles; and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprint afresh the Consciousness of having done that Action, by which the Brain has as lively an Impression of Consciousness, (though it be not entirely composed of the same Particles,) as it had the Day after it did the Action, or as it has of a Triangle or any other new Idea not before imprinted on it. Consciousness of having done that Action, is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into View our Ideas, before they are quite worn out; which Idea continues in me not only the Memory of the Action it self, but that I did it. And if there is every now and then, a Recollection of a past Action;* it may hereby be *conceived,* that *a Man may be conscious of things done by him, though he has not one Particle of Matter the same that he had at the doing of those things; without Consciousness's being transferred from one Subject to another, in any absurd Sense of those Words.* And again: *If* Matter *can know at this Instant, that it Thinks;* you *can see no reason why it may not remember to Morrow what it thinks of to Day, though some Particles will be then wanting which it has at present: And if it can remember at all; then the Memory of things may be continued even after we have lost all the Particles of Matter that we had at the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating or imprinting afresh our Ideas before they are quite lost or worn out.* But the Fallacy of this Reply, is very evident. For to affirm that *new Matter* perpetually added to a fleeting System, may by repeated Impressions add Recollections of

pag. 211, 212.

pag. 236.

Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a *Memory* of what was formerly done by the *Whole Syſtem*; is not explaining or proving, but begging the Queſtion, by aſſuming an *impoſſible* Hypotheſis. But ſuppoſing it were *poſſible*, that the *Memory* in general of ſuch or ſuch an Action's having been done, might be preſerved in the Manner you ſuppoſe; yet it is a manifeſt Contradiction, that the *Conſciouſneſs* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, ſhould continue in me after my whole Subſtance is changed; unleſs *Conſciouſneſs* could be transferred from one Subject to another, in the abſurdeſt Senſe of thoſe Words. For to ſuppoſe that One Subſtance ſhould be *Conſcious* of an Action's having been done by it ſelf, which really was not done by It, but by another Subſtance; is as plainly ſuppoſing an Individual Quality to be transferred from One Subject to another, in the moſt abſurd Senſe; as it is plain that *Conſciouſneſs* is a *real individual Quality*, and different from bare *general Memory*.

If therefore you will anſwer, (which is the only poſſible ſeeming Evaſion in this Caſe,) that That which we call *Conſciouſneſs*, is not a *fixt individual numerical Quality*, like the numerical Figure or Motion of a ſolid Body; but a *fleeting transferrible Mode or Power*, like the Roundneſs or the Mode of Motion of Circles upon the Face of a running Stream; And that the *Perſon* may ſtill be the ſame, by a continual Superaddition of the *like Conſciouſneſs*; notwithſtanding the Whole *Subſtance* be changed: Then I ſay, you make *Individual Perſonality* to be a mere *external imaginary Denomination*, and nothing at all in reality: Juſt as a *Ship* is called

the *ſame Ship*, after the Whole Subſtance is changed by frequent Repairs; or a *River* is called the *ſame River*, though the Water of it be every Day new. The *Name* of the Ship, is the ſame; but the *Ship it ſelf*, is not at all the ſame; And the continued *Name* of the River ſignifies Water running in the ſame Channel, but not at all the *ſame Water*. So if a Man at Forty Years of Age, has nothing of the ſame Subſtance in him, neither material nor immaterial, that he had at Twenty; he may be called the *ſame Perſon*, by a mere *external imaginary Denomination*; in ſuch a Senſe as a *Statue* may be called the *ſame Statue*, after its whole Subſtance has been changed by piecemeal: But he cannot be *really and truly* the *ſame Perſon*, unleſs the *ſame individual numerical Conſciouſneſs* can be transferred from one Subject to another. For, the continued Addition or Exciting of a *like Conſciouſneſs* in the new acquired Parts, after the Manner you ſuppoſe; is nothing but a Deception and Deluſion, under the Form of Memory; a making the Man to ſeem to himſelf to be Conſcious of having done That, which really was not done by Him, but by Another. And ſuch a Conſciouſneſs in a Man, whoſe Subſtance is wholly changed, can no more make it Juſt and Equitable for ſuch a Man to be puniſhed for an Action done by another Subſtance; than the Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs (by the Power of God) to two or more new Created Men; or to any Number of Men now living, by giving a like Modification to the Motion of the Spirits in the Brain of each of them reſpectively; could make them All to be One and the ſame individual Perſon, at the ſame time that they remain ſeveral and diſtinct Per-

ſons; or make it juſt and reaſonable for all and every one of them to be puniſhed for one and the ſame individual Action, done by One only, or perhaps by None of them at all.

Mr. *Lock* himſelf, in the very Place where he contends that *Conſciouſneſs* makes the *ſame individual Perſon*, notwithſtanding that the *Whole Subſtance* be ſuppoſed to be changed; acknowledges expreſsly, (*Book II. ch.* 27. *Sect.* 13.) that ſuch a Continuation of the *ſame Conſciouſneſs* in a fleeting Subſtance, would be *a repreſenting That to the Mind to have been, which really never was*; a *repreſenting to One intellectual Subſtance as done by it ſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by ſome other Agent*; a *Repreſentation without Reality of Matter of Fact, as ſeveral Repreſentations in Dreams are*; a *Transferring by a fatal Errour from One to Another, That Conſciouſneſs which draws Reward or Puniſhment with it*; a *making Two* [or Two Hundred] *Thinking Subſtances, to be but One* [Individual] *Perſon*; And *leaves it to be conſidered, how far this may be an Argument againſt thoſe who would place Thinking in a Syſtem of fleeting Animal Spirits.*

To ſay here, that God's *Juſtice and Goodneſs* will not permit him to put any ſuch inevitable Deceit upon Men; is nothing to the Purpoſe. For if it be but *naturally poſſible* for him to do That, which, upon Suppoſition of the Truth of your Notion, will be a *plain Contradiction*; this is a certain Demonſtration that your Notion is Falſe. And I think it is a *Contradiction plain enough*, to ſay that God's impreſſing permanently upon a Thouſand Mens Minds, after the Manner of the Repreſentation of a Dream, the like Conſciouſneſs

with

with that which I find in my own Mind; would make every One of them, to be, not Perſons *like* me, but the *ſame Individual Perſon* with my ſelf. According to ſuch Reaſoning as this, Accidents need not have any neceſſary Dependence on their Subſtance: And the ſame individual Subſtance may as well be conceived to exiſt in a Thouſand Places at once, under like Accidents; as the ſame *Individuating* Accidents or Qualities can inhere in a Thouſand different Subſtances at once. By which ſame Subtilty, (as Believing *too much* and *too little*, have commonly the Luck to meet together, like things moving two contrary ways in the ſame Circle,) all the Abſurdities in the Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation* may eaſily be reconciled.

You *deny that we have any Conſciouſneſs at all, that we continue the ſame Individual Being at different times.* If ſo; it can be to no great purpoſe for us to diſpute about any Thing: For, before you receive my Reply, you may happen poſſibly to be entirely changed into another Subſtance; and, the next time you write, may deny that you have any Conſciouſneſs at all, that you continue the ſame Individual Being who wrote this Remarkable Sentence. But to the Aſſertion, I anſwer: Either Conſciouſneſs proves a Man to be the ſame Individual Being at different times; Or elſe it is a mere Deceit and Deluſion; and by being added in like manner to other Subſtances, might (as I ſaid) make an Hundred other Men with equal Juſtice liable to the ſame Puniſhment with himſelf for any One Individual Action done by Him. But of this more, when I come to ſpeak of the Uſefulneſs and pag. 236.

Importance of the preſent Argument to the Ends and Purpoſes of Religion.

pag. 212. You affirmed, that *The Matter, of which an Egg conſiſts, doth entirely conſtitute the young One; and that the Action of Senſation began under a particular Diſpoſition of the Parts by Motion:* To this I anſwered; that *ſo far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Diſpoſition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or entirely conſtitutes the young One; that (according to the beſt Diſcoveries by Microſcopes and in Anatomy) it does not conſtitute it at all, not ſo much as the Body of it; but only ſerves it for Nouriſhment and Growth.* You pag. 213. reply: *If by* our Eyes *we can perceive the organized Body of the Animal to be* Part of the Matter *of the Egg; no Microſcopical Obſervation can deſtroy ſuch Matter of Fact, and —— make us See Nothing, where we do See Something.* Now I am very ſorry, Sir, to find you in a ſerious and important Queſtion deſcend to ſo extremely mean and trifling a Quibble. For, This is exactly the ſame Thing, as if you ſhould ſay, that *by your Eyes* you can perceive an incloſed Worm to be *Part of the Matter* of the Nut it feeds on; or that *by your Eyes* you can perceive a Man to be *Part of the Matter* of the Houſe he dwells in.

I called *Gravitation* the *Effect of the continued and regular Operation of ſome Other Being* pag. 216. *on Matter.* You replied; that *it does not appear, but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally placed in it by God, and is now left to it ſelf to act by thoſe original Powers.* To this I anſwered: That *a Law or Power, that is*

to

to ſay, a mere abſtract Name, or complex Notion, which is no real Being; cannot impel a Stone, and cauſe it to begin to Move. You reply again; that you *deny not the Neceſſity of a Bing impelling another, in order to cauſe that Mode of Motion called Gravitation:* That you ſuppoſe it to be cauſed by the *Impulſe of Other Bodies:* And, *to ſpeak your own Opinion, it ſeems Matter of Fact to* You, *that the external Figure and internal Configuration of the Parts of Matter, are thoſe Powers in Matter, by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravitation, from the circumambient impelling Bodies.* I did imagine, Sir, when I expreſſed my ſelf with ſuch brevity in my firſt Anſwer, you had been ſo well acquainted with Natural Philoſophy, as not to be ignorant that it has been demonſtrated even Mathematically, that Gravitation cannot ariſe from the *Configuration and Texture of the Parts of Matter*, and from the *circumambient impelling Bodies*; becauſe, if it did, it would not be proportionable to the Quantity of Matter, or the Solid Content of all Bodies, without any regard to their Superficial Proportion; as we find by Experience it is; ſeeing all Bodies, of all Textures, and all Configurations of Parts, and all Varieties of ſuperficial Proportion; [a Bullet, or a Feather, or a Piece of Leaf-Gold, or a Sheet of Paper;] deſcend in *Vacuo* with equal Swiftneſs. And if *Material Impulſe*, be not the Cauſe of Gravity; then ſome Being that is *not Material*, (for *Laws* or *Powers* are nothing but mere empty Words,) muſt of neceſſity be allowed to be the Cauſe of it. But it ſeems you are, notwithſtanding the Force even of Demonſtration it ſelf, ſtill of Opinion that Gravitation

pag. 217.

pag. 218.

See the incomparable Sir *Iſaac Newton's Principia* throughout; and the *Queries* at the End of the *Latin* Edition of his *Opticks*.

pag. 218. is *purely owing* to the outward Figure and inward Configuration of the Parts of Matter, and the Impulſe of circumambient Bodies.

pag. 218. For, *drop a Pound of Lead, in the Form of a Bullet, from the Top of a Tower; and it deſcends in a very quick Space to the Ground: Vary the external Figure of the Bullet, by beating it broad with a Hammer; and its Tendency downward decreaſes: Vary the Configuration of its Parts by Fire; and it will aſcend, inſtead of deſcending.* Certainly the Reader cannot but be greatly ſurprized, to meet with ſuch Philoſophy as This, in *our preſent Age*. For, what has All This to do with *Gravitation?* Or with the Cauſe of Bodies *Tending downwards?* Has a *Pound* of Lead in the Form of a Bullet, a greater *Tendency downward*, than under any other Form; becauſe the Air making leſs Reſiſtance to it when in that Form, ſuffers it to fall more ſwiftly? Or when it is beaten out into a *thin Plate*, which is ſtill of a *Pound Weight*; does its *Tendency downward decreaſe*, becauſe the Air making greater Reſiſtance to it when under that new Form its Superficies is enlarged, ſuffers it now to fall but ſlowly? You might by the ſame Philoſophy, and exactly with the ſame Truth, affirm that a *Hundred-pound-weight*, ſo long as you ſupport it with your Hands, has loſt its *Tendency downward*, becauſe it does not deſcend; But, I preſume, Experience will eaſily convince you of the contrary. In like manner; when *Lead* being evaporated by Fire, *aſcends* in the Air *inſtead of deſcending*, becauſe it is carried upward by the Motion of the Air, which aſcends being rarefied with Heat; is therefore its *Tendency downwards decreaſed?* You might exactly with

with the ſame Reaſon have affirmed that a *Pound of Lead* in one *Scale of a Balance*, loſes its *Tendency downwards*, whenever a greater Weight in the oppoſite Scale, forces it to *aſcend inſtead of deſcending*. The Truth is plainly This: As a Pound of *Wood*, during the time of its aſcending from the Bottom of a Pail of Water towards the Top, is as much a Pound-weight added to the Weight of the Whole Water, as a Pound of *Lead* is, that lies ſtill at the Bottom; and conſequently the *Tendency* of the Wood *downwards*, is always the very ſame, whether it be *aſcending* in Water, or *deſcending* in the Air; So your *Bullet*, whether it falls ſwiftly in the Form of a *Bullet*, or ſlowly in the Form of a *thin Plate*, or falls not at all while it is *ſupported in your Hand*, or on the contrary aſcends in the Form of *Fume*, (in which caſe, *It* is in the Air, exactly what *Wood* is in the Water;) ſtill its *Tendency downward*, that is, its Gravitation, continues always the ſame, without any the leaſt *Decreaſe* or *Increaſe*: Which is the direct Contradictory to your Aſſertion. As *in Vacuo* all Bodies, of all Figures, and all Textures whatſoever, actually deſcend with equal Swiftneſs; ſo in the open Air, and every where elſe, their *Tendency downwards*, that is, their Gravitation, whether they aſcend or deſcend, whether they fall ſwiftly or ſlowly, or not at all, continues always invariably the ſame; and cannot be *increaſed* or *decreaſed* by any change whatſoever, of their *external Figure*, or of the *internal Configuration of their Parts*, or of the *circumambient impelling Bodies*. Gravitation therefore cannot poſſibly ariſe from the *external Figure*, nor *internal Configuration of the Parts of Matter*, nor

from the *circumambient impelling Bodies*; since by no alteration of Any or All of these things, can the Gravitation of any Body be in the least *increased* or *diminished*; And consequently Gravitation is quite another thing, than you seem to have at all thought of, when you

pag. 218. *spoke your Opinion* about what *seemed Matter of Fact to you*, and talked of the *Decrease* of a Bullet's *Tendency downward*, upon the Variation of its Figure.

[Whoever will explain *Gravity*, which by Experience is always proportionable to the *Solid Content* of Bodies; must assign such a Cause, as can act upon Bodies in proportion to their *Solid Content*, without any regard to their *Superficial* Proportion; that is to say, such a Cause, as can reach and penetrate to the very Center of every solid Particle of Matter: Which I suppose you will hardly affirm your *circumambient Bodies*, how subtle soever, are capable of doing.]

And not content to have erred so very grossly in the first Foundation of all Natural Philosophy; you could not forbear professing

pag. 218. further, that you *have often Admired that Gravitation should be esteemed a Matter of such Difficulty among Philosophers*; and that you think it to be so evident and necessary an Effect of *Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another*, that you wonder every Body should not see it. I suppose the rest of the World will no less *Admire* at *You*, for imagining that by so slight *an Admiration* you could at once set aside all the Propositions in that most excellent Book before-mentioned; wherein it is made appear by strictly Mathematical Demonstrations, drawn from the Laws

Principia Philosophiæ Mathematica.

of

of Motion now agreed on by Mathematicians and eſtabliſhed by Experiments, and from the Phænomena of the Heavenly Bodies; that the preſent Operations of Nature, depending upon Gravitation, cannot poſſibly be Mechanical Effects of *Matter in conſtant Motion perpetually ſtriking one part againſt another.*

Not much unlike to This, was Mr. *Hobbes*'s fancying that he had confuted all the Propoſitions in *Euclid*, by *Admiring* at *Euclid*'s Definitions of Lines and Surfaces: And all Men ever ſince, that underſtand the firſt Elements of Geometry, have *Admired* at *Him* for fancying ſo.

But that which follows, is ſtill the moſt wonderful of all. You ſay: *Whether* you *take* pag. 220. *Mr.* Clarke *right or no, the incomparable Sir* Iſaac Newton (in the Preface to his *Principia*,) *is of Opinion*, "*That ſeveral Phœnomena of Na-*" *ture may depend on certain* Forces *or* Powers, "*whereby from Cauſes yet Undiſcovered, the Par-*" *ticles of Bodies are mutually impelled againſt* "*each other*, —— *or receed and are driven from* "*one another*: *Which* Forces *or* Powers *being* "*yet unknown, the Philoſophers hitherto have* "*attempted Nature in vain*". Now to inſinuate to your Reader by ſuch a Citation, that This Great Man is of your Opinion in the preſent Queſtion; when on the contrary, the very Sentence you cite, was ſpoken by him (as appears from the Words immediately preceeding thoſe you have cited,) not concerning *Gravitation*, but concerning *Other* more particular Phænomena of Nature, in *expreſs Contradiſtinction* to thoſe of *Gravitation*; and when in that whole Book, from one End to the other, he is profeſſedly confuting and ſhowing

the

the abſolute Impoſſibility of your Notion of Gravitation; and when he has * elſewhere in expreſs words declared, that by the Terms, *Forces* and *Powers*, he does not mean (as You did by *Powers originally placed in Matter by God*) to ſignify the *Efficient Cauſe* of certain determinate Motions of Matter, but only to expreſs the *Action* it ſelf by which the Effect is regularly produced, without determining the immediate *Agent* or *Cauſe* of that Action: After all this, I ſay, to inſinuate to your Reader by the Citation of a Piece of a ſingle Sentence, that That Great Man is of your Opinion; is (to uſe your own Expreſſions once more,) ſuch a *Conduct*, as the World may juſtly *demand a Reaſon of* from your ſelf; for *I cannot aſſign a good one for you.*

* *Optic.* *pag.* 322.

pag. 193.

Laſtly: As you declare it to be your Opinion, that Gravitation is cauſed by *Material Impulſe*; ſo you think it impoſſible, that it ſhould be owing to any *Immaterial Cauſe*: And you believe it to be *as intelligible, that Matter might act without Impulſe, by* Powers *placed in it by God*; *as that an* Immaterial Being *ſhould move Matter without being able to impell it by Contact.*

This Belief of yours is founded wholly upon the Suppoſition, that there is nothing in the World but *Tangible* Subſtance; Which Opinion you give no Reaſon for; and therefore it is a *mere Prejudice.* But further: I preſume you will hardly deny, but *God* himſelf is an *Immaterial Being*; and that *He* can move Matter, though he does not *impel it by Contact.* Other *Immaterial Beings* therefore, though they do not *impel Matter by Contact*, yet it does not from thence follow that they cannot move it

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at all; Becauſe from *God*'s moving it, it is manifeſt that there are other ways of moving it, beſides that of *impelling by Contact*. But *Powers* or *Laws*, are not real Beings; They are nothing but mere Words or Notions; and can neither act in any Senſe, nor move Matter either with Contact or without it. I conceive an ordinary Reader may be able to diſcern the Difference, between affirming that an *Immaterial Subſtance*, a real Being, though not hard and ſolid, may move Matter; and affirming that a *Law* or *Power*, a mere Word or Term of Art, which is really No Thing, and has not truly any Being or Exiſtence, ſave only in the Imagination, can cauſe Matter to move.

Upon the Whole; All that you have advanced in theſe Sections about *Gravitation*, is ſuch marvellous Reaſoning, to be made uſe of in the preſent Age, after ſo many great Diſcoveries, founded upon Experience, and even Mathematical Demonſtration; that though I have no cauſe at all to be diſpleaſed with you for arguing in ſuch a Manner; yet I believe your Readers cannot but think you might very well have forborn going out of your Way; to give ſo very diſadvantagious a Repreſentation of your own Philoſophy.

I have been the longer upon this Head, becauſe the true Theory of *Gravitation*, as it has been made out by that excellent Perſon whom you juſt now ſo unfortunately cited, does in its obvious and neceſſary Conſequences, more entirely ſubvert the very Foundations of all poſſible Hypotheſes, wherewith *Materialiſts* would undertake to explain the Phænomena of Nature *Mechanically* by the mere

mere Powers of Matter and Motion; than any Diſcovery in natural and experimental Philoſophy, that has ever yet been made in Any Age: Showing the *Matter* of the Univerſe to take up almoſt an infinitely ſmall and inconſiderable Part of that Space, which you ſuppoſe to be filled with it; bearing in truth far leſs Proportion to it, than a Tennis Ball does to the Body of the Earth: And conſequently, that the great Phænomena of Nature cannot poſſibly depend upon any *Mechanical* Powers of Matter and Motion, but muſt be produced by the Force and Action of ſome higher Principle: And ſo leading us even with Mathematical Certainty, to *Immaterial Powers*; and finally to the Author of all Power, the *Great Creator and Governour of the World.*

See Sir *Iſaac Newton's Opticks.* page 314 & 346. *Lat. Edit.*

I affirmed, that *there are many Demonſtrations, even in abſtract Mathematicks themſelves, which no Man who underſtands them, can in the leaſt doubt of the Certainty of; which yet are attended with difficult Conſequences, that cannot be perfectly cleared:* As, for inſtance, thoſe concerning *the infinite Diviſibility of Quantity, and the Eternity and Immenſity of God.* In anſwer to this, you ſay that *if* there are any ſuch Demonſtrations, from whence any *Contradictions or Abſurdities* follow in our way of conceiving things, *&c.* And again: *Abſurdities and Contradictions, &c.* And again: *Abſurdity, Contradiction, or Diſagreement of Ideas, &c.* And again: You *require* me *to prove* that any *Abſurdity or Contradiction* follows either from the infinite Diviſibility of Matter, or from the Eternity or Immenſity of God, in our way of conceiving; and if I cannot, I

pag. 223. pag. 223. pag. 223. pag. 224.

have

have no ground, *you ſay*, from thoſe Inſtances, to put Human Nature in ſuch a State of *Scepticiſm and Abſurdity*. Now, *by all the Rules of Anſwering*, (to uſe your own Expreſſion;) you ought not to have changed my Words, *Difficult Conſequences that cannot be perfectly cleared*; into *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas:* Becauſe *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*, are things juſt as different from *Difficult Conſequences* of Demonſtrated Truths, *which cannot be perfectly cleared*; as *Light* is from *Darkneſs*. *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*, are things *already perfectly cleared*; that is, things proved with *perfect Clearneſs*, to be Falſe and Impoſſible: But *Difficulties* that *cannot be perfectly cleared*, may attend things either *poſſibly* or *certainly* True. *Abſurdities, Contradictions, and Diſagreements of Ideas*, do with as *perfect Clearneſs* prove a thing to be *Falſe*; as a *poſitive Demonſtration* proves a thing to be *True:* And therefore it is abſolutely impoſſible, that they can Both be applied to the ſame thing; even juſt as impoſſible, as that the ſame thing ſhould at the ſame time be both *true* and *falſe*. But *Difficult Conſequences that cannot perfectly be cleared*, may be, and very often are, found to attend Things which are Demonſtrated to be True. The Reaſon is; becauſe *Difficulties that cannot perfectly be cleared*, do not (like *Abſurdities and Contradictions*) ariſe from a *Perception of the Diſagreement of Ideas*, but barely from the *Defect* or *Imperfectneſs of the Ideas themſelves*. Our *Reaſon* is able to *apprehend* clearly the Demonſtration of the Certainty of the Exiſtence of ſome Things, where the *Imagination* is not able to *comprehend* the Ideas

pag. 228.

of

of the Things themſelves. This is plainly the Caſe of the *infinite Diviſibility of Quantity*, of *Infinity and Eternity* in general, of the *Actions of Immaterial Subſtances upon Matter*, and of many other Things. Here therefore I have juſt Cauſe (if I may uſe your own Expreſſion
pag. 193. once again) to *demand a Reaſon of your Conduct*; and to complain that you have greatly departed from that Fairneſs, for which your former Papers were juſtly commended.

And you can ſtill the more hardly be excuſed in this Matter; becauſe you knew I had before expreſſed my ſelf very particularly and fully concerning the ſame Thing, in a Book which you your ſelf cite upon another occaſion in the very next Page to That wherein you accuſe me ſo wrongfully. My Words were Theſe: (*Demonſtrat. of the Being and Attributes of God*, p. 11.) "Since in all Queſtions "concerning the Nature and Perfections of "God, or concerning any Thing to which the "Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined; "though we can indeed demonſtrate certain "Propoſitions to be true; yet it is impoſſible "for us to comprehend or frame any adæ-"quate or complete Ideas of the Manner How "the things ſo demonſtrated, can Be: There-"fore when once any Propoſition is clearly "demonſtrated to be True; it ought not to "diſturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing "Objections on the other ſide, which for want "of adæquate Ideas of the Manner of the "Exiſtence of the Things demonſtrated, are "not eaſy to be anſwered. Indeed, were it "poſſible there ſhould be any Propoſition, "which could equally be *Demonſtrated* on both "ſides of the Queſtion, or which could on

"both

" both ſides be *reduced to imply a Contradic-*
" *tion*, [*as Some have too inconſiderately* aſſert-
" ed ;] This it muſt be confeſſed, would al-
" ter the Caſe ; Upon this abſurd Suppoſition,
" all Difference of True and Falſe, all Think-
" ing and Reaſoning, and the Uſe of all our
" Faculties, would be entirely at an End.
" But when to Demonſtration on the one
" ſide, there are oppoſed on the other, only
" Objections raiſed from our Want of having
" adæquate Ideas of the Things themſelves ;
" this ought not to be eſteemed a Real Diffi-
" culty. It is poſitively and clearly Demon-
" ſtrable, that Something has been *from Eter-*
" *nity:* All the Objections therefore raiſed
" againſt the *Eternity* of any thing, grounded
" merely on our Want of having an adæ-
" quate Idea of *Eternity* ; ought to be lookt
" upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other
" the like Inſtances : It is Demonſtrable, for
" Example, that Something muſt be actually
" *Infinite:* All the Metaphyſical Difficulties
" therefore, which ariſe uſually from apply-
" ing the Meaſures and Relations of Things
" Finite to what is Infinite ; and from ſup-
" poſing *Finites* to be [Aliquot] Parts of
" *Infinite*, when indeed they are not properly
" ſo, but only as Mathematical Points to
" Quantity, which have no Proportion at all ;
[and from imagining all *Infinites* to be *Equal*, when in things diſparate they manifeſtly are not ſo ; an *infinite Line*, being not only *not equal to*, but *infinitely leſs* than an *infinite Surface* ; and an *infinite Surface*, than *Space infinite in all Dimenſions* ;] " ought to be eſteemed
" vain and of no Force. Again ; It is in like
" manner Demonſtrable, that Quantity, is in-

" finitely Divisible: All the Objections there-
" fore raised [by supposing the *Sums Total of all Infinites* to be *equal*, when in disparate Parts they manifestly are not so; and] " by com-
" paring the imaginary *Equality or Inequality* " *of the Number* of the Parts of Unequal " Quantities, whose Parts have really *no Num-* " *ber at all*, they all having Parts *without Num-* " *ber*; ought to be looked upon as weak " and altogether Inconclusive, *&c*".

Concerning the *Questions*, Whether Immaterial Substances be extended or not; *and* Whether, upon Supposition of their being extended, they may not nevertheless be of such a Nature, as not to consist of Parts which (like the Parts of Matter) are themselves every one of them complete distinct Beings, separable, and wholly independent of each other: *Also*, Whether from the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, it follows that they must of necessity be put into an eternal State of Rewards and Punishments: Concerning these Questions, I say, I have nothing further to add; but only that I think All you have advanced upon these Heads in your *Reflections*, hath been already clearly obviated in my former Papers; To which therefore I refer the Reader, who, I fear, is already too much tired with Repetitions.

In the last Place, you challenge me to show
pag. 226, *&* 239. that my Argument is *of any Use to the Ends and Purposes of Religion*. That it is of the *Greatest Use*, will I suppose easily be granted; if it be evident that the Notion I am arguing against, is utterly destructive of Religion. And in what respects

reſpects it is ſo, I ſhall give you an Inſtance or two to conſider of; and ſo conclude.

1*ſt* then; If the *Mind* of Man, were nothing but a certain *Syſtem of Matter*; and *Thinking*, nothing but a certain *Mode of Motion* in that Syſtem: It would follow, that, ſince every *Determination* of Motion depends *neceſſarily* upon the *Impulſe* that cauſes it, therefore every *Thought* in a Man's Mind muſt likewiſe be * *neceſſary*, and depending wholly upon external Cauſes; And there could be no ſuch thing in Us, as *Liberty*, or a Power of *Self-determination*. Now what *Ends and Purpoſes of Religion* mere Clocks and Watches are capable of ſerving, needs no long and nice Conſideration.

* See above; *pag.* 277, 278.

2*dly*, If *Thinking*, in a *Man*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion*, or *of any other Quality of Matter*; it will be but too natural a Conſequence, to conceive that it may be only the ſame thing in all *Other Rational Beings* likewiſe; and even in *God* himſelf. And what a Notion of *God* This would give us, is not difficult to imagine. A Friend of yours has given us a very broad Hint, whither This tends; when he tells us that † *the greateſt Freedom or Liberty we can conceive to belong to ANY BEING*, is ſuch as he there largely explains to be No Liberty at all, but abſolute Neceſſity, ſuch as the Motion of a Watch or Clock is determined by.

† *Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Reaſon in Propoſitions, the Evidence whereof depends upon Human Teſtimony. pag.* 47.

3*dly*, If the *Soul*, be nothing but a *Syſtem of Matter*; and *Thinking*, nothing but a *Mode of Motion*, or *of ſome other Power of Matter*; the Doctrine of the *Reſurrection*, (as I before obſerved, *pag.* 291, *&c.*) will be inconceivable and incredible; and the Juſtice of future Re-

wards and Punishments, impossible to be made out. The Notion of the Soul's *Immateriality*, evidently facilitates the Belief of a *Resurrection* and of a future Retribution, by securing a Principle of *Personal Individuality*, upon which the Justice of all Reward or Punishment is entirely grounded: But if *Thinking* be in reality nothing but a *Power* or *Mode*, which inhering in a loose and fleeting System of Matter, perishes utterly at the Dissolution of the Body; then the restoring the Power of *Thinking* to the same Body *at the Resurrection*, will not be a Raising again of the *same Individual Person*; but it will be as truly a *Creation* of a *new Person*, as the Addition of the like Power of *Thinking* to a new Body *Now*, would be the *Creation* of a *new Man*. For, as God's superadding *Now* to a new Parcel of Matter, the like *Consciousness* with what I at this time find in my self, would not make that new Parcel of Matter to be the *same individual Person with me*, but only *another Person Like me*; so his superadding That *Consciousness* at the *Resurrection*, to the same Particles of Dust, of which my Body was formerly composed; will not be a *Restoration* of the *same Person*, but a Creation of a *new one* like me. For, the Sameness of the senseless Particles of Dust, it is evident from the flux Nature of the Substance of our Bodies, is not that which *Now* makes me to be the same Person; and therefore cannot be that, which will *Then* make me to be so. If my present *Consciousness*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* in the fleeting Particles of my Brain or Spirits; this *Consciousness* will be as utterly destroyed at the Dissolution of my Body, as if the very Substance of my Body was annihilated:

annihilated: And it would be juſt as poſſible for the *ſame Individual Perſon* to be *created again*, after an *abſolute Annihilation*; as to be *reſtored again*, after ſuch a *Diſſolution*. But now, if the *ſame Perſon*, after *Annihilation*, could, by reſtoring of the ſame *Conſciouſneſs*, be created again; he might as poſſibly be created again, by addition of the ſame *Conſciouſneſs* to new Matter, even before Annihilation of the firſt: From whence it would follow, that Two, or Two Hundred, ſeveral Perſons, might All, by a Superaddition of the like *Conſciouſneſs*, be *one and the ſame individual Perſon*, at the ſame time that they remain *ſeveral and diſtinct Perſons*: It being as eaſy for God to add *my Conſciouſneſs* to the new formed Matter of One or of one Hundred Bodies at this *preſent Time*, as to the Duſt of my preſent Body at the *Time of the* Reſurrection. And no Reaſon can be given, why it would not be as juſt at any time, to puniſh for my Faults a new created Man, to whom *my Conſciouſneſs* is by the Power of God ſuperadded; as to puniſh That Perſon, who at the *Reſurrection* ſhall by the ſame Power be new made out of the Duſt of my Body, with the ſame *Conſciouſneſs* ſuperadded: It being allowed that *Then*, as well as *Now*, it is not the Sameneſs of the Particles of Duſt, that makes the *ſame Perſon*. But if it was; yet That would make no difference in this Matter: For, the Particles of Duſt, which in the Courſe of Twenty Years have ſucceſſively been part of the Subſtance of my Body, are enough in Quantity to form ſeveral Bodies: And if the Addition of a like Conſciouſneſs with what I now find in my ſelf, to One of thoſe Bodies at the Reſurrection, will make *It*

to be the ſame *Individual Perſon* with *Me*; the Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs to Twenty of them, would conſequently make every one of them to be (not Perſons *like* Me, but) the ſame *Individual Perſon* with *Me*, and with *each other likewiſe*. Which is the greateſt Abſurdity in the World: An Abſurdity equal (as I before ſaid) to that of *Tranſubſtantiation*. This inexplicable Confuſion, wherewith your Doctrine perplexes the Notion of *Perſonal Identity*, upon which Identity the Juſtice of all Reward or Puniſhment manifeſtly depends; makes the *Reſurrection*, in Your way of arguing, to be inconceivable and impoſſible: And conſequently your Doctrine, (which ſuppoſes the Body to be the Whole Man,) is deſtructive of Religion; leaving no room for Reward or Puniſhment, but in the preſent Life only; and conſequently giving Men liberty to do every thing for their preſent Pleaſure or Advantage, that can be done with a good Colour, and without being obnoxious to human Laws: Which is the greateſt Miſchief that can poſſibly befal Mankind. But if the Soul be, as We believe, a *permanent indiviſible Immaterial Subſtance*, then all theſe Difficulties vaniſh of Themſelves.

It is here to be obſerved, that all the Abſurd Conſequences which I have now (in conſidering of what Uſe my Argument is to *Religion*) ſhown to follow from your Doctrine, with reſpect to the *Reſurrection*; do equally follow from it (as has been before proved) even *without reſpect to the Reſurrection*. For as it is Abſurd to ſuppoſe, (which you muſt do in your Scheme,) that at *the Reſurrection* the *ſame individual Perſon* can be reſtored; merely by the Addition of a *like* Conſciouſneſs with that which

which utterly periſhed at the Diſſolution of the Body, to the Duſt of the ſame Body when re-collected again: As this, I ſay, is plainly Abſurd, becauſe in the ſame manner Twenty other Men formed out of the ſame Duſt, (of which there is quantity enough belonging to every Perſon that has lived any Number of Years,) may alſo by an Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs become every one of them *That One Same Individual Perſon*, at the ſame Time that they remain ſo many ſeveral and diſtinct Perſons: So, without regard to any future Reſurrection, there is the very ſame Abſurdity in ſuppoſing (as you do,) that a Man *at this preſent Time*, though he has none of the ſame Subſtance belonging to him, may yet, merely by a like Modification of the Motion of his Spirits, continue to be *the ſame Individual Perſon* he was Twenty Years ſince; There is, I ſay, the very ſame Abſurdity in this Suppoſition, as in the former; becauſe there is no difference between ſuppoſing that any Number of new Bodies at the Reſurrection *co-exiſtently*, or any Number of different Men now living *contemporarily*, or any Number of different Bodies *ſucceeding* one another in one continued Form by a perpetual uninterrupted Flux of Particles, (which is the thing you contend for;) can be *One and the ſame Individual Perſon*, merely by a *like* Modification of the Figures and Motions of their Parts reſpectively, without having any thing at all *the ſame* in them.

To the *Propoſitions* I laid down at the Concluſion of my former Reply, you have objected nothing, but what (I think) is already clearly anſwered in the foregoing Pages.

AN ANSWER TO Mr. *Clarke*'s Third Defence OF HIS LETTER TO Mr. *DODWELL.*

--Neque decipitur ratio neque decipit unquam.
Manilius.

LONDON:
Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

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A N

ANSWER

T O

Mr. *Clarke's* 3d Defence, &c.

WHEN I conſider that the Queſtion between Mr. *Clarke* and me is concerning the Force of an *Argument made uſe of in* his *Letter to Mr.* Dodwell, *to prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul*; and that out of Four Objections inſiſted on in my *Reflections* againſt that Argument, he has dropt the Conſideration of *Three*; and in anſwer to the Fourth, is ſo far from ſhowing, *That if Conſciouſneſs did inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts*, (which was the Abſurdity, that by his Argument he laboured to fix on thoſe who judged it poſſible for Conſciouſneſs to inhere in a Syſtem of Matter) that on the contrary, he has only endeavoured to prove, againſt my parallel Inſtance of Roundneſs, That it muſt conſiſt of ſeveral Pieces of Roundneſs, or Tendencies towards Roundneſs; and conſequently

quently can only infer, *That if Conſciouſneſs did, in like manner with Roundneſs, inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of ſeveral Tendencies towards Conſciouſneſs:* I freely acknowledge, that I cannot tell how to juſtify my ſelf to any Reader (exeept Mr. *Clarke* himſelf) in not appealing to him, or in preſuming, that he had any need of my Aſſiſtance to find out Mr. *Clarke*'s apparent Deſertion of his Argument. But ſome incidental Points to that in hand, of great Importance to be cleared, having crept into our Diſpute; I hope the further Continuance of this Debate will not be unacceptable to Lovers of Truth; and that upon that account they will pardon a Review of the Controverſy between us.

There are few Diſputes of any Conſequence, but the *Rule* by which they ought to be determined, is both appealed to and called in queſtion. When Reaſon is on our ſide, we chearfully ſubmit to its Dictates, and expect that others ſhould do ſo too; but when we are not able to anſwer Difficulties alledged againſt our *Schemes*, then we contend that Reaſon is weak, and from its ſuppoſed Weakneſs infer, That our Inability to clear up Difficulties and anſwer Objections, ought not to hinder our Aſſent to *them*.

Mr. *Clarke* has thought fit to purſue this Method of proceeding with me; and therefore I cannot but eſteem it a neceſſary Preliminary to this Debate, to examine what he ſays on this Head, and thereby endeavour to fix a Standard or Meaſure, by which all that we ſay muſt be tryed. For to what purpoſe is diſputing and reaſoning about the Truth and Falſehood of Propoſitions, when by any Doubt or Scruple concerning

concerning the Meaſure whereby we judge of Truth and Falſehood, Truth and Falſehood either become Names without any Signification at all, or elſe ſignify different things in different Mens Minds?

It is demonſtrable, according to Mr. *Clarke*, That Matter is incapable of Thinking, becauſe it is diviſible by *the Power of God.* From whence he concludes, That Thinking muſt reſide in an immaterial Being; in the Idea whereof Extenſion is contained: which is in effect to ſay, That Thinking can and cannot reſide in a diviſible Being. For what other Argument can be made uſe of to prove all Matter diviſible by the Power of God, but what is drawn from the Conſideration of its Extenſion? And if Matter as an extended Being is diviſible, all extended Beings muſt be diviſible, and conſequently muſt be incapable of Thinking: unleſs Mr. *Clarke* will ſay, That a diviſible Being is both capable and incapable of Thinking. *1ſt Def. p. 98.*

To clear his Argument from this manifeſt Contradiction, he has recourſe to the following Diſtinction, (by which a Man may be enabled to believe every thing, and reaſon about nothing) That it is abſurd to ſuppoſe Matter indiviſible by the Power of God; but to ſuppoſe an extended unſolid Subſtance indiviſible by the Power of God, is only *a difficult Conſequence that cannot be perfectly cleared:* and to make this Diſtinction intelligible, he urges, *That difficult Conſequences that cannot be perfectly cleared, do not (like Abſurdities and Contradictions) ariſe from the Perception of the Diſagreement of Ideas, but barely from the Defect and Imperfectneſs of the Ideas themſelves.* Which is as much as to ſay, That Difficulties which cannot be perfectly cleared, do not ariſe from the Perception of *2d Def. p. 175.* *3d Def. p. 303, 304.*

the

the Disagreement of Ideas, but from the Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas. For what is a Difficulty which cannot be *cleared* (or *perfectly cleared*, for I know no Difference) by reason of *defective Ideas*; but a Difficulty which arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of those Ideas? If he means that there is a Difference between a Difficulty which arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of perfect or adequate Ideas; and a Difficulty that arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of imperfect or inadequate Ideas: I answer, That there is no manner of ground for such a Distinction; or if there was any ground for that *Distinction*, it is not to his purpose, as will evidently appear, if we do but consider what we mean by adequate and inadequate Ideas.

Mr. Lock's *Essay of Human Understanding.* B. 2. c. 31.

By an adequate or perfect Idea, I understand, An Idea which *perfectly represents the Archetype the Mind supposes is taken from*; as for Instance, *all complex Ideas of Modes*, such as Fear, Courage, *&c. which being voluntary Collections of simple Ideas, that the Mind puts together, without reference to any real Archetypes existing any where, are adequate Ideas; because they not being intended for Copies of things really existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind, cannot but represent themselves.*

By an inadequate Idea, I understand an Idea which does not perfectly represent that Archetype the Mind supposes it taken from: as for Instance, If I put into my Idea of Gold only its *Colour* and *Weight*, it is evident they represent not the Archetype my Idea is taken from, but only imperfectly or inadequately. And thus, for ought we know to the contrary, all the Ideas we have that we refer to real Existences,

ces, may be inadequate; for we can never be certain that we contain in our Idea all the whole Plenitude of Eſſence, Properties and Affections, that reſide in any Being whatever.

What I have ſaid, if I miſtake not, comprehends the entire Senſe of the Diſtinction of adequate and inadequate Ideas. I know Mr. *Locke* accounts ſimple Ideas adequate; but I cannot ſee on what ground, but what deſtroys the Diſtinction of adequate and inadequate Ideas, and does in reality make all Ideas adequate. For if, as he ſays, ſimple Ideas are adequate, *becauſe being nothing but the Effects of certain Powers in things ordained by God to produce ſuch Senſation in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe Powers*; then every Idea whatever may be adequate in that ſenſe, that is formed with Care: for we ought not to uſe a Word to ſignify any Idea whatever, but ſo far as the Idea goes it ought to correſpond to the Archetype it is referred to. As for Inſtance, If I ſhould put into my Idea of Man, *ſolid Subſtance, Life, Senſe, ſpontaneous Motion, and a Faculty of Reaſoning*; it is plain, all this agrees to Man, how inadequate ſoever a Repreſentation it is of him, and is as much correſpondent and adequate to the Subject it is taken from, as any ſimple Idea is to the Power that occaſions it. For ſimple Ideas, by means of Organs of different Perfection, cannot be preciſely alike in different Men; and conſequently muſt in any Men, if not in all, be imperfect and inadequate, if conſidered with relation to the whole Power that occaſions them, though they are adequate and correſpondent to a Power in Nature, ſo far as they go and were deſigned to be. Now, if all Ideas, as referred to things exiſting, are really imperfect and inadequate;

and

and if with relation to things existing, there is no other Test of Truth but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; then, if Mr. *Clarke* denies not all Knowledge, that relates to things existing, he cannot distinguish between Difficulties that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas, and Difficulties that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of adequate Ideas. And if he allows that Difficulties which arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas are Absurdities and Contradictions, he gives up his Distinction. So that he must either destroy all Knowledge or Science relating to things existing, or else own that there is no difference between Difficulties that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of adequate Ideas, and Difficulties that arise from the Perception of the Disagreement of inadequate Ideas.

2. But to vindicate human Knowledge, and show further the Groundlessness of Mr. *Clarke*'s Distinction; I observe, That though we can never be sure that we have adequate Ideas of any thing that exists, yet we have as much reason to think that our inadequate Ideas agree to the Reality of things, as adequate Ideas do to the Archetypes they are referred to; and consequently have no reason but to conclude, that inadequate Ideas can be as well compared together, and as right Judgments formed from their Comparison, as from the Comparison of adequate Ideas. For suppose I see something in a Mist, near the Size and Shape of an ordinary Man; which though I see not distinctly enough to know, whether it be a Statue or a Man; yet I may certainly know it not to be a

Steeple,

Steeple, by perceiving the Diſagreement between the Idea of a *Steeple*, and the Figure I ſee, as I can know a moral or abſtract Mathematical Propoſition to be falſe, by perceiving the Diſagreement of the Ideas of which it is made up. Wherefore, ſince we can as well know or be certain, by the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of inadequate Ideas as of adequate Ideas; the Difficulties that ariſe from the Perception of the Diſagreement of both adequate and inadequate Ideas, muſt be equally Contradictions, and conſequently there is no ground for Mr. *Clarke*'s Diſtinction.

3. Was not a Difficulty that ariſes from the Perception of the Diſagreement of inadequate Ideas, as much an Abſurdity as a Difficulty that ariſes from the Perception of the Diſagreement of adequate Ideas; we could not diſcourſe at all with Certainty of the principal Objects of Religion, *God and his Attributes*. The Ideas we fix to the Terms, *God and his Attributes*, are no doubt inadequate Ideas, if any of our Ideas are inadequate; and yet in religious Diſcourſes we argue from the Juſtice, Veracity, Goodneſs, Holineſs and Wiſdom of God; and ſay, that ſuch and ſuch things muſt be, becauſe they follow from the Suppoſition of thoſe Attributes; and that ſuch and ſuch things cannot be, becauſe they are inconſiſtent with them; that is, ſuch and ſuch things agree or diſagree to our Ideas of the Juſtice, Veracity, Holineſs, Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God. As for inſtance, we ſay, It is inconſiſtent with his Juſtice, to puniſh eternally a Man who obeys his Laws, and to reward a Man who diſobeys them: and on the other ſide, that it is agreeable to his Juſtice, to reward a Man that obeys his Laws,

and to punish a Man that disobeys them. Mr. *Clarke* himself argues, That moral and immoral Actions *must be attended with Rewards and Punishments: because the same Reasons that prove God himself to be necessarily just and good; and the Rules of Justice, Equity and Goodness, to be his unalterable Will, Law and Command to all created Beings; prove also, that he cannot but be pleased with and approve such Creatures as imitate and obey him, by observing those Rules; and be displeased with such as act contrary thereto; and consequently cannot but some way or other make a suitable Difference in his Dealings with them.* But *since the Condition of Men in this present State is such, that the natural Order of things in this World is in event manifestly perverted, and Virtue and Goodness are visibly prevented, in great measure, from obtaining their proper and due Effects, in establishing Mens Happiness proportionable to their Behaviour and Practice* —— Therefore, *It is certain that there must be a future State of Existence* for Men, *as that by an exact Distribution of Rewards and Punishments therein, all the present Disorders and Inequalities will be set right, and the whole Scheme of Providence, which, to us who judge of it by only one small Portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and confused.*

Lectures, Vol. II. *p.* 155.

Ibid. p. 161.

Now on what is this Argument founded, but on Mr. *Clarke*'s inadequate Idea of the Justice of God? And wherein does its Strength lie (if it has any) but in his Perception of the Disagreement of the visible Disorders and Inequalities in this World, with his inadequate Idea of the Justice of God, without the necessary Supposition of a future State, to set right those Disorders and Inequalities? Wherefore

fore ſince Mr. *Clarke* thinks he argues with *Certainty* for a future State, and ſince he argues only from a defective or inadequate Idea; and ſince there can be no arguing in the Caſe, but from the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſuch Ideas as we have; it follows, That Mr. *Clarke* muſt allow that Certainty can be attained as well where our Ideas are inadequate or imperfect, as where they are adequate or perfect: that is, the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſuch Ideas as we have, whether perfect or imperfect, adequate or inadequate, is the true and only Criterion of Truth; unleſs Mr. *Clarke* will deny the Force of his own Argument for a future State, or ſay, that we have an adequate Idea of the Attributes of God.

4. But ſuppoſing there was a juſt Ground to diſtinguiſh between our Knowledge that relates to things exiſting, and our Knowledge that relates to Ideas of the Mind which have no Archetypes beyond their own Exiſtence; ſo that in one Caſe there is not the ſame Degree of Certainty as in the other; yet Mr. *Clarke* has no reaſon here to oppoſe them to one another, becauſe his Argument for the Immateriality of the Soul is and can be only founded on the ſole Compariſon of the inadequate Ideas of Matter, Spirit, and Thinking. And therefore an Objection or Difficulty founded on the Diſagreement of thoſe imperfect or inadequate Ideas, is as much a Demonſtration of the Falſehood of a Propoſition that involves ſuch a Difficulty, as the Agreement of inadequate Ideas is a Demonſtration of the Truth of a Propoſition made up of ſuch Ideas. And conſequently, whether there is or is not any juſt Ground for

Mr. *Clarke*'s Distinction, it serves not his purpose in the least.

5. But perhaps the Reader may, from the Writings of the Papists for Transubstantiation, and from the Writings of some Protestants against the *Socinian Heresy*, ask, Whether there are not in some Questions Demonstrations on both Sides, and consequently that the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is not the Criterion or Test of Truth. In answer to which I freely declare it to be my Opinion, That whatever can be demonstrated, can be *perfectly cleared* from all Objections and Difficulties; and that any Person that understands a Demonstration and the Objections made against it, is capable of solving them; and that all the Difficulties that may be urged against the *Immensity and Eternity of God*, &c. *which* Mr. *Clarke* says, *cannot be clearly answered*, are to be clearly answered. And in order to answer them clearly, I would only require these equitable Conditions of him, that he would define the Terms *Immensity*, *Eternity*, *Immaterial Being*, &c. and show that his Definitions agree to the things existing, that they refer to.

2d Def. p. 175.

He proceeds: *Our Reason*, says he, *is able to apprehend clearly the Demonstration of the Certainty of some things, where the Imagination is not able to comprehend the Ideas of the things themselves.* That is, if I understand him right, we can apprehend clearly, suppose, that an immaterial Being exists, or that something exists correspondent to the Idea we fix to the Terms *Immaterial Being*, without being able to comprehend entirely all that exists in the Being our Idea refers to. And what then? How does it follow from hence that there is any Difference between

3d Def. p. 303, 304.

between Difficulties that ariſe from the Perception of the Diſagreement of adequate Ideas, and Difficulties that ariſe from the Perception of the Diſagreement of inadequate Ideas? Cannot I, though I know but in part the Archetype to which my Idea of Immaterial Being refers, have a juſt Idea of Immaterial Being as far as my Idea goes? And if it be ſo, why ſhould I not be able to anſwer all Objections againſt the Exiſtence of that which I clearly apprehend does exiſt? Nay, What other Method can there be taken in the Uſe of ſuch Words as *Immaterial Being*, *Infinity*, *Immenſity*, &c. but to make them ſtand for intelligible and conſiſtent Ideas, which have a Conformity to things that really exiſt? And why intelligible and conſiſtent Ideas ſhould not be capable of being cleared from all Difficulty, I ſhall then be able to conceive, when I can ſee no Difference between *intelligible* and *unintelligible*, *conſiſtent* and *inconſiſtent*.

By what has been ſaid, the intelligent Reader may be ſatisfied, that when I underſtood *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*, to ſignify *Contradictions and Abſurdities*, I *did not depart from that Fairneſs for which*, Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *my former Papers were juſtly commended.* And I am not without ſome hopes that Mr. *Clarke* may contradict himſelf once more in my favour, ſince in his *Third Defence* he is pleaſed to contradict what he ſaid in his *Second Defence*, for he there accuſed me of *Unfairneſs*, and now acquits me of it.

3d. Def. p. 303. *3d Def. p.* 304. *2d Def. p.* 173.

I proceed now to the Queſtion concerning the Poſſibility of Matter's being conſcious: and as I have ſhowed that finite Extenſion in an immaterial Being implies Diviſibility as well as in

Reſl. 2d Edit. p. 224, 225.

in a material Being, and which consequently, according to Mr. *Clarke*, must be a Subject equally incapable of Thinking with material Being; so I shall endeavour to reconcile Mr. *Clarke* to himself, by showing, that his Argument drawn from the Divisibility (or, which is all one, the Extension) of Matter, is inconclusive. His Argument is as follows; *That all the Qualities or Powers which either are in Matter, whether they be known or unknown, or are vulgarly ascribed to it, must of necessity be either,*

3d Def. p. 244.

1. *Real Qualities truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascribed; such as Magnitude and Motion in Matter. These,* says he, *are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the same Kind, inhering distinctly in the several Parts of the material Subject. And could Consciousness in like manner be a Quality really inherent in a System of Matter; it must likewise be the Sum and Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts: and so there would be as many distinct Consciousnesses as there are Particles of Matter of which the System consists.*

1st Def. p. 92, 93.

3d Def. p. 244.

Or, 2. *Qualities not really inhering in the Subject to which they are usually ascribed, but being indeed Modes excited and residing in some other Subject: such as are Colours, Sounds, and all those which are commonly sensible Qualities of Matter. These do not exist at all in that Subject to which they are usually ascribed, but in some other Subject. And this also not being applicable to Thinking, it is manifest therefore, that Thinking cannot be a Power or Quality of this kind in a material Subject.*

Or,

Or, 3. Such Qualities as Magnetiſm, Electricity, Attraction, Reflexibility, Refrangibility, and the like. Theſe have no real Exiſtence by way of proper inhering in any Subject; which likewiſe ſince it cannot be ſaid of Conſciouſneſs, it is manifeſt, that Conſciouſneſs cannot be a Power or Quality in a material Syſtem of this kind neither.

In anſwer to which Argument, the Subſtance of one Objection that I urged was, That his Enumeration was imperfect, becauſe he omitted the Conſideration of the Modes of thoſe Kinds of Powers mentioned in the firſt Branch of his Diviſion; and that Conſciouſneſs being, according to me, a Mode of one of thoſe kinds of Powers, it is impoſſible his Argument ſhould conclude againſt Conſciouſneſs's inhering in a Syſtem of Matter, when that Quality that agrees with Conſciouſneſs is not named in his Enumeration. As for inſtance, Conſciouſneſs being with me a Power or Quality in Matter anſwering to a Mode of Motion or Figure, ſuch as the peculiar Motion of a Clock, or Roundneſs; the Conſideratiou of Conſciouſneſs, as ſuch a Quality or Power, ſhows, that his Argument is perfectly foreign to the Queſtion. For if Conſciouſneſs be conſidered like Roundneſs or any other Mode of Figure, or like a Mode of Motion in an Animal or Clock, it is manifeſt, 1*ſt*, That it has a real and proper Inherence, and is not an Effect reſiding in no Subſtance at all, and conſequently anſwers not to *Magnetiſm*, *Electricity*, &c. 2*dly*, That it has a real Inherence in the Subject of which it is ſaid to be a Quality, and conſequently anſwers not to Colour and Sound, which exiſt not in the Subſtance to which they

are ascribed. And, *3dly*, That as it inheres truly and properly in Matter, so it is not of the same Extent, nor does it answer to Figure, Magnitude, and Motion. For Roundness inheres in a System of Matter, without being the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts. And the like may be said of the peculiar and individual Modes of Motion in a Clock, or an Animal, that they inhere not distinctly in each of the distinct Parts. I did not take upon me to determine of what kind of Power Thinking or Consciousness was a Mode; but for greater Clearness in arguing, I did take the Liberty to speak of it as a Mode of Motion. Now, if it be considered as a Mode of Motion, that is, if it consists of Ten Thousand distinct Motions, it is as impossible that whole Consciousness should exist in each of the distinct Parts of a System of Matter, as that whole Roundness should exist in each Part of a Circle, or that the individual Motion of an Animal or Clock should exist in each of their distinct Parts. Wherefore it is evident, that the Strength of his Argument lies in considering Consciousness as standing for an Idea inconsistent with its being a Power of Matter, that follows *from the Division or Composition* of Matter, as he pro-
P. 22, 23. posed to consider it in his *Letter to Mr. Dodwell:* and therefore his Demonstration was granted by me, as not affecting the Question he proposed to prove, since it related solely to a Chimera * or

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* *If the Reader could doubt of my Meaning in* p. 47. *of my* Reflections, *he may consider what I say here as the Explication of it; and then he will see, that what Mr.* Clarke *advances in* p. 50. *Edit.* 1. *and some following Pages, needs no particular Answer.*

Idea,

Idea, that he was pleaſed to ſuppoſe, without any ground, I was obliged to rank Conſciouſneſs under.

Mr. *Clarke*, to ſhow that his Argument is concluſive againſt the Poſſibility of Matter's Thinking, lays down this Propoſition, as what he propoſes to *explain* and *vindicate*; That *it is abſolutely impoſſible, and an evident Contradiction, that any real Quality ſhould truly and properly inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers and Qualities reſiding diſtinctly in the ſeveral Parts of the Syſtem, and being always of the ſame Kind with the Whole that reſults from them.* 3d Def. p. 248.

In anſwer to this, I humbly conceive that Mr. *Clarke* ought to have laid down a Concluſion clearly contradictory to me, and not have expreſſed himſelf in ſuch a Manner, that I can agree to what he ſays, conſiſtently with maintaining the Force of my Objection. As for inſtance, I do allow, that no Quality can reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, but what *muſt be always* in a certain Senſe *of the ſame Kind with the Whole that reſults from the Parts.* For when Roundneſs or any other individual Figure inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, the Parts muſt be ſo far *of the ſame Kind*, as to have a Tendency to that individual Figure of which they are a part. And in that Senſe I have always allowed Conſciouſneſs to conſiſt of *Powers of the ſame Kind*; for if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt neceſſarily be allowed, that the diſtinct Beings in that Syſtem contribute towards Thinking, as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as all the Parts of a Syſtem of Matter contribute towards the Syſtem: unleſs a Man will ſay, that Conſciouſneſs *Letter to Mr. D.* p. 79.

neſs inheres in a diviſible Subſtance, and does not inhere in it at the ſame time. Wherefore his Propoſition to be vindicated is obſcure; and I deſire the Reader to obſerve, that no Propoſition can be truly contradictory to what I affirm, unleſs it affirms that every Quality that inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, muſt inhere wholly in each part of it; that is, that in a round Figure every Particle muſt be round: for unleſs he affirms and proves *that* which is ſo manifeſtly againſt Experience, he will never contradict me, or be able to ſhow, that Conſciouſneſs muſt neceſſarily, (if it inheres in a Syſtem of Matter) conſiſt of ſeveral diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes.

3d Def. *p.* 248, &c. To vindicate his Concluſion, Mr. *Clarke* premiſes a Diſcourſe of the various Uſe of the Terms *Powers of the ſame Kind*; to which, that I may not diſoblige him by taking no notice of it, I anſwer, That when Terms are defined, and Inſtances agreeing to thoſe Definitions given, whereby all Doubtfulneſs about one another's Meaning is in the moſt effectual Manner excluded, I cannot ſee of what uſe it is to enumerate the various Senſes that *Logicians* give to the ſame Terms, eſpecially ſince I have the Authority of the Schools (as Mr. *Clarke* repreſents them) for my uſe of thoſe Terms: Though had I underſtood them in a Senſe not to be juſtified from their Authority, my miſtake had only been in the Meaning of two or three *Engliſh* Words, which was a Matter of no great Conſequence when the Words were defined. Wherefore I proceed to the Defence of his Argument.

3d Def. *p.* 249, &c.

He

He ſays, *When he affirms, that Roundneſs or Globoſity muſt needs be the Sum of Qualities of the ſame Kind; he does not mean that Globoſity is made up of Globoſities, but that a whole round Figure muſt neceſſarily be made up of Pieces of Roundneſs, which are all of the ſame Kind with Roundneſs. For nothing that is void of Figure can be part of any Figure whatſoever; nor any thing that is void of Curvity in particular, be part of a round Circumference; nor any thing that is void of that particular Degree of Curvity which makes a Circle of a certain determinate Diameter, be part of the Circumference of that Circle.* And to prove that Roundneſs conſiſts of Pieces of Roundneſs, or *Powers of the ſame Kind*, in that Senſe *with Roundneſs*, he ſpends near Twenty Pages. All which, for ought I know, may be a Vindication of the *Concluſion* he laid down, and that I cited, but concerns not his Argument in the leaſt. For what Mr. *Clarke* endeavoured to prove againſt thoſe who judged it poſſible for Matter to think, was, that no Power could inhere in a Syſtem of Matter without being the Sum of Powers of the ſame Kind; and conſequently that if Thinking or Conſciouſneſs did inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, there muſt be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes as there are Parts in that Syſtem. And to ſhow how inconcluſive that was, I produced Roundneſs (and I might have produced almoſt all the Modes of Motion and Figure that can exiſt) as an inſtance that a Power might inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum of Powers of the ſame Kind; that is, that Roundneſs might inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without making as many diſtinct Roundneſſes as there are Parts in that Syſtem; P. 352.

Syſtem; and conſequently, that Conſciouſneſs, if it inhered in a Syſtem of Matter in like manner with Roundneſs, could not conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts. Now, how does it follow, *That if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts,* or in that Senſe of *Powers of the ſame Kind*; becauſe in another Senſe, Roundneſs, which I made parallel to Conſciouſneſs, conſiſts of *Powers of the ſame Kind*, viz. of *Figures* and *Curvities?* For it is readily allowed by me, that Roundneſs conſiſts of Pieces of Roundneſs, which by being all Figures are of the ſame Kind with Roundneſs, conſidered as a Figure; and by being little Curves or Arches, are likewiſe of the ſame Kind with Roundneſs, conſidered as a Curve; and in that Senſe I allow Conſciouſneſs to conſiſt of Powers of the ſame Kind; for that, according to me, conſiſts of Parts which have a Tendency to Thinking or Conſciouſneſs, as Roundneſs does of Parts that have a Tendency to Roundneſs. And yet for all that, neither Roundneſs nor Conſciouſneſs conſiſt of *Powers of the ſame Kind* in the Senſe of Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument: For unleſs in a round Figure each part muſt be wholly round, and in a conſcious Syſtem of Matter, each part muſt be wholly conſcious, and in that ſenſe conſiſt of *Powers of the ſame Kind*; not one Step can be taken in Defence of Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument: Nay, what he has advanced is ſo far from defending it, that it evidently demonſtrates the Falſehood of it. For if Roundneſs does conſiſt of Parts, none of which can poſſibly be round, (as Mr. *Clarke* evidently ſhows it muſt, by proving that Roundneſs muſt conſiſt only of Pieces of Roundneſs) and that

are only Powers of the ſame Kind with Roundneſs, by being all Figures, and by conſiſting of Parts that have a nearer Affinity to Roundneſs than ſtraight Lines; it is a Demonſtration that there may be Powers in Matter which are not the Sums of Powers of the ſame Kind, in that ſenſe which ſhows the Inconcluſiveneſs of his Argument. For when it is proved, that Roundneſs conſiſts of Parts, none of which can poſſibly be round, there is a full and perfect Inſtance to ſhow, that Conſciouſneſs may inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without each of the Parts being diſtinctly conſcious. So that as far as I can ſee, the Force of Mr. *Clarke*'s *Defence* lies in underſtanding the Terms *Powers of the ſame Kind*, in a different Senſe from what he did at firſt, and in a Senſe that evidently ſhows his Argument has no force. However, he is capable of making the ſame Concluſion in words that he did at firſt, *viz. That no Power can inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum of Powers of the ſame Kind*; and that, I will allow him, is artful enough to impoſe on Readers that are willing to be ſatisfied on his ſide of the Queſtion.

But let us ſee how he applies all that he ſays, for Twenty Pages together, to prove *Roundneſs muſt conſiſt of Powers of the ſame Kind* (in the Senſe he now contends for, and that I allow to be true) to the Queſtion, *That if Conſciouſneſs does inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of the diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts.*

I can find nothing to that Queſtion, but in theſe words; *That the individual Roundneſs of a Globe is not made up of a Number of the like whole Roundneſſes*, (and I add, nor is it made up of any Number of Roundneſſes or any round 3d Def. p. 258.

round Parts at all) *but yet must needs be made up of such Figures as are Parts of Roundness, nay Parts indued with that particular numerical Degree of Roundness; and cannot be made up of straight Lines, nor of any Figures which are not Pieces endued with that particular Degree of Roundness. So that an individual Consciousness (supposing it to inhere in a System of Matter) must be made up, though not of the very same Consciousnesses, yet of such Powers as are of the very same Kind with that numerical Consciousness, as the Arches of a Circle are of the same Kind with the whole Circumference* —— *That is, It must be made up of different Consciousnesses indeed, but still Consciousnesses only.* All which, I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, That though Roundness consists of Parts or Pieces of Roundness (none of which can possibly be round) yet, if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter, in like manner with Roundness (that is, consists of Parts, none of which can possibly be conscious) there must be as many distinct Consciousnesses as there are Parts; which is in effect to say, If Consciousness inheres in like manner in a System of Matter with Roundness, it inheres in a different Manner from Roundness: Or in other words; if Consciousness by inhering in a System of Matter does not consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts, it does consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.

This is the Stress of his Demonstration, which I think I may submit to the intelligent Reader, without any Reply: *1st*, Because it visibly confutes it self; and, *2dly*, Because on this occasion, I have a mind to show my Complaisance to Mr. *Clarke*, in letting him have the Satisfaction

Satisfaction to ſee his *Demonſtration* ſtand in its full force, without any attack from me: for when I conſider, that it can deceive no Reader but himſelf, and that by a Citation from Mr. *Hobbes* in his Title-Page, he is of Opinion, *That Arguments ſeldom work on Men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themſelves in a contrary Opinion*; I think it would be a Piece of ill Nature to diſturb his particular Satisfaction in the Force of his Argument.

But there is one thing more of which I think it neceſſary to inform the Reader, with relation to my Inſtance of *Roundneſs*, and that is, That I made uſe of it to no other purpoſe, than to give the Reader an Idea, how Conſciouſneſs might inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without conſiſting of the Conſciouſneſſes of the Parts; and that purpoſe I think it fully anſwers. But whether in other reſpects Conſciouſneſs anſwers to Roundneſs, concerns not me: Nay, I profeſs that I think it differs from Roundneſs, and all other Modes of Figure, in many reſpects; and therefore I am not anſwerable for any Diſagreement between Roundneſs and Conſciouſneſs, provided they agree in conſiſting of Parts, none of which are diſtinctly round or diſtinctly conſcious.

I did urge ſeveral other Inſtances of Modes to my purpoſe, (for indeed almoſt every Mode in Matter is to my purpoſe) but I chuſe rather to remit their Defence to the Conſideration of the Reader, who may, from the Principles already advanced, eaſily ſolve Mr. *Clarke*'s Objections, than ſpend more words to ſhow the Inconcluſiveneſs of his Argument, when I think enough has been ſaid already.

Wherefore

Wherefore I proceed to the Consideration of the remaining Parts of Mr. *Clarke's Defence.*

That I might let the Reader more clearly into the Force of my Objection to Mr. *Clarke's* Argument, and make my self more intelligible, *I did suppose Consciousness (of whose Nature I was ignorant) to be a Mode of Motion, and not a Mode of some unknown Power; and the rather because,* I thought, *I had to do with a Gentleman that understood the Rules of arguing too well, to impute that to me as my Opinion, which I only took the Liberty to suppose.* But Mr. *Clarke* not taking to himself my Character of an ingenuous Adversary, will make me accountable for the *Absurdity of the Notion* of *Thinking's being* really *a Mode of Motion*; though he might as well have made me accountable for the *Absurdity of the Notion* of Thinking's being really a Mode of Figure, because I likened Thinking to Roundness, as much as I did to a Mode of Motion: but without any design by either, to assert it as my Opinion, that Thinking was either a Mode of Motion, or a Mode of Figure; having no design then to enquire into the Nature of Thinking. Wherefore I am concerned to vindicate my *Supposition* no farther than the Nature of my Objection required, which was only to assign such an Instance of a Power in Matter, that did not consist of Powers of the same Kind, in such a Sense as destroyed the Force of Mr. *Clarke's* Argument. And therefore should the Absurdity of the Notion of Thinking's being *really* a Mode of Motion be proved; yet the Absurdity of my *Supposition* would not in the least be proved. I use the Supposition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion to no other End, but to express my

Refl. p. 203.

3d Def. p. 270.

Meaning intelligibly, how Thinking may inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum of the diſtinct Thinkings of the Parts; and if my Suppoſition ſerves that purpoſe, it is nothing to me, let the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing Thinking to be really a Mode of Motion, be as great as he pleaſes. Therefore when Mr. *Clarke* propoſes *to prove* againſt me, by the *Arguments* contained between *page* 270, and *page* 279, *the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing Conſciouſneſs to be a Mode of Motion* (meaning the Suppoſition that *Conſciouſneſs is* really *a Mode of Motion*) he changes the Queſtion in diſpute, under an Appearance in Words of confuting my *Suppoſition*; whereas my *Suppoſition* is no more touched on, in thoſe Arguments, than the moſt foreign Queſtion in the World. However, that Mr. *Clarke* may be kept a little more in Countenance for his Labours here, than for the Pains he has taken about *Roundneſs*, I will ſo far tranſgreſs the Rules of Diſpute, as to conſider, whether he proves a Propoſition that was not in Debate between us: And I hope the Reader will be pleaſed to excuſe me, for the Breach of the Rules of Diſputation, for the Sake of my Complaiſance to Mr. *Clarke*. The Method I ſhall take, ſhall be briefly to enquire into the Nature of Thinking, and then into the Force of Mr. *Clarke*'s Arguments, to prove Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion. P. 270.

1. As to the Nature of Thinking, I obſerve, that Thinking is an Action that begins not in us, till we are operated on by external material Objects, that act on us by Motion and Contact; no more than a Windmill begins to go till the Air or ſome other Body ſtrikes againſt

the Sails. For we having no Objects or Ideas to think upon, but what are ultimately founded on and resolved into the simple Ideas of *Sensation* and *Reflection* (by the first of which we have all our Ideas of sensible Qualities in Bodies external to us, and by the latter all our Ideas of Thinking, and its Modes, *viz.* doubting, willing, knowing, *&c.*) cannot think first on the Ideas of Reflection, because we must think upon something before we can reflect or think upon Thinking and its Modes; and since that *something* cannot be Thinking or any of its Modes, it remains that we must first think on the simple Ideas of Sensation. And if we think on the simple Ideas of Sensation, it is matter of Fact, that we do not begin to think upon them till Bodies operate upon us. And this is an evident Agreement of Human Thinking with a Power or Affection of Matter, which ever ows its Existence to the Motion or Operation of some other Body. What is *Fire* but a Power or Affection of Matter, beginning in Matter perfectly free from that peculiar Mode of Motion, till by the Application of Matter in Motion it is produced? And what are other Powers or Affections of Matter, such as bitter, sweet, sour, soft, hard, cold, all Smells, Tastes, Sounds, *&c.* but peculiar Modes of Motion or Figure, that begin in particular Systems of Matter, upon the Action of other Matter upon them?

Did we perceive Ideas antecedent to the Operation of Matter on our Senses, there might be some Colour to suppose Human Thinking not a Power or Affection of Matter, (since Matter cannot be conceived from no Action, or Rest, to begin an Action;) but Thinking

following the Motion of Matter on our Senſes, we have juſt as much reaſon to conclude, that it is a Power or Affection of Matter occaſioned by the Action of Matter, as we have to ſay, that Fire is a Power or Affection of Matter, when it is produced by the rubbing of a Wheel and its Axle-Tree. And I ſee not why it is not as neceſſary to introduce the Hypotheſis of an Immaterial Being into every material Subject, to account for its wonderful Operations, as for the Operations of Man or Beaſt. I doubt not, but that it is very poſſible to be part of the Religion of the moſt learned Country in *Europe* (if we can form any Judgment what they may believe from what they do believe) to believe, that Repetitions of Words in Eccho's are performed by an intelligent or immaterial Being that mocks us, according to *Ovid*'s Deſcription of her, as a real Being:

——— *Quæ nec reticere loquenti,*
Nec prior ipſa loqui didicit, reſonabilis Echo.
Corpus adhuc Echo, non vox erat: & tamen uſum
Garrula non alium, quam nunc habet, oris habebat;
Reddere de multis ut verba noviſſima poſſet.
——————————— *in fine loquendi*
Ingeminat voces; auditaq; verba reportat.

And then we ſhould ſee as many learned Treatiſes, to ſhow the Inconſiſtency of ſuch a regular Repetition of articulate Sounds in any Being but an Immaterial Being (which is ſuppoſed only to have Memory and Reflection) as *Tertullian*'s, and ſome other antient Fathers are to prove the Soul material; and as any

of the Moderns are to prove the Soul immaterial.

2. Human Thinking has Succeſſion and Parts, as all material Actions have; for all our Thoughts ſucceed one another, can be ſuſpended in a Point, or continued in like manner with a Mode of Motion, and ſo are as much diſtinguiſhable into Parts.

3. Thinking has its Modes, ſuch as Doubting, Willing, Knowing, Pleaſure, Pain, *&c.* juſt as particular Powers of Matter have their Modes. Sound (which in the Body to which it is attributed, is nothing but a Mode of Motion) has Modes of acute, grave, *&c.* which with their ſeveral Degrees, are capable of being varied *in infinitum.* And as Sounds are ſwift or ſlow, regular or irregular, according to the different Action of Matter; ſo the Soul thinks ſwiftly or ſlowly, regularly or irregularly, is drunk or ſober, has Pleaſure or Pain, according to the different Motions produced in our Bodies.

4. It is evident to me that God muſt be an Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without any of the Properties of Matter, without Solidity, Extenſion or Motion, and that exiſts in no Place; and not a Being that has Extenſion (and conſequently exiſts in Place and has Parts) according to Mr. *Clarke*'s Idea of Immaterial Being. Now Thinking in God cannot be founded on any Objects acting upon him, nor is Thinking in him ſuppoſed to be ſucceſſive, or to conſiſt of Parts, or to have any Modes, becauſe Modes of Thinking are diſtinct Acts of Thinking. But as his Eſſence is eternal and immutable, without any the leaſt Variation or Alteration,

ration, ſo his Thinking is ſuppoſed to be one numerical individual Act, comprehending all things and all the Poſſibilities of things at one View; and is as fixt, and permanent, and unvariable, and as much without Succeſſion and Parts, as his Eſſence. So that if we can form any Judgment of the Nature of Thinking in Man, from its perfect Conformity with the Powers of Matter, and its entire and total Diſagreement with Thinking, in that only Immaterial Being which, we are ſatisfied, exiſts; we may reaſonably conclude Human Thinking a Power or Affection of Matter.

If it be asked, Of what kind of Power in Matter, Thinking is a Mode? Is it a Mode of Motion, or a Mode of ſome unknown Power? To that I anſwer, That I pretend not to know that Secret, and therefore will only make theſe two Obſervations.

1. That Mr. *Clarke* allows Matter, or the *Bodily Organs, to act upon the Soul.* Now Matter cannot act upon an Immaterial Being by Motion, becauſe there can be no Contact between a material and immaterial Being: Wherefore by Mr. *Clarke*'s own Principles, there muſt be a Power in Matter unknown to us, and of which we have no Idea; and if there is a Power in Matter, of which we have no Idea, that Power in Matter may comprehend under it Thinking and its Modes, as Figure does Roundneſs, *&c.* and Motion the ſeveral Modes of Motion, and their Modes. *3d Def. p.* 287.

2. It is by many thought a Difficulty to conceive, how by a mere Preference of the Mind, we can cauſe our left Hand, which was in motion, to be at reſt; and our right Hand, which was at reſt to be in motion; and by a new

Will, Choice or Preference (call it as you please) to put the left Hand in motion, and the right Hand at rest, and so on, let our Wills vary and change ever so often. But that Difficulty is entirely at an end, if Thinking in Man be nothing but a Mode of Motion, or Matter in motion: and it is then as conceivable, that Thinking should produce those Motions, as that a Spring or Weight in a Clock should make a Clock strike or point to the Hour of the Day.

But let us proceed to Mr. *Clarke*'s Arguments, to prove, that *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion in Matter.*

3d Def. p. 272. His first Argument is, *That Modes of Motion are nothing else but particular Motions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea, beyond the Genus of Motion,* —— And he *has as clear and distinct a Perception. that the Idea of Consciousness contains something in it, besides and beyond the Genus of Motion*; *as* he *has, that it contains in it something beyond the Genus of Figure.*—— He *has therefore exactly the same intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion*; *as* he *has that any one thing in the World is not another, whose Idea is the remotest and most different from it that can be imagined.*

To which I answer, That though we have an abstract Idea of Motion, which as it ought, so I doubt not but it does, comprehend under it all the Modes of Motion, that ever did or can exist, yet I deny, that we have an Idea of all the really existing, much less of all the possibly existing Modes of Motion. We have Ideas of the more simple Modes of Motion; such as a circular Motion, or Motion in a straight Line. But when the Motions are very complex,

plex, ſuch as the Mode of Motion in a Tree, by which Vegetation is performed; and the Mode of Motion in a Man or Animal, by which Life and Senſation is continued: we have not a diſtinct Conception of them in our Minds. The only diſtinct Conception that we have of ſuch Modes is, that they have in them the Genus of Motion; and that they have Succeſſion and Parts, and can be variouſly modified. Now as far as we know any thing of the Nature of Thinking, by what we find and feel in our ſelves; *That* has likewiſe the Genus of Motion, by ariſing from Motion, by being varied by Motion, and by its producing other Motions diſtinct from it ſelf; and has likewiſe Succeſſion and Parts, and withal innumerable Modifications. Wherefore ſince no particular Idea of Human Conſciouſneſs can be produced, beyond the Genus of Motion; and that we have no particular Ideas of the more complex Modes of Motion that exiſt: It is impoſſible for him to prove or know, that one is not the other. For till he has a further Idea of the Nature of Human Thinking, than what I have deſcribed; and a particular diſtinct Idea of that complex Mode of Motion, that exiſts in our Animal Spirits; he can no more know, that one is not the other, than he can know, whether two things agree or differ from one another, that he has no Idea of at all. Indeed a Man may ſay, That a Wheel in Motion does not think, or that a circular Motion is not Thinking; becauſe we ſee not any of the Effects of Thinking follow from a circular Motion: though I doubt not, but (if the Effects of Thinking followed from a circular Motion, as much as they do whenever that complex

Motion peculiar to the Body of a Man, exists) that Mr. *Clarke* would have recourse to the *Hypothesis of Immaterial Being*, and say, That Immaterial Beings were added to all Wheels on the production of every circular Motion. But it is not possible for us to say, that Thinking does not consist in the peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of those Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking, as something distinct from a Mode of Motion, or as distinct from a Power or Affection of Matter; of none of which has Mr. *Clarke* given us any Ideas.

2. I have been the longer on this Argument than was necessary, because what I have offered, will in a great measure serve to set this Question in a true Light; otherwise there needed nothing to be said to an Argument which does only affirm the Question in debate, and which can signify nothing to any body that wants Conviction: for as he only affirms, *That he has an intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion*; so a Man may affirm against him, that by a Survey of the Nature of Human Thinking, and the different Effects of Motion, he knows or perceives that Human Thinking is a Mode of Motion; and another may affirm with me, that he is so far ignorant of the Nature of Human Thinking, as not to know, whether it be a Mode of Motion or no. All three prove alike, and have nothing else to do, but to submit their several Affirmations to the Reader, but can never convince one another. Mr. *Clarke* has indeed affirmed the Question that he has brought into dispute, in stronger Words than I have produced from him, as *That it is a greater Absurdity*, and *more*

3d Def. p. 273.

ridiculous

ridiculous than ſome evidently falſe and ridiculous Propoſitions, which he is pleaſed to produce as Parallels to what he would make me affirm. But I humbly conceive, there is no more proof in ſuch Aſſertions, than in the moſt modeſt and civil Affirmations. However, I thought my ſelf obliged to do him the Juſtice, to produce what he ſays, that it may have its Weight with the Reader; becauſe I ought to ſuppoſe he intended it for Argument.

His ſecond Argument to prove, that *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, is, *If Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion, it would follow, that all Motion would be a Degree of Thinking.* To which, as well as to all that follows under this Head, I think it ſufficient to reply: That Matter is every where the ſame, and all alike; but becomes Fire, or Water, or produces Smells, Taſtes and Sounds, *&c.* according as it is diverſified by Motion: and as it is ſuppoſed, that Motion can produce nothing but Motion, ſo theſe Differences in Matter are nothing but peculiar Modes of Motion. Wherefore if it be proper to ſay, That every Motion is a Degree of Fire, a Degree of Water, a Degree of all the Modes of Smell, a Degree of all the Modes of Sound, a Degree of Bitter, and a Degree of Sweet, a Degree of Vegetation, and a Degree of Corruption; I do in that ſenſe allow, that every Motion is a Degree of Thought; if it be true, that Thinking is a Mode of Motion, as Mr. *Clarke* ſuppoſes it to be in this Argument. 3d Def. p. 247.

His third *Argument* to prove, *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, is, *That if Thinking was a Mode of Motion, then Motion would be a more generical Power* than Thinking. Whereas, p. 276.

On

On the contrary, says he, *it is evident, that Thinking is a Power infinitely more generical, than either Figure or Motion, or any other Power of Matter. There are as many Ideas of Figure, as there are Figures; and there are as many Ideas of Motion, as there are Modes of Motion; and as many Ideas of other Things, as there are other things in the World, that can be thought upon: And all these Ideas are Modes, and Sorts, or Kinds of Thinking.*

1. When Motion is said to be more *generical* than any particular Species or Mode of Motion; and when Figure is said to be more generical than any particular Mode of Figure: I take the Meaning of it to be, that Figure and Motion are abstract Ideas, which comprehend under them all the particular Modes of Figure and Motion that can possibly exist; so that wherever any particular Figure or Motion exists, it has a Conformity to our abstract Ideas of Figure and Motion: whereas a circular Motion and Squareness are abstract Ideas, to which only a particular Mode of Motion and Figure has a Conformity. So that Motion and Figure are called more generical than any particular Motion or Figure, because their Ideas are contained under them.

But when Mr. *Clarke* calls *Thinking* in Man *a more generical Power than Motion and Figure*, I am perfectly at a Loss what he means. Does he mean, that Thinking is a Power which does consist both of Motions and Figures? If he does mean so, (and I know not what other sense, according to the Meaning of the Terms *more generical* in this place, to understand him in) then if it be proper Language to call that an individual Power which consists of all possible

ſible Motions, and all poſſible Figures; what does Mr *Clarke* do in affirming Thinking to be *more generical than Motion*, but make Thinking a perfectly material Action? For unleſs it comprehends under it all poſſible Modes both of Figure and Motion, as Motion and Figure does all poſſible Modes of Motion and Figure, (which thereby become *more generical* than any particular Mode of Figure and Motion) he uſes the Term *generical* in one ſenſe in one place, and in another ſenſe in another place. Wherefore it follows from this Argument, that either Thinking is, by conſiſting of Figures and Motions, a material Action; or elſe that he uſes the Term *generical* fallaciouſly.

If he uſes the Term *generical* in one and the ſame Senſe in both places, and pretends it follows from his Argument, that thinking muſt, by being more generical than Figure and Motion, conſiſt both of Figures and Motions, and ſo cannot conſiſt of Motion alone; and would thereby deſtroy the Suppoſition, *that Thinking is a Mode of Motion*. I anſwer, That when Thinking is ſuppoſed to be a Mode of Motion in the Animal Spirits, the Figure and Structure of them, as well as the principal Parts of a Man, are included, as neceſſary to conſtitute an Act of Thinking; for otherwiſe, neither the Motion of Thinking, nor the various Motions in the Body of a Man could be performed; no more than the Mode of Motion called Vegetation could be performed in an Oak, without ſuch an organical Diſpoſition of Parts as is peculiar to that kind of Tree called an Oak.

If he uſes the Term *generical* fallaciouſly, and not in the ſame Senſe that it is uſed when Figure is ſaid to be *more generical* than Round-

neſs;

neſs; but for Thinking's containing in it Ideas, *&c.* that is, for being *more generical* than Motion and Figure, becauſe we have Ideas of Motion and Figure: His Diſcourſe is not to the Point, and he might as well have uſed any other Term in the World as the Term *generical.* For if he means, that the Objects of *Thinking are more generical* than Motion and Figure, (as by affirming, *That Thinking contains in it ſelf the Ideas of all the Modes of Figure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Motion, and infinite other Ideas beſides*; and by what he ſays in this Article, I am apt to think he does) then what he ſays is not to the Queſtion in diſpute, which has no relation to the *Genericalneſs* of the Objects on which we think, but to the *Genericalneſs* of Thinking it ſelf.

3d Def. p. 258.

Indeed Mr. *Clarke* does help himſelf out as well as he can, by ſaying, *That Ideas of Figure,* &c. *are Modes, and Sorts or Kinds of Thinking.* But that, I conceive, is a clear Miſtake, and a confounding together the Faculty and the Object. I allow there can be no Thinking without an Idea or Object, nor can there be an Idea or Object without Thinking: for they are as relative Ideas as Father and Son, and muſt therefore ſubſiſt together; but yet Thinking, when Roundneſs is the Object, is no more the material Idea we think on, nor that material Idea, Thinking, than the Idea of *Father* is the Idea of *Son,* or the Idea of *Son* the Idea of *Father.*

2. But let Thinking in Man be whatever Mr. *Clarke* pleaſes; let it be a Power in an extended Subſtance that, according to him, conſiſts but of one Figure and one Motion, and not of the Figures and Motions of the Parts, and that is indiviſible by the Power of God;

though one ſide cannot but be diſtinct from the other ſide. Does not that extended Being of Mr. *Clarke*'s, with one only Figure and one Motion, by means of that ſuppoſed Power, perceive the Ideas of Figures and Motions? And if one Power can perceive or have the Idea of another Power, as by Mr. *Clarke*'s own Suppoſition he muſt allow, I ſee no more reaſon againſt making Figures, *&c.* the Objects of a *Mode of Motion*, than againſt making them the Objects of any other Power, that exiſts in a Subject which has neither Modes of Motion, nor Modes of Figure contained in it.

3. It muſt be allowed, that every diſtinct Thought is a particular Mode of Thinking; and ſo Thinking muſt in us have a great Number of Modes; but yet for all that our Thoughts are finite and limited. And notwithſtanding Mr. *Clarke* affirms, *That Thinking* 3*d Def.* in Man *contains in it the Ideas of all the Modes* p. 258. *of Figure, and the Ideas of all the Modes of Motion*; yet I take it to be matter of Fact, that we comprehend only the more ſimple Modes of Motion and Figure. And ſince our Thoughts are all limited, in point of Number, I ſee no reaſon from their Variety neceſſarily to conclude, that human Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion. For if we conſider but the prodigious Variety of Sounds which are called diſtinct Modes of Sound, it is as eaſy to conceive, that upon the Suppoſition of Thinking being a Mode of Motion, it ſhould have the ſeveral Modes that we are conſcious it has, as that Sound ſhould have all the diſtinct innumerable Modes which that has.

His

3d Def. p. 277, 278. His fourth Argument to prove *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, is a Citation from *Mr.* Locke's *Essay of Human Understanding*, *which* he *cannot but suppose I will give some Deference to.* But why he should expect any Deference from me to any Man's words, any further than they carry Evidence along with them, except those of the inspired Writers, is as surprizing to me, as that Mr. *Locke* should be made choice of as a proper Authority to submit to. However, since Mr. *Clarke* is so far mistaken in me as to think I would pay any more Deference to Mr. *Locke* than I do to him, I will on this occasion freely declare it to be my Opinion, that I look on it to be contrary to the Duty of a rational Agent to pay any manner of Deference in matters of Opinion or Speculation to any Man, or Number of Men whatsoever; and that could I so far prostitute my Conscience, as to submit to any mere human Authority, Mr. *Locke*'s would in all likelihood be the last for my Purpose; because it would be much more for my Ease, if not my Profit, to submit to the Decisions and Determinations of those Men that in every Country have worldly Preferments to bestow, than act the same low Part out of so poor a Prospect as I must see would follow from believing in so rational an Author as Mr. *Locke.*

B. 4. c. 10. §. 17. As to the Passage it self, I refer the Reader to it, who will see, that it is so far from having any relation to the Question that Mr. *Clarke* has been pleased to start, whether *human Thinking be a Mode of Motion*, that its whole design is to prove, that Thinking in the Deity cannot *depend on the Motion of the Parts of a Corporeal System*, against such Theists as affirm,

that

that *God is a certain Syſtem of Matter*, and that *Thinking is a certain Motion of the Parts* of that Syſtem. And as the Queſtion is not the ſame, ſo ſome of the Conſequences that Mr. *Locke* draws from thoſe Principles, affect only that really abſurd Suppoſition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in God. For if it be a juſt Inference, *that all Thoughts muſt be unavoidably accidental and limited* that depend *on Motion*, as I think it is; it ſufficiently proves the Abſurdity of thoſe Theiſts that Mr. *Locke* argues againſt, but is no manner of Objection againſt thoſe imaginary People that maintain Thinking in Man to be a Mode of Motion.

His Fifth Argument; as far as I can under- 3*d Def.* ſtand it, is, That it is not *proper* to diſtinguiſh *p.* 278, 279. Motions and Figures into *Modes* or *Species of Motion and Figure*; and that a Man may as well call a *Syllogiſm* a Mode or Species of Motion, as call any particular Motion a Mode or Species of Motion. And for this he *appeals to the common Senſe of Mankind.* This Argument has relation only to Propriety of Language, and therefore I can only ſay this to it: That I have diſtinct Ideas of ſeveral Motions, and diſtinct Ideas of ſeveral Figures, whereby I diſtinguiſh thoſe Motions and Figures from one another, as well as I can Figure from Motion: That ſome of theſe peculiar Motions and Figures have diſtinct Names given to them, and conſequently thoſe Motions and Figures are as much ranked into Kinds and Sorts (though they may be never called Kinds or Sorts) as any things elſe in the World. For what do we mean by a Kind or Sort, but ſeveral Particulars having a Conformity to an abſtract Idea? So that if our abſtract Idea of Roundneſs agrees to the

the Figure of any Number of Beings, we do as necessarily call them all round, and reckon their Figure a sort of Figures, as we do a Negro of the Sort or Species of Men, by his answering or having a Conformity to our abstract Idea of Man, though the Term *Species* or *Sort* may not perhaps be made use of in one case as it is in the other. But after all, I cannot see what ground Mr. *Clarke* has to contest this Language with me, who says so much about *Figures differing specifically* from one another.

3d Def. p. 250.

Thus I have gone through his Arguments to prove, that *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, and will conclude what I have to say on this Head, with considering the Apology he makes for my maintaining so absurd an Opinion, though it be only an Opinion he puts upon me, as he did, that I maintained *Sweetness existed in a Rose*, in direct Defiance of my Words that were before him. He says, *that in reviewing the Matter*, he *can hardly persuade* himself, *but that* I *have mistaken my own Argument*. And his reason is, because *some ingenious Persons have undertaken to maintain, that God can make Matter think*; which it seems, though a *false* and *impossible* Assertion, is not so *extravagant* an Absurdity as mine: and therefore I presume he thinks I intended to follow, or should have followed those *ingenious Persons*; which is as much as to say, I am more extravagantly absurd than others, therefore I have mistaken my own Argument. I may as well say, that Mr. *Clarke* has mistaken his own Argument, because I think him more mistaken than *Descartes*, and some other *ingenious Persons*, in making the Soul *an extended Being*, and yet indivisible by the Power of God. Have not Mr. *Clarke*, and I,

See Reply, p. 122.

3d Def. p. 281, 282.

and

and every Man elſe, a Liberty to judge and argue for our ſelves? And though it be very poſſible for us all to argue in ſuch a manner as will ſeem *extravagantly abſurd* to ſome Men or other, yet I humbly conceive that we ought not from thence to be charged with miſtaking our own Arguments. When a Papiſt argues for *Tranſubſtantiation*, I cannot ſee how he can be charged with *miſtaking his own Argument*, becauſe *ſome ingenious* Divines of the Church of *England* contend only for a real Preſence. If we look into the World, is there not evident Proof, that Men profeſſing Learning are capable of believing and defending any Abſurdity in Nature? Nay, are not almoſt all the *extravagant* Opinions that abound in the World, chiefly confined to thoſe that profeſs Philoſophy and Learning? For as *no living Creature is ſubject to the Privilege of Abſurdity, but Man only*; ſo the common People, by their Incapacity for Speculation, can enter no farther into the particular Speculations of their Country, than like the common Soldiers of an Army, by ſhowing their Courage and Warmth *for they know not what*. Indeed we have had the Happineſs in *England* to have ſuch rational Parliaments and Convocations that have eſtabliſhed nothing but Truth: yet an *Engliſhman* is thereby no more priviledged from maintaining and believing any, the moſt *extravagant* Abſurdity, than a Man born in *Turkey*, *France*, or *Spain*; and that with the ſame Degree of Honeſty and Sincerity. Had I contradicted my ſelf, I might be ſaid to have *miſtaken my own Argument*; as Mr. *Clarke* may juſtly be ſaid to have done, in making an extended Being, as ſuch, diviſible and indiviſible at the ſame time. But to ſay I have miſ-

taken my own Argument, becauſe I exceed another in Abſurdity, is ſuch a *Miſtake*, and argues ſo little inſight into the Nature of Man (ſo prone to Errour and Abſurdity) that I know not under what *Kind* or *Species* of Miſtakes to put it.

To prove the Impoſſibility of Matter's Thinking, Mr. *Clarke* urged another Argument, *viz. That it is abſurd to annex Conſciouſneſs to ſo flux a Subſtance, as the Brain or Spirits: because if ſuch a Subſtance could be the Seat of that Conſciouſneſs, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years ſince; but alſo is conſcious that he himſelf, the ſame individual Being, was the Doer of them; it would follow, that Conſciouſneſs could be transferred from one Subject to another; that is, that a Quality could ſubſiſt without inhering in any Subject at all.*

2d Def. p. 158. 3d Def. p. 288, 289.

To which Argument I anſwered, That no Man has the ſame numerical Conſciouſneſs to Day that he had Yeſterday: the Conſciouſneſs he has to Day, is a diſtinct numerical Act from all paſt Conſciouſneſſes; and can be no more the ſame numerical individual Conſciouſneſs with any of thoſe paſt Conſciouſneſſes, than the Motion of a Syſtem of Matter to Day, can be the numerical individual Motion it had Yeſterday.

Reſl. p. 236, 237, 210, &c.

That we are not conſcious, that we continue a Moment the ſame individual numerical Being. That we utterly forget or ceaſe to remember a great many things, done in the former Part of our lives, which yet we as certainly did, as ever we did any of thoſe things that we are conſcious we did. That we do by degrees forget things partially, which we do not revive by frequent Recollection: And that in order

order to retain the Memory or Conſciouſneſs of a paſt Action, it is neceſſary to revive the Idea of it, before any conſiderable Flux of Particles: and by reviving the Idea, we have as perfect a Memory or Conſciouſneſs of having done that Action (though the Brain or Spirits be not compoſed of the ſame numerical Particles) as we had the Day after we did the Action; or as we have of a Triangle, or any other new Idea not before imprinted on the Brain. And if there is every now and then a Recollection of a paſt Action, a Man may be conſcious of things done by him, though he has not one Particle of Matter, the ſame that he had at the doing of thoſe things, without *Conſciouſneſs's being transferred from one Subject to another*, in any abſurd Senſe of thoſe words. And nothing can better account for a total Forgetfulneſs of ſome things, and partial Forgetfulneſs of others, than the Suppoſition of Conſciouſneſs's inhering in a Subſtance, whoſe Particles are in a conſtant Flux.

But, Mr. *Clarke* ſays, *the Fallacy of this Reply is very evident. For to affirm, that new Matter, perpetually added to a fleeting Syſtem, may, by repeated Impreſſions and Recollections of Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a Memory of what was formerly done by the whole Syſtem, is not explaining or proving, but begging the Queſtion, by aſſuming an impoſſible Hypotheſis.* 3d Def. p. 289, 290.

Now as far as I underſtand any thing of the Nature of Arguing; it was not my buſineſs, as a Reſpondent, to *prove*, but *aſſign* an Hypotheſis. For aſſigning an Hypotheſis, provided that Hypotheſis be poſſible, is a full Anſwer to an Argument, whereby the contrary is propoſed to be demonſtrated; becauſe what

is possible, cannot be reduced to an Absurdity. And this I have done in the Words I have cited; but whether that Hypothesis be possible or impossible, I leave to be determined by every Man's Reason; and whether it be not the real Truth of the Matter, by every Man's Experience. This I am sure of, that Mr. *Clarke*'s calling it *an impossible Hypothesis*, and instead of saying a word to prove it impossible, immediately arguing on the Supposition of its *Possibility*, is begging the Question, and supposing that which he was to prove: whereas I was not to prove, but assign a Supposition or Hypothesis. The Substance of what he adds, while he argues on the Supposition of the Possibility of my Hypothesis, relating to the Question of Personal Identity, and the Justice of future Rewards and Punishments, shall be considered under another Head.

Letter to Mr. D. *p.* 80, 81. I had urged, That though from the Immateriality of the Soul, it did follow, that the Substance of the Soul was naturally immortal or indivisible; yet it would by no means follow, that the Soul, considered as an actually thinking Being, was naturally immortal: and unless the Soul, as an immaterial Being, did perpetually think or perceive, or as a thinking Being, was naturally immortal, a future State of Rewards and Punishments could not be proved from Mr. *Clarke*'s Argument; and therefore, it was of *no use to the Ends and Purposes of Religion*, that is, it was of no use to prove what it was designed for, *viz. a future State of Rewards and Punishments*.

Reflect. p. 225, 226.

3d Def. p. 306, 307. To this Mr. *Clarke* says, *That he supposes it will be granted to be of the greatest Use, if it be evident*

evident that the Notion he is arguing againſt, is utterly deſtructive of Religion.

Let *the Notion he is arguing againſt* be *utterly deſtructive of Religion*, it will not therefore follow, that a Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul, is any Proof of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments: and if a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments does not follow from the Suppoſition of the Soul's Immateriality, his Argument is not of any *uſe* to that *end*, for which it was intended; and no more proves a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments than any Opinion or Principle, whoſe Suppoſition *is utterly deſtructive of a future State.* For whatever *Medium* does not prove a Propoſition, when the pretended Uſe of that *Medium* is to prove that Propoſition; that Medium no more ſerves that *End* and Purpoſe, than the moſt abſurd Propoſition in the World. Wherefore it is plain, that his ſubſequent Arguments, ſhould they prove *my Notion deſtructive of Religion*, do not prove the Uſefulneſs of his own *Argument*; and are no more to the Queſtion in diſpute, than his Endeavours to prove Roundneſs conſiſts of *Powers of the ſame Kind*, and that *Thinking* is not a *Mode of Motion.* But to purſue the Complaiſance with which I have treated him, I will conſider what he ſays to prove *my Notion deſtructive of Religion.*

His firſt Argument to prove my Notion de- *p.* 307.
ſtructive of Religion, is, *That if the Mind of Man were nothing but a certain Syſtem of Matter, and Thinking nothing but a certain Mode of Motion in that Syſtem; it would follow, that ſince every Determination of Motion depends neceſſarily upon the Impulſe that cauſes it; therefore every*

Thought in a Man's Mind must be necessary, and depending wholly upon external Causes; and there could be no such thing in us, as Liberty, or a Power of Self-Determination. Now what Ends and Purposes of Religion, mere Clocks and Watches are capable of serving, needs no long and nice Consideration. To which I answer:

1. I no where affirm, Thinking to be a Mode of Motion in any System of Matter; and therefore let his Argument be ever so just and conclusive, it cannot prove my *Notion destructive of Religion.*

2. But supposing I had affirmed, *the Mind of Man to be nothing but a certain System of Matter*, and that *Thinking is a Mode of Motion in that System*; and that therefore, there can be *no such thing in us, as a Power of Self-Determination*, no more than there is in *Clocks or Watches*: How does it follow, *that my Notion is destructive of Religion?*

Men and Clocks agree in being necessarily determined in all their Actions; therefore, says he, they are alike incapable of Religion. I might as well argue, that because an immaterial Substance and a Clock agree, according to Mr. *Clarke*, in being extended, therefore an immaterial Substance is no more capable of Religion than a Clock. For what is it makes a Man a proper Subject of Religion but his Understanding? And what excludes a Clock from being a proper Subject of Religion, but the Want of a human Understanding? Both are necessarily determined in their Actions: The one by the Appearances of Good and Evil, and the other by a Weight or a Spring. But how does this Agreement destroy Man's Capacity for Religion? How does it appear, that an intelli-

intelligent Agent that acts neceſſarily is not a proper Subject of Religion, becauſe an unintelligent Agent that acts neceſſarily is not? When Mr. *Clarke* proves, that ſuch an intelligent Agent cannot be a proper Subject of Religion, I will allow him, that Man is no more a Subject of Religion than a Clock; nay, I will go farther and allow, that there can be no ſuch thing as Religion. For among all the Speculations relating to the human Mind, or any other intelligent Beings, there ſeems to me nothing more evident than that there cannot exiſt in any intelligent Being, nor do we enjoy any other Liberty than *a Power to do as we will, and forbear as we will*: that is to ſay, if I have the Will to ſtay in my Chamber, I have a Power to ſtay there; and if I have the Will to go out of my Chamber, I have a Power to go out. Let my Mind determine either way, I have ſtill the Power to act as I will, unleſs ſomething happens to hinder me from acting as I will. If I am locked up faſt, I have no longer my Liberty in that reſpect, I have not then a Power to do as I will; and if I am thruſt out by Violence, I am not at Liberty in that reſpect, becauſe I cannot forbear going out, though I ſhould will not going out. Whenever therefore the doing or forbearing any Action, according to the Determination of my Will, is in my Power, I am then always free and at liberty, that is, from any Agent's hindering me from acting as I will, but not *free* from *Neceſſity*. For when I will, or prefer going abroad to ſtaying at home, that Act of Volition or Preference as much determines me to act according to that *Preference*, if it is in my Power to go abroad, as Locks and Bars will hinder me

from acting according to that Preference. The only Difference is, that in one Case I am necessitated to act as I will, and in the other Case to act contrary to my Will.

This seems to me to contain the whole Idea of human *Liberty*. Now, if Mr. *Clarke* cannot assign another Idea of *Liberty*, that is intelligible and consistent with it self, and that we can know to be true, by comparing it with the Actions of our Minds; Then if he shows, that a necessary Agent cannot be a Subject of Religion, it will follow from his Principles that Man is not a Subject of Religion. And that he can have no consistent, intelligible Idea of *Liberty*, besides what I have assigned, I think will be evident to any Man, that carefully considers the Actions of intelligent Beings, or endeavours to frame an Idea of *Liberty*, that is distinct from *Necessity*. Upon the best Information I can get, I can put no other intelligible Meaning on the Terms *Liberty* or *Self-Determination* for Mr. *Clarke*'s Purpose, than a *Power to will or chuse differently under the same Circumstances*: that is, though I will or prefer staying in my Chamber to leaping out at the Window, yet I could under those very Circumstances, wherein I preferred staying in my Chamber, have preferred leaping out at Window; which is as much as to say, I could have preferred what I did not prefer, though all the Causes of Preference continued. Now this to me is perfectly inconsistent; for whenever I prefer one thing to another, it is always on some Motives or Causes; and I find, that I cannot but prefer what I do prefer, till different Motives or Causes produce another Preference, Choice, or Will: and particularly in the Case

before

before us, the Conſideration of the Duty I owe to God and my Country, the Satisfaction I take in living, *&c.* are ſome of thoſe Cauſes that produce that Will or Preference; and therefore to ſay I can prefer or will differently, under the ſame Circumſtances, is to ſay, I can prefer what diſpleaſes me, than which nothing can be more inconſiſtent. I know the Doctrine of *Neceſſity* is too generally ſuppoſed to be irreligious and atheiſtical; and I muſt confeſs, I cannot but wonder at it, conſidering that the Predeſtinarians are ſo numerous in all the Sects of Chriſtians, and that it is eſtabliſhed in ſo many *Confeſſions of Faith.* Among the Reformed I think it cannot be doubted, but there are more Calviniſts than Arminians: and if the *Janſeniſts* in the Church of *Rome* are not equal in number to their Oppoſers, their Writings ſhow them to be the moſt acute and ingenious * *Perſons* of that Communion. And if, in the Church of *England*, its Members incline to Arminianiſm, yet it is affirmed by many, that our Articles are *Calviniſtical*, and acknowledged by all, that they were not deſigned to exclude a *Calviniſtical* Meaning: which is a ſufficient Ground to preſume, that the Compilers were *Calviniſts*, or at leaſt, that they did not think *Calviniſm* led to Irreligion. I could produce many Divines of our Church that in Terms teach the *Doctrine of Neceſſity* (for indeed it would be ſtrange, if ſome *Divines* did not maintain what ſeems ſo evidently the Doctrine of the Church) but I think it ſufficient to name only Dr. *South*, whoſe Penetration, to know what is Orthodox, can no more be called in queſtion by any Man that has looked into his Writings, than his Zeal to be Orthodox can be

* *Mr.* Arnauld, *Mr.* Paſcal, *Mr.* Nichole, *&c.*

be suspected; when it is considered, that after declaring what he takes to be *the commonly received Doctrine of the Church concerning the Blessed Trinity*, he *humbly submits it to the Church of* England. And I look upon his Authority alone to be sufficient to convince every impartial Reader, that a poor Layman may hold the Opinion of the Necessity of all Events, as innocently as so Reverend a Doctor of the Church, and take off from the Force of Mr. *Clarke*'s Imputation of Irreligion on that Principle, since the Doctor has never met with any Censure for asserting it. In his *first Volume of Sermons*, he says, *Providence never shoots at Rovers. There is an Arrow that flies by Night as well as by Day; and God is the Person that shoots it, who can take aim then as well as in the Day. Things are not left in an æquilibrium, to hover under an Indifference, whether they shall come to pass or not come to pass; but the whole Train of Events is laid before-hand, and all proceed by the Rule and Limit of an antecedent Decree. Nay, and sinful Actions too are overruled to a certain Issue: even that horrid Villany of the Crucifixion of our Saviour was not a thing left to the Disposition of Chance and Incertainty; but in* Acts ii. 23; *it is said of him*, That he was delivered to the wicked Hands of his Murderers by the determinate Counsel and Foreknowledge of God. *For surely the Son of God could not die by Chance, nor the greatest Thing that ever came to pass in Nature, to be left to an undeterminate Event. Those that suspend the Purposes of God, and the Resolves of an eternal Mind, upon the Actions of the Creature, and make God first wait and expect what the Creature will do (and then frame his Decrees and Counsels accordingly) forget that*

Animadversions on Dr. Sherlock's Vindication of the Trinity, p. 240.

P. 381.

P. 382.

P. 383, 384, 385.

that he is the first Cause of all things, and discourse most unphilosophically, absurdly, and unsuitably to the Nature of an infinite Being; whose Influence in every Motion must set the first Wheel a going. He must still be the first Agent; and what he does he must will and intend to do, before he does it; and what he wills and intends once, he willed and intended from all Eternity: it being grosly contrary to the very first Notions we have of the infinite Perfection of the divine Nature, to state or suppose any new immanent Act in God. The Stoicks indeed held a Fatality, and a fixed unalterable Course of Events; but then they held also, that they fell out by a Necessity emergent from and inherent in the things themselves, which God himself could not alter: so that they subjected God to the fatal Chain of Causes, whereas they should have resolved the Necessity of all inferiour Events into the free Determination of God, who executes necessarily that which he purposed freely.

In the foregoing Words the learned Doctor, in Terms, asserts the *Necessity of all inferiour Events*; and though he distinguishes between the Christian and Stoical Necessity, yet that is only with relation to the Cause of that Necessity. A Necessity founded on the Will of God, must as much destroy the *Power of Self-determination* in Man, as if that Necessity was founded on a Chain of Causes.

But let us suppose, that the Necessity of all Actions was destructive of all Religion, by destroying the *Power of Self-determination*; I desire Mr. *Clarke*, who maintains the *Certainty of all Events*, to show what different Influence that supposed Necessity of our Actions can have on the *Power of Self-determination*, that the Supposition of the *Certainty of our Actions* has

Boyle's *Lectures*, Vol. I. p. 209, 210, 211.

has not. If every Action, and the least Circumstance of it, be certain to exist before they do exist; can I possibly have a Power to act contrary to such an Action, or any Circumstance of it, any more than I can contrary to an Action that will necessarily exist? Now unless he can show such a Difference between the Certainty and Necessity of all Actions, whereby it may appear that the Necessity of all Actions destroys all *Power of Self-determination*, and the Certainty of all Actions does not; he must give up Religion on his Principles: or if he quits them, he must own with me, that Religion is consistent with maintaining the Necessity of all Events.

Besides, Mr. *Clarke* must suppose, that God himself can have no other Liberty, but a *Liberty to do or forbear according as he wills*, when he says, *That the necessary and eternal different Relations, which different things bear to one another, always and necessarily do determine the Will of God*; and that *God is unalterably determined to do always what is best in the whole.* For if the Will of God is always necessarily and unalterably determined, how can he have a *Power of Self-determination*, as before explained; that is, How can he will differently under the same Circumstances? And if his Will be necessarily determined, what other Liberty can be attributed to the Deity but a Power to do all that he wills, and to forbear what he wills the Forbearance of? The Force of Truth has produced these Expressions from Mr. *Clarke*, and he is desired to reconcile them with his Censure of the Author *of the Essay of*, &c. for asserting only the same Opinion; and not only so, but to reconcile the Power of *Self-determination*

Lectures, Vol. II. *p.* 255, 256.

P. 128.

3d Def. p. 307.

termination in Man, with his Principle of *God's Will being neceſſarily determined.* For if he conſiders the matter, he will find, that as God's Will is neceſſarily determined by what is really beſt, ſo the Human Will muſt always be determined by what ſeems beſt; and that it is impoſſible to conceive, but that every intelligent Being, that has a Power of Action, muſt be thus determined; nay that the Perfection of intelligent Beings, as diſtinguiſhed from unintelligent Beings, lies in being determined by appearing Good and Evil, and a Power of acting purſuant to thoſe Appearances. What would Man have, or can he wiſh for more than to have a Will, Election and Choice, and a Power to do as he wills or chuſes? Would he be able to chuſe or will Pain, when he wills or chuſes Pleaſure? Or would he, when he wills or chuſes Pleaſure, be capable of acting contrary to his Will? That is, would he be ſo miſerable a Being, as to be able to will Pain under the Notion of Pain, or by acting contrary to his Will or Choice have all his Actions involuntary? Both which muſt follow from a ſuppoſed Power in Man, to will or chuſe differently under the ſame Circumſtances, and from a Power to act contrary to what he wills. But God be thanked we are in a much better State; we are ſurrounded with Objects, which ſo far as they ſeem preferable one to another, we do, and cannot help willing or preferring; and while we will or prefer them, we cannot help acting agreeable to that Will or Preference: and nothing but Violence offered to us can hinder us from acting agreeable to our Wills; which Compulſion or Violence ſure no one can deſire. Indeed we are a little reſtrained in

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our Liberty. If we will going into the Moon, or no further than the Atmosphere, we are not at liberty to act as we will; for had we a Liberty in all cases to act as we will, we should be omnipotent.

3d Def. p. 307, 308. His next Argument to prove *my Notion destructive of Religion*, is, *That the Doctrine of the Resurrection will be inconceivable and incredible, and Justice of Rewards and Punishments impossible to be made out.*

What he says to make out this point, being founded on the Question of Identity, it will not be amiss to state briefly my Opinion, before I consider his Exceptions.

1. A particular Substance, I call the same Substance that it was formerly, from its perfect Agreement to that Idea which I then supposed it correspondent to. As for instance, the Identity of a material Substance, at different times, lies in consisting of exactly the same numerical Particles, to which no Addition or Substraction has been made.

2. A particular Mode (as suppose any particular Mode of Motion) not being capable of a Continuation of Existence, like *Being* and *Substance*, but perishing the Moment it begins; its Identity cannot consist in being the same numerical Mode of Motion at different times, but only in being that Mode of Motion that it was when it existed, and not another Mode of Motion. In like manner, any particular Act of Consciousness is incapable of the Continuation of its Existence; wherefore its Identity can only consist in being that very numerical Act of Consciousness that it is.

3. The

3. The Identity of an *Oak*, *Animal*, or *Man*, conſiſts in a Participation of a continued Life, under a particular Organization of Parts. An Oak that contains ſeveral Loads of Timber, is called the ſame Oak with an Oak that was an Inch long an Hundred Years ago, by partaking thence-forward of a continued vegetable Life, in a like continued Organization of Parts: and an Animal or Man is called the ſame Animal or Man at Twenty Years old, that it was at a Quarter old, by partaking of a continued Animal Life, under a like continued Organization of Parts; let this Vegetable and Animal Life in the Oak, Animal or Man, be united at different times, to ever ſo different Particles of Matter.

4. Beſides theſe ſorts of Identity, there is a fourth very different from theſe, which we ſignify by the Word *Self*, and ſometimes call *Perſonal Identity*. Now to underſtand what it is that conſtitutes *Self* or Perſonal Identity, let us conſider to what Ideas we apply the Term *Self*. If a Man charges me with a Murder done by ſome body laſt Night, of which I am not conſcious; I deny that I did the Action, and cannot poſſibly attribute it to my *Self*, becauſe I am not conſcious that I did it. Again, ſuppoſe me to be ſeized with a ſhort Frenzy of an Hour, and during that time to kill a Man, and then to return to my *Self* without the leaſt Conſciouſneſs of what I have done; I can no more attribute that Action to my *Self*, than I could the former, which I ſuppoſed done by another. The mad Man and the ſober Man are really two as diſtinct Perſons as any two other Men in the World, and will be ſo conſidered in a Court of Judicature, where want

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of Consciousness can be proved: and it will be thought as unjust to punish the sober Man for what the mad Man did, as to punish one Man for another's Fault, though the Man both sober and mad is the same Man.

And lastly, should there be so strong a Representation to my Understanding of a Murder done by me (which was really never done at all) so that I could not distinguish it in my Mind from something *really* done by me; I can no more help attributing this to my *Self*, than I can any other Action which I really did, and was conscious of. So that it is evident, that *Self* or Personal Identity consists solely in Consciousness; since when I distinguish my *Self* from others, and when I attribute any past Actions to my *Self*, it is only by extending my Consciousness to them. And further, to give the Reader an Idea of the Nature of Personal Identity, let him consider, That our Limbs or Flesh, while vitally united to *Thinking conscious Self*, are part of our selves; but when separated from us, are no part of *Self*, but that Flesh which succeeds in the room of the Flesh separated, becomes as much a part of *Self* as the separated Piece of Flesh was before.

The Question then between Mr. *Clarke* and me is, whether upon Supposition that Personal Identity consists in Consciousness, and that Consciousness is only a Mode in a fleeting System of Matter, the Doctrine of the *Resurrection will be incredible*, and *the Justice of future Rewards and Punishments impossible to be made out.*

3d. Def. p. 308. Mr. *Clarke* says, *If Thinking be in reality nothing but a Mode, which inhering in a loose and fleeting System of Matter, perishes utterly at the Dissolution*

Diſſolution of the Body; then the reſtoring the Power of Thinking to the ſame Body at the Reſurrection, will not be a raiſing again of the ſame individual Perſon; but it will be as truly a Creation of a new Perſon, as the Addition of the like Power of Thinking to a new Body now would be the Creation of a new Man.

To which I anſwer, that if *Perſonal Identity* conſiſts in Conſciouſneſs, as before explained; and if Conſciouſneſs be a Mode in a fleeting Syſtem of Matter, Conſciouſneſs can periſh no more at the Diſſolution of the Body, than it does every Moment we ceaſe to think, or be conſcious. Suppoſe we were taken to pieces every Night after we are aſleep, and our Parts put into the ſame Form and Order which they would have been in in the Morning had we continued ſleeping; I think it is not to be doubted but we ſhould have the ſame Conſciouſneſs or Memory that we ſhould have had in our natural State. Conſciouſneſs is no more created anew in one caſe than in the other; there is only a Suſpenſion of the Operation of Thinking: Therefore the reſtoring the Power of Thinking to the ſame (or if you pleaſe a different) Body at the Reſurrection, with a Memory or Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions, will be a raiſing the ſame Perſon, and not a Creation of a new Perſon, *as adding the like Power of Thinking to a new Body now would be the Creation of a new Man*; becauſe the Identity of Man, conſiſting in a Participation of a continued *Life*, under a particular Organization of Parts, muſt be new created whenever ſuch a *Life* begins; whereas, if perſonal Identity conſiſts in Conſciouſneſs, or a Memory extending to paſt Actions, *that* will make

any one as much the same Person that he was in this World, as any one is the same Person here two Days together. *That Memory* or *Consciousness* preserves him from being a *new Person* (the Essence whereof *ex hypothesi*, consists in having a Power of Thinking that cannot be extended backwards.)

2. But if Mr. *Clarke* means by the *same individual Person* in the Paragraph I cited, the *same numerical Being* with the *same individual numerical Consciousness* at different times, as I suppose he does, since therein consists his Notion of personal Identity, (as the Reader may see, if he will read the Places referred to in the Margin) I do allow, that such an individual Person cannot be raised at the Resurrection. Nay, I think it is demonstrable, that there can be no Resurrection at all of the *same Person* on that Supposition. And thus I demonstrate it.

3d Def. p. 288 — 293. *p.* 307. *to the End.*

1. Being as Being cannot be rewarded or suffer.

2. Being only as Conscious or Thinking can be rewarded or suffer.

3. Human Thinking or Consciousness consists of a Number of particular Acts of Thinking or Consciousness, which whether they reside in a fleeting or indivisible Substance, can each of them have but one Existence, and cannot possibly exist at different times as Substances do, but perish the Moment they begin.

4. Since it is not possible for those individual numerical Acts of Thinking or Consciousness that are past to exist again; the same numerical Being, with the same numerical individual Consciousness, cannot exist at two different

times,

times, and conſequently cannot poſſibly be rewarded or puniſhed for an Action done.

5. Therefore if perſonal Identity conſiſts in the ſame numerical Being, with the ſame individual numerical Conſciouſneſs, there can be no Reſurrection of the *ſame Perſon*; nay, there can be no ſuch thing as the *ſame Perſon* at two different times.

So that upon the whole, my Notion of perſonal Identity is ſo far from contradicting the Doctrine of the Reſurrection, or making it *impoſſible or incredible*, that there can only be a Reſurrection of the *ſame Perſon*, on theſe Principles, That preſent *Conſciouſneſs* or Memory *is nothing but a preſent Repreſentation of a paſt Action*, and that *perſonal Identity* conſiſts only in having ſuch a *Conſciouſneſs* or Memory. For on theſe Suppoſitions, a particular Conſciouſneſs or Memory of paſt Actions can begin at the Reſurrection as well as after a Night's ſleep; whereas, if the *ſame numerical individual Conſciouſneſs*, that exiſted in this World, is to exiſt at the Reſurrection, as Mr. *Clarke* maintains, he requires a Condition in order to a Reſurrection that implies a Contradiction.

There ſeems to me but one Objection more to my Notion of *perſonal Identity* that requires a Solution, and that is as follows: *That if the Addition of a like Conſciouſneſs with what Mr.* Clarke *now finds in himſelf to any Syſtem of thoſe Particles of Duſt, which in the Courſe of Twenty Years have ſucceſſively been part of the Subſtance of his Body, and are enough to form ſeveral Bodies at the Reſurrection, will* conſtitute *the ſame Perſon with himſelf; the Addition of the like Conſciouſneſs to all thoſe Syſtems, would conſequently make every one of them to be, not Perſons like* 3d Def. p. 309, 310.

him, *but the same individual Person with* him, *and with each other likewise, which is the greatest Absurdity in the World, an Absurdity equal to Transubstantiation.* It is making *them all to be*
P. 309. *one and the same individual Person at the same time that they remain several and distinct Persons.*

1. To which Objection I answer, by asking him, If these thinking Beings can know themselves to be the same or different Persons any other way, but purely by Consciousness? And I ask him, whether each of them must not unavoidably think himself the *same Person* with Mr. *Clarke*? If each conscious Being cannot help thinking himself to be the same Person with Mr. *Clarke*, it is past doubt, that nothing can be meant by the Term *Self*, but purely a present Representation of past Actions, or a Consciousness extending it self to past Actions, without regard to Sameness or change of Substance. Wherefore I do allow that each of those Beings would be the *same Person* with Mr. *Clarke*, that is, each of them would have a present Representation of the past Actions of Mr. *Clarke* (for that is what I understand, and what I think every Man must unavoidably signify by the Term *Self*, or by *Sameness* of Person.) And if each thinking Being is in that Sense the *same Person* with Mr. *Clarke*; and if Sameness of Person or *Self* consists in having a present Representation of a past Action, and applying that Action to a Man's Self, let there be ever so many thinking Beings that have a present Representation of a past Action, they can all constitute but one and the same Person, because they all agree in, or have a present Representation of the same past Action, wherein *Self* or personal Identity consists; as my consisting of

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ever ſo great a Bulk of Matter, or ever ſo many diſtinct Beings, does not conſtitute different Perſons, but conſtitutes what we call *Self*, by the Sympathy and Concern I have for each part united to me, though I have a diſtinct Act of Senſation for each part that is at any time affected. I ſuppoſe Mr. *Clarke*, when he expects *any Deference ſhould be given* to an Authority he cites againſt me, will pay the ſame Deference to the ſame Authority that he expects I ſhould; and therefore on this occaſion I ſhall give him Mr. *Locke*'s own Words, who ſays, *It muſt be allowed, that if the ſame Conſciouſneſs can be transferred from one thinking Subſtance to another*, (as in a certain Senſe he evidently ſhows that it may) *it will be poſſible that two thinking Subſtances may make but one Perſon.* 3d Def. p. 278. B. 2. c. 27. §. 12.

2. It is an Article of Chriſtian Faith, that the ſame numerical Particles that are laid in the Grave, ſhall be raiſed at the Reſurrection. And ſince God Almighty has made that neceſſary by the Declaration of his Will; the *ſame Perſon* will at the Reſurrection only exiſt in thoſe very numerical Particles that were laid in the Grave; by virtue of which, perſonal Identity or *Self* will begin in the ſame manner at the Reſurrection, as it does in the Morning when we awake from Sleep. Beſides, if God ſhould cauſe to exiſt Twenty preſent Repreſentations of the ſame paſt ſinful Actions in ſo many diſtinct Beings, the conſequent Puniſhment would be Twenty times as much as the ſinful Action deſerved, and his Juſtice required. Wherefore if God will not puniſh for Puniſhment-ſake, as to be ſure he will not, there cannot be two diſtinct thinking Beings, with each of them a

Conſciouſneſs extending to the ſame paſt Actions, and attributing them to themſelves.

3. But ſuppoſing that each of theſe Twenty diſtinct Beings is the *ſame Perſon* with Mr. *Clarke*, (which *ex hypotheſi* is true) and ſuppoſing further, that they can be conſidered as diſtinct *Perſons* from one another, (which yet is not the Caſe, as the Reader may ſee by what I have ſaid before) yet I humbly conceive Mr. *Clarke* will not upon Recollection ſay, this is an Abſurdity equal to *Tranſubſtantiation*, but will rather chuſe to call it, *a Difficulty that cannot be perfectly cleared*, when he conſiders that it is one of the Articles of our Chriſtian Faith, to believe that two complete Perſons, ſingly conſidered, *viz.* the ſecond Perſon in the Trinity, and a human Perſon, do conſtitute, by an hypoſtatical Union, but one Perſon.

4. But as to his own Scheme, beſides the Abſurdity of making the ſame *individual numerical Conſciouſneſs* neceſſary to conſtitute the *ſame Perſon*, I think there follows another Abſurdity from his making the ſame numerical Being neceſſary to conſtitute *Self*, or the *ſame Perſon*. For how can he account for the Reſurrection on the following Caſe? Suppoſe a Man lives and believes as a good Chriſtian ought to do for forty Years, and then has a Diſtemper in his Body which obliterates all the Ideas lodged in the numerical individual immaterial Subſtance; ſo that on his Recovery there remains no Memory, no Conſciouſneſs of any Idea that he perceived for forty Years paſt. And further, ſuppoſe this numerical, individual, immaterial Subſtance, to get Ideas again as a young Child does, and till its Separation from the Body, leads a diſſolute and debauched

debauched Life. Here on my Principles is the ſame Being at different times, as much two Perſons as any two Men in the World are two Perſons, or as the ſame Man mad and ſober is two Perſons. Now I ask him, whether or no they are two diſtinct Perſons? If he anſwers, they are two diſtinct Perſons: I ask him, how one of them can be puniſhed eternally, and the other eternally rewarded, on Suppoſition that the ſame numerical individual Subſtance is neceſſary to conſtitute the *ſame Perſon?* And if they are two Perſons, whether perſonal Identity muſt not conſiſt in Conſciouſneſs alone, without any regard to its exiſting in the ſame or different Subſtances? If he anſwers, that they are not two Perſons, but one Perſon; I ask him, whether he can ſuppoſe this Being rewardable or puniſhable? And what kind of Conſciouſneſs it will have when it is either rewarded or puniſhed? When he has anſwered theſe Queſtions to himſelf, and will give himſelf, the trouble to conſider Mr. *Locke*'s Chapter of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, he will ſee, that let him frame what imaginary Schemes of *perſonal Identity* he pleaſes, if there lie not unanſwerable Objections againſt them all, except that of *perſonal Identity conſiſting in Conſciouſneſs*, yet at leaſt that Experience perfectly contradicts his Notion of *perſonal Identity*, which conſiſts in *an individual numerical Being, with the ſame numerical Conſciouſneſs.* And when he ſees the Impoſſibility of the *ſame numerical Conſciouſneſs* continuing a Moment in a finite Being, but that every Moment's Conſciouſneſs is a new Action, and nothing but bringing the Idea of a paſt Action into view; he may perhaps ſee the Needleſneſs of conteſting whether

Self or *personal Identity* must inhere in the same or different Beings at different times: because he may then as easily conceive that the *same Consciousness* may exist in different Beings at different times, as in the same numerical Being at different times; and may have as clear an Idea of *personal Identity* continuing under the greatest Change of Substance, as he may have an Idea of Animal or Human *Identity*, which consisting in a continued Life, under a like continued Organization of Parts, cannot be destroyed by the greatest Change or Flux of Particles imaginable. Though after all, was a Flux of Particles absolutely inconsistent with personal Identity, God Almighty could as easily preserve the most loose Particles from a Separation, as he can an immaterial or unextended Being from Annihilation.

As to what Mr. *Clarke* says about the Injustice of Punishment, on Supposition that *personal Identity* consists in Consciousness, and that Consciousness is a Mode of Motion in a System of Matter; it is to no purpose to enter into that Question till we are agreed on the Ends and Reasons of both Temporal and Eternal Punishment, which he has not as yet assigned. And when he assigns what I take to be the true Ends of Punishment, both in this World and the next, it will be then time enough to show, that they may all take Place on my Principles, as they can on any Principles whatsoever.

Being come to a Conclusion of what I think fit to reply to Mr. *Clarke*'s *Third Defence* on the Head of the Possibility of Matter's Thinking, I will, out of a Desire to have this Argument put on its true Foot, observe in this place, That Mr. *Clarke* and I have only spoken of

Matter

Matter ſo far forth as is knowable, *viz. as Solid*; and the Queſtion between us has been in effect, whether Thinking can be an Affection of Solidity? And therefore ſhould he have demonſtrated with the greateſt Clearneſs the Impoſſibility of all I have ſaid, (as I humbly conceive it is quite the contrary) yet for all that, he cannot upon his Principles prove that there are different Kinds of Subſtances in the World. For ſince he ſuppoſes, *That we are utterly ignorant of the Subſtance or Eſſence of all Things, and, That there is no Subſtance in the World of which we know any thing further than only a certain Number of its Properties or Attributes*; it is abſolutely impoſſible for him to prove that there are two different Subſtances in the World, becauſe having no Idea of the *Subſtance* of *Matter*, nor of the *Subſtance* of a *Being diſtinct from Matter*, it is impoſſible for him to know that the Subſtance of one is not the Subſtance of the other, or that there exiſts any other Subſtance but the Subſtance of Matter. *Lectures.* Vol. I. p. 76, 77, 79.

He can only know a thing to be true, either by Intuition, or by perceiving the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas by the Help of intermediate Ideas.

He cannot know that the Subſtance of Matter and the Subſtance of Spirit, or Being diſtinct from Matter, are not the ſame by Intuition, when he has no Idea of either; for that would be to ſay, that he perceived a Difference when he perceived no Difference at all.

Nor can he perceive or know, that there is a Difference between them by the Help of an intermediate Idea, becauſe no intermediate Idea can diſcover any Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas, but by being placed between two

Ideas.

Ideas. Now no intermediate Idea can be placed between two Ideas of things, when there is no Idea of either, no Subject of Comparison. Suppose a Brass Farthing put into one Box, and a Ring into another Box; how is it possible for a Man that has no Idea of either by any intermediate Idea, to know whether they differ from one another or no? And suppose one Man should affirm to another, who has no Ideas to the Terms *Three Angles of a Triangle and two Right Angles*, that Three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; how is it possible for him to know their Equality, by the Help of any intermediate Ideas, under that Ignorance? Other Angles can never show him the Agreement of *he knows what* with *he knows not what*, no more than if he was showed the Sun or the Moon.

Preface to his Second Volume of Lectures.

All that I can find said against this most evident Demonstration by Mr. *Clarke*, to whom it has been objected, is, *That from the demonstrable Attributes of God, and from the known Properties of Matter, we have unanswerable Reasons to convince us, that their Essences are intirely different, though we know not distinctly what those Essences are. The Attributes of God*, says he, *are, that he is Self-existent, Eternal, Infinite, Intelligent, Free, Wise*, &c. *The known Properties of Matter are*, adds he, *that it is not Self-existent, but Dependent, Finite, Divisible, Passive, Unintelligent*, &c. But by what intermediate Idea does it appear that the Substance of Matter is not *Self-existent*, but *Dependent, Finite, Passive, Divisible, Unintelligent*, &c? Nay, is it not supposed by our having no Idea of the Substance of Matter, that we cannot possibly know whether it be *Self-existent, Dependent, Finite, Passive, Divisible*,

Diviſible, *Unintelligent*, or no? How then can Mr. *Clarke* on his own Principles know, that the *Subſtance* of Matter is not *Self-exiſtent*, &c? There is nothing in Matter that appears to be *Dependent*, *Paſſive*, not *Self-exiſtent*, *Finite*, &c. but Solidity and the Affections thereof. The Subſtance in which Solidity inheres we have no Idea of, and conſequently cannot affirm of it, that it is *Finite*, *Diviſible*, or *Unintelligent*, or *not Self-exiſtent*. So that it is evident that Mr. *Clarke* and all thoſe Gentlemen who ſay, we are entirely ignorant of the Subſtances and Eſſences of things, or have no Idea at all of them, cannot take a Step to prove, that there are different Subſtances in the World, without contradicting themſelves, and ſuppoſing, that they are not utterly ignorant, but that they have an Idea of the Subſtances and Eſſences of things, when at the ſame time they confeſs, that they are utterly ignorant, or have no Idea at all of the Subſtances and Eſſences of Things.

Mr. *Locke*, who always ſpeaks of a *Subſtance* as ſomething unknown, and of which we have no Idea, whether it be applied to material or immaterial Subſtances, but *a mere relative Idea of a Support*, might very juſtly argue, *That from our not having any Notion of the Subſtance of Spirit, we can no more conclude its Non-exiſtence, than we can for the ſame Reaſon deny the Exiſtence of Body. It being as rational*, ſays he, *to affirm, there is no Body becauſe we cannot know its Eſſence, as it is called, or have no Idea of the Subſtance of Matter; as to ſay, there is no Spirit, becauſe we know not its Eſſence, or have no Idea of a Spiritual Subſtance.* For on the Suppoſition of our having no Idea of Subſtance, and that Subſtance is ſomething diſtinct from what are uſually

Eſſay of H. U. B. 2. c. 23. §. 5.

called Properties, it will be impoſſible for any *Spinoziſt* or Materialiſt to prove that there is no other Subſtance in the Univerſe but material Subſtance. But then on the other Side, it will be as impoſſible for ſuch an Immaterialiſt to prove that there muſt neceſſarily be two kinds of Subſtances, becauſe by having no Idea either of the Subſtance of Matter, or the Subſtance of Spirit, he cannot know but that the *Subſtance of Matter is the Subſtance of Spirit.* From what I have ſaid it is evident, that Mr. *Clarke*, and thoſe that are of his mind, cannot poſſibly, upon their own Principles, prove the Neceſſity of Thinking's inhering in an immaterial Being. For though they ſhould prove, that Thinking cannot inhere in Matter, becauſe it is ſolid, and conſequently diviſible; yet that is no more than to ſay, *That thinking cannot be an Affection of Solidity*: for that is what they muſt mean when they ſay, *Thinking cannot inhere in Matter*, becauſe having no Idea of the Subſtance of Matter, they can only ſay, Thinking cannot inhere in that part of Matter of which we have an Idea. Wherefore, ſuppoſing Mr. *Clarke* to argue right, *that Thinking cannot inhere in Matter*, that is, cannot be an Affection of Solidity, it would by no means follow, that it may not be made an Affection of, or be annexed to that Subſtance which is veſted with Solidity. For of that *Subſtance* we are ſuppoſed to have no Idea, and conſequently cannot exclude it from a Poſſibility of Thinking, any more than from a Poſſibility of being Solid.

Mr. *Locke*, to juſtify the Conſideration of *Subſtance* as an unknown *Support*, in which Properties inhere, ſays, *A Philoſopher that ſays, Subſtance (or that which ſupports Accidents) is ſomething*

Letter to the Bp. of W. p. 16.

ſomething he knows not what, and a Countryman that ſays the Foundation of the great Church at Harlem *is ſupported by ſomething he knows not what, and a Child that ſtands in the Dark on his Mother's Muff, and ſays, he ſtands upon ſomething he knows not what; in this reſpect talk exactly alike.* Now I humbly conceive, that they may not all talk exactly alike in this reſpect, for the Countryman and Child may have a clear abſtract Idea of ſolid Being or Matter, a Species whereof the Countryman may imagine the Church at *Harlem*, and the Child himſelf ſupported by; whereas the Philoſopher has no Idea at all: For let the Philoſopher ſtrip any part or piece of Matter of Solidity, and nothing conceivable remains, nothing in which Solidity can inhere; for as to that Portion of Space, in which it exiſted, that could not be the Subſtance in which it inhered, becauſe that Portion of Space in which it exiſted, was really diſtinct from the material Subſtance, and accidental to it: for that Portion of Space exiſts immutably and perpetually in the ſame Place (if I may ſo ſpeak) though ever ſo many particular material Subſtances are coextended to it, and then removed from it.

But as far as I can judge, all this talk of the Eſſences of Things being unknown, is a perfect Miſtake: and nothing ſeems clearer to me, than that the Eſſence or Subſtance of Matter conſiſts in Solidity, and that the Eſſence or Subſtance of a Being, diſtinct from Matter, muſt conſiſt in want of Extenſion, and is truly defined an *unextended Being*. For nothing can be conceived to be coextended with the Parts of Space (if I may ſo ſpeak) but what is ſolid. And therefore to make immaterial Being extended

tended (as Mr. *Clarke* does) is to make immaterial Being material, which indeed is but of a Piece with his making an extended Being indivisible, though he has no other Reason to make all Matter divisible, but because it is extended.

From p. 295, to 299.

As to what he has said against material Impulse being the Cause of *Gravitation*, the whole is founded on this, That because *a Bullet, a Feather, and a Piece of Leaf-Gold descend with equal Swiftness in vacuo* (that is, in a Vessel out of which the Air is exhausted, according to Mr. *Boyle*'s Definition of the Term *Vacuum*, in the like case, by which he *understands not a Space wherein there is no Body at all, but such as is either altogether, or almost totally devoid of Air*) therefore material Impulse cannot be the Cause of Gravitation. I use the Term *vacuum* in the aforesaid Sense, because it is so far from being evident that all Matter is exhausted (though it should be granted, that there is no perfect *Plenum* there) that there are Experiments which prove, that Body remains there after the Air is exhausted, and that does receive actual Modifications by Motion from Bodies without the Vessel. And if so, a Bullet, a Feather, and a Piece of Leaf-gold may descend *in vacuo*, as Mr. *Clarke* calls it, with equal Swiftness, by virtue of the Impulse of those Parts of Matter that are contiguous to them, as that Lead under different Forms ascends or descends according to the Pressure of the circumambient Air. And as to that external Motion, which is the Cause of that Mode of Motion called *Gravitation*, I think the Experiment of several Pieces of Thread, tyed to the Inside Parts of a Hoop, all tending to a Center, upon a Globe's being

New Experiments touching the Air, 4to, p. 10.

ing whirled round its Axis in the Middle of the Hoop, and this further Experiment of Bodies not deſcending *in vacuo*, as Mr. *Clarke* calls it, with the ſame Velocity at a greater Diſtance, as they do near the Earth, evidently ſhow, that the Motion of the Earth is a proximate Cauſe of the *Gravitation* of Bodies in our Neighbourhood, and do diſcover the Cauſe of Gravitation throughout the material Univerſe. But however this be, unleſs Mr. *Clarke* proves, that there is a real *vacuum* in Nature, that is, that there are ſome Portions of Space without Body; and unleſs he proves withal, that there can be an entire Portion of Space in a Veſſel without any the leaſt Particle of Matter, ſo that he may try whether Bodies weigh or deſcend without the leaſt Contact from other Bodies; he will not be able to prove, that material Impulſe is not the Cauſe of Gravitation: and I may in the mean while ſay what I think, that could any Body be at firſt ſo ſituated as to be ſurrounded with nothing but pure Space, there would be no Beginning of Motion, no Weight, no Gravitation in that Body. This I humbly conceive is ſufficient to obviate all he has advanced without Proof under this Article: for as to his Treatment of me I paſs it all by, except one particular and extraordinary Liberty he has taken, *viz.* his ſaying that I *inſinuate to my Reader, that Sir* Iſaac Newton *is of my Opinion in the preſent Queſtion*; and to that will ſay no more than aſſure the Reader, that it is a pure Fiction. 3d Def. p. 299.

He ſays, *That the great Phœnomena of Nature* (and particularly that of Gravitation) *cannot poſſibly depend upon any mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion, but muſt be produced* (that P. 302.

is,

is, constantly) *by the Force and Action of some higher Principle: And so leading us even with mathematical Certainty to immaterial Powers; and finally to the Creator of the World.*

Boyle's *Inquiry into the vulgar Notion of Nature.* p. 66.

P. 71

But the Honourable *Robert Boyle* was of Opinion, *That it seems manifest enough, that whatsoever is done in the World, at least where the rational Soul intervenes not, is really effected by Corporeal Causes and Agents acting in a World so framed as ours is, according to the Laws settled by the omniscient Author of things.* And, *that as it more recommends the Skill of an Engineer to contrive an elaborate Engine, so as that there need nothing to reach his ends in it, but the Contrivance of Parts devoid of Understanding; than if it were necessary that ever and anon a discreet Servant should be employed to concur notably to the Operations of this or that part, or to hinder the Engine from being out of Order: So it more sets off the Wisdom af God in the Fabrick of the Universe, that he can make so vast a Machine perform all those many things, which he designed it should, by the mere Contrivance of Brute Matter managed by certain Laws of Motion, and upheld by his ordinary and general Concourse, than if he employed from time to time an intelligent Overseer to regulate and controule the Motion of the Parts.* And therefore could it be proved, that the *grand Phænomena of Nature* depended on the constant *Force and Action of* immaterial Beings, it would, according to Mr. *Boyle*, argue a less Degree of Wisdom, than if they *depended on the mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion*, and consequently overturn the Existence of an infinitely perfect Being, by not attributing to him the highest Wisdom we can possibly conceive.

2. But

2. But let this matter be as it will, I conceive this Argument of Mr. *Clarke*'s for the Exiſtence of God, or the *Creator of all things*, is as *obſcure* and *defective*, as he thinks *Deſcartes*'s Argument from the Idea of God, is. For the true Queſtion being, *whether there has exiſted from all Eternity one immaterial Being of infinite Perfections, that created Matter and every thing elſe* ex nihilo; how does it follow, that ſuch a Being exiſts, from the mere Suppoſition of the Exiſtence of two Beings of different kinds? For it does not neceſſarily follow from that Suppoſition, that one muſt have created the other *ex nihilo*; and therefore other Mediums are neceſſary to prove that Point. *Lectures*, *Vol.* I. *p.* 38.

To infer a *Creator* of one Being or Subſtance from the mere Exiſtence of two kinds of Beings or Subſtances, is a Reaſoning no where extant in the old profane Authors, who *had not ſo much as a word to ſignify the Production of things ex nihilo*, and therein agreed with the *Jews*, who (as the ſame Author obſerves) every where apply the *Hebrew* Word, which we render *Creation*, to expreſs *other Actions and Effects* than a Production of Matter *ex nihilo*. The Queſtion therefore of a *Creator ex nihilo* is a modern Queſtion; and conſequently out of Reverence to ſacred and profane Antiquity, it became Mr. *Clarke* not barely to ſuppoſe the mere Exiſtence of two Beings of different kinds ſufficient to demonſtrate the Creation of one of them *ex nihilo*. Burnetii Arch. Phil. *p.* 315.

3. Since, on occaſion of the *Boylean* Lecture, the Exiſtence of God is often made a Queſtion (which otherwiſe would be with few any Queſtion at all) and ſince the Gentlemen that preach that Lecture propoſe to prove the Exiſtence

Clarke's *Lect. Vol. I.* p. 15. istence of God *by the Rules of demonstrative Argumentation* (and thereby give Men a right to expect Demonstration) I shall, out of the Inclination I have to see the Foundation of all Religion established on Demonstration, and to

Ibid. p. 6. gratify that *Desire* which even *Atheists* (as Mr. *Clarke* observes) *must of Necessity own* they have to see a Truth established, that is so much

P. 9. *for the Benefit and Happiness of Men*; for, says he, *on whatever Hypothesis* they proceed, *Nothing is so certain, as that Man, considered without the Protection and Conduct of a superiour Being, is in a far worse Case, than upon the Supposition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour* (from whence it seems to follow, That Atheists, according to Mr. *Clarke*, even while they continue so, have no reason to fear any thing for their Disbelief) I say, I shall couclude this Debate with an Essay, showing a way how to demonstrate the *Existence of God*, since Demonstration is thought so necessary in the Case, though I should think Probability enough to determine any Man. As far as I can judge of the Opinions of *Strato*, *Xenophanes*, and some other antient Atheists, from a few Sentences of theirs which yet remain, and of the Opinions of that *Sect* called the *Literati* in *China*, from the Accounts we have in the several Voyages thither, and more particularly from Father *Gobien*'s Preface before his *Histoire de l'edit de l'Empereur de la Chine en faveur de la Religion Chretienne*, 8*vo*, *Par.* 1698, they seem all to me to agree with *Spinoza* (who in his *Opera Posthuma* has endeavoured to reduce Atheism into a System) that there is no other Substance in the Universe but Matter, which

Spinoza

Spinoza calls *God*, and *Strato*, *Nature*. And this Syſtem is thus deſcribed by *Manilius*, Lib. 1.

Omnia mortali mutantur lege creatâ.
Nec ſe cognoſcant terræ vertentibus annis
Exutas. Variant faciem per ſæcula gentes.
At manet incolumis mundus ſuaq; omnia ſervat,
Quæ nec longa dies auget, minuitq; ſenectus.
Nec motus puncto currit, curſuſq; fatigat:
Idem ſemper erit, quoniam ſemper fuit Idem.
Non alium vidêre Patres, aliumve Nepotes
Aſpicient. Deus eſt qui non mutatur in ævum.

Now to anſwer theſe Atheiſts demonſtratively, and on Principles which will ſtand the Teſt, I am ſo far of Mr. *Clarke*'s Mind, as to think that we ought to prove the Creation of Matter *ex nihilo*; or which is all one, that Matter is not a ſelf-exiſtent Being. For if once Matter be allowed to be a ſelf-exiſtent Being, we Chriſtians who believe but in one ſelf-exiſting Being, are obliged by our own Reaſoning to allow Matter all poſſible Perfections, and to exclude every thing elſe from being Self-exiſtent: Becauſe it is from the Idea of Self-exiſtence, that we infer the Perfections of God. Beſides, ſhould we admit two Self-exiſting Beings, *Spirit* and *Matter*, we could not then be able to prove, but that there may be Self-exiſting Beings *in Infinitum*, and a Plurality of Gods; which is as inconſiſtent with the Being of God, or a Creator, as the Self-exiſtence of Matter. Wherefore it is evident, that to avoid the two dangerous Extreams of believing, either that nothing exiſts but the material Univerſe, or that Beings of different kinds neceſſarily exiſt,

we must not only know that Beings of different kinds exist (which Mr. *Clarke* thinks sufficient to prove a Creator) but we must have an Idea how it is possible for Matter not always to have existed: And then it will evidently follow, that what we can conceive possible not always to have existed, cannot be a Self-existing Being, and consequently that there must be a God or a Creator of Matter.

Now the way to prove, *That Matter is not Self-existent*, or, which is all one, *the Creation of Matter ex nihilo*, is to form to our selves an Idea of the *Creation of Matter ex nihilo*, as we have an Idea of the several Powers of Matter beginning to exist without any preceeding Existence; for unless we have an Idea of the *Creation of Matter ex nihilo*, we must inevitably conclude Matter a Self-existent Being. For what is a Self-existing Being, but a Being which we cannot but conceive existing? And what is the Idea of *Creation ex nihilo*, but an Idea of the Possibility of the Existence of Matter, or an Idea how Matter may begin to exist? As our Idea of the Creation of the Powers of Matter, is an Idea of the Possibility of those Powers beginning to exist; of which we have as clear a Conception, as we have that any Powers of Matter do really exist. Now to get an Idea of Creation, or a Conception how Matter might begin to exist, *we must* (as the incomparable Mr. *Locke* with great Modesty expresses himself) *emancipate our selves from vulgar Notions, and raise our Thoughts as far as they can reach to a closer Contemplation of Things; and then we may be able to aim at some dim and seeming Conception, how Matter might at first be made, and begin to exist by the Power of the Eternal*

Essay of H. U. B. 4. c. 10. §. 18.

ternal First Being. But as he thought that *this would lead him too far from the Notions, on which the Philosophy now in the World is built,* and that it *would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them*; so the small Compass of this Treatise, and the great Labour of shewing the Falsehood of so many received Prejudices and Opinions, as is necessary to give an Idea of *Creation ex nihilo,* must make it more pardonable in me (who own my self to be infinitely below him in Abilities) if I omit for the present so useful a Design, or should leave it entirely to some of those Gentlemen that are appointed annually to preach at the Lecture founded by the Honourable *Robert Boyle.*

Before I conclude, it may be expected that I should take some notice of the Expressions of Contempt used towards me in Mr. *Clarke's Third Defence.* But to every thing of that kind, I think it sufficient to say, 1*st*, to Mr. *Clarke,* That I heartily forgive all such Usage from whomsoever I receive it, and that I think my self in a particular Manner obliged to forgive him: Because I sincerely believe he endeavoured to be civil, and that he was as civil as he could be. And, 2*dly*, as to my other Readers, I will take the Liberty to believe them so much Philosophers, as that upon second Thoughts they will think *Civility* the best Answer and Reproof: Notwithstanding that we are lately told, by a Reverend Author, That *Good Nature and Good Humour make* Men *Atheists and Scepticks.*

Edwards's *Preface to the Doctrine of Faith,* &c. p. 19.

But there is one thing which I am very much surprized to find in Mr. *Clarke,* and of which I did not think him capable, and that is an In-

3d Def. p. 293. In the Remarks on his Sermons, and Defence of those Remarks.

sinuation that I *believe too little.* For I did imagine that the *Usage* he had had of the like kind, would have given him an opportunity to consider, that such Reflections are capable of being made by any body, and so derive no Credit on their Author, and that they can please no Man of Candour and Ingenuity. However, I shall not make that Return which such an Insinuation does suggest and would justify, but instead thereof will give him on this occasion a Testimony in his favour, before I finally take my leave of him; That I verily think he neither *believes too little*, nor *too much*; but that he is perfectly and exactly Orthodox, and in all likelihood will continue so.

A Fourth

A FOURTH DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT

Made use of in a

Letter to Mr. *DODWELL*,

To prove the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the SOUL.

In a Letter to the Author of the *Answer to Mr.* Clarke's *Third Defence*, &c.

With a POSTSCRIPT, relating to a *Book*, entitled, *A Vindication of Mr.* Dodwell's *Epistolary Discourse*, &c.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. late Rector of St. *James's Westminster.*

If we look into the World, is there not evident Proof, that Men professing Learning, are capable of believing and defending any Absurdity in Nature? Answer to Mr. *Clarke's* 3d Def. *p.* 353.

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A Fourth

DEFENCE,

OF AN

ARGUMENT, &c.

In a Letter to the Author of the *Answer* to Mr. Clarke's *Third Defence*, &c.

SIR,

OF repeating the same Things over and over again, there is no End. The Thing I proposed to prove, is, I think, so fully made out in my foregoing *Defences*; that I might safely leave the whole Matter to the intelligent and impartial Reader, without any further Enlargement. Your last Answer is little more, than a renewing of your former Assertions, sometimes in the same, and sometimes in different Words; as if you thought all that I had advanced to the contrary, was entirely wide of the Question. Whether that be really the Case or no, I am very willing the World should judge: And therefore in Reply to your perpetual Repetitions, I shall not transcribe my former Papers; but only refer to them, as occasion



A Fourth DEFENCE OF AN ARGUMENT, &c.

SIR,

OF repeating the ſame Things over and over again, there is no End. The Thing I propoſed to prove, is, I think, ſo fully made out in my foregoing *Defences*; that I might ſafely leave the whole Matter to the intelligent and impartial Reader, without any further Enlargement. Your laſt Anſwer is little more, than a renewing of your former Aſſertions, ſometimes in the ſame, and ſometimes in different Words; as if you thought all that I had advanced to the contrary, was entirely wide of the Queſtion. Whether that be really the Caſe or no, I am very willing the World ſhould judge: And therefore in Reply to your perpetual Repetitions, I ſhall not tranſcribe my former Papers; but only refer to them, as occaſion

ſion ſhall offer; and deſire they may fairly be compared together: And, as I go along, ſhall endeavour to point out to you ſome of the chief Miſrepreſentations and Fallacies you appear to be guilty of: And where you offer at any Argument that ſeems new in any part of it, ſhall conſider it in its place.

Anſwer, pag. 315. You begin with charging me, that *out of Four Objections inſiſted on in* your *Reflections, I have dropt the Conſideration of Three.*

Whether this be true, or no; they who pleaſe to compare the Papers, may find. I am not ſenſible, that I have paſſed over any of your Objections, or any part of any of them, unanſwered: Only, where you have repeated the ſame Things again, (as, for Inſtance, in that poor Objection drawn from our *Ignorance of the Manner how God will diſpoſe of the Souls of Brutes*;) inſtead of repeating my Anſwers, I have only referred to them as they ſtood in my former Defences; which is ultimately appealing to the Judgment of the intelligent Reader: And for this Complaint, I ſhall give you more frequent Occaſions hereafter.

pag. 315. & 316. *And in anſwer to* your *Fourth Objection*, you ſay I *am ſo far from ſhowing* (as I ought to have done,) *that if* Conſciouſneſs did inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of the *Conſciouſneſs* of the Parts; *that on the contrary* I *have only endeavoured to prove, that, as Roundneſs muſt conſiſt of ſeveral* Pieces *of Roundneſs, or* Tendencies *towards Roundneſs*; *ſo*, if Conſciouſneſs did, in like manner with Roundneſs, inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, It muſt conſiſt of ſeveral *Tendencies* towards Conſciouſneſs. And this you call an *apparent Deſertion of* my *Argument*.

Now

Now to this, I reply; that, *conſiſting of the Conſciouſneſs of the Parts*, and *conſiſting of ſeveral* Tendencies *towards Conſciouſneſs*, is the very ſame thing. For, as nothing that is not *Curve*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Curvity*; as nothing that is not *Colour*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Colour*; as nothing that is not *Sound*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Sound*: So nothing that is not *Conſciouſneſs*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Conſciouſneſs*. Differences indeed and Degrees there may be, of the Diſtinctneſs of *Conſciouſneſs* and vigour of *Thinking*; as there are different Degrees of the *Curvity of a Line*, different Degrees of the *Brightneſs of a Colour*, and different Degrees of the *Clearneſs of a Sound*: But as it is plainly impoſſible that any *Colour* ſhould have any *Tendency* towards being any *Sound*, or that any *Figure* ſhould have any *Tendency* towards being any *Motion*; ſo it is likewiſe ridiculous to imagine that any *Motion*, or any other Quality of Matter void of Conſciouſneſs, ſhould have any *Tendency* towards being *Conſciouſneſs*.

Beſides: The Curvities of the ſeveral little Arches that conſtitute the Circumference of a Circle, are not properly *Tendencies* towards *Roundneſs*; (for a *Part* has no more *Tendency* to the *Whole* by *Compoſition*, than the *Whole* has a *Tendency* to its *Part* by *Diviſion*;) but they are themſelves, being taken together, the whole Circle, or the *Roundneſs* it ſelf: So that *Roundneſs* is not a new real Quality, reſulting from the Curvities of the ſeveral Parts; but only a *Name* of the *Whole*, a *mere external Denomination*: Even in the ſame Manner as the Twelve Units that conſtitute the Number a *Dozen*, are not properly ſo many *Tendencies* towards a *Dozen*,

See *Third Defence*, *pag.* 363, 364.

Dozen (as towards any *real* new Thing or Quality;) but are Themſelves, being taken together, the Number *a Dozen*; which Name is nothing but a *mere Term*, an *external Denomination of the Whole*, and nothing at all really in the Things numbered. *Conſciouſneſs* therefore in like manner, if it was nothing but the *Sum* of thoſe Motions or Modes of Motion, which you call *Tendencies* towards Conſciouſneſs; would not be a diſtinct Quality really inhering in the Thinking Subſtance, (as every Man feels by Experience, and you your ſelf grant that it is;) but it would be a mere *Word* or *Term of Art*, nothing but a *Name* or *external Denomination*, ſuch as are thoſe Qualities which I ranked under the Third Sort.

Anſwer to 3d Def. pag. 329. Wherefore when you confeſs, that *the Parts*, (of Roundneſs, ſuppoſe) *muſt be ſo far of the ſame Kind, as to have a* Tendency *to that Individual Figure of which they are a Part: And* that *in that Senſe* you *have always allowed Conſciouſneſs to conſiſt of Powers of the ſame Kind; becauſe if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt neceſſarily be allowed that the diſtinct Beings in that Syſtem contribute towards Thinking, as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as all the Parts of a Syſtem of Matter contribute towards the Syſtem:* And again; that What is ſaid in the *Third Defence, may, for ought* you *know, be a Vindication of the Concluſion before-recited,* (viz. *that if Conſciouſneſs did inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, it muſt conſiſt of ſeveral* Tendencies *towards Conſciouſneſs:*) And again; You *do, in that Senſe, allow Conſciouſneſs to conſiſt of Powers of the ſame Kind; For, according to* You, *it conſiſts of Parts which have a* Tendency *to Thinking or Conſciouſneſs, as Roundneſs does of*

pag. 331.

pag. 332.

Parts

Parts that have a Tendency *to Roundneſs*: In all theſe Paſſages you directly give up the Queſtion. For, thoſe Modes of Motion (or of any other Quality of Matter) which you call *Tendencies to Conſciouſneſs*, either are themſelves *Conſciouſneſſes and Thoughts*, or not. If they *be*; then, as the whole Curvity of a Circle is made up of the Curvities of the ſeveral little Parts or Arches of which it is compoſed, ſo *whole Conſciouſneſs or Thinking* will likewiſe be made up of ſeveral *partial Conſciouſneſſes or Thoughts*; which is giving up the Queſtion with one Hand: Or if they *be not*; then, as the Roundneſs of a Circle, ſo far as it differs from the Curvities of the little Arches of which it is compoſed, is nothing but a *bare Name* of a *Whole*, a *mere external Denomination*; ſo *Conſciouſneſs*, as far as it differs from thoſe conſtituent Modes that are *no Conſciouſneſſes*, will be only a *Name of a Whole*, a *mere External Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf; Which is giving up the Queſtion with the other Hand.

YOU repreſent me all along ſpeaking, as if my whole Argument was founded upon the Suppoſition, that *in the Idea of an Immaterial Being Extenſion is contained.* That *Extended Being of Mr.* Clarke's. You *think him miſtaken in making the Soul an Extended Being. In making an Extended Being, as ſuch, &c.* An *Immaterial Subſtance and a Clock agree, according to Mr.* Clarke, *in being Extended*: And, *to make Immaterial Being Extended, as Mr.* Clarke *does.*

pag. 317. *pag.* 349. *pag.* 352. *pag.* 353. *pag.* 358. *p.* 381, 382.

This

This is neither doing Me nor your Readers Juſtice. For my Argument is not at all founded upon any Suppoſition either of Immaterial Subſtance being Extended or Unextended. That which I undertook to prove, was, that Matter, (all whoſe ſolid Parts are ſo many diſtinct, ſeparable, independent, unconnected Beings;) could not be a Subject capable of Individual Conſciouſneſs; And that therefore Conſciouſneſs muſt have ſome other Subject to reſide in. Whether That other Subject be Extended or Unextended, (whatever you may ſuppoſe my Opinion to be, upon other Grounds,) the preſent Argument determines not; but leaves every Reader at Liberty to judge as he ſhall find Reaſon. Only I affirmed *by the Bye*, for Argument's ſake, that I thought the Difficulties ariſing from the Suppoſition of Immaterial Subſtance being Extended, were not greater, but rather leſs, than thoſe which ariſe from the Suppoſition of its being Unextended. See *Second Defence*, pag. 174, 175.

Anſwer to 3d Def. pag. 317.

It is here alſo further to be obſerved incidentally; that, when you ask, *What other Argument can be made uſe of to prove all Matter diviſible by the Power of God, but what is drawn from the Conſideration of its Extenſion?* And affirm, that *if Matter, as an extended Being, is diviſible; all extended Beings muſt be diviſible:* and, that I have *no other Reaſon to make all Matter diviſible, but becauſe it is Extended:* and, when you mention the *Diviſibility*, add by way of Explication, *or (which is all one) the Extenſion, of Matter:* You ſeem to forget, that you your ſelf expreſsly allowed *Space*, though extended, to be abſolutely Indiſcerpible; And, therefore

pag. 382.

pag. 326.

Reply to 1ſt Def. pag. 135.

therefore you your ſelf make Matter diviſible, not barely *as an Extended Being*, but as *finitely* Extended; And, that I gave ſtill another Reaſon for ſtiling Matter diviſible; *viz.* God's having by his own Will and good Pleaſure created it ſuch a Subſtance, all whoſe ſolid Parts we find by Experience to be ſo many diſtinct Beings, looſe, independent one from another, and unconnected; that is, having no eſſential Connexion one with another, nor any Dependence one upon another for their Exiſtence; as the Parts of *Space* evidently have, even ſeparate from the Conſideration of its being abſolutely Infinite; and as the Parts of *Time* have, (foraſmuch as every *Moment*, co-exiſting with all the Parts of Space, is yet both *indiviſible* in it ſelf, and *inſeparable* from the other Parts of *Duration*;) and as the Parts, improperly ſo called, of Immaterial Subſtances may have, for any thing that can ever be proved to the contrary, on Suppoſition of their being Extended. But all this is beſide the main Argument, which (as I have ſaid) does not neceſſarily imply any ſuch Suppoſition.

and *Reflect.* on 2*d Def.* *pag.* 222. 1*ſt Def.* *pag.* 101. and 2*d Def.* *p.* 175, 176.

IN like manner; when you make a long and pompous Diſcourſe about *Adequate and Inadequate Ideas*, and about *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*; (that is, which cannot be cleared *wholly*, but yet may *in great part*, and enough to ſatisfy any reaſonable Perſon; though, it ſeems, you *know no* ſuch *Difference*:) When, I ſay, you talk about theſe things as of great Neceſſity to be premiſed, and as if you would have the Reader think the Whole Argument depended upon the right ſtating of them; whereas in reality they have no relation at

Anſwer to 3*d* Def. *pag.* 318—323.

pag. 318.

at all to the Argument, but were ſtarted only upon occaſion of that foreign and incidental Queſtion concerning the *Extenſion of Immaterial Subſtance*; In all this Matter, you have by no Means made a right Repreſentation of things.

However, as to the Diſtinction it ſelf, between *Abſurdities* or *Contradictions*, and *Difficulties that cannot perfectly be cleared*; I deſire only, that what *I* have ſaid upon this Head, (*3d Defence, page* 302, 303.) may be compared with what *you* have ſaid upon it, (*Anſwer, pag.* 318—325:) And whether then I had not reaſon, (notwithſtanding the Amuſement of 7 or 8 Pages about *Difficulties ariſing from the Perception of the Diſagreement of perfect or adequate Ideas, and Difficulties ariſing from the Perception of the Diſagreement of imperfect or inadequate Ideas*; when on the contrary I had expreſsly ſaid, that the Difficulties I meant, did *not* ariſe from the Perception of *any Diſagreement of Ideas at all*, but merely from our having in our *Imagination* either *no Ideas*, or ſuch very imperfect ones as cannot well be compared together, of Things whoſe Exiſtence or Certainty we can nevertheleſs demonſtrably prove by *Reaſon*, and apprehend many of their Properties by the *Underſtanding*; Which every one, that underſtands the firſt Elements of Mathematicks, knows to be the Caſe of *All Sorts of Infinites* and of *Some Finites*: Whether I ſay, I had not good reaſon) for the Diſtinction I made, I am willing any one, who pleaſes to compare the Books, ſhould judge.

Anſwer, *p.* 138, *&c.*

YOU

YOU ask, *What is a Difficulty which cannot be perfectly cleared by reaſon of defective Ideas, but a Difficulty which ariſes from the Perception of the Diſagreement of thoſe Ideas?* I anſwer; It is a Difficulty ariſing, not from the Perception of any *Diſagreement* of Ideas, but from the *Want or Defectiveneſs* of Ideas in the *Imagination*; which therefore we cannot compare ſo as to *Imagin* diſtinctly *how* they *agree*, though we can by our *Reaſon and Underſtanding* demonſtrate it is *impoſſible* they ſhould *diſagree*. This is plainly the Caſe in moſt Queſtions, concerning *Eternity*, *Immenſity*, &c. pag. 318.

You declare your ſelf of another Opinion; And, that you think, *whatever can be demonſtrated, can be* perfectly cleared *from all Objections and Difficulties*; *And, that all the Difficulties that may be urged againſt the Immenſity and Eternity of God*, &c. *which Mr.* Clarke *ſays cannot be clearly anſwered, are to be clearly anſwered*; *And, in order to anſwer them clearly*, you *would only require theſe equitable Conditions of him, that he would define the Terms, Immenſity, Eternity, Immaterial Being*, &c. It is a pleaſant Inſtance of an *Equitable Condition*, that you deſire me to give a Definition, that is, to expreſs the Idea, of things whereof I contend we have no Ideas or very imperfect ones, (ſeeing we can only give Negative Deſcriptions of them;) though we have certain Demonſtrations of their Exiſtence. And it is no leſs remarkable, that notwithſtanding all this ſtir about the *Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*, yet you your ſelf, when you come to diſcourſe more particularly concerning the Nature of Thinking, talk of a *Power in Matter* pag. 324. pag. 341.

unknown to us, and of which we have *no Idea*; of which nevertheleſs you venture to affirm, that it may *comprehend under it Thinking and its Modes*, as *Figure does Roundneſs*. But, to paſs this over: Since it is your declared Opinion, that all the Sorts of Difficulties now-mentioned, may be *clearly* anſwered; I cannot but think you would very much oblige the World, in anſwering them *clearly*. And I will offer you a fair Opportunity of doing it; by reconciling, if you pleaſe, the two following Accounts together; or elſe by maintaining either of them, and anſwering *clearly* the Objections and Difficulties contained in the other.

It is evident to me, that God muſt be an Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without any of the Properties of Matter; without Solidity, Extenſion, or Motion; and that exiſts in No Place; and not a Being that has Extenſion, and conſequently exiſts in Place and has Parts. — Thinking in God, cannot be founded on any Objects acting upon him; nor can Thinking in him be SUCCESSIVE *or conſiſt of Parts; nor can his Thinking have any* MODES, *becauſe Modes of Thinking are* DISTINCT ACTS *of Thinking. But as his Eſſence is eternal and immutable, without any the leaſt Variation or Alteration; ſo his*

The next Abſurdity charged on the Attribute of Eternity, is, How God ſhould co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time, and yet there be no SUCCESSION *in his Being. This I own to be as abſurd, as* ——; *and that there is a manifeſt Contradiction in this Notion or Conception. For if by* Succeſſion *in God's Being, is underſtood, (and I know not what other Senſe to put upon it,) co-exiſting with all the Differences of Time; then the Difficulty is, how to conceive God to co-exiſt with all the Parts of Time, and yet not to co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time. Now I acknowledge I cannot do This. But in behalf of God's*

Eternity

Thinking is one Numerical INDIVIDUAL *Act, comprehending all Things, and all the Poſſibilities of Things at one View; and is as fixt and permanent and unvariable, and as much without* SUCCESSION *and Parts, as his Eſſence.* Anſwer to Mr. *Clarke's* Third Defence, *page* 340, 341.

Eternity I beg leave to plead, that if God does * *co-exiſt with the Differences of Time, then he does co-exiſt with the Differences of Time; and it by no means can be ſaid, that he does not co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time, if it be true, that he does co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time.* —— *To ſay, God exiſts all at once, is to ſay that he actually exiſts in time paſt, preſent, and to come; that is, that Time paſt is not paſt, and that Time to come is come, and was always come. But to give ſome Satisfaction to thoſe who think it an Imperfection for God to co-exiſt with the ſeveral Parts of Time, I deſire it may be conſidered, that if God Operates at different Times, and takes up the Space of Six Days in the Creation of the World, redeems Mankind* 4000 *Years after, and will judge Men in a Time not yet come; then he Operates not all at once: And if he Operates not all at once, then he exiſts not all at once: For if he exiſted all at once, there could be no Diſtinction of Time in His Operations. Paſt, preſent, and to come, muſt be attributed to the Being that Operates, as well as to its Operations, becauſe Operations at different Times, ſuppoſe* Succeſſion *in the Nature of Things, and Exiſting all at once, ſuppoſes* no Succeſſion: *And conſequently, if there*

* *Note*: All that is here argued concerning God's co-exiſting with the Differences of *Time*, may in the very ſame Manner be applied to his co-exiſting with the different Parts of *Place* or *Extenſion*.

is a Succeſſion *in the Nature of Things, there is no ſuch Thing in Nature as Exiſting all at once. Now if there is no Imperfection in ſuppoſing that God Acts at different Times; as there is not: What Imperfection can there be in ſuppoſing that he does not exiſt now at the time of the general Judgment, any more than that he is not now judging the World?* Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Reaſon, *&c.* pag. 53, 54.

This Difficulty you muſt by no means paſs over unſatisfied; becauſe the Author of the Eſſay here cited, is believed to be a Perſon, whoſe Reaſoning you cannot ſlight.

Anſwer, *pag.* 325. But to *proceed now* (as you ſay) *to the Queſtion* it ſelf, My Argument, you pretend, is inconcluſive; becauſe, in my Enumeration of the poſſible Qualities of Matter; individual Modes of Figure, Motion, and other Qualities; (ſuch as are the *Roundneſs of a Circle*, the *individual Mode of Motion of a Clock*, and, in your Opinion, *Conſciouſneſs or Thinking*;) are omitted: not being reducible to any of the Three Heads there mentioned.

3*d* Def. *pag.* 264, 265.

Anſwer, *pag.* 327.

I anſwer: *Whole Roundneſs* (as you call it,) that is, the Name of the Sum of the Curvities of the little Arches that conſtitute a Circle; And, the *whole Mode of Motion of a Clock*, that is, the Name of the Sum of a certain Number of Motions; And, *Conſciouſneſs or Thinking*, that is, as you ſuppoſe, the Name of the Sum of *Ten Thouſand diſtinct Motions*, or of a Number of any other Qualities void of Conſciouſneſs; do all plainly belong to the *Third* ſort of Qualities I mentioned; That is, they are all plainly nothing but bare *Names of Wholes*, mere *external Denominations*, ſo far as their Idea

pag. 328.

See 3*d.* *Def. pag.* 262, *&c.*

is

is different from that of their conſtituent Parts; and are nothing at all really in the Things themſelves. Which whether it can poſſibly be the true Notion of Conſciouſneſs; making it nothing at all really in the Thinking Subſtance it ſelf, but a mere empty and foreign Name; I leave every Man to judge from his own Experience.

For my contending that *Thinking* was not ſuch a bare external *Name* of a Number of Qualities, but it ſelf a *real diſtinct Quality* in the Thinking Subſtance; you before called my Idea of *Thinking* a *mere Chimera of my own framing*, (though I believe no Man can help being conſcious of the like *Chimera* in himſelf;) And now you repeat it again. In anſwer to which, I refer you to what has been already ſaid, (*3d Defence*, pag. 307, 308.) and to what you will preſently give me Occaſion to add further upon this Head.

Reflect. on 2d Def. pag. 238.

Anſwer *to 3d Def. pag.* 328.

You *allow that no Quality can reſide in a Syſtem of Matter, but what muſt be always* in a certain Senſe *of the ſame Kind with the Whole that reſults from the Parts*; (that is to ſay, *of the ſame Kind with It ſelf*; But I ſuppoſe you mean, *of the ſame Kind with its conſtituent Parts*;) Namely, that *the Parts muſt be ſo far of the ſame Kind, as to have a* Tendency, *&c. And* that *in That Senſe*, you *have always allowed Conſciouſneſs to conſiſt of Powers of the ſame Kind.*

Anſwer, *pag.* 329.

p. 329, 332.

But I have proved at large in my *Third Defence*, that *Motions* (or any other Qualities void of Conſciouſneſs) can be *in no Senſe* of the ſame Kind with Conſciouſneſs. And I have ſhown *juſt now*, that they cannot poſſibly in any Senſe have any *Tendency* towards

3d Def. paſſim.

See above, *pag.* 395.

it, any more than *Colours* or Modes of Colour, can have any Tendency to *Sound* or *Smell*.

Anſwer, pag. 329. *The diſtinct Beings in a Syſtem of Matter, contribute*, you ſay, *towards Thinking; as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle.*

That they cannot do ſo; and that there is no Analogy, no Similitude in the leaſt, between the Things you compare together; I have ſhown at large in my *Third Defence*; and particularly *page* 248, *&c.* to which I refer you and the Reader.

pag. 330. You alledge, that in order *to contradict you, it muſt be affirmed, that every Quality that inheres in a Syſtem of Matter, muſt inhere* Wholly pag. 331. *in each Part of it*: That *Roundneſs* is *an Inſtance, that a Power may inhere in a Syſtem of Matter, without being the Sum of Powers of the ſame Kind*, that is, of Whole Roundneſſes: pag. 328. That *it is as impoſſible that* Whole *Conſciouſneſs ſhould exiſt in each of the diſtinct Parts of a Syſtem of Matter, as that* Whole *Roundneſs ſhould* pag. 332. *exiſt in each Part of a Circle*: And that, *unleſs in a round Figure each part muſt be* Wholly *round*; *and in a conſcious Syſtem of Matter, each part muſt be* Wholly *conſcious*; *and* in that Senſe *conſiſt of Powers of the ſame Kind: not one ſtep can be taken in Defence of Mr.* Clarke's *Argument.*

To all this, I think I have already given a clear and diſtinct Anſwer. *Third Defence*, pag. 248, *&c.*

pag. 334. In repreſenting Part of which Anſwer, you make it amount to this ridiculous Propoſition; that *though Roundneſs conſiſts of Parts, none of which can poſſibly be Round; yet, if Conſciouſneſs inheres in a Syſtem of Matter in like manner with Roundneſs;*

Roundneſs; that is, if it conſiſts of Parts, none of which can poſſibly be Conſcious; there muſt be as many diſtinct Conſciouſneſſes, as there are Parts: Whereas the plain Strength and Sum of the Argument, was this; that *as Roundneſs conſiſts of Parts, none of which can indeed be the* Whole *Roundneſs, but yet every one of them muſt of neceſſity be* Pieces *of Roundneſs; ſo Conſciouſneſs, if it inhered in Matter in like manner with Roundneſs, muſt likewiſe conſiſt of Parts, none of which could indeed be the* Whole *Conſciouſneſs, but yet every one of them muſt of neceſſity bear the ſame* Analogy *to the Whole Conſciouſneſs, as the Curvity of a Semicircle bears to the Curvity of two Semicircles, or the Curvity of one Quadrant to the Curvity of four Quadrants.* And whether ſuch Parts can be *wholly* void of Conſciouſneſs, becauſe they have not in them ſingly the *Whole* Conſciouſneſs; any more than the Arches of a Circle can be *wholly* void of Curvity or Roundneſs, becauſe they have not in them ſingly the *Whole* Curvity or Roundneſs; I leave to your ſelf to judge. Herein therefore you are guilty of a very great Miſrepreſentation; in charging me with a Contradiction, which ariſes only from *your own* ludicrous Interpretation of *my* Words. For if you abſurdly, and in defiance of the moſt perſpicuous Expreſſions, put *your contrary Senſe* upon *my* Words; what wonder then is it, if they become contradictory to *my own evident Meaning?*

What you repeat (*Anſwer to Third Defence*, page 236, 237, *&c.*) concerning your uſing it as a *Suppoſition* only, and not declaring it your *Opinion*, that *Thinking* may be a Mode

of *Motion*; I only desire the Reader would be pleased to compare, with what I offered, (*Third Defence*, pag. 271.) And, if in your *Supposition* you pitched upon the likeliest Quality of Matter you could find, to make Thinking a Mode of; and I proved the Absurdity and Impossibility of Thinking's being a Mode of *That* Quality; and, at the same time, made it evident that the same Arguments proved equally the Absurdity and Impossibility of Thinking's being a Mode of *any Other* Quality or Power of Matter whatsoever; and yet you declared it positively to be your *Opinion*, that Thinking *was* a Mode of *Some* Power in Matter: I presume, your denying your self to be accountable for the Absurdity I charged you with, and complaining of my *Disingenuity* in charging it upon you, (or, as you are pleased to express your self, in *putting it upon you*;) will not be looked upon as of any Weight, till you can Answer the *Argument* by which I proved it to be justly chargeable upon you; which Argument you have not taken the least Notice of, as I might reasonably have expected an *Ingenuous Adversary* would have done.

3d Def. pag. 271.

Reflect. on 2d Def. pag. 206.

Ibid.

You proceed to offer some Considerations, concerning the *Nature of Thinking*; from whence to deduce Arguments, to prove that it is merely an *Affection of Matter*.

Answer, pag. 337.

The Sum of your First Argument, is this.

> The Mind is operated upon by Matter, and Sensations are excited in it by the Operation of Matter, and all our Senses depend on Material Organs.

Matter

Matter likewiſe is operated upon by Matter, and Motions are excited in it by the Contact and Impulſe of Matter.

Therefore the Mind is Matter, and Thinking a mere Affection of Matter.

This Argument, I think, deſerves no Anſwer. Yet the Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult upon this Head *the Third Defence*, pag. 273, 274.

I ſhall only obſerve here, by the Bye; that whereas you ſay, *ſeeing Thinking follows the Motion of Matter in our Senſes, we have juſt as much Reaſon to conclude that It is a Power or Affection of Matter occaſioned by the Action of Matter, as we have to ſay that Fire is a Power or Affection of Matter, when it is produced by the Rubbing of a Wheel and its Axle-tree:* It is evident on the contrary, that we have all the Reaſon in the World to conclude there is no Similitude between theſe two Things: Becauſe Fire, as it exiſts in the Matter it ſelf, (ſeparate from the Senſations it excites in our Minds,) is confeſſedly nothing but mere Motion: But Thinking cannot poſſibly be mere Motion; as I have abundantly proved in my *Third Defence*; and will ſtill further appear, when I come to conſider in their proper Place the Exceptions you have made to the Proofs there urged.

pag. 339.

3d Def. pag. 271, &c.

Your Second Argument, is this. *pag.* 340.

Human Thinking has Succeſſion and Parts.

Material Actions likewiſe have Succeſſion and Parts.

Therefore Human Thinking is a Material Action.

This Argument alſo, I think, deſerves no Anſwer.

Your

pag. 340. Your Third Argument, is,

Thinking has its Modes.
Qualities of Matter have likewiſe their Modes.
Therefore thinking is a Quality of Matter.

This is juſt as if I ſhould argue.

Sound has its Modes.
Colour has likewiſe its Modes.
Therefore Sound is a Colour,

Or thus:

Spirit has Exiſtence.
Matter alſo has Exiſtence.
Therefore Spirit is Matter.

That I have not in the leaſt miſrepreſented your Senſe in theſe Arguments, I appeal to whoever pleaſes to compare our Papers together.

Ibid. Your Fourth Argument, is, this.

Thinking, in God, who is an Immaterial Being, is without any Succeſſion, Modes, and diſtinct Acts.
Thinking in Man, has, on the contrary Succeſſion, Modes, and diſtinct Acts; as the Powers of Matter have.
Therefore Thinking, in Man, is a Power or Quality of Matter.

In this alſo there is no Conſequence, though the Premiſes were true. But, that Thinking, in God, is without *Succeſſion*, I know not whether you will continue to affirm, or not; when you have conſidered and compared together the two different Accounts of this Matter, which I juſt now tranſcribed; and ſhall have reſolved which of them you will adhere to, by anſwering clearly the Objections contained in the other.

See above, pag. 402, 403.

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In the mean time I cannot but take notice, that you uſe a very ſtrange Expreſſion, when you ſay *it is evident to* you, *that God muſt be an Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without Any of the Properties of Matter, without Solidity, Extenſion or Motion, and that exiſts in No Place*; that is, in other words, *which exiſts not at all*: For, if he exiſts at all, it is certain he exiſts in *every Place*. I ſhould not have made this Remark, but that I am ſure you are no Friend to Unintelligible Diſtinctions, and Words that have no Signification; and that you will be aſhamed to give me the School-mens Anſwer, that God exiſts in every *Ubi*, but not in any *Place*; that is, that in *Latin* he exiſts *every where*, but in *Engliſh no where*. And yet, unleſs you give either this Anſwer or a better, (for it is a thing of too great Importance to be paſſed over without any Anſwer at all;) it cannot be helped, but your Words will ſignify, what it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe you could mean. Anſwer, pag. 340.

Nor is it a leſs wonderful Expreſſion, when you affirm that *Thinking, in God, cannot be ſucceſſive, nor have any Modes or diſtinct Acts of Thinking*; *but* that *it is one numerical individual Act, fixt, and permanent, and unvariable, and without Succeſſion*, &c. That is to ſay; that God cannot vary his Will, nor diverſify his Works, nor act ſucceſſively, nor govern the World, nor indeed have any *Power* to *will* or *do* any thing at all. I do not *charge* you with Conſequences; but I affirm they *are* too plain Conſequences of what you profeſs. p. 340, 341.

You obſerve that I allow *Matter to act upon the Soul*; Which ſince it cannot do by *Contact*, pag. 341.

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it muſt be by a *Power whereof we have no Idea*; and if there be in Matter any ſuch *Power whereof we have no Idea*, why may it not as well be capable of *Thinking?*

I anſwer: The Power by which Matter acts upon the Soul, is not a *real Quality*, inhering in Matter, as *Motion* inheres in it, and as *Thinking* inheres in the thinking Subſtance; but it is only a Power or Occaſion of exciting certain *Modes* or *Senſations* in another Subſtance; Which Power, is one of thoſe Qualities I ranked under the *Second* Sort; And there is no Analogy at all, between a Subject's being it ſelf capable of Senſation, and its being the Occaſion of certain Senſations being excited in another Subject.

3d Def. pag. 244.

However, as to the thing it ſelf, there is no more difficulty in conceiving how *Matter* may act upon *Immaterial Subſtance*, than in conceiving how it acts upon *Material Subſtance*. When a Globe, ſuppoſe, of a Foot Diameter, in Motion; ſtrikes upon a Globe of a Foot Diameter, at Reſt: Tell me how *Matter* acts upon *Matter*, by *Contact*; why the Quieſcent Globe makes a *certain determinate* Degree of Reſiſtance; why it *does not* make an infinitely great Reſiſtance; or why it *does* make any Reſiſtance at all. And when Light is reflected and refracted by Bodies, which it never touches; nay, at a diſtance from them evident to Senſe; and, in ſome Circumſtances, the nearer the Medium, whoſe Surface it reflects from, approaches to a Vacuum, the greater and ſtronger the Reflection is; (of which there are convictive Experiments publiſhed to the World:) Or when Matter acts, by the Cauſe of Gravitation, upon other Matter, in proportion, not

to

to the Bigneſs of the Superficies, but to the Quantity of the ſolid Matter it ſelf; that is, acts upon the very Centers of the original ſolid Parts of Matter; (of which, Mathematicians know there are Demonſtrations extant;) Tell me how, in theſe Caſes, *Matter* acts upon *Matter, without Contact*; and I will undertake to tell you, how Matter acts upon *Immaterial Subſtance.*

It is worthy of Remark, that, both here and elſewhere, you ſeem willing to allow, that That Power in Matter, whereof you contend Thinking to be a Mode, is a Power you *pretend not to know*; a Power *unknown to us*, and *of which we have no Idea, no diſtinct Conception* in our Minds, and which you *know not* whether it *be Motion or no.* Whatever it be, I have ſhown that the ſame Arguments hold equally againſt Thinking's being a Mode of that unknown Power, as againſt its being a Mode of Motion. But that which I would here remark, is this. If *it is abſolutely impoſſible* (as you elſewhere affirm) *to prove that there are two different Subſtances in the World, becauſe we have not Ideas of them*; how can we know there is any ſuch unknown *Power* in Matter, without having an *Idea* of it? And if it can be known that there is a *Quality* in Matter, of which we have *no Idea*; why can it not as well be known that there is a *Subſtance* in the World, of which we have *no Idea?* If there be (as you ſay) *no other Teſt of Truth, but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Ideas*; how can we affirm any thing concerning a *Quality*, of which we have *no Idea?* If *Difficulties which cannot be perfectly cleared*, are (according to you) *Contradictions and Abſurdities*; why is this important

Anſwer, *pag.* 341, &c.

See above, *p.* 407, 408.

Anſwer, *pag.* 377.

pag. 320.

pag. 325.

important Difficulty left *uncleared?* Again:

pag. 388. If it be true (as you affirm in another Place,) that *unleſs we have an Idea of the Creation of Matter out of Nothing, we muſt inevitably conclude Matter a ſelf-exiſtent Being*; how comes it not to be as evident, that, unleſs we have an *Idea* of the Formation of a Thought out of ſuch Qualities of Matter as we have *no Idea* of, we muſt inevitably conclude that Matter cannot think? And, that, unleſs we *have Ideas* of thoſe Qualities which we *have no Ideas of*, there can be no ſuch Qualities in Matter? But all this, is only upon your *own Suppoſitions*:

pag. 341. For the *unknown Quality* you make *Me* to aſcribe to Matter, in order to enable it to act upon immaterial Subſtance; is not (as I juſt now ſhewed) a real *inherent Quality*, but only a *Power* or *Occaſion* of exciting *Modes in another Subject*.

See above, pag. 412.

Anſwer, p. 341, 342. You obſerve further, that if the Soul be an Immaterial Subſtance, it is *a great Difficulty to conceive how by a mere Preference of the Mind* we can move our Hand, and cauſe it to reſt again, when we will: Whereas, *if Thinking be nothing but a Mode of Motion, or Matter in Motion, That Difficulty is entirely at an End*; there being then nothing in it harder to be underſtood, than how the Hand of *a Clock* is moved by the *Weights or Spring*.

It is very true: If there be *no Liberty of Will at all*, then all the Difficulties concerning the *Manner* of it, are *entirely at an End*. Thus *Des-Cartes* put an End to all the *Difficulties* concerning the *Knowledge and Perception of Brutes*, by denying that they have any ſuch thing as *Senſe, Knowledge, or Perception* at all: And if you

you had deprived your *human Machines*, as he did his Brutal ones, of all *Senſe and Perception*, all *Knowledge and Underſtanding*, as well as all *Liberty of Will*; ſome further *Difficulties* ſtill, concerning the Nature of *Thinking* and *Perception* in general, would have been alſo *entirely* at an End. And thus, if I ſhould ſay I could *entirely put an End* to all the Difficulties about *Opticks*, by ſuppoſing that Men have *no Eyes at all*, I ſhould likewiſe ſay very true: But who would thank me for the notable Diſcovery, I cannot tell.

And yet there is a Difficulty even upon your own Suppoſition; greater than you ſeem to be aware of. For by what *Impulſe*, by what *Preference*, by what *Power*, That Matter *firſt and originally began* to move, which you ſuppoſe impells both the *Weights of a Clock*, and the *Thinking Materials in a Man*; is juſt *as difficult to conceive*, as how, by a *mere Preference of the Mind*, without any external Impulſe, we can cauſe our *Hands* to *move*.

See *Boyles's Lecture for the Year* 1704, *pag.* 96, &c. *2d Edit.* *pag.* 122, &c. *1ſt Edit.*

YOU go on in the next Place to conſider my Arguments againſt the Poſſibility of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion.

To my firſt, viz. *that Modes of Motion are nothing but particular Motions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea beyond the Genus of Motion; and that therefore we have the ſame intuitive Certainty that Conſciouſneſs cannot be a Mode of Motion, as we have that any one thing is not another, whoſe Idea is the moſt remote from it that is poſſible:* You reply; That *we have no Idea of all the poſſible Modes of Motion*; That though *we have* indeed *Ideas of the more ſimple Modes of Motion*, yet of the *very complex* ones

Anſwer, *pag.* 342, 343, 344.

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we have no distinct Conception in our Minds; That therefore we *can no more prove or know that* Thinking *is not one* of these more complex Modes of Motion, *than* we *can know whether two things agree or differ from one another, that* we *have no Idea of at all*; That *it is not possible for us to say that Thinking does not consist in the peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of those Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking as something distinct from a Mode of Motion*; That *Thinking has the Genus of Motion, by arising from Motion, by being varied by Motion, by producing other Motions, by having Succession and Parts, and innumerable Modifications*; That *no Idea of human Consciousness can be produced beyond the Genus of Motion*; That *saying we have an intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, is only affirming the Question in debate, which can signify nothing to any Body that wants Conviction*, &c.

Now in all this, you have at last plainly declared the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of your whole Hypothesis; namely, that you intend to make *Thinking* not a *real Quality*, but a *mere empty Name* or *external Denomination*, such as I at first ranked under the *Third Head*. For the most complex Modes of Motion possible, whatever *Name* we call them by, are still nothing but Motions; and the *Name* we give them, is nothing but a *mere external Denomination*. *Thinking* therefore, according to you, being only a *very complex Mode of Motion* [or *of any other Quality of Matter*] is likewise nothing but a *mere external Name or Denomination* of that Mode. Which Notion of yours concerning Thinking,

3d Def. pag. 244.

See Answ. to 3d Def. pag. 328.

Thinking, is certainly a mere *Chimera*; and a very abſurd one.

Every Man has within himſelf the *Idea*, (or, in your Language, the *Chimera*) *of Conſciouſneſs*; which, though he cannot *produce* (as you abſurdly require,) that is, cannot *define*, nor *deſcribe*, any more than you can deſcribe your Idea of any *Colour* or *Sound*; yet he as certainly knows *it* not to be any complex *Mode of Motion*, as you know your Idea of *Colour* not to be any complex Mode of *Sound*: Which intuitive Certainty, if it be *only* a bare *affirming the Queſtion in Debate* in one caſe, *and can ſignify nothing to any Body that wants Conviction*; it is ſo in the other likewiſe: And then there is an end of all human Knowledge, and no Man can pretend to know any one thing not to be any other. See above, *pag.* 405. *Anſwer to* 3*d* Def. *pag.* 343.

Thinking has indeed *Succeſſion and Modes*, and many other things in common with *Motion*; and ſo has *every thing*, with *every thing*: The thing I affirmed, was not that *Thinking* has *no Property* that Motion has; but that it has ſomething in its Idea, which Motion has not; that it has ſomething *beyond*, and *totally different from*, the Genus of Motion: And this, I ſtill affirm, every Man has an *intuitive* Certainty of: Which *Intuition* you your ſelf allow to be one Way, (*Anſwer*, pag. 377,) and, I add, it is of all others the moſt infallible Way, of knowing a thing to be true. Ibid. See *Third* Defence, *pag.* 272.

We cannot indeed frame in our Minds diſtinct *Images* of the more complex Modes of Motion, as we can of the more ſimple Ones: But are we not, nevertheleſs, equally certain that they are all alike *Imaginable*, though our *narrow Imaginations* cannot comprehend them? Anſwer, *pag.* 343.

And that, if we could repreſent them to our Imaginations, they would all appear as remote from the Idea of *Thinking*, as any One of them does? Becauſe we cannot comprehend in our Imagination a diſtinct Conception of a *vaſt Number in Arithmetick*, as we can of a *ſmall one*; do we not therefore know, but that a *vaſt Number* may poſſibly prove ſo different from a Small one, as to turn into a *Plant* or an *Animal?* Becauſe we cannot form in our Minds an *Image* of a Space *Ten Thouſand Millions of Miles* Square, as we can of *Ten Foot* Square; are we not therefore ſure, but that the great Space may poſſibly be ſomething, whoſe true Idea ſhall have no Similitude, no Relation to Extenſion? If I ſhould plead in Favour of *Motion*'s being a Mode of *Figure*, (as you do for *Thinking*'s being a Mode of *Motion*,) that, *though we have indeed Idea's of the more ſimple Modes of* Figure, *yet of the very complex ones we have no diſtinct Conception in our Minds*; and that therefore, though we are ſure indeed that a *Triangle* or a *Square* is not a *Motion*, yet we *can no more prove or know that* Motion *is not one of the more complex Modes of* Figure, *than we can know whether two things agree or differ from one another, that we have no Idea of at all:* If I ſhould argue thus, I ſay, I know well what Mathematicians would argue concerning Me: And I can gueſs what Anſwer I ſhould deſerve, if I ſhould tell the World further, that *it is not poſſible for us to ſay that* Colour *does not conſiſt in a peculiar* Mixture of Ten Thouſand various Sounds, *till we have a particular diſtinct Idea of* the Reſult of the Mixture of thoſe Ten Thouſand Sounds. *I* may *call Scarlet-colour*, if I pleaſe, a very complex

p. 342, 343.

pag. 343.

pag. 343.

plex Mode of *Sound*; and who ſhall confute me, by *producing* the *particular diſtinct Idea* of the Reſult of a *peculiar* Mixture of Ten Thouſand Sounds? And *you* may *call Thinking*, if you pleaſe, a very complex Mode of *Motion*: Yet neither of them will, by either of our Confidence in giving things *Names*, be ever the nearer becoming ſuch in reality. This I think, clearly ſhows your Notion to be ſomething *more* than a *Difficulty that cannot be perfectly cleared*; that is, (according to *you*,) ſomething *more* than *an Abſurdity and Contradiction*; But *I* will be content to look upon it, as being but barely *contradictory and abſurd.* pag. 343.

To my ſecond Argument, *viz. that, if Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion, it would follow that all Motion would be a Degree of Thinking*: You reply, that you *do allow, that every Motion is a Degree of Thought, in that Senſe* wherein *it is proper to ſay that every Motion is a Degree of Fire*, &c. That is; you *allow* every Motion, to be as much a Degree of the *Senſation it ſelf*; of *Heat*, for inſtance, or of any other *Senſation* or *Thought* ariſing in the *Mind*; as it is a Degree of that *Mode of Motion* in *Matter*, which excites in us ſuch or ſuch a particular Senſation: You *allow* every the ſloweſt Motion of a *Needle* to be as much and as properly a Degree of *Pain*, as it is a Degree of *that Motion* which cauſes it to prick the Skin: You *allow* every Motion of a Particle of Air, to be as truly a Degree of the *Thought and Reaſon* of a Man; as it is a Degree of that *Mode of Motion*, which, ſtriking the Ear, excites in us the Senſation of *Sound*: You muſt by the ſame Reaſon have *allowed*, if it had been de- pag. 345.

ſired of you; that a *Straight Line* is as much a Piece of a *Motion*, as it is a Piece of the *Figure of a Triangle*. But I accept contentedly what you *do allow*; and I do not deſire to be *allowed* any more.

To my third Argument, *viz. that if Thinking was a Mode of Motion, then Motion would be a more generical Power than Thinking; whereas on the contrary*, &c. Your Reply is ſo uncertain and obſcure, that it is hard to know what to make of it. The Strength of the Argument, which you pretend you cannot underſtand, was plainly this: That *no particular Mode of any Power, can contain under it ſo great a Variety of Modes, as the Superiour Power it ſelf does; for the ſame Reaſon that Quadrilateral Figure, which is a Mode of Figure, cannot contain under it ſo great a Variety of Modes, as Figure in general does: And that therefore, if Thinking was a particular Mode of Motion, there could not poſſibly be ſo many Modes of Thinking, as there are of Motion. But now, on the contrary, it is evident there are more Modes of Thinking, than there are of Motion; becauſe every Mode of Motion has a Mode of Thinking* [*an Idea*] *anſwering to it, and there are innumerable other Modes of Thinking beſides: Thinking therefore cannot poſſibly be a Mode of Motion.* [And *the ſame Argument holds againſt the Poſſibility of its being a Mode of any other Power of Matter whatſoever.*] This is in ſhort the Sum of that Argument, which, you ſay, *you are perfectly at a Loſs to know what it means. To know what it means*, I believe every Man, except your ſelf, is very able; But to *know what to anſwer to it*, you might well be *perfectly at a Loſs*. Inſtead of

p. 345—349, &c.

anſwering

anſwering it therefore, you were reſolved to be even with me for offering you an Argument you could not underſtand; and would needs ſay ſomething in oppoſition to it, which you were ſure neither *I* nor *any Body elſe* could underſtand; namely, that *Ideas* are not *Modes*, but *Objects* of *Thinking*. However, this being manifeſtly abſurd, you contradict your ſelf again in the next Page, and ſay *it muſt be allowed that every diſtinct Thought*, [that is, every *Idea*] *is a particular* Mode *of Thinking*; *and ſo Thinking muſt in us have a great Number of Modes. But yet, for all that*, you ſay, *our Thoughts are finite and limited*; and *we comprehend only the more ſimple Modes of Motion and Figure*; and, *ſince our Thoughts are all limited in point of Number*, you *ſee no reaſon from their Variety neceſſarily to conclude, that human Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion.* You ſeem reſolved indeed not to *ſee the Reaſon*: But the Reaſon is *viſible* enough, and will force any Man to ſee it, that does not ſhut his Eyes; *viz.* that, there being more Variety of *Modes of Thinking*, than there is of *Modes of Motion*; and all the *Modes of Motion* (though we cannot *actually* attend to them, becauſe their Number is infinite,) anſwering only to *one Species* of the *Modes of Thinking*, (which Modes of Thinking under that *one Species*, are likewiſe infinite in Number;) it is plainly, and for the very ſame Reaſon, as impoſſible that *Thinking* ſhould be any one of the infinite Number of the *Modes of Motion*, as that *Figure in general* ſhould be any one of the infinite Number of the *Modes of Quadrilateral Figure*.

pag. 348.

pag. 349.

pag. 349.

pag. 349. You add: *If we consider but the prodigious Variety of Sounds, which are called distinct Modes of Sound; it is as easy to conceive, that upon Supposition of Thinking being a Mode of Motion, it should have the several Modes that we are conscious it has; as that Sound should have all the distinct innumerable Modes which That has.* But from what has been said, it is evident, That as all the Modes of *Sound*, though infinite in Number, yet bear no Proportion to the infinite Variety of the Modes of infinite other things put all together; so the infinite Modes of *Motion*, and their correspondent Ideas, bear no proportion to the infinite Variety of infinite other Modes of Thinking: And that therefore *Thinking* with its infinite Variety of Modes, can no more possibly be a *Mode of Motion*, though the *Modes of Motion* be allowed to be capable of infinite Variation; than *Colours*, or *Smells*, or any other thing that has no similitude to these, can be any of the infinite Number of the Modes of *Sound*.

My fourth Argument, was drawn from the *Authority*, and from the *Reasoning* of Mr. *Locke*.

pag. 350. The *Authority*, you profess to despise.

p. 350, 351. To the *Reasoning*, you answer; that Mr. *Locke*'s *whole Design in the Passage* I cited, was not to prove *that* Human *Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, but that *Thinking in the* Deity *cannot depend on the Motion of the Parts of a Corporeal System*; and that, *as the Question is not the same, so some of the Consequences that Mr.* Locke *draws from those Principles, affect only that really absurd Supposition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in God.*

I reply:

I reply: It is very true, that Mr. *Locke* indeed is not there proving that *Thinking in Man*, but that *Thinking in God* cannot be a *Mode of Motion*; and that *Some* of the Conſequences he there draws, do indeed affect only the latter Queſtion, and not the former. But, if the *Reaſoning* he uſes, be as ſtrong in one Caſe, as in the other; and the *Conſequences* I made uſe of from him, were only ſuch as affect both Queſtions alike; (for which I appeal to every Reader;) It was by no means conſiſtent with Ingenuity and Candour, for you to endeavour to impoſe upon your Readers with ſo weak an Anſwer.

See *Third Defence*, *pag.* 277, 278.

To my laſt Argument, (which alſo you ſeem unwilling to *underſtand*,) *viz.* that, *if Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion; then, in like manner as it is a proper Expreſſion to ſay, that Circularity is one Species of Figure, and Squareneſs a ſecond, and Cubicalneſs a third, and Ellipticalneſs a fourth; ſo it would be proper alſo to ſay, that Circular Motion is one Species of Motion, and Motion in a Square a ſecond, and Motion in an Ellipſis a third, and Thinking or Conſciouſneſs a fourth*; (which Conſequence, I think, is abundantly abſurd:) You reply, by quibbling upon the Word *proper*, that the Argument has relation only to *Propriety of Language*, and that you ſee not what Ground I have to *conteſt this Language* with you: Whereas the Queſtion was not Whether it was *proper* with reſpect to the *Language*, but with reſpect to the *Senſe*; that is, whether it was *True* according to your Hypotheſis, and a *juſt and neceſſary Conſequence* from it, to ſay that *Thinking* differs no otherwiſe from *Circular Motion*,

Anſwer, *pag.* 351.

p. 351.

than *Circular Motion* does from *Elliptical Motion* or from *Motion in a Square*: And this, it ſeems, (as you are indeed this time very liberal in your Conceſſions,) you are willing to grant; And I am well contented with the Conceſſion.

Anſwer, *p.* 354, 355, *&c.*

UPON the Queſtion, *whether individual Perſonality can be preſerved by a continual transferring of Conſciouſneſs from one parcel of Matter to another, in ſo flux a Subſtance as the Brain or Spirits*; you repeat what you had before advanced in your *Reflections*. In anſwer to whicy, I ſhall not repeat, but only deſire the Reader to compare what I offered in my *Third Defence*, pag. 288—289, and 302—303. And I ſhall here make only ſome brief incidental Obſervations on what ſeems new in your Reply.

See 3*d Def.* *pag.* 288, *&c.* 302, *&c.*

In the firſt Place you diſown none of the abſurd Conſequences I charged on your Hypotheſis. You deny not, but *One Subſtance may be Conſcious of an Action's having been done by it ſelf, which really was not done by It, but by Another Subſtance*; you make *Individual Perſonality to be a mere external imaginary Denomination, and all Self-Conſciouſneſs a mere Dream and Deluſion*; you own that *One Man may poſſibly be two Perſons, and Two or Two Hundred Men one Perſon*; *that is, not Perſons exactly Like one another, but all really and truly one and the ſame individual Perſon, at the ſame time that they continue ſo many diſtinct, intelligent, rational Men.* Theſe Abſurdities, I ſay, you have not denied to be unavoidable Conſequences of your Hypotheſis; nor have you done any thing towards clearing them from being Abſurdities; but

Anſwer, *pag.* 367, 368, 369.

compare 3*d Def.* *pag.* 291, 292. and *Anſwer*, *pag.* 369

but inſtead thereof, have only offered ſome looſe Objections againſt what I propoſed under this Head.

You ſay you *are ſure*, that my *calling* your *Hypotheſis* an *impoſſible* one, *and inſtead of ſaying a Word to prove it impoſſible, immediately arguing on the Suppoſition of its Poſſibility; is begging the Queſtion, and ſuppoſing what I was to prove.* The particular Hypotheſis here referred to (*viz. that Memory may be preſerved in a fleeting Subſtance, by continually repeating the Idea's, and imprinting them afreſh upon new Particles of Matter perpetually ſucceeding in the Room of thoſe that paſs away,*) was, I ſaid, an impoſſible Hypotheſis; And an impoſſible Hypotheſis it will always appear to be, till you can find out ſome new Hypotheſis, by which to make it intelligible, how it is poſſible that new Ideas printed upon new Particles, ſhould be a *Memory* of old Ideas printed upon old Particles. But I did not enlarge upon this; becauſe, ſuppoſing the *Poſſibility* of it, yet it would avail nothing towards your main Purpoſe; the Queſtion being, not whether the *Memory* in general of ſuch or ſuch an Action's having been done, might poſſibly be preſerved in the manner you ſuppoſe; but whether the *Conſciouſneſs* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, could in this manner be continued. Now how it was in me a *begging of the Queſtion*, to argue, that, even on Suppoſition of the Poſſibility of the Hypotheſis now mentioned, yet it would nevertheleſs be impoſſible for you from thence to make out the Concluſion you were to prove; I confeſs, I underſtand not: Neither do I underſtand how you can prevail upon your ſelf to diſpute in ſuch a Manner. *Anſwer, pag.* 353.

A Man,

pag. 367. *A Man*, you ſay, who, during *a ſhort Frenzy*, *kills* another, *and then returns to himſelf, without the leaſt Conſciouſneſs of what he has done; cannot attribute that Action to Himſelf*; and therefore *the mad Man and the ſober Man are really two as diſtinct Perſon as any two other Men in the World, and will be ſo conſidered in a Court of Judicature.* Extraordinary Reaſoning indeed! Becauſe in a *figurative* Senſe a Man, when he is mad, is ſaid *not to be Himſelf*; and in a *forenſick* Senſe, is looked upon as not anſwerable for his *own Actions*; therefore in the *Natural and Philoſophical* Senſe alſo, *his Actions* are not *his own Actions*; but *another Perſon's*; and the *ſame Man* is *really two diſtinct Perſons!*

pag. 368. You add: *Should there be ſo ſtrong a Repreſentation to my Underſtanding, of a Murder done by me, which was really never done at all; ſo that I could not diſtinguiſh it in my Mind from ſomething really done by me; I can no more help attributing this to my ſelf*, &c. It is true, I could not *help* it indeed; But it would be (as Mr. *Locke* well expreſſes it,) a *fatal Errour*; and not (as you would have it) a making me to be really the Perſon I am not. *So that it is evident* (you go on,) *that Self or Perſonal Identity conſiſts ſolely in Conſciouſneſs*, though a falſe one; that is, it conſiſts in a *Falſe Repreſentation*, in *a Dream*, as Mr. *Locke* well expreſſes it again. And ſo all Mankind, it ſeems, are nothing but a Dream: Unleſs rather your Opinion it ſelf be a Dream; as, I preſume, it will be found to be, by every Man whoſe Reaſon is awake.

See 3d Def. pag. 392. Anſwer, pag. 368.

pag. 369 *The reſtoring*, you ſay, *the Power of Thinking to the ſame or to a different Body at the Reſurrection, with a Memory or Conſciouſneſs extending*

to

to paſt Actions, will be a raiſing the ſame Perſon and not a Creation of a new one. If ſo; then the reſtoring the like Power of Thinking to Twenty different Bodies with a falſe Memory (a Dream,) or a Conſciouſneſs extending to imaginary paſt Actions, will be a making them all (as I ſaid, and as you expreſsly allow,) to be, not Perſons like one another, but one and the ſame individual Perſon, at the ſame time that they continue different, intelligent, rational Men. That is to ſay, if twenty of your Clocks happen to go exactly alike, they are no more twenty Clocks, but one and the ſame individual Clock. *pag.* 369.

Your Diſtinction between *raiſing the ſame Perſon* and *creating a new One*, is a Diſtinction without any the leaſt Difference. For the *Memory or Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions*, which you ſuppoſe makes the *ſame Perſon* in the one Caſe; does exactly as well make the ſame Perſon in the other Caſe: It being evidently as eaſy for God to add an imaginary *Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions that never were*, to a new created Body *now*; as to add an imaginary *Conſciouſneſs extending to paſt Actions that were done by one Body*, to another Body at the *Reſurrection*. So that from your Opinion it unavoidably follows, that I may now at this preſent Time as poſſibly be created a-new, and have another *Self*, *exiſting* at the ſame time with me, by God's adding to *the Underſtanding* of a new-made Body *ſo ſtrong a Repreſentation* of my paſt Actions, that That Other My-ſelf *could not diſtinguiſh them in his Mind from things really done by him*; (as you expreſs your ſelf in a like Caſe:) This, I ſay, is exactly as poſ- Ibid. See *Anſ.* p. 368. See *Anſ.* *pag.* 367 & 368.

ſible,

ſible, in your Hypotheſis; as it is for me to be raiſed again at the Reſurrection.

p. 370, 371, & 375. Your Argument, by which you endeavour to retort upon me, that, according to my Notion of Individual Perſonality, there can be no Reſurrection, nor any ſuch thing as perſonal Identity at all; is founded upon a fallacious Repreſentation, as if, by the *ſame individual numerical Conſciouſneſs*, I underſtood the *ſame individual numerical Act of Thinking*: Whereas the *individual numerical Conſciouſneſs*, which Identifies the Perſon, is that Perception, by which the Perſon is ſenſible, thas his *Paſt Acts of Thinking* were his *own Thoughts* and not *another's*; Which *Perception*, in the ſame continued Being, is a *true Memory*, and can be *true* in that one numerical Being only; But in your fleeting Being, it would be a *falſe Memory*, a *mere Deluſion*, and might be impreſſed on any number of Beings at one and the ſame time: All which, diſtinct, intelligent, rational Beings, becauſe they happened to be in the pag. 372. ſame *Dream*, you would affirm to be one and the ſame individual Perſon; And, for the ſame Reaſon, if twenty Pieces of Money happen to be ſtampt with ſo like an Impreſſion, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed one from another; you muſt affirm them all to be one and the ſame *Individual Shilling*, notwithſtanding their being different *Pieces of Silver*.

p. 372, 373. Having granted, that if *ever ſo many Thinking Beings* have (not *one and the Same numerical Conſciouſneſs*, as by your Compariſon of a *vaſt Bulk of ſenſeleſs Matter* being added to a Man's Body, you would very artfully inſiauate, in contradiction to the whole Courſe of your Argument and moſt expreſs Conceſſions; but) having

having granted, I ſay, and contended, that if *ever ſo many diſtinct Thinking Beings* have within themſelves a Like *Conſciouſneſs*, or a Like *preſent Repreſentation of paſt Actions*, they *can all conſtitute but one and the ſame Perſon*; You ask me, Whether each of theſe diſtinct Thinking Beings muſt not unavoidably *think* himſelf the *ſame Perſon* that did the Action, and the *ſame Perſon* that every one of the reſt will likewiſe diſtinctly think himſelf to be? I anſwer, as before; They muſt indeed *unavoidably think* ſo; But in ſo doing, they muſt alſo *unavoidably be miſtaken*: And ſo, according to your Notion, we are all *vnavoidably we know not who*, and do but *fancy and dream* our ſelves to be the Perſons we think we are, and write and read about *we know not Whom nor What*. See above, pag. 426.

To your taking Refuge in the *Juſtice* of God, I have already anſwered; that the Queſtion is not, whether God *will* do an abſurd thing, but whether in the Nature of Things it be *poſſible* to be done. And whereas you alledge that *if God ſhould cauſe to exiſt twenty preſent Repreſentations of the ſame paſt ſinful Actions in ſo many diſtinct Beings, the conſequent Puniſhment would be twenty times as much as the ſinful Actions deſerved and his Juſtice required*; and that therefore God *will not* do any ſuch thing: I reply; The Difficulty does not lie there; Becauſe the Puniſhment due to the ſingle Perſon's ſinful Actions, might be divided proportionably among the twenty diſtinct intelligent Beings, which in your way are One and the Same Individual Perſon; and ſo *according to you*, there would be no Injuſtice done, becauſe the Puniſhment would not be more than the Offences deſerved: And yet it is manifeſt, that *in reality*, Nineteen at leaſt 3d Def. pag. 292. Anſwer, pag. 373.

leaſt of theſe Twenty diſtinct intelligent Beings would be puniſhed unjuſtly, how ſmall a proportion ſoever they bear of the Puniſhment; becauſe they would be puniſhed for what they had never been guilty of at all, however by a falſe *Conſciouſneſs* they might *imagine* themſelves to have *done* what they *never did.*

P. 374, 375. The Caſe you put, of a Perſon living well for ſome Years, and afterwards forgetting that he had done ſo, and then living for the future in all manner of Debauchery; is ſo far from being an *Abſurdity*, as you call it, upon my Notion of Perſonal Identity; that, on the contrary, there is no manner of Difficulty in it. The Man is not *two Perſons, as much as any two Men in the World are two Perſons*; (which you declare he muſt be, in Conſequence of *your* Principles; A Conſequence ſufficient to have convinced almoſt any Man, of the Falſity of the Principles from which he ſees and owns ſuch an Abſurdity to follow;) But he is, I confeſs, (as you add in the next Words,) *as much two Perſons*, as *the ſame Man Mad and Sober is two Perſons*; that is, he is *not at all two Perſons*, but plainly *one and the ſame Perſon*; and ſhall juſtly be puniſhed as his Iniquities deſerve.

P. 356, 357. You urge, that my Argument is no more uſeful to the *Ends of Religion*, than yours; becauſe, *unleſs the Soul, as an Immaterial Being, did perpetually Think*; *a Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul*, would not neceſſarily *prove a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments:* And upon this you are pleaſed to make your ſelf merry, in a very needleſs Manner. Now what

Connexion there is between the Soul's *Immateriality*, and its *Perpetual Thinking*; has been conſidered elſewhere. In this place it may be ſufficient to add, that whether the *Immateriality and Immortality* of the Soul neceſſarily infers its perpetual actual Thinking, or not, yet *my* Argument is evidently *uſeful* to Religion, by proving at leaſt the *Poſſibility* and *great Probability* of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; And *yours* is evidently *deſtructive* of Religion, by making a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments not only *Improbable*, but *Impoſſible*; ſeeing it infers (as I have at large ſhown) an abſolute *Impoſſibility* of a *Reſurrection of the ſame Perſon*; And if a Reſurrection were poſſible, yet, by introducing ſuch an abſolute and fatal *Neceſſity* of all human Actions, as Mr. *Hobbes* and *Spinoza* formerly attempted to eſtabliſh by the ſame *numerical* Argument, (though from your *Thinking in the ſame way*, I would not conclude you All to be the ſame *Individual* Perſon;) it manifeſtly makes all future *Reward unreaſonable*, and all *Puniſhment unjuſt*: Of which more immediately.

My firſt Argument to prove your Notion deſtructive of Religion, was, that *by inferring the Neceſſity of all Human Actions, it makes Men to be Subjects no more capable of Religion, than Clocks and Watches are.*

To this you reply, Firſt, that *Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in any Syſtem of Matter*, (which is the Suppoſition I refer to, that deſtroys all Liberty of Will,) *is no where affirmed by you.* But this is a mere Quibble; as I have ſhown at large, *Third Defence*, pag. 270, 271. And above, *pag.* 407, 408. Anſwer *to* 3*d* Def. *pag.* 358.

In

p. 358. In the next place therefore, you anſwer ſeriouſly; that *Men and Clocks Agreeing in being neceſſarily determined in all their Actions, does no more prove them to be alike incapable of Religion; than an Immaterial Subſtance and a Clock's agreeing in being* * *extended, proves them to be alike incapable of Religion.* Had I not ſeen it, I could not have believed that either you or any reaſonable Man could have given ſuch an Anſwer. *Neceſſity*, if Men and Clocks agree in it, muſt make them both alike incapable of Religion; becauſe *Neceſſity* is the very thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion: But *Extenſion*, ſuppoſing Immaterial Subſtance and Clocks to agree in That, would not make Them both alike incapable of Religion; becauſe *Extenſion* is not the thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion.

* See above, pag. 397.

Neceſſity, you *muſt reply*, is not the thing that makes any Being incapable of Religion; What is it then, that incapacitates for Religion? *Want of Underſtanding*, you ſay: For *What excludes a Clock from being a proper Subject of Religion, but the Want of a human Underſtanding?* and *What is it that makes a Man a proper Subject of Religion, but his Underſtanding?* I anſwer: It is not *Underſtanding*, but *Will*, that makes a Man capable of Religion; and it is not *Want of Underſtanding*, but *Want of Will and of a Power of acting freely*, that makes a Clock incapable of Religion. For, ſuppoſing a Clock to have the Underſtanding of a Man; yet if, for all that Underſtanding, it continued to be moved by the Weights as neceſſarily as it is Now, it is manifeſt it would Then have no more Power of doing either *good or evil*, than it has Now; And the only Difference would

Anſwer, pag. 358.

be,

be, that it would then Know and underſtand it ſelf to be incapable of Religion, whereas now it is incapable of Religion without underſtanding or being ſenſible that it is ſo.

And to make it appear, that *Neceſſity* in an Intelligent, as well as in an Unintelligent Being, incapacitates for Religion; and that there can be no Religion without *Freedom of Will*; I offer only the following Argument. *Religion* ſuppoſes a *future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*; and a *future State of Rewards and Puniſhments*, ſuppoſes that God is *pleaſed* and *diſpleaſed* with the different Actions of Men; and God's manifeſting his *diſpleaſure* towards certain Perſons by *puniſhing* them finally, ſuppoſes that ſuch *Puniſhment* is *juſt* and that the Perſons *deſerved* it: For *God cannot err.* Now, if Men, with all their *Underſtandings*, were under the ſame *Neceſſity* in all their Actions, as a Clock is in its Motions; then, though you would unreaſonably imagin perhaps it might ſerve *ſome Deſigns* of human Government, to *pull* and *draw*, to *drive* and *puſh* ſuch neceſſary Agents with the *Screws* and *Springs* of *Rewards and Puniſhments*, as Men govern their Clocks by the Addition and Subſtraction of Weights; yet neither from the Hands of *God* or *Men* could the good or evil Actions of ſuch intelligent Machines *Deſerve* either Reward or Puniſhment; nor could there poſſibly be any *Juſtice* in God's final Diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments; nor is there any Reaſon why any Man ſhould *reproach* himſelf, or be *blamed* by others, (even by thoſe who would be ſo unreaſonable as to *puniſh* the Machine,) for any Profaneneſs, Impiety or Wickedneſs whatſoever, for murdering a Man (for inſtance)

with his Sword, when his Hand was moved *neceſſarily* to do it, by the Action of Subtle Matter upon his Brain and Spirits; any more than if he had done it by another Man's *forcibly* uſing his Hand and Sword: Neither is it poſſible that God ſhould be *pleaſed* or *angry* with any Man, for doing what he could not avoid doing; any more than a Man can be *angry* with his Clock for going wrong, even ſuppoſing the Machine indued with Underſtanding enough, to feel and be ſenſible that its Weights neceſſitated it to do ſo. The Notion therefore you maintain, of Mens Actions being all *Neceſſary*, is totally deſtructive of Religion.

Till you can give a *clear* Anſwer to this Argument, you ſtand obliged by Promiſe to *allow that Man is no more a Subject of Religion, than a Clock; nay, to go further, and allow that there can be no ſuch thing as Religion.* Though, I hope, you will be better than your Word; and own rather, that there is no ſuch thing as *Neceſſity*.

pag. 359.

Before we diſmiſs this Argument, you will expect I ſhould anſwer the two Queſtions you put to me *ad hominem*. Though indeed you have no reaſon to expect it; becauſe you knew, (but, for Reaſons beſt known to your Self, took not the leaſt Notice of it,) that they were Both of them *directly* and *clearly* anſwered in the Places from whence you had them.

pag. 363.

Firſt, you *deſire Mr.* Clarke, *who maintains* (you ſay) *the* Certainty of all Events, *to ſhow what different Influence the ſuppoſed* Neceſſity *of our Actions can have on the* Power of Self-determination, *that the Suppoſition of the* Certainty of our Actions *has not*. I anſwer: Your ſuppoſed *Neceſſity* is directly contradictory

to the *Power of Self-determination*, and therefore manifeſtly inconſiſtent with it; But the *Certainty* I ſpeak of in the Place you cite, has no Inconſiſtency at all with the *Power of Self-determination*, becauſe it means (as is there largely explained) only that *mere Futurity*, which you your ſelf muſt confeſs all Actions had while they were *yet future*, even upon Suppoſition of the *Power of Self-determination*. For you can *ſuppoſe*, what you will *not grant*, a *Power of Self-determination*. And, I preſume, you cannot deny but every *paſt* Action *had*, and every *future* Action *has* a *Futurity*, (which is all that was meant by *Certainty of Event* in the Place now referred to,) notwithſtanding that ſuppoſed *Power of Self-determination*.

Boyle's Lect. Vol. I. 1ſt Ed. pag. 215, 216. 2d Edit. pag. 169, 170.

Secondly; You ask, *if* (as Mr. *Clarke* affirms) the neceſſary and eternal different Relations, which different things bear to one another, always and *neceſſarily* do determine the Will of God; *and* God is *unalterably* determined to do always what is beſt in the whole; then *how can he have a Power of Self-determination?* I anſwer; The *Neceſſity* there ſpoken of, is only a *Moral* Neceſſity; which, as to the *Effects*, may be depended upon with infallible Certainty, (*viz.* that a *Wiſe* Being *will* not act *fooliſhly*, and a *Good* Being *will* not do *Evil*;) but, as to the *thing it ſelf*, it is in the *natural and philoſophical* Senſe, (of which we are now treating,) *no Neceſſity at all*, but *mere Self-determination*: As is at large explained in the Book you refer to. Which, if you would have * *taken to your ſelf the Character of an Ingenuous Adverſary*, certainly you ought to have taken ſome notice of. For † *when Terms are defined, and Inſtances agreeing to thoſe Definitions given,*

Boyle's Lect. Vol. I. 1ſt Ed. pag. 256, and 128. 2d Edit. pag. 200, & 101.

Ibid. 1ſt Edit. pag. 140, 237, 243, &c. 247, &c. 2d Edit. pag. 110, 111, 115, 190, &c. 191, &c.

* *Anſwer to 3d Def. pag. 336.*

† Ibid. *pag. 330.*

given, whereby all Doubtfulneſs about one another's Meaning is in the moſt effectual manner excluded; To cite an Author's Words, notwithſtanding this, and apply them to a Senſe directly contrary to what the Author largely and expreſsly explains he intends they ſhould be taken in, is no fair way of managing a Controverſy.

My ſecond Argument to prove your Notion *deſtructive of Religion*, was drawn from the Conſideration of the Nature of *Perſonal Identity*, and of the *Reſurrection of the ſame Perſon*. To which all the Reply you have made, has been conſidered already.

3d Def. pag. 288, 289, &c.

Anſwer, pag. 377.

To your Argument, that, *if we have no Idea of the Subſtance of Matter and of the Subſtance of Spirit, it is impoſſible to prove that one is not the other*; It might be ſufficient to Anſwer, that an unprejudiced Perſon would be apt to think it as eaſy to prove, that there is a *Subſtance* in the World, of which we have *no Idea*, totally different from the *Subſtance of Matter*; as that there ſhould be a *Quality* in Matter, of which we have *no Idea*, totally different from all the known *Qualities of Matter*. But to paſs this over: I affirm, that from our Knowledge of any Being's having certain Properties incompatible with the *Eſſential Properties* of Matter, we may certainly infer that the Subſtance of that Being and the Subſtance of Matter are not the ſame, though we have no Ideas of the Subſtances themſelves. We have no Idea of *Infinite*; and yet every Mathematician can demonſtrate concerning Many Infinites, that one is not another; and in ſome, the exact Proportion between One and Another; without having

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having an Idea of either. And to *your ſelf*, you ſay, *it is evident that God muſt be an* Immaterial *Being*, becauſe he is *without Any of the Properties of Matter*: (I hope you mean the *peculiar* Properties of Matter; Otherwiſe *Exiſtence* will be one of its Properties, as much as any of thoſe you mention.) The moſt *Eſſential Properties* of Matter we know, are, I think, *Impenetrability*, *Diviſibility*, and that which Mathematicians call its *Vis Inertiæ*. If you will ſay, that though theſe Properties belong indeed univerſally to all the Matter we have any knowledge of, yet, for ought we know, there may be other Matter which wants theſe Properties; and ſo theſe Properties may poſſibly not be *Eſſential*, but only *Accidental* to Matter; Then, I ſay, you either mean nothing at all by the Word *Matter*, or elſe you mean by it the ſame as you do by the Word *Subſtance*; and then your affirming God to be *Immaterial*, will be as much as affirming him to have *no Exiſtence*. And, as to the *Thinking Subſtance* in Man; When you ſhall declare, that by the *Thinking Syſtem of Matter in the Brain*, you mean a Syſtem of ſuch *Matter*, as has no *Impenetrability*, no *Diviſibility*, and no *Vis Iuertiæ*; we ſhall then diſpute upon a new Foot.

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pag. 340.

In the mean time, *nothing ſeems clearer* to you at *preſent*, *than that the Eſſence or Subſtance of Matter conſiſts in Solidity*; and that, to be *Solid*, is *to be co-extended with the Parts of Space*. If ſo; Then the *Omnipreſent God* cannot coexiſt with all the Parts of Space, without being *Material*: And I deſire you would be pleaſed in your next; to Anſwer the Difficulties objected againſt your Notion of *God's Immateriality*,

pag. 381.

materiality as they are expreſſed in the Paſſage I before-cited out of the *Eſſay concerning the Uſe of Humane Reaſon*; ſubſtituting only the Words [*co-exiſt with all the different Parts of Space*] all along inſtead of the Words [*co-exiſt with all the Differences of Time,*] and [*Immenſity*] inſtead of [*Eternity.*] And this I inſiſt on the rather, and deſire it the more earneſtly; becauſe (as I before obſerved,) it is generally believed that That Eſſay was written by a Perſon, with whoſe *Reaſoning* (for we are not to give any deference to *Authority*) you are thoroughly acquainted.

See above, *pag.* 402.

As to what I ſaid againſt material Impulſe being the Cauſe of Gravitation; the *Whole*, you ſay, *is founded on this, that becauſe a Bullet, a Feather, and a Piece of Leaf Gold deſcend with equal Swiftneſs in Vacuo, therefore material Impulſe cannot be the Cauſe of Gravitation.* Whereas, on the contrary, this was only an incidental Inſtance, to ſhow by a groſs and vulgar Experiment, (what Mathematicians know there are Proofs enough of in Nature,) that Gravity is exactly proportionable to the Quantity of *Solid* Matter contained in Bodies, and not at all to the Quantity of their *Superficies.* This Proportion it is, that evidently ſhows Gravitation not to be cauſed by Material Impulſe. And unleſs you could have found an Hypotheſis, whereby either the Quantity of *Solid* Matter in Bodies, and the Quantity of their *Superficies*, could be made one and the ſame; or, upon Mechanical Principles, Bodies could, by *Superficial* Contact, receive Impulſes proportional to the Quantity of *Solid* Matter contained in them; you would much more advantagiouſly

Anſwer, *pag.* 382.

vantagiouſly to your ſelf, have acknowledged the firſt palpable Errour; than by a heap of things beſide the Purpoſe, have endeavoured to amuſe only ſuch Readers, as want Skill in Mathematicks.

My ſaying, that you endeavoured to inſinuate to your Reader, that That excellent Perſon, Sir *Iſaac Newton*, was of your Opinion in the preſent Queſtion; you *aſſure the Reader, is a pure Fiction.* But I hope you will take it in good part, that I was ſo complaiſant to you as to imagine, that you were not your ſelf ſo ſenſible of the *Needleſneſs* of your Citation out of his Book, as you now acknowledge that you were. pag. 383.

YOU tell us; *If we have not an Idea of the Creation of Matter out of Nothing, we muſt inevitably conclude Matter a Self-exiſtent Being*: I anſwer; By the ſame Argument it follows on the contrary, that *if we have not an Idea of the Self-exiſtence of Matter*, [that is, that every diſtinct Particle of Matter in the Univerſe, is a Neceſſary, Independent, Self-exiſtent Being,] we muſt inevitably *conclude Matter to be a Created Being*: And by a better Argument it follows; *if we have an Idea of the Poſſibility of the Non-exiſtence of Matter*, that is, *if we have an Idea that Space can (without a Contradiction) exiſt without Matter in it; we muſt inevitably conclude Matter not to be a neceſſarily exiſting, but a created Being.* In like manner: By the ſame Argument with yours, it follows, that, *if we have not an Idea* (as * you own we have not) *of the Inherence of Thinking in Matter, we muſt inevitably conclude it to inhere in ſomething Immaterial:* And by a better Argument it follows; *if we ſee a Diſagreement* pag. 388.

* pag. 341.

of Ideas in ſuppoſing Thinking to inhere in Matter, we muſt inevitably conclude it to inhere in Immaterial Subſtance.

pag. 385, &c. What the reſt of your looſe and uncertain Diſcourſe about *Creation* and *Self-exiſtence* tends to, I do not well underſtand: Only, I am ſure, it is foreign to our preſent Queſtion. Yet two things there are in it, which, I think, deſerve to be remarked incidentally.

The firſt is; that from theſe Words of mine, [*On whatever Hypotheſis they* (that is, Atheiſts) *proceed, Nothing is ſo certain, as that Man, conſidered without the Protection and Conduct of a ſuperiour Being, is in a far worſe Caſe, than upon the Suppoſition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour*;] you moſt uncan-

pag. 386. didly infer, that *Atheiſts, according to Mr.* Clarke, *even while they continue ſo, have, no reaſon to fear any thing for their Disbelief.*

pag. 386. The ſecond, is this; that, *to gratify that Deſire which even Atheiſts have to ſee a Truth eſtabliſhed, ſo much for the Benefit of Men*; you

pag. 386. *ſhall conclude this Debate* (you ſay) *with an*

pag. 387. *Eſſay, ſhowing a way how to demonſtrate the Exiſtence of God*; viz. *by proving the Creation of Matter out of Nothing*: And this you do,

pag. 389. by *omitting for the preſent ſo uſeful a Deſign*, and *leaving it entirely to ſome of thoſe Gentlemen that are appointed annually to preach at the Lecture founded by the Honourable* Robert Boyle.

Inſtead of concluding therefore, as you promiſed, with *an Eſſay ſhowing a way how to demonſtrate the Exiſtence of God*, you almoſt in the ſame Breath repent of ſo noble an Undertaking, and end your Diſcourſe with a pre-

tended

tended *Compliment* to *Me*; that you *will give* me *upon this Occaſion a Teſtimony* in my *Favour*; viz. *that* you *verily think* I *neither believe too little nor too much*; *but* am *perfectly and exactly Orthodox, and in all likelihood will continue ſo.* And conſidering *we have had* (you ſay) *the Happineſs in* England, *to have ſuch rational Parliaments and Convocations, that have eſtabliſhed nothing but Truth*; I ſhould have taken this as a Teſtimony very much in my Favour indeed; had you not elſewhere dropt ſome Expreſſions concerning *proſtituting Conſcience ſo far as to ſubmit to any mere human Authority*, and *to the Deciſions and Determinations of thoſe Men, that in every Country have worldly Preferments to beſtow*: Which yet ſince you make no Application of, neither ſhall I. Only, in return for your *Favour*, I ſhall, inſtead of giving *any* Teſtimony concerning *You*, conclude with moſt hearty Wiſhes, that you would be very careful, while you are diſputing about *Metaphyſicks*, not to oppoſe the Intereſt of *true Religion and Virtue*, without which nothing is truly valuable or praiſe-worthy among Men.

pag. 353.

pag. 350.

Ibid.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

WHEREAS there has lately been publiſhed a rude and ſcurrilous Book, entitled, *The Holy Spirit the Author of Immortality*, Or, *A Vindication of Mr.* Dodwell's *Epiſtolary Diſcourſe.*

Which Vindication the Learned Mr. *Dodwell* has been ſo far from diſapproving, (as there was Reaſon to expect he ſhould have done,) that on the contrary he has referred to it in the following Words. *The Defence of what I have formerly produced from the Fathers, I left to the* Abler *Advocate for my Cauſe, raiſed up for me by Divine Providence.* And again: *I ſhould now have proceeded to have Vindicated my Interpretation of,* &c. *if God himſelf had not partly ſuperſeded that part of my Work, by raiſing me up a* more Able *Patron* —— *that ſo* Excellent *a Perſon, ſo utterly unknown to me, ſhould prevent me with a Defence ſo much* Better *than I could have made for my ſelf.* —— *I leave ſo much of* —— *my Task, to him who is ſo much* Fitter *for it* —— *It looks to me, like a Divine Interpoſition,* &c. And again: *How much I am indebted to Providence that has appeared on this Occaſion, and to the* Worthy Inſtrument *who has ſo readily anſwered the Call of Providence,* &c.

The Scripture-Account of the eternal Rewards or Puniſhments, &c. pag. 1, & pag. 291.

pag. 293.

It cannot therefore be improper nor unſeaſonable, to give the World a few Inſtances of the *Great Abilities* That Author has diſcovered in his ſo highly commended Performance.

In

In that Part which relates to the FATHERS.

THEY (*saith he*) [the Philosophers] *maintained it* [the Immortality of the Soul] *by way of Anticipation, by the* Instinct of Evil Spirits. *Vindicat. of Mr* Dodwell's *Epistolary Discourse.* Preface, *pag.* 27.

To what purpose, the pretended natural Immortality? To exist vitally for ever, for nothing! *pag.* 37.

The Original Belief of a Natural Immortality, suggested by the Devil, *was a* Lie. *pag.* 43.

* Ὀυ γὰρ δι' ἀυτῆς ἐςι τὸ ζῆν, ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ. [Thus rendred, very learnedly.] *It is not so of it self to live, as it is of God.* Vindicat. p. 6. 7.

* i. e. *The Soul hath not Life from* It self, *as God has from* Himself.

Ἀνάςασίς ἐςι τοῦ πεπτωκότος σαρκίου, πνεῦμα γὰρ οὐ πίπτει. *pag.* 8, 10.
The Resurrection is of the Flesh that fell; for the Spirit doth not fall —— What then? If it doth something * *analogous* ta falling, it is as much to our Purpose.

* *That is, if it dies, though without falling to the Ground, as the Body does.* A very learned Distinction.

The Soul in its natural Separation ——, *though* Alive, *is no more to the Man, than the* Dead Carkass. *pag.* 11.

No

pag. 25. *No created Beings can be* naturally immortal, *becauſe by being ſuch they would be* * Equal unto God, *not* inferiour *or* ſubject *to him, but* independent *on him.*

* *Contrary to common Senſe, and to the expreſs Declarations of All that defend the Soul's Natural Immortality.*

pag. 27. *Quemadmodum igitur Apoſtolus*, &c. —— *Sic & Deus*, &c. [Thus rendred, without any Senſe.] *Whereas the Apoſtle*, &c. —— *So God*, &c.

pag. 46. * *In eo quod dicunt*, &c. [Thus tranſlated, with no Senſe.] *At the ſame time they affirm*, &c.

* i. e. *In* or *by* their affirming.

pag. 49. (*and 2d Part*, pag. 14.) If [*the Soul be*] a God in *one* reſpect, or as to * *One* Attribute; why not as to *all* the reſt?

* *Viz.* a Created Immortality, owing wholly to the Good Pleaſure of God.

pag. 61. Though he [*Athenagoras*] ſays indeed, that Men have *Perduration* without any Interruption, with reſpect to the *Soul*; yet this is not to be taken in a *proper*, but in a * *figurative* Senſe.

* *What is living for ever, in a Figurative Senſe?*

pag. 120. Then from this Opinion [*of the Soul's natural Immortality*,] it will follow that its Life is * *neceſſary*, or its *Exiſtence*; and why not its *Propenſions* and *Inclinations?* If ſo; then the Man is in Conſequence *Incapable* of Sin, and no way *Obnoxious* to *Judgment* or *Penalties* on that account. —— Then hence it will follow, that to be *Virtuous* or *Vicious*, is an *Indifferent* thing, &c.

* *Nothing leſs.*

* Ex

* Ex rebus igitur diverſis ac repugnantibus HOMO factus eſt; ut, ſi &c, —— ſit Immortalis. Si autem, &c. —— ſit in tenebris ſempiternis & in morte. [*Thus rendred*] † The SOUL is made of different and repugnant Principles: So that, if &c; IT ſhould be Immortal: But and if, &c; SHE ſhould be in everlaſting Darkneſs and Death. *pag.* 123.

* i. e. MAN *is made up of two different and contrary Parts,* (viz. *Soul* and *Body*:) *That if,* &c; *then* HE *ſhould be immortal, and enjoy perpetual Light: But if,* &c; *then* HE *ſhould be in everlaſting Darkneſs and Death. The Effect of which Death is not to* Kill *wicked Souls, but to* puniſh *them eternally; &c.* And much more follows to the ſame Purpoſe.

† *Note,* In the *Errata* he has put [*Man*] for [*the Soul*] But even That Correction does not make the whole Senſe right.

I am ſenſible this Paraphraſe of mine, will be looked upon as *Forced*, by the * Prejudiced and Ignorant: But I *matter not That.* *pag.* 130.

* *That is, by all but Himſelf.*

Tunc cum Anima ſocietate Corporis liberata, in ſolo Spiritu vivit: *When the* Soul *being delivered from the Society of this Earthly Body, lives or exiſts in the* Spirit alone. *That is,* (ſuppoſing *Lactantius* to ſpeak in a *Chriſtian* Senſe;) when the *Soul* and *Body Both* ſhall be *Spiritualized, Immortalized,* &c. *pag.* 130 & 131.

* i. e. In Mr. *Dodwell's* Senſe.

Homo configuratus eſt ex —— Animo, & Corpore; —— Æterno, ac Temporali: *Man is faſhioned,* of, —— Soul *and* Body, —— Eternal *and* Temporal, *&c.* There may be ſome Advantage taken from this Place, I foreſee: But I think it is eaſily anſwered by this Diſtinction: *pag.* 140.

tinction: Either *Lactantius* here argues from Principles allowed by the Philoſophers; Or elſe * owns an Actual Eternal Principle in Man, reſulting from the Spirit of God, the τὸ θεῖον, the *quid divinum*, ſuperadded by *Baptiſm*.

* i. e. *Suppoſing him*, again, *to ſpeak in Mr.* Dodwell's *Senſe; it will then follow indeed, that he* does *ſpeak in Mr.* Dodwell's *Senſe*.

p. 141, 142. Cum poſſet ſemper ſpiritibus ſuis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare, ſicut Angelos genuit: *Whereas he might always have procreated innumerable Souls with their Immortal Spirits, as he generated the Angels.* I cannot queſtion, whilſt he * mentions *Spirits* in Conjunction with *Souls* as cauſes of their *Perduration*, and *immortalizing* them; but he means their being united with the *Eternal Divine Spirit*; And becauſe He is collated on every Individual in *Baptiſm*; ſpeaks of him improperly, as if He was a *particular Spirit* to every *Soul* that is *Immortalized*.

* *The Author evidently means no ſuch thing.*

pag. 73. Ἡ δὲ ἀλόγων [Ψυχὴ] —— ἐπίγειος ὅσα —— συναποθνήσκει τῷ σώματι — τῷ δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἡ Ψυχὴ, ἀείζωος ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀτελεύτητος. [Thus interpreted.] *The* * irrational *Soul*, —— *being earthly as to its Orgination*, —— dieth *together with the Body: But the Soul of* (The Ἄνθρωπος or) Man, (*under ſuch Limitations as are here* † *ſuppoſed of* —— *being united with and under the Guidance of the* Spirit,) —— *exiſts for ever, and ſhall have no End of its Exiſtence.*

* The Soul of irrational Creatures, *he ſhould have rendered it.*

† *Suppoſed by his own Imagination.*

Σύνθετος

Σύνθετος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ ἁπλῆς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὁμοειδῶν pag. 177.
μερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀσωμάτε νῦ, καὶ σώματος τῦ ἐπιθυμητικῦ ἤ τοι ἐμψύχε: [Thus explained.] *Man is a compounded, not a ſimple Being, not conſiſting of ſimilar Parts, but of an* incorporeal Mind *(or* Spirit,*) [he doth not ſay,* Ψυχὴ, *Soul,] and of a* Concupiſcible Body *or* animated by Ψυχὴ, Soul *(Excellently diſtinguiſhed!)*

I am well aware that ſome may be ready to carp pag. 179.
at this my Paraphraſtical Verſion; viz. *that it is* Forced and Extorted. *All I ſhall ſay by way of Anticipation, is only this; that either the Senſe I have given, is genuine; or that it is impoſſible to reconcile it to a* * Chriſtian *Senſe.*

* *That is,* to Mr. *Dodwell's* Senſe. *And ſo every Author muſt needs ſpeak* Mr. Dodwell's *Senſe; or elſe the ſame great Abſurdity will certainly follow,* viz. *that he does* not *ſpeak* Mr. Dodwell's *Senſe.*

Granting any Being to be actually Immortal,— pag. 234.
there is no need of ſuppoſing it any further dependent on its Creator *for Exiſtence; but is now as* Self-ſufficient *and* Independent; *as That Being that produced it.*

Had he been ſo created, Man would have been a pag. 235.
God.

The natural Immortality of any created Being, pag. 236.
will imply * neceſſary Exiſtence *to all Eternity* a parte poſt, *as much as of* God himſelf.

* *Nothing leſs.*

To ſay that the Soul is naturally Immortal, pag. 237.
and can in its own Nature, in Conſequence of the Deſign of God *in its Creation, perſevere in vital Exiſtence for* ever, *and ſhall* never die; *is to make*

make it in a ſtrict and proper Senſe neceſſarily-exiſtent, independent, *and its* Death *it ſelf or* Annihilation *impoſſible even to* * Omnipotence *it ſelf.*

* *Though it exiſts only in Conſequence of God's* Deſign and Will *in creating it; as is expreſſed in the very ſame Sentence.*

In the Other Part.

pag. 37. SUCH *a Criticiſer* (he ſays) *as Mr.* Clarke, *I foreſee may take ſome Advantage of my* * ſeeming Miſapplication *of this Text: But,* &c.

* *Nay, very real.*

Might not this very Notion [the Heathens Notion] *of* The One God, *terminate even in the* Devil *himſelf, the very Source of Errour and Idolatry?*

pag. 74. *This pretended univerſal Conſent of the Heathens, of owning* One God, the Creator of all things; *in them is plainly a* Lie, *though in Us the grandeſt* Truth: *Becauſe by this* One God *, they meant* the Devil. —— *The actual Knowledge of* God, *muſt be from Revelation, either by* God *or* the Devil; *nay, by* Both; *and cannot be obtained by mere* Natural *Light. And that this* two-fold Revelation, *&c.*

* *God forbid.*

pag. 135. *Hath Mr.* Clarke * *proved* —— *that Men are any way* INTERESSED *in the* Vital *Exiſtence of the* Soul *after Death, any more than in their* dead Bodies?

Or

Or can he * *prove* ——— *that the* Ἀνθρωπος pag. 135. [the Man] *is* Concerned *in the* happy or miserable *Existence of one Essential Part, suppose the* Soul; *whilst the other* [the Body] *is in a State of Insensibility? Or* [that the *Man* is concerned] *in the* happy or miserable *State of* Both *the essential Parts, whilst actually separated from each other?*

* *One would think, these needed no proof.*

So then, we have gained One Soul; *The other* pag. 135. [*the Rational*] *he* must *yield us*; *Then here are* Two Souls, *&c.*

Is it possible for a Compositum to consist of con- p. 146, 147. *trary constituent Parts? Would it not be monstrous for Man to consist of two essential constituent Parts, whereof one is dead, the other alive; or one* Subject to Dissolution, *the other* not? *Or, is it not certain that* the Soul is naturally mortal *, *BECAUSE* the Body is? *Or, is it not certain, that* —— *Both his constituent essential Parts, as animal and reasonable, must partake of the same Nature as to* Mortality *and* Immortality? *Is not this* SELF-EVIDENT *as to both States, This and the future?*

* *A most clear and self evident Consequence indeed!*

What signifies the separate * VITAL *existence* pag. 149. *of the* Soul, *to the* Man? *If the* Ἀνθρωπος [the Man] *be dead, the* Soul *is dead to him as actually as the Body,* &c.

* *That is; there is, no difference between* Alive *and* Dead.

When he [*Adam*] was punished for his pag. 157. Transgression, —— The Breath of Life, that is, the Spirit of him who saith *I am the Life,*

withdrew from this *Fleſh* of an earthly Original, and the *Animal* dropt into *Death*; the *Immortality* of the *Soul* being preſerved, becauſe it was only ſaid to the *Fleſh*, *Duſt thou art*, &c. Cyril. Alex.] *Here I can confeſs*, St Cyril *differs ſomewhat*; *but agrees*, *in the main* —— *that the Immortality of the* Soul *was preſerved*, *becauſe he ſuppoſes the* Spirit * *did not recede from* It.

* *That is to ſay*; The *Soul* at Death did not recede from the *Soul*, as it did from the *Body*.

pag. 196. *Neither did theſe Antient Philoſophers*, *as our Immaterialiſts*, *opine*, *that the* Spirituality *or* Immateriality *of any Being argued its* Rationality, *or on the other Hand its* Rationality *argued its* Immateriality *in the Senſe of our Neotericks*, *or that its* Spirituality *inferred its* Immortality. *At this rate*, *the very* ÆTHER, *nay* WINDS *would be* Rational *and* Immortal.

Theſe are ſome few of the innumerable Inſtances of the *Singular Abilities* of that Author, whom the Learned Mr. *Dodwell* ſo highly commends. Whoever caſts his Eye upon this Specimen, it is preſumed will not expect that any One ſhould think it worth his while, to follow more particularly ſo *ſtrangely ſtupid* a Writer, through twice Two Hundred Pages of *thick Darkneſs*, even *Darkneſs that may be felt*.

SOME

SOME

REFLECTIONS

On that Part of a BOOK called

AMYNTOR,

OR THE

Defence of MILTON's Life,

Which relates to the WRITINGS of the *PRIMITIVE FATHERS*

AND

The CANON of the *New Teſtament.*

In a Letter to a Friend.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year MDCCXXXI.

SOME REFLECTIONS

On that Part of a BOOK called

AMYNTOR, &c.

SIR,

THE Design which the Author of the *Defence of* Milton's *Life* professes that he had, in writing that part of his Book which relates to the Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Testament, was only to vindicate himself from the Charge of *denying the Scripture and declaring his Doubt that several Pieces under the Name of Christ and his Apostles, received now by the whole Christian Church, are supposititious*; by shewing that what he had said in the Life of *Milton*, concerning the Spuriousness of *several Pieces under the Name of Christ and his Apostles*, was meant not of those Writings which are *now received by the whole Christian Church*, but of those Apocryphal Pieces, which were in many places received *and approved in the Primitive Times*. This is what the Author

profeſſes to be the only Deſign of this part of his Book: And though for his own ſake I cannot but heartily wiſh it were really no other; yet becauſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, wherein he either ſo expreſſes the very ſlight Eſteem that he has for the Primitive Fathers, as ſeems to reflect upon our Religion it ſelf; or raiſes ſuch Doubts about the Authority of the Canon of the New Teſtament, as *Hereticks* (to uſe his own words) *may draw miſchievous Inferences* from, and by which *Scruples* may be put into the Minds of *Sincere Chriſtians*; I have therefore ſent you ſuch ſhort Remarks as upon reading the Book have occurred to me, and as I hope may be of ſome uſe to others on this Occaſion.

The Principal Propoſitions which our Author maintains, and which I thought moſt to deſerve Conſideration, are theſe three.

Pag. 38. 39. *Firſt*, That *the Books aſcribed to the Diſciples and Companions of the Apoſtles, which are ſtill extant, and at this time thought genuine, and of great Authority; ſuch as the Epiſtle of* Clemens *to the* Corinthians, *the Epiſtles of* Ignatius, *the Epiſtle of* Polycarp *to the* Philippians, *the Paſtor of* Hermas, *and the Epiſtle of* Barnabas; (for about the reſt which he mentions, there is no great Controverſy;) *are all very eaſily proved to be ſpurious, and fraudulently impoſed upon the Credulous.*

pag. 38. pag. 45. *Secondly*, That *it is the eaſieſt Task in the World, to ſhew the Ignorance and Superſtition of the Writers of theſe Books:* That *Barnabas* has *many ridiculous Paſſages*; and by *ſaying that the Apoſtles before their Converſion were the greateſt Sinners in Nature, robs us of an Argument we draw*

draw from their Integrity and Simplicity againſt Infidels: That *the Paſtor of* Hermas *is the ſilliest Book in the World*: And that *Ignatius* ſays, *the* pag. 46. *Virginity of* Mary *was a Secret to the Devil*; which, I ſuppoſe, he cites as a ridiculous Saying.

Thirdly, That *they who think* theſe Books *genuine*, ought to *receive them into the Canon of Scripture*, *ſince* the reputed Authors of them *were the Companions and Fellow-labourers of the Apoſtles*, *as well as St.* Mark, *or St.* Luke, which is the *only reaſon* he *ever heard of*, why pag. 48. *theſe two* Evangeliſts are thought *Inſpired*. For *to ſay that theſe Books ought not to be received now into the Canon*, *becauſe the Ancients did not think fit to approve them*, *is but a mere Evaſion*; ſince *many Books now received as Canonical*, *were not approved by the Ancients*; *and ſome received by the* pag. 57. *Ancients*, are now *rejected by the Moderns*; and Mr. *Dodwell* owns, that antiently *no difference* pag. 73. *was put by the Church between the Apocryphal and Canonical Books of the New Teſtament*: and beſides, *no ſtreſs can be laid on the Teſtimony of the Fathers*; ſince they *not only contradict one ano-* pag. 80. *ther*, *but are often inconſiſtent with themſelves in their relations of the very ſame Facts*; were di- pag 56. vided into *various Sects*, who *in thoſe early Days did*, *like us*, *condemn one another for damnable Hereticks*; uſed to *reaſon precariouſly*, (*as* Ire- p. 50, 51. næus *the famous Succeſſor of the Apoſtles*, argues from the *four Regions of the World*, *and the four Winds*, *that there cannot be more nor fewer than four Goſpels*) *and give hard Names to thoſe who contemn* ſuch *precarious Reaſoning*.

Theſe are the principal Aſſertions of our Author, which becauſe they ſeem to me not

only to be falſe, but alſo to be propoſed with too bold a Liberty of paſſing Cenſures upon the Judgment both of the ancient and modern Church; I ſhall therefore in anſwer to them, and for a Vindication of the Primitive Fathers and Modern Doctors of the Chriſtian Church, with Submiſſion advance theſe three Propoſitions,

Firſt, That though we are not infallibly certain that the Epiſtles of *Clemens*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp*, and *Barnabas*, with the Paſtor of *Hermas*, are Genuine; yet that they are generally believed to be ſo, upon very *great Authority*, and with very *good Reaſon*.

Secondly, That therefore, though they are not received as of the ſame Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Teſtament, yet they ought to have a *proportionable Veneration* paid to them, both with reſpect to the *Authors*, and to the *Writings* themſelves.

Thirdly, That neither the Belief of the Genuineneſs of theſe Books, nor the Reſpect paid to them as ſuch, does in the leaſt *diminiſh from the Authority of the New Teſtament*, or tend to *make the Number of the Canonical Books Uncertain or Precarious*.

I. *Firſt*, That though we are not infallibly certain that the Epiſtle of *Clemens*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp*, and *Barnabas*, with the Paſtor of *Hermas*, are Genuine; yet that they are generally believed to be ſo, upon very *great Authority*, and with very *good Reaſon*.

1. The

1. The Epiſtle of *Clemens* to the *Corinthians*, *a* * *great and wonderful Epiſtle*, ſaith *Euſebius*, was *unanimouſly and without any Controverſy received* by the antient Church; and † *read publickly in moſt Churches, both antiently, and in his time.* And that the Epiſtle now extant is the ſame with that which was ſo commended by the Antients, has not been queſtioned by any Learned Man theſe many Years, and has been lately proved at large by the Learned *Doctor Wake* in his *Genuine Epiſtles of the Apoſtolical Fathers*, and by *Grabius* in his *Spicilegium*, p. 261. whom I ſhall not now tranſcribe.

* Τέτῳ ὴ ἔν τοῦ κλήμεντος ὁμολογεμένη μία ἐπιϛολὴ φέρεται, μεγάλη τε ἡ θαυμαϛὴ. Euſeb. Hiſt. l. 3. c. 16.

Ἀναμολογημένη παρὰ πᾶϛιν. Id. l. 3. c. 38.

Ἱκανωτάτη γραφή. Id. l. 5. c. 6. ex Irenæo, l. 3. 3. c. 3.

† Ταύτην ὴ ἡ ἐν πλείϛοις ἐκκλησίαις ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸ δεδημοσιευμένην παλαιτε καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἔγνωμεν. Id. l. 3. l. 16.

2. That *Ignatius* wrote ſeveral Epiſtles, ‖ one to the *Epheſians*, one to the *Magneſians*, one to the *Trallians*, one to the *Romans*, one to the *Philadelphians*, one to the *Smyrnæans*, and one to *Polycarp*; *Euſebius* expreſsly teſtifies; quoting a large Paſſage out of his Epiſtle to the *Romans*, which Paſſage is now extant word for word in that Epiſtle, being publiſhed with the reſt above-mentioned. And that all the Epiſtles now extant under theſe Titles, are the ſame with thoſe mentioned by the Antients; is ſufficiently proved by the very Learned Biſhop *Pierſon* in his *Vindiciæ*, *Cotelerius*, and others.

‖ Μίαν μὲν ἐπιϛολὴν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Ἔφεϛον ἐκκληϛίᾳ γράφει, —— ἑτέραν ὴ τῇ ἐν Μαγνηϛίᾳ, —— καὶ τῇ ἐν Τράλλεϛι ὴ ἄλλῳ, —— πρὸς ταύταις ἡ τῇ Ρωμαίων ἐκκληϛίᾳ γράφει, —— τοῖς τε ἐν Φιλαδελφίᾳ ἄνωθις ἕτερα γραφὴς ὁμιλεῖ, —— ἡ τῇ Σμυρναίων ἐκκληϛίᾳ, ἰδίως τε τῷ ταύτης προηγεμένῳ Πολυκάρπῳ. Euſeb. Hiſt. l. 3. c. 35, 36.

3. The

3. The Epiſtle of *Polycarp* to the *Philippians*, is mentioned by * *Irenæus* that knew him living, and by † *Euſebius*, ‡ *Hierom* and others, whoſe Teſtimonies ſet down at large by *Cotelerius* I need not tranſcribe: And that the *Epiſtle* now extant under his Name, at leaſt the greateſt Part of it, is the Genuine one, is acknowledged by ‖ all Writers eminent for Judgment and Learning.

* *Lib.* 3. *c.* 3.
† *Hiſt. l.* 3. *c.* 36.
‡ *In Catalogo*, &c.

‖ See Dr. *Wake*'s Genuine Epiſtles, and *Cotelerius*, not. 1. in Epiſtolas Ignatii.

4. The Paſtor of *Hermas* is inconteſtably a moſt antient Work, being cited by almoſt all the Primitive Fathers extant, that lived in or near the ſecond Century; *viz.* by * *Irenæus*, by † *Tertullian*, by ‡ *Origen*, by *Clem. Alexand.* &c. whoſe Teſtimonies are ſet down at large by *Nicol. de Nourry* at the End of his *Apparatus ad Bibliothecam maximam veterum Patrum*, and prefixed to the *Oxford* Edition of *Hermas*, and to that of *Cotelerius*. Whether the Author of this Book be the ſame *Hermas* that is mentioned by St. *Paul*, though it is affirmed by many of the beſt and moſt judicious Writers, yet is it not ſo certain, nor of ſuch conſequence, that we ſhould be obliged to defend it.

* *L.* 2. *&* 4. *&* 6.
† *De Orat. c.* 12 *& de Pudic.*
‡ *Hom.* 8. num. *lib* 1, 2. *&* 3. de Princip. *Comment. in* Mat. *Hom.* 37. *in* Luc. *multiſq; aliis in locis.*

5. The Epiſtle of *Barnabas* is alſo without Controverſy antient, a Work of the Apoſtolick Age, being quoted by almoſt all the ‖ Primitive Fathers; as you may ſee by the Teſtimonies ſet down at large,

‖ *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 2. *& Strom* 5. *Origen contra Celſ. lib.* 6, *&c.*

in

in all the ſame Authors with the Teſtimonies concerning *Hermas*.

Upon theſe *great Authorities* then, though we cannot be abſolutely ſure that theſe Writings are Genuine, yet we may well conclude and believe them to be ſo, notwithſtanding the Suſpicions which ſome have raiſed to the contrary. There are alſo ſundry other Arguments, which may be drawn from the Simplicity of the Stile and Way of arguing uſed in theſe Writings, agreeable to the Cuſtom of the Age in which they are ſuppoſed to be written; from the Conformity of the Matters contained in them, to the Doctrine and Diſcipline of thoſe times; and from the exact Agreement of all the Quotations of the moſt antient Authors, to the Copies extant at this Day: All which taken together, afford ſo *good Reaſon* to believe theſe Books to be genuine, that whoſoever conſiders them, may very well wonder at the Confidence of Mr. *T.* who is pleaſed to affirm that *it is the eaſieſt Task in the World to prove all theſe Writings ſpurious, and fraudulently impoſed upon the credulous.*

II. *Secondly*, Though theſe Writings are not received as of the ſame Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Teſtament, yet ought they to have a *proportionable Veneration* paid to them, both with reſpect to the *Authors* and to the *Writings* themſelves.

Clemens was a Companion of the Apoſtles, and *Ignatius* and *Polycarp* their immediate Succeſſors; and if the Authors of the Epiſtle of *Barnabas* and of the Paſtor of *Hermas* were not the ſame with the Fellow-Labourers and Contemporaries of the Apoſtles, known by thoſe

thoſe Names, yet are they ſo undeniably antient, (being certainly of the firſt Age,) as to challenge all the reſpect that can poſſibly be due to any Writers upon the Account of Antiquity. And as to the Writings themſelves, though Mr. *T.* will not be perſuaded to grant with the Learned Dr. * *Wake*, that *they contain the true and pure Faith of Chriſt, without the leaſt Errour intermixt with it*; yet this we may be bold to affirm, that in general they are ſo far from betraying either the *Ignorance* or *Superſtition* of their Authors, which Mr. *T.* ſo confidently charges them with, that they contain a very good Account of *that Doctrine and Diſcipline* of the pureſt Ages of the Church, *which* all learned and good Chriſtians heartily wiſh could be reſtored at this Day.

* In his Diſcourſe of the Authority of the genuine Epiſtles, *pag.* 175.

1. The Epiſtle of *Clemens* is ſtiled by *Euſebius*, (as I have already obſerved) *a great and admirable Epiſtle*; and was publickly read in the Chriſtian Churches both before and in his time: "And indeed it does not at all come "ſhort of the higheſt Praiſes which the Antients have given to it; being a Piece compoſed with ſuch an admirable Spirit of Love "and Charity; of Zeal towards God, and of "Concern for the Church; of the moſt excellent Exhortations delivered with the "greateſt Plainneſs and Simplicity of Speech, "and yet preſſed many times with ſuch moving Eloquence too; that I cannot imagine "what could have been deſired in ſuch an "Epiſtle, more proper for the End for which "it was compoſed; what could have been "written more becoming an Apoſtolical Age,

"and

" and the Pen of one of the moſt eminent " Biſhops of it". Thus the Learned Dr. *Wake.*

His making the *Scarlet Thread* hung out by *Rahab* to the Spies, a Type of the *Blood* of *Chriſt*; however it may poſſibly ſeem ſtrange to ſuch as Mr. *T.* was yet in the Opinion of the Antients very agreeable to the Tenour of the Scripture, and particularly to that Type of the *Scarlet Wool*, wherewith the Blood of the Sacrifice was ſprinkled on the People under the Law, *Heb.* ix. 19.

The Hiſtory of the *Phœnix*, mentioned in this Epiſtle, is confeſſedly a Fable. But he that conſiders that it was a Story at that time generally told and believed, as *Tacitus* largely relates; and that the beſt of Men never had any Aſſurance of being preſerved from vulgar and innocent Errours; will not be haſty in cenſuring an excellent Man, and an excellent Book, for making ſuch a vulgar Errour the Topick of a popular Argument.

2. The Epiſtles of *Ignatius* are written indeed in a plain, ſimple, and unaffected Stile; as are moſt of the Books of the Holy Scripture it ſelf: but, whatever Mr. *T.* ſays, there is nothing in them either of *Ignorance* or *Superſtition*; unleſs a *Firm Belief of Divine Revelation* muſt be eſteemed *Ignorance*, and a *ſtrict Obſervance of the Laws of Chriſt* is to be called *Superſtition.*

One Paſſage indeed there is in his Epiſtle to the *Epheſians*, which Mr. *T.* cannot but ſmile at: *viz.* that *the Virginity of* Mary *and her Delivery, was kept in ſecret from the Prince of this World.*

World. But he that considers the manner of our Saviour's Temptation, and how the Antients constantly, and (in the Judgment of the very Learned * *Grotius*) not without good Grounds, denied the Devil to have known any thing at first of the great Mystery of the Incarnation, will not for this Passage condemn *Ignatius* of *Ignorance*.

* Sanè Diabolum majus aliquid homine in Christo agnovisse hoc quidem tempore, constanter, *nec sine magnis argumentis*, negant Scriptores antiqui. *Grot.* in Mat. 4, 3.

3. The Epistle of *Polycarp* to the *Philippians* is a very valuable Monument of Antiquity, containing nothing in it unworthy the Character of so great a Father. † *Irenæus* calls it *a most compleat Epistle; out of which they that are careful of their own Salvation, may learn what was the Belief of* that Apostolical Man, *and what the Form of sound Doctrine which he delivered in his Preaching.*

† Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴ Πολυκάρπου πρὸς Φιλιππησίους γεγραμμένη, ἱκανωτάτη ἐξ ἧς καὶ τὸν χαρακτῆρα τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα τῆς ἀληθείας, οἱ φροντίζοντες τῆς ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίας δύνανται μαθεῖν. Euseb. Hist. l. 4. c. 14. ex Irenæo.

4. The Pastor of *Hermas* is a Book full of very excellent Moral Instructions, delivered for the most Part in easy and natural Similitudes, and these also explained at large to the Apprehension of the meanest Capacities: For which reason, though it was not received into the Canon of Scripture, yet (as *Eusebius* testifies) it ‖ *was judged by the Antients a most necessary Book, especially for those who were to be instructed in the first Principles of Religion; and was therefore accordingly read in Churches:* And *Origen* (who was far from being an *ignorant Man*) judges it to * be a *most useful*

‖ Πρὸς μέν τινων ἀντιλελέκται δι' οὓς οὐκ ἂν ἐν ὁμολογουμένοις τεθείη ὑφ' ἑτέρων καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον, οἷς μάλιστα δεῖ στοιχειώσεως εἰσαγωγικῆς. κέκριται ὅθεν ἤδη καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις ἴσμεν αὐτὸ δεδημοσιουμένον. Euseb. Hist. l. 4. c. 3.

* In *Rom.* xvi. 14.

uſeful Book. But Mr. *T.* ſaith it is *the ſilliest Book in the World.* Why he ſhould think ſo, I cannot apprehend, unleſs it be becauſe there are here and there ſome few odd Paſſages ſcattered in it, very different from our modern way of Writing, which perhaps he can ſingle out and expoſe; And ſo there is hardly any Book extant in the World, which a witty Man may not turn into ridicule.

All the Objections which I think have been hitherto made to this Book, are theſe: That * *it contains fabulous Viſions*: That *it makes too much for Free-will*: That *it aſſigns to every Man two Angels*: That *it favours the* Novatians *in allowing but one Repentance*: That *it favours Monkiſh Solitude*: and, that *it ſpeaks of Purgatory*. The three firſt of theſe Objections we ſhall conſider immediately; But the three latter are ſo *directly falſe*, that one would wonder how Prejudice could poſſibly be ſo ſtrong as to make Men ſee in any Author thoſe things, of which there is not the *leaſt Syllable or Hint* in the whole Book.

* Libri *fabuloſi* ſunt, in quibus contra Apoſtolicum conſenſum adſtruitur *Liberum Arbitrium, una Pœnitentia. Solitudo Monaſtica*, & quod memoratu dignum, purgatorium ab anu quâdam in viſione tertiâ profertur. *Sculletus de Script. Apoch.*

That the *Viſions* contained in it are *fabulous*, we ought not to ſay, unleſs we be ſure, either that God never afforded any Viſions to the firſt Chriſtians; or that theſe Viſions have ſome particular Circumſtances, which prove that they could not come from God. But if it were ſo, yet taking that which is uſed in this Book to be no other than a Parabolical way of Writing, wherein the Church is introduced as repreſenting its own Doctrine and Diſcipline to a Perſon in a Viſion, it ought not to be ſtiled

fabulous, any more than * other Books of that kind which are written in our Age.

* Parable of the Pilgrim of the Prodigal, *&c.*

That maintaining the *Freedom* of Mans *Will*, in the Senſe that *Hermas* aſſerts it, is a good Objection againſt a Book, I ſuppoſe neither Mr. *T.* nor any Man elſe, at this time of Day, will contend.

That *Hermas* aſſigns *to every particular Man two Angels*, if the Titles of the Chapters were of any Authority, could not indeed be queſtioned. But in the Book it ſelf there is no ſuch thing *expreſsly* affirmed: All that the Author there ſays, is only in general, That † *there are two Angels with Man; one of Righteouſneſs, the other of Iniquity*; and that *when good Thoughts ariſe in a Man's Heart, then the Angel of Righteouſneſs* (that is, ſome good Spirit) *is with him*; *and when evil Thoughts ariſe in his Heart, then the Angel of Iniquity*, (that is, ſome evil Spirit) *tempts him*: Which perhaps is no more than what all Chriſtians believe. So that *Cotelerius* in his Notes upon the Place, might have ſpared the Pains of proving other Fathers to have been of the ſame Opinion with *Hermas*, till he had ſhown that theſe words do *neceſſarily* ſignify that *Hermas* himſelf was of that Opinion.

† Duo ſunt nuntii cum homine; unus æquitatis, & unus iniquitatis. *Mandat.* 6.

That *Hermas* by allowing *but One Repentance* for great and ſcandalous Crimes, favours the *Novatians*, whoſe Hereſy conſiſted in allowing *no* other *Repentance at all*, than that of *Baptiſm*, is ſo far from being true, that he in expreſs words oppoſes his *One Repentance* to *Baptiſm*; and ſays more for the Validity and Efficacy

cacy of that after-Repentance for Crimes committed by Baptized Christians, in this one little Book, than perhaps is to be found in all the other Writers of the three first Centuries put together; insomuch that *Tertullian*, after he turned *Montanist*, and had embraced the Opinion of the *Novatians*, * exclaims with all imaginable bitterness against this Book for that very Reason, because it was more favourable than any other Book then extant, in allowing Repentance to Adulterers after Baptism, which the *Novatians* denied.

* Cederem tibi, si scriptura Pastoris, quæ sola mœchos amat, non ab omni concilio Ecclesiarum inter Apocrypha & falsa judicaretur, adultera & ipsa, & inde patrona sociorum. *De Pudicitia.*

That this Book favours *Monkish Solitude*, is also so far from being true, that on the contrary it even expressly allows † *Second Marriages*, which was more than most Writers of that Age were willing to do.

† *Mandat.* 4.

Lastly, So far is this Writer from establishing the Doctrine of *Purgatory*, that there is not *one Syllable* about it in the whole Book: All the Places where he speaks of Mens Undertaking many Hardships, and so *purging* themselves from their Sins, being as plainly meant of the Penances to be gone through, according to the then established Discipline of the Church, as it is possible for any thing to be expressed by words.

5. The Epistle of *Barnabas* was very much esteemed among the Antients: And though, it must indeed be confessed, that it contains some very strange and allegorical Interpretations of Scripture; yet he that considers how much that manner of Interpretation was antiently in use among the *Jews* in their Targums,

and how many important Truths were that way conveyed, ſo that the Apoſtles themſelves in their arguing with the *Jews* did often make uſe of it, as we ſee in their uncontroverted Writings; I ſay whoſoever conſiders theſe things, will rather chuſe modeſtly to ſuſpend his Judgment, than raſhly to upbraid this Author with the Terms of fooliſh and *ridiculous*.

And as to his ſaying that *the Apoſtles before their Converſion were the greateſt Sinners in Nature*; this does not at all *rob us of the Argument we uſe to draw from their Integrity and Simplicity againſt Infidels*. For ſuppoſing them to have been never ſo wicked, were they the leſs *Simple and Illiterate* for that? Or is their Wickedneſs before their Converſion any way inconſiſtent with their Integrity after it? But beſides, theſe Words might be ſpoken with relation to ſuch Sins, as though very great in themſelves, yet ſincere and well-meaning Men might be guilty of in their Ignorance; as St. *Paul* ſays of himſelf, that before his Converſion he was the *chief of Sinners*, in reſpect of his blaſpheming Chriſt and perſecuting Chriſtians even to Death, for Chriſt's ſake.

In ſhort, though it muſt after all be confeſt, that the Authors of theſe Writings uſed a plain, popular, and unpolite Stile; that they were guilty of ſome Miſtakes, in things wherein the whole World at that time erred with them; (for which Mr. *T.* is pleaſed to ſtile them *Ignorant*;) and that they delivered divers things, which though very agreeable to the Strictneſs of their Diſcipline in the Primitive Church, yet the preſent Times will not ſo well bear; (for which Mr. *T.* calls them *Superſtitious*;) Though I ſay, all this muſt be granted;

yet

yet ſince in general the Matter of theſe Writings is ſuch, that not only the Antients thought fit to cite them in their Books and read them in their Churches, but alſo the Learnedeſt and moſt Judicious Criticks of our own times, as well Laicks as thoſe of the Clergy, have received them as genuine, and recommended them as *containing the true and pure Faith of Chriſt*; I cannot but think that the very great Scorn and Contempt, wherewith Mr. *T.* hath thought fit to treat them, is a very bold aſſuming to himſelf, and undervaluing the Judgment of the greateſt Men both of the Antient and Modern Church, and conſequently a Reflexion upon our Religion its ſelf; and that after all, we have very *good Reaſon*, as well as very *great Authority*, though not to receive theſe Writings as of the ſame Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Teſtament, yet to pay them a *proportionable Veneration*, both with reſpect to the *Authors*, and to the *Writings* themſelves.

III. *Thirdly*, Neither the Belief of the Genuineneſs of theſe Writings, nor the Reſpect paid to them as ſuch, does in the leaſt diminiſh from the Authority of the New Teſtament, or tend to make the Number of the Canonical Books uncertain or precarious.

This is the Difficulty, on which Mr. *T.* ſeems particularly to inſiſt, as if it were impoſſible for thoſe who believe the Genuineneſs of theſe Writings to give any tolerable Reaſon why they do not admit them into the Canon of the New Teſtament, as well as ſeveral others, which are now received i And therefore I

ſhall endeavour to be ſomewhat more exact and particular in giving an Anſwer to it.

1. *Firſt* then, Though we have great Reaſon to believe theſe Books to be Genuine, yet have we not the ſame *Certainty* of it, as we have of the Genuineneſs of the Books received into the Canon of the New Teſtament. The Books of the *New Teſtament*, as it might be proved of every one of them particularly, were received at their firſt coming forth as being written by Divine Inſpiration, and were quoted as ſuch by *Irenæus* and others of the Antienteſt Fathers: And though upon occaſion of ſome Diſputes that aroſe afterwards among Chriſtians, the Authority of ſome few of thoſe Books came to be called in Queſtion; (not to ſpeak at preſent of thoſe Hereticks, the *Cerinthians*, *Marcionites*, *Manichees*, and others, who rejected whatſoever made againſt their abſurd Opinions;) yet thoſe few Queſtioned Books were ſo far from being (as Mr. *T.* falſely aſſerts) *rejected a long time by all Chriſtians almoſt with univerſal Conſent*, that even thoſe Books were not only kept entire from the Beginning, but (as *Euſebius* expreſsly teſtifies) were * owned by *moſt* Doctors of the Church, and were all along read together with the other Scriptures; and at laſt, upon the full and exact Examination of all Circumſtances, the Matter being put out of Queſtion, they were unanimouſly received, as well by thoſe Churches where they were doubted before, as by all other Chriſtian Churches, into the Canon of

* Γνωρίμων δ' ὅμως τοῖς πολλοῖς —— ὅμως ὑ παρὰ πλείστοις τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν γιγνωσκομένας. Hiſt. l. 3. c. 25.

Πέτρᾳ δευτέραν, ὃν ἐνδιάθηκον μὲν, εἶναι παρειλήφαμεν, ὅμως ὑ πολλοῖς χρήσιμον φανεῖσαν, μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπουδάσθη γραφῶν. lib. 3. c. 3.

of Scripture; and ſo have been continued ever ſince by univerſal Conſent, and by the uninterrupted Succeſſion of Chriſtians in all Ages. Whereas of thoſe Writings which we are now ſpeaking of, that which is the leaſt controverted, *viz.* the Epiſtle of *Clemens*, was for many Ages thought to be utterly loſt: and though upon its appearing again, the beſt Criticks in the World thought they had *good Reaſon* to pronounce it *Genuine*; yet they could not be ſo ſure that it was free from Corruption and Interpolation, as we are of thoſe Writings which were never loſt. And now this Argument is of peculiar Force againſt Mr. *T.* For if he thinks, as he ſays, that he can with all the eaſe in the World prove theſe Writings ſpurious; (which notwithſtanding his vain boaſt, he will never be able to perform;) he may at leaſt allow thoſe, who do not doubt but they are Genuine, yet not to advance them above their own Rank, and place them among thoſe which by the Univerſal Church have been received into the Canon of the New Teſtament.

2. *Secondly*, Though the Matter of theſe Writings be ſuch, as that they do therefore deſerve very great Veneration and Reſpect; yet is there plainly ſomething *humane*, ſomething of *infirmity*, ſomething of *fallibility* in them, for which they are with all Reaſon thought inferiour to the Writings of the Apoſtles. And this Argument is alſo peculiarly ſtrong againſt Mr. *T.* For if he thinks, as he ſays, that he can with all the eaſe in the World ſhew the *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* of the Authors of theſe Writings; well may he allow thoſe, who ſo far differ from him in this, as to think they deſerve

deſerve the high Character of Primitive, Holy, and Apoſtolical Men, yet not to preſume to equal them with the Apoſtles themſelves.

3. *Thirdly*, When we have made the beſt Judgment of things, that we can poſſibly at this diſtance of Time, we cannot after all but pay ſome Deference to the Judgment of the Antients, eſpecially when aſſembled in a Council; and allow them to judge ſomewhat better in the Ages next after our Saviour, what Writings were of Authority to be made the Standard and Rule of Faith, than we can after Seventeen Hundred Years: Eſpecially ſince of the doubted Books, which were ſometime read promiſcuouſly with the uncontroverted, it is plain they received ſuch only into the Canon, whoſe Stile, and Matter, and Agreement with the reſt of the Apoſtolical Writings, do ſufficiently prove them to have judged wiſely and upon good Grounds. But this Argument is of no force with Mr. *T.*

4. *Fourthly*, Therefore, and which is a direct Deciſion of this Queſtion, I add, that the true Reaſon why ſuch a certain and determinate Number of Writings are received as the Canon of Scripture, that is, as an Authoritative Rule of Faith and Manners, is becauſe they were *written by the Apoſtles themſelves* (who are acknowledged to have been guided by an infallible Spirit,) or which is all one, were *dictated, reviewed and approved by them or ſome of them.* All the Books of the New Teſtament, except the Goſpels of St. *Mark*, and St. *Luke*, and the *Acts of the Apoſtles*, are therefore received as Canonical, becauſe the Church upon undoubted

doubted Grounds believes them to be *written immediately by the Apoſtles themſelves*; and theſe three Books are therefore received as Canonical likewiſe, becauſe we believe them to have been *dictated, reviewed and approved by ſome of the Apoſtles.* And this is a plain and direct Reaſon, though Mr. *T.* is ſo modeſt to ſay *he never heard* of it, why the Writings of St. *Mark* and *Luke*, who were only Companions of the Apoſtles, are received among the Canonical Writings of the Apoſtles; and yet the Epiſtles of *Clemens* and *Barnabas*, who were Fellow-Labourers with the Apoſtles, are not. And that this is indeed the true Reaſon, why ſome Books are received as of infallible Authority, and others not; may be ſufficiently proved to any unprejudiced Perſon, from what we find in the Antients concerning this Matter. That *all Books acknowledged to be written by the Apoſtles, were always received as of unqueſtionable Authority*, is evident. The Queſtion concerning any doubted Book, being not whether the Writing of an Apoſtle ſhould be received as of good Authority or not, but whether that Writing ſaid to be an Apoſtle's, was indeed the Writing of him whoſe Name it bore. That *the Reaſon why the Writings of St.* Mark *and St.* Luke *were always received as of certain Authority*, was not becauſe they were Contemporaries with the Apoſtles, (for ſo were *Clemens*, and *Hermas*, and *Barnabas*,) but *becauſe* their Writings were particularly approved and authorized by the Apoſtles, is plain from *Euſebius*; who tells us expreſsly that St. *Peter* received and approved the Goſpel of St. *Mark*, and that * *it was this Approbation that authorized*

pag. 48.

* Κυρῶσαί τε τὴν γραφὴν εἰς ἐντύξιν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. l. 2. c. 15.

it

it to be received by the Churches: In like manner, * *That St.* John *reviewed all the Gospels, and confirmed the Truth of them: Irenæus* likewise tells us, † that *what St.* Mark *wrote, was dictated by St.* Peter; and that ‖ *the Gospel of St.* Luke *was only a Transcript of St.* Paul's *Preaching*: St. *Paul* himself plainly refers to it, 1 *Cor* xv. 5, where declaring unto the *Corinthians* the Gospel which he had before Preached, he puts them in mind *how that Christ rose from the Dead according to the Scriptures, and that he was seen of Cephas*, &c. which appearance of our Saviour to *Peter*, is no where mentioned but in St. *Luke*'s Gospel, *Luke* xxiv. 34.

And in the first Epistle to *Timothy* v. 18. he quotes it with the *express Title of* Scripture; *The Scripture saith, The Labourer is worthy of his Hire*; which words are no where found in Scripture, but in St. *Luke*'s Gospel, *Luke* x. 7. So that it is not without great Reason, that Learned Men have judged it to be St. *Luke*'s Gospel, which the Apostle calls *his own Gospel*, 2 *Tim.* ii. 8. and elsewhere. And then for the *Acts of the Apostles*, it is plain they are an Account of St. *Paul*'s Travels, * written before his Death; so that they are with all reason believed to have been approved by him; and if they were not, yet † being antiently the same Book with the Gospel of St. *Luke*, they were undoubtedly reviewed by St. *John*, together with

* Ἤδη ὁ Μάρκος ἡ Λουκᾶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸς εὐαγγελίων τὴν ἔκδοσιν πεποιημένων. Ἰωάννῃ —— ἀποδέξασθαι μὲν φασιν, ἀληθείαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιμαρτυρήσαντα. l. 3. c. 44.

† *Marcus* discipulus & interpres *Petri*, quæ à *Petro* annunciata erant, edidit. 3. *cap.* 1.

‖ *Lucas* sectator *Pauli* quod ab illo prædicabatur, Evangelium in Libro condidit. *Ibid.*

* Baron. ad ann. 61.

† Sunt enim Acta δεύτερος ejus operis λόγος cujus πρῶτον λόγον ipse suum agnoscit Evangelium. Acta postea ab Evangelio divulserunt, quibus

with it, and their Authority was hardly ever, that I know of, called in queſtion by any, but * *Marcion* the Heretick. Laſtly, *That no other Books, however written by the Contemporaries of the Apoſtles, were received by the Antients as of infallible and deciſive Authority in Matters of Diſpute* is evident. *Euſebius* tells us expreſsly that the Authority of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* was queſtioned by ſome, not becauſe they doubted whether it was written in the Age of the Apoſtles, (for that they could not,) but † becauſe the Church of *Rome* thought it not to be written by St. *Paul*. The Paſtor of *Hermas* alſo (as ‡ the ſame Author tells us) was eſteemed ſo much as to be read publickly in Churches, and yet never received as of infallible Authority: Nay *Origen* goes farther, and thinks it to be not only a *uſeful* Book, but written * even with ſome Degree of Inſpiration; and yet † impoſes it not upon any one to be received as Scripture.

commodius viſum, ob locorum faciliorem expeditioremque invicem comparationem, Evangeliſtas ſeparato codice complecti, & ab Actis ſecernere. *Dodwell.* Diſſertat. 1. in *Irenæum*.

* Vid. *Tertull.* adverſus Marcion. lib. 5. ſub initio.

† Τινὲς ἠθετήκασι τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους, πρὸς τῆς Ρωμαίων ἐκκλησίας ὡς μὴ Παύλου ἔσαν αὐτὴν ἀντιλέγεσθαι φήσαντες. lib. 3. cap. 3.

‡ Idem ibidem.

* Quæ ſcriptura valdè mihi utilis videtur, &, ut puto, divinitus inſpirata. *Origen* in Rom. xvi. 14.

† Si cui tamen Scriptura illa recipienda videtur. *Origen*. Hom. 8. in *Num*.

In like manner the Epiſtle of *Clemens*, though the moſt unqueſtioned Piece in all Antiquity, and (as *Euſebius* ſtiles it) ‖ ἀνωμολογημένη ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶσι, yet it is by the ſame Author * elſewhere reckoned up among the Apocryphal Pieces: that is, as *Cotelerius* well obſerves, not that any one doubted of its Genuineneſs or Excellency, but only

‖ *Lib.* 3. *c.* 38.

* *Lib.* 6. *c.* 13.

that they would not reckon it among the Books τῆς θείας γραφῆς, to which *Eusebius* there oppoſes it.

The Truth is, the unqueſtioned Works of the Apoſtles were not antiently (as Mr. *Dodwell* confeſſes) kept in a diſtinct Book from the Apocryphal, but read and cited promiſcuouſly with the Works of their immediate Succeſſors: But then it is alſo certain, that as the unqueſtioned Works of the Apoſtles, *whenever* they were cited, were looked upon by all as infallible and deciſive; ſo the other Pieces, whilſt they were quoted and urged by ſome, might as freely be denied or not yielded to by others.

Vainly therefore doth Mr. *T.* object, *That they who beleeve the Epiſtle of* Clemens *and* the reſt *to be genuine, cannot give any reaſon why they do not admit it into the Canon of Scripture.* And as falſely does he inſinuate, that the Eſtabliſhment of that Canon is uncertain and precarious. Could it be proved, *That the Epiſtles of* James, *and of* Peter, *and of* Jude, *or any of them, were not written by thoſe whoſe Names they bear*; we ſhould indeed be obliged to reject them: And could the *Preaching* and *Revelation of Peter* be proved to be genuine, we ſhould be obliged to receive them into the Canon of the New Teſtament. But ſo far is it from being true, That the *Preaching and Revelation of Peter* were *ſo* received by the Antients, as by more than a *Parity of Reaſon*, to claim Admiſſion into the Canon with his ſecond Epiſtle, and the reſt of the ſome time queſtioned Books, that on the contrary theſe Pieces (beſides the Arguments that may be drawn from the Writings themſelves) were received by ſo few of the Antients, as to make

make * *Euſebius* think, (tho' in that indeed he was miſtaken,) that they were never quoted by any of the Antients at all.

* Τὸ, τε λεγόμενον αὐτῷ κήρυγμα, καὶ τὴν καλυμένην ἀποκάλυψιν, οὐδ' ὅλως ἐν καθολικοῖς ἴσμεν παραδεδομένα. Ὅτι μήτε ἀρχαίων, μήτε τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς τις ἐκκλησιαστικὸς συγγραφεὺς, ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν συνεχρήσατο μαρτυρίαις. Hiſt. l. 3. c. 3.

What Mr. *T.* has invidiouſly urged about the Diviſions among the Fathers, and their want of Exactneſs in their Reaſonings, I ſuppoſe will not move thoſe, who know that Truth is nevertheleſs ſuch for being ſurrounded with a Multitude of Errors; and that Men did not then write in a Nice and Scholaſtick Way, but in a plain and unpolite Stile, mixing *Arguments*, *Similitudes*, and *Illuſtrations* promiſcuouſly, which is the way of repreſenting things popularly, and to mean Capacities.

Thus I have endeavoured to give a ſhort Anſwer to the Difficulties *which Mr.* T. *has with great Freedom propoſed: Hoping that what I have here very briefly and with Submiſſion hinted, may give occaſion to ſome abler and more learned Pen, to treat of this Matter with that Largeneſs and Clearneſs, with which ſo great a* Point *well deſerves to be handled.*

I am SIR,

YOURS.

FINIS.

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